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Adam Cox, NYU: Roger. Thank you so much.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And thanks also to David to Roshi to UCLA to to USC for putting this event on Christina and I will speak just briefly about the book and
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Adam Cox, NYU: In order to maximize this time for heroes shoes response in a conversation with you all.
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Adam Cox, NYU: will divide up the conversation. I guess as follows, for ourselves, our book is really about two things.
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, it's about how the President became our immigration policy maker achieve. It's about what that means for the present and future of American Immigration policy so
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Adam Cox, NYU: I'll start by talking a little bit about that first question, the question of how we got to this place.
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Adam Cox, NYU: In the world where the President wields so much power immigration policy, and I think Christina is going to talk a little bit about the more normative
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Adam Cox, NYU: Questions that that descriptive project raises you know the question whether we should be happier terrified about the role of the presidents presidents plane. So just to set the stage, I should note you know presidential control over immigration policy is everywhere we look
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, you can see it in President Trump's ban on migrants from majority Muslim countries on his administration's attempts to rescind the Docker program, which was itself a signature executive branch initiative.
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Adam Cox, NYU: From the Obama administration design designed to protect dreamers in deportation and you can see it most recently in the in the near complete shutdown of America's
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Adam Cox, NYU: System for screening asylum seekers along the US Mexico border. So all of these recent events. Make it really tempting to think that we're witnessing
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Adam Cox, NYU: A new phenomenon phenomenon that is about President Trump and his administration or it's not just about President Trump at least about recent politics and about the way in which political polarization in Washington.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Has led to dysfunction with Congress, unable to act and the president acting and Congress's stead.
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Adam Cox, NYU: So mostly in our book, we want to urge folks to resist this temptation.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Of thinking that what we're witnessing today is a new phenomenon because we think that the roots of the President's power.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Over immigration policy are really much deeper than the than the partisan politics of the moment. And we think that understanding how we got here is really critical to chart in a productive way forward.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And so the first half of our book is really an effort to tell the story of how the President came to stand at the center of immigration policy making.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Now through to that story or really burial because sense America's earliest days presidents have played an important role in shaping immigration policy.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And the 19th century immigration policy was, you know, quite literally made through treaties that were negotiated I presidents with four nations.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Those days are gone. During the 20th century, Congress created an enormous and an enormously complex set of immigration statutes yet over the course of the 20th century.
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Adam Cox, NYU: In fact, partly because of Congress's creation of this enormous code. Our system of immigration regulation was transformed in a way that really cemented the President's central role.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And in our view, there were really three interlocking developments that contributed to this change. The first was the rise of deportation in the 20th century.
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Adam Cox, NYU: The earliest federal immigration statutes often lacked deportation provisions altogether and immigrants in general who came to United States and were admitted were welcome to take up residence and remain for as long as they wanted to
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Adam Cox, NYU: Today, the opposite is true today the grounds of dependability and the federal immigration code are incredibly numerous and essentially all immigrants.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Right to reside and remain in the United States is contingent under threat of being taken away, and that makes migration today to America, much more probationary
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Adam Cox, NYU: So the second change that complemented the rise of deportation and the turn of our immigration system to a more probationary model was the explosive growth of an enforcement bureaucracy that could back those deportation rules on the federal government first started to restrict immigration.
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Adam Cox, NYU: It initially built an enforcement apparatus largely around the ports of entry screaming people at seaports there was little enforcement along the land borders, there's no border patrol before 1924, for example, and really minimal enforcement around the nation's interior
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Adam Cox, NYU: And that world stands in stark contrast to the world today where the Department of Homeland Security.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Which has the authority to enforce federal immigration law has a budget that dwarfs the budgets of all other federal law enforcement agencies combined and has resources significant enough during the Obama administration to deport upwards of 400,000 non citizens every year.
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Adam Cox, NYU: That's a huge number. It's more people that are incarcerated in the entire federal criminal justice system.
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Adam Cox, NYU: So you had one change the rise of deportation, which was legal in a second. The rise of the enforcement bureaucracy which is which was bureaucratic.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And those legal and bureaucratic changes collided with a demographic change in the final third of the 20th century, and that demographic change was a rapidly rising rate of unauthorized immigration to the United States, the causes.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Of the rising rates of unauthorized immigration from about 1970 forward are complicated and contest it to this day, but the consequences of those rising rates.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Are really clear today.
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Adam Cox, NYU: The consequences that have left us with a world in which roughly 11 million not citizens are living in the United States, in violation of immigration law.
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Adam Cox, NYU: That's nearly half of all non citizens living in the US and that means we effectively have an enormous shadow immigration system that stands alongside the former one
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Adam Cox, NYU: That shadow system puts the president in charge, because the intricate complicated statutory code that Congress has erected becomes less and less important. What matters more or simply the enforcement choices made by executive branch officials decisions about
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Adam Cox, NYU: Whom to enforce against when and where and those enforcement choices are ultimately supervised by the senior leadership within the Department of Homeland Security and ultimately by the President.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And does not through and express statutory delegation, but instead through the creation of this enormous shadow system Congress effectively gave the President the enormous power to shape immigration policy in America.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Now this de facto delegation isn't the only source of the residents power. There are other sources like expressed allegations of emergency authority that we see.
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Adam Cox, NYU: In President Trump's ban on migrants from majority Muslim countries and we can talk about the conversation about those express sources of delegated authority which we think are
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Adam Cox, NYU: Also important but we think this key structural feature this creation of an enormous shadow system.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Is is a is a crucial fact that we all need to understand in order to make sense of the way that immigration policy looks today. So let me stop there and turn it over to Christina to talk a little bit about how she feel about the state of affairs.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Thanks, Adam, and thanks so much to David for the invitation to Roger for the introduction and Hershey we especially appreciate you.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Taking the time to be our commentator, so I'll pick up where Adam left off and think through, which is what we do in the second part of the book.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: How we should think about the system, how we should evaluate the shadow system and the President and Executive branch has power over it, that arises.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: As a result of its existence and we begin from the premise and the book we
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: make this clear that if we think that the Trump administration in particular has abused this power or that this kind of power in the hands of a president is dangerous.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: We don't actually think that the proper response is to assert strong claims against the presidency.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Or to declare that the Presidency is out of control. And this was an argument that is a this easier to make now than it was two weeks ago, at least we feel
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: less stressed when making the claim, but it's an it's a general argument about
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: How we should think about the forms of power and control that should be in place in light of the rise of the shadow system and
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: In many ways the import of our historical account is to show that presidents have long looked for ways to advance their immigration agendas through the your product and legal systems.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Over which they preside and that our objective should be to understand when and why strong presidential power is actually constructive and needed
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And then instead of making strong claims against the presidency, identify the laws and legal structures.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That can be exploited for abusive ends and and work to reform them and and this agenda is as much a political one, as it is a legal one
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: So our primary normative argument is that given the shadow systems existence we actually need presidential power and control.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: To team or bring humanity to the enforcement system that it is presidential control. That is the only hope for accomplishing that if we keep the shadow system constant
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But we should always be thinking about how that control can be used responsibly and with a president like Trump that might be a possibility. But now there's. In fact, an opportunity for recommitment to thinking through this kind of internal reform and the most important
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: observation that we make and this comes from doing a fairly
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Elaborate case study of the way the Obama administration use high level presidential control to try to manage the shadow system.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Is that it's first vital for a president to articulate enforcement priorities for high levels of an administration to articulate enforcement priorities that correspond to
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Their immigration agenda and then and this is just as important, because the priorities cannot be realized. Without this
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Use that power to supervise law enforcement agents and the law enforcement bureaucracy in order to advance those priorities.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: It's important also to understand that exercising bureaucratic control of this sort, actually requires strong political will and
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: One of the lessons from Dhaka is that it required high level intervention to really shape the system to reflect
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: enforcement priorities that operated to extend relief and to temper the the REACH and frankly cruelty of the shadow system, and I think
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: One of the questions for the new administration is, is there actually the kind of political will to try to remake the bureaucracy that very clearly existed during the Trump years where a Steven Miller and his allies throughout the government
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: exerted a kind of force that bent the bureaucracy to their will and it has to be a political priority in order for bureaucratic change to happen, but the to
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Work together to shape the, the nature of the enforcement system.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Now this of course this approach means that with a president like Trump, we may wind up with enforcement priorities we are poor and reshaping of the bureaucracy in ways that we would object to
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But we ultimately conclude that leaving these fundamentally political choices. And the way to effectuate them in the hands of a semi militarized law enforcement culture that characterizes is, which is what we focus on but but also could be said about CBP would be far worse over time.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: So that's the first way in which we think about how to manage the President's control over the shadow system and the agenda that we would articulate for
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The control of it in a way that has a chance for introducing humanity into the enforcement bureaucracy and we link it in in ways to other statutory
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Regimes where the articulation of enforcement priorities in the political will to actually make them real through the bureaucracy of enforcement choices can substantially shape.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The domain of the law criminal justice and civil rights are probably the two best examples of this. But then we turn our attention in the second part of the book, or really towards the end of the book.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: To explain that our ultimate aspiration is to bring the shadow system to an end, all together. So it's not enough to say, given the shadow system that is the product of the historical
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Interaction of those three historical threads that Adam described. It's not enough to acknowledge it and think of ways to to manage it.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But instead we offer a vision of a system where there was less discretion than the shadow system entails in the hands of the executive branch because even as
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: It's important to to defend and conceptualize political control of law enforcement. If the zone of discretion is too large, then
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: It's a becomes a policy domain where the dysfunctions are undersides and discretion have too much room for expression. So even for example, a well intentioned administration that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: would seek to temper enforcement through a priority regime that is implemented through bureaucratic controls still has to preside over a mammoth system and Adam underscored how large that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: State capacity is and has become especially since sep tember 11th. And so even concerted political effort to try to to shape it will still
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: give way to the operation of the system and to arrange of enforcement twists and enforcement driven
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Policies and the way the system operates regardless of what the clinical principles in the President's views are how the system should operate and because Adam and I share a set of commitments that we articulate in the book that are in tension with the persistence of this large scale.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Discretion the ambition ultimately has to be to bring the soda discretion to shrink in to bring the shadow system to an end.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: We spend a fair amount of time talking about what we think those undersides of this discretionary regime are and they would be familiar to people who follow
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Immigration Law and Policy and they stem from the concept of the probationary system that Adam articulated at the outset, but that the probationary kind of framing of the immigration system mapped onto a shadow regime where it's all about the enforcement choices of the executive
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Makes the system into one that is effectively.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: What of social control and opens up the possibility of domination by the government of immigrant populations even Dhaka is a contingent status, subject to political whims and the decision to
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: End discretionary decision making the threat of deportation.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Which hangs over people without status, regardless of these belief programs makes it difficult to plan and invest and deportations itself.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Enormously destabilizing to individuals and the community and we draw on the work of sociologists and others to underscore the picture of this system is one of domination that given its size and character to be tamed and essentially eliminated.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Now obviously doing something of that sort, or perhaps it's not obvious outside of the
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: legal context but taming the enforcement logic of the system, the way in which our system as it is constructed drives immigration policy through an enforcement lens.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: First and foremost entails adopting legalization program, which is the only way to bring the shadow system to an end and and this of course requires legislation and so
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The results of the election might mean that this remains is part of the book remains as much aspiration, as it was
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: When we were writing it as opposed to something that is achievable, given the likelihood of divided government for at least the next two years, but nonetheless remains important to think through what this agenda would look like.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: In anticipation of openings in the legislative process and it's not enough to adopt the legalization program. We're also very clear that it's important to write tools into the law.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That enable the executive branch in particular.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: To prevent the shadow system from reemerging and there are a lot of examples that we include that have been part of immigration reform debates for a long time, such as reviving statutes of limitations on deportation grounds.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The possibility of creating rolling legalization programs that are administered by the executive and it's this ladder concept that we
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Want to also turn into a larger frame for thinking about immigration policy and ultimately to to use the opportunity of the the book to to say that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: We've learned things about the role of the Presidency and the executive branch in the formulation of immigration policy, and even if we think that it's vital to undo the enforcement logic. There are other forms of executive power.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That are constructive and dynamic and essential to ongoing governance that is effective and tools that sound in that are ones that ought to be incorporated into the law.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: In order to prevent humanitarian disaster as from arising in the first place again. And this is the the nodal I'll end on this is a political ambition and requires mobilizing at least enough interest group pressure but possibly also a public opinion that rises above
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The level of priority number 13 on everyone's list for legislative reform in order to be achieved, and so even though we end the book on an optimistic note about the possibilities for reform in a system.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That is more dynamic and less dependent on a coercive enforcement, it remains the case that we have to continue to think about
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: How to tame it enforcement logic without the the transformation of the system.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And in the event that the kinds of dynamics Adam described at the outset are deeply embedded in the political economy of immigration and may well continue despite who's actually in charge at the level of the Presidency.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: So I'll leave it at that and maybe just also make one more note, which is that neither Adam and I said anything about the courts in in all of this, and the courts play a minor role in the book.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And in the account of the exercise of power over immigration, but they were made an important part of the system and whether we can
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Expect or hope for courts acting as ongoing backstops against the worst abuses of
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Presidential an executive power. Regardless, who have who was in charge of the executive branches is a conversation worth having. And one would be also interested to entertain absolutely with that. And then, I guess, turn it over to the Roshi right
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay, excellent. So Roshi
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: We're not hearing you. Hiroshi
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Yeah, so I've been. I've been. I've been looking forward to this event for a long time. So it's really, it's really great to actually be on the same room so to speak here.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And yeah, I just want to say, first of all, I mean this is this is a real honor to comment on what is really, I think, a very important book in a lot of different dimensions.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And it's been especially nice to see the project evolve over time. And as I think about it now OVER MULTIPLE ADMINISTRATIONS
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And I'm sure you feel like you're you're you're you're trying to hit a target that keeps morphing and evolving in ways
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: I remember going to a workshop on a draft of this book that was in the now think of the latter days of the Obama years and thinking about what would happen.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What could happen in the 2016 election, which I guess you know was obviously a big change. So there's so much to talk about here.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And it made me realize that you know your task and telling us about the book and 20 minutes is is much more daunting, then even like commenting on it. Instead, so
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: You know, I think that there's so much to talk about. I should make clear that so much of it is is is both in just entirely in material and also new perspectives on on a lot of ways that many of us have thought over the years.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: That's a weekly equally valuable. And so I really, really appreciate that. So I'm going to be selective and focus on one aspect, really, in the interest of time here and
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And what's interesting about this as as sort of a meta comment on my own comment is, it's going to be different from what you said in an interesting the book. I'm going to talk about parts of the book, you didn't actually talk about that much, but I think I really important
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And I want to lift them up and it was and. And for those of you in the audience. We didn't do this Frank pre arrangement. So that I would talk about what they didn't reach but
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: I do want to use it as a perspective to talk about what you do reach. Okay, so, um, you know, the book. I mean, if you really want to break it down into into its conceptual architecture.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: You obviously grossly oversimplifying it there's kind of a two by two grid that I have my mind. What is time in the other direction.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And the time dimension is how we get here, right, I mean it's the past in the present and and and the direction dimension. So the other, whether it's vertical or horizontal is that is the inward facing the internal part of the book, the part that focuses on interior enforcement on causation.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: But I also think that you do a lot of really important pathbreaking work on the external facing part of this. And so, and, and it's been something that I think
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: you uncover in in novel ways which is starting with the so called parole power. So the parole power is
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Is the is the power granted with certain constraints, often those constraints, a bit ignored, but they've been allowed that it's been a way for people to get
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Into the United States without formula admission. So this has been used in many refugees situations and and and Christina do a lot
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: To explain this as a source of power, then more recently in alongside the parole power which is the quality, but not really admission power.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Subject to all kinds of political and legal constraints. We also have the opposite side, which is the powers to block the border.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Which is the suspension power and we see that in the band and on travel from majority certain majority Muslim countries it's been used much more aggressively by
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: By President Trump. And so that's kind of the two bites by by two grid.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And you've just spoken now about the internal part of this right and i think that you know you do a lot to
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: I mean this the the internal the internal mechanisms have gotten a lot of scholarly attention, but I think you you reorder this you reorient this and you look at this perspective to his
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: You look at prior work that maybe focus. For example, in the undocumented population and re examine it from a more institutional lens of the Presidency, and that's really important. And so in your in your remarks you talk about the enforcement and the internal facing
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: You have one chapter basically on the outward facing piece on you know parole and suspension power sort of the, what do we do about things happening outside the border when they reach the border or could reach the border.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And you have several chapters so you devote more time to the enforcement.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Part of this and this is where he talks about probationary status sort of the zone of discretion enforcement.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: I think what's interesting to me is is is and this is not so much a question. Maybe it's a compliment, but sort of what the relationship is between the internal and the external
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: In other words, you just focus now for based on I some time constraints on the internal but the external part has gotten I think even less attention by scholars
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And if it is a violation of these two categories of the parole power to quasi let people in and the suspension power to keep people out
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: So the reason I think this is interesting.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What's interesting to me. And, and I think it's important is is when you shift from the, the, how we got here in the past and present.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: That part of the that half of the two by two grid but but to the forward looking part
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Because a lot of what you're talking about. And it makes sense to me everything you just said about the forward looking part minimizing the
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Zone of discretion legalization programs, reducing the potential for this executive branch power in the president or agencies to be used in an abusive.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Way, especially if the abuses cannot be uncovered and remedies that
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Makes me ask this thought experiment. Question is supposed to be, what, suppose we did those things supposedly had legalization program. Suppose we had more of a closer connection between long the books in law.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Then what would the presidential powers that be. And the reason I ask this question is what happens to the outward facing part of residential power at that time at that moment.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Is it the case that no matter what we do with enforcement in no matter how much we bring the rule of law to that. And no matter how much we
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Think about this in terms of a matter of reducing you know what you're calling de facto delegation and the abuses that it may and we get off we accomplish that.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What is the is the question, what is the reducible about the pronoun suspension or is that more fundamental to the president immigration law than the enforcement part of it.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: The future external pieces.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What's going to happen with that and I say this because I think a lot of what's happened. This is a general comment about maybe the field of immigration law and policies that
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: You know, many of them. Many of the much of the action. I suppose you could say both intellectually and politically has been focused on the undocumented population and it should be there right
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: But what we're seeing as the shift in politics that centers, not only undocumented population, but also
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What happens more globally more externally. What happens when 10s of thousands, hundreds of thousands of people come from Central America or or go to Europe from from from from from Africa or Syria.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And we're going to see in the future, not now, but maybe 10 or 20 years now sort of something that is much more where
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: The if you're writing a book about the prison immigration law post the enforcement apparatus era would then be a book about the person immigration law and then with the attention, come to the President that the parole and suspension power is somehow more irreducible.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And so I'm wondering if
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What, how that informs how you think about the future and how you think about proposals because
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Part of my reaction was, I actually agree with just about everything you say about the internal how to move forward on the internal side.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: But I also wanted to hear more about how you think about
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: What are the checks and balances on the external side. I mean, Adam, you started by talking about the days of treaties, right.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And you made a comment, which I don't think he quite said this, I want really attribute this paper. This phrasing to you, but it sounds like, well, those were the days of yesteryear but but
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: It almost feels like. Now, what really matters in migration might be what our relationship is with Mexico, what the US relationship with Turkey or the Horn of Africa or with Jordan in sort of taking in, you know, transit countries taking in a more
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: supportive way people who flee. What do we do about climate change and the migration that that forces in if that's where the foundational issue should be. Then I feel like
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: And then maybe the right answer is another book right it's always, there's always another book but but it feels like if I look at the architecture of the book.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: I'm interested in what there is on the external future. Is there a revival of the Treaty.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Power, if that's what the action is, do the responses to have a more responsible presidential and executive power over
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Immigration law or the responses to the inward facing the pot problems could be the same as the problem to the outward facing problems. I don't know the answer to that question.
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: By the way, I just did my in five seconds I have left. I just, I just realized that in some ways of what I'm about what I said about this book is very similar to
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Something that Christina said when she reviewed a book of mine 12 years ago, which is this is interesting, internally, but what about the how's it going into
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: The world. And I think that was very fitting for criticism, Christina, you may have the book at the time of my bucket. So I feel like
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: I'm waiting 12 years to say this, don't worry about this, but it just occurred to me was I was talking like, oh my god, this is really very similar. So that's 10 minutes
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay. Terrific, thank you so much. Hiroshi
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: So why don't we give the floor back to Adam and Christina and then open up. So people interested in
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Raising questions please either send me a question in the chat or raise your hand, via the Q AMP. A. Okay, Adam or or Christina, whoever wants to go first.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: I'll start and I first want to say that it's nice Hershey 12 or 14 years later to still be in conversation with you and and that Roshi is responsible, certainly for me. And I think probably also for Adam
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Engaging immigration law and entering the the field because we met him very early in our careers music. Fantastic. And for a nurturer of a young scholar, so it's nice to to be having this conversation with you. And I thought what I could do is just make some observations about the external
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And and then maybe the combination of them will begin to answer your question. So the first is that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: When I began teaching and writing about immigration law. I thought that the claim that there was some necessary relationship between immigration foreign policy was dramatically overstated. And you see it.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Used in the first entry point to it was the the rhetoric and Supreme Court cases about how this is about the United States relationship to the world and and that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Understanding of the immigration powers help to empower the, the President and also create these complex doctrines of deference, that also relate to the national security dimension of immigration.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But I think the with through the work that Adam and I have done, and especially with respect to Chapter two, which is the chocolate, you were joking, but also the work we did on
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The Gentleman's Agreement and the arrow era, I, I've come to to actually appreciate that. That is a deep connection in ways that both obviously have empowered the president because of the Treaty, making power, but also because
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Many of the challenges that lots of the President's whose policies we discuss
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: arise because of foreign policy interests by the establishment, but also foreign policy pressures and pressures from the outside.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That the United States does not directly control or the policymakers cannot directly control in some ways on authorized immigration, which is central to our domestic story is also a reflection of that. And that to me from a both a reform and a power point of view.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Pushes in the direction of. And I think this is part of what you're interested in. Hiroshi and more holistic understanding of what it would take to undo the shadow system and to make an immigration policy that is oriented towards
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: humanitarianism, an integration and pursuit of the national interest. And that is a concept of immigration policy that deals with things like root causes and that deals with
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The, the reasons why people migrate and that cannot be separated from the laws that the United States adopts
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Certainly the the power that I was describing the suspension power was added to the immigration code during the Cold War, out of the fear that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: You know, there could be migration related security threats that would arise during that era. But you know, I think the view is now in our view is that those kinds of tools, need to be reshaped into ones that actually
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Both address the reasons why those threats might emerge, but then also provide an executive branch with ways of addressing them that that are
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Constructive and not just oriented towards exclusions. So that's the first point. The second point to make. And there's a lot to say. And I'll let I went out to
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Adam reacts to it to what you're saying is that the other way in which the parts of the book that you're talking about, though, what we say about how presidents of us the parole power to construct our refugee system or have
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Use the suspension power to make strong to strong political stance.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: reflects something that's also true about the domestic system. And so it's something that pervades I think just the exercise of presidential bureaucratic power. Generally, which is
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That the possibility for bureaucratic dynamism that a administration with the political will to do something like admit 10s of thousands of Hungarians or admit hundreds of thousands of Cubans.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Without the legal channels to do it will find tools that exist, some of which are not intended for large purposes, but that nonetheless are present.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: To make good on those promises. And I think that that is just interesting observation Lee. And it's interesting to us because we're defending a concept of dynamic executive governance that should be better employed.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Which helps to justify which may be counterintuitive to some more delegation to the executive branch, as opposed to less which is delegation of certain kinds of tools, but it's also, I think,
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Important because it demonstrates that that the way that the executive branch uses that the tools that exist will adapt to the crises that people that the country faces and it's a reason why
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Executive power both has an advantage here, but it's also an important kind of power to to understand and not to fear, but to try to to mobilize and i think it's it's unclear exactly how those adaptations will occur. I think we can all
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: posit that United States is going to face threats, not, not, that's wrong or not threats, but pressure from
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Refugees that are produced through climate change. I mean that's something that is on the rise of but we don't exactly what
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The means for addressing that are but that's precisely why you need a adaptable system and why executive powers. It is a useful way of thinking about managing both the outside and the inside so it's just a collection of thoughts, based on that challenge that you that you are rich
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Terrific. Adam
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Adam Cox, NYU: Yeah, let me. So let me just, I agree with everything. Christina said
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Adam Cox, NYU: And also also want to take the time to say to Hiroshi as Christina.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Thank you, because it is true, it's absolutely true that the only reason I'm standing here today is because of you have
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Adam Cox, NYU: The your work as a mentor for all of us has been amazing, and even on this project, as you said you you know you gave us tremendous feedback when we had this book and draft. And the book is so much the better for it.
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Adam Cox, NYU: So let me just say two more things about your super interesting thoughts about the parole power the suspension power me say one thing about power and one thing about needs maybe are the changing world.
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Adam Cox, NYU: On the question of power and you're sort of seductive idea that maybe there's something more you reducible out the parole and suspension powers in the hands of the President.
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Adam Cox, NYU: I do think it's true. You know, we're obviously written a book about the separation of powers effectively and immigration policy and
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Adam Cox, NYU: One thing we've learned, you know, which is a lesson we all probably relearn and many domains is
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Adam Cox, NYU: The way that the power gets the power dynamics operated are going to be not just domain specific immigration law looks different than environmental law, but also different different parts of a domain.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And I do think what we observed in chapter two, is that, you know, efforts to discipline the parole power.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And I'm going to, I'm going to speculate that potential future efforts to discipline the suspension power are gonna run into serious problems.
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, on the parole power side, we've seen historically like Congress repeatedly tried
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Adam Cox, NYU: to rein in the kind of large scale exercise for all authority by presidents and presidents just repeatedly ignored congress and that would that created in a way I think exact has exacerbated some of the problems with the system is what Congress
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Adam Cox, NYU: Was kind of effective at doing was refusing to regularize the status of people who were paroled ultimately
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Adam Cox, NYU: And limiting access to things like permanent residency. So when the, you know, refugee X 1980 gets written yes what it does.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Is restricts in some way. The domain of of of policy space where people are going to have a pathway to permanent residency because they have to qualify as refugees.
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Adam Cox, NYU: But they didn't really ultimately that that didn't effectively restrained presidents counter let more people it
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Adam Cox, NYU: Just meant that the people who are living in were more likely to be in a regular status in a kind of permanent way which is true for the merrier Cuban a boat live, for example, and for others and so
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Adam Cox, NYU: That, to me, seems slightly dysfunctional, right, the kind of constraint Congress's able to enforce against presents extra as a power is the one that just kind of exacerbates the problem and away.
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Adam Cox, NYU: On the suspension power that we haven't seen efforts to restrict it legislatively.
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Adam Cox, NYU: I suspect will run into some of the same problems because you can see historically, is that the President and Executive Branch.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Has other tools that can use as kind of substitutes for formal suspension authority to push the border out
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Adam Cox, NYU: Like the Caribbean patient interdiction policy as a kind of policy substitute. You know, I think, an important reason why we never saw you know large scale suspension exercise at at the border.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Was because we saw it exercise food addiction policy and, you know, interestingly, it was technically you know a declaration of suspension power when we engage in addiction in the Caribbean basis.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And today we see in other contexts, like when it's not you know when it's not open ocean, but it's land borders.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Well we negotiate with Mexico to persuade the Mexican government to increase its enforcement efforts along its own southern borders to reduce the flow of people who can make it to our southern border and so those kinds of
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Adam Cox, NYU: Substitute vehicles for making suspension like policies, I think will make it pretty difficult to rein that power in. So that's another question of power. I think I agree with you that there's something that's going to be difficult to get out there.
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Adam Cox, NYU: The question of the changing world and needs.
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Adam Cox, NYU: It might also be true. And this is definitely more speculative. But, you know, if you think about that epics of American Immigration history. We spent a really long time and typical period where the policy terrain in the world of so many people thought about was, was centrally defined by
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, the kind of bilateral relationship between the United States and Mexico and very, very high rates of in migration from principally Mexico.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And a lot of policy responses were designed around that at that that world is kind of mostly in our past.
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know there's there's a real real live and happening where, you know, while there's significant rates of
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Adam Cox, NYU: Immigration from Central Americans. It's not personally from Mexico any longer. And so, that does suggest that we might in the future in the not too distant future be in a world where either unilateral responses to, you know,
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Adam Cox, NYU: To policy issues that arise, just because we're a giant receiving state.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Or even bilateral arrangements, because there's really one sending country that sending this many, many people are going to have to give away too much more multilateral arrangements in order for
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, the US government to take actions that it sees in the interest of the United States. And so
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, maybe we will come full circle. Right. It might be that like we began in the 19th century world where
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Adam Cox, NYU: So much of immigration policy was externally facing we transition through a world would became very much like other domestic policy areas, and maybe will ultimately transition back to the world. It looks much more multilateral
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Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA Law: Me, Roger, hear me.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Sorry. Hi. Okay. So thank you very much. So let's switch now to question. So, in the interest of time, I guess I'll ask only one author to respond if that's okay. Although if you feel compelled please jump in. So the first question.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Is from David Fitzgerald. How would you rate the degree of presidential power in the US of immigration policy compared to the power of the executive in other major countries of immigration.
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Adam Cox, NYU: I'm not a compared to this. So, I, I'm not going to give it to get to this question, Christina. Do you want to take a stab at it.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: I'm not really competitive this either i but i think that if this is speculative um
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That a presidential is system will look very different in this regard and then a parliamentary system and that a lot of the dynamics that we are describing our characteristic of other policy domains in the United States.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And are a feature of a presidential this system where you have a separate branch of government and the way in which I think it's different because obviously
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Other immigrant receiving societies, the one I know the most about others, United States is Canada have ministries and executive officials.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Concept of executive power, but there's less likely to be a divergence. There's not a divergence between the, the person in charge of the government. And what is happening through those ministries, there are one in the same. But there's still obviously
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: A disconnect between what political officials generally seek to do and what the law underlying law might require them to do. And so you see similar kinds of
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Debates about the scope of detention. For example, we haven't used that word yet. But that's part of the enforcement logic that we're describing
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Whether due process is afforded by executive officials during the deportation.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And whether you know which structures of government should be involved in making decisions.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: About who can enter the country and not in Canada, that's more likely to get channeled through federalism than in the United States. So we do talk a lot in the book about the role that federalism plays and its relationship to presidential control.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And so there's both a way in which presidential priorities loom large and American system and shape the system way that's not true for a parliamentary system, but that the concept of enforcement is universal and the same sorts of
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: forms of resistance to enforcement as well as pressure to enforce
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: exist as a result of political cultures, you know it all immigrant receiving country, so that's that's a shot at the answer to the question I'd be interested in. If David himself has some insight as to what is working better than we are.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay. Terrific question from
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Lucille
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: How do you approach the concept of catch and release and and the policy of remain in Mexico. Is there any room for bilateral agreement with some degree of humanitarianism
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Adam Cox, NYU: That's a great question. I mean, it actually, it could be several different questions. So let me make sort of restate what I think the question is asking to make sure I'm answering
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Adam Cox, NYU: Answering the question properly.
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Adam Cox, NYU: So obviously there's a bunch of different strategies that that our government has used to try to manage the increasing rates of asylum seekers particularly along the US Mexico border.
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Adam Cox, NYU: One approach which you know has somewhat pejoratively been labeled catch and release is to initially screen, folks.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Who present themselves at ports of entry or apprehended between points of entry.
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Adam Cox, NYU: For asylum and if they pass it what's known as a credible fear screening rights and pass implausible claim to asylum than to grant them to revert to go back to her. She was I'm a grant and parole.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Right. So to use the parole power to actually release them into the nation's interior for dependency of their immigration case. Well, while the immigration courts figure out whether they in fact she received asylum.
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, in the last six years, we've seen two other strategies.
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Adam Cox, NYU: One is to not release people on parole, but instead to hold them in detention facilities for the duration of the proceedings.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Right, that that was a policy that began to be used much more widely during the final couple of years of the Obama administration.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And then continued and and adopted even more aggressively during the Trump administration were non citizens who satisfied the traditional criteria for release on parole, even after they've
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Adam Cox, NYU: Made it through their credit wifi interview with them were denied release and were held in custody. That's possible, in part because parole is as her. She noted, it's a discretionary act.
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Adam Cox, NYU: It's not a bail hearing. It's not in front of a judge, you don't have a right to release. If you demonstrate that you're not a flight risk or a danger.
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Adam Cox, NYU: It's discretionary until the government in its discretion and starting to deny it at much higher rates. So one, one possibility is pull people in detention.
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Adam Cox, NYU: That's another possibility which the Trump administration pursued is, don't let people in force them to pursue their asylum cases, while they remain outside the United States and Mexico.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Now, you know, both the increased use of detention and the remaining Mexico policy are justified.
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Adam Cox, NYU: principally on the argument that releasing people into the interior United States guarantees that they won't show up for their hearings and that they'll pose a threat to the community.
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Adam Cox, NYU: I think, you know, well, that's what's driven these policies, I think.
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Adam Cox, NYU: I think that there isn't actually evidence
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Adam Cox, NYU: To support the need for such high rates of detention or something like the remaining Mexico policy in order to ensure people's appearance at their asylum hearings, nor is there significant evidence that people who are asylum seekers.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Have made it through the credible fear process that are awaiting their hearings are significant dangerous to the community. And so, you know, at a small scale, you've seen alternative ideas.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Like other forms of supervisory release.
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Adam Cox, NYU: That have been very effective when implemented on a small scale by the department Homeland Security. And so in bite administration. I think one potential policy opportunity.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Would be to respond very differently to arrive in asylum seekers by pursuing a much more broad scale these alternative forms of supervision, which could provide people, you know,
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Adam Cox, NYU: The ability to live their lives in American communities, while they pursue their asylum claims, rather than sitting in jails different facilities or being forced to remain in Mexico.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And I think that
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay, so I am going to pose a question sent to me by Sophie Cosmo. And then I'm going to build on that so
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Her question is, I'm curious about the degree to which you think political gridlock influences presidential power does it track that historically
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Presidential peril Wayne's when Congress is working efficiently and waxes when it's stuck. Now in and to this, I really want to build on.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: An aspect of brochures comment because your emphasis really is on the punitive controlling power of the executive but Hiroshi highlighted another dimension that is the way the really historically
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Transformative way in which the President use discretion, a power for expansionary purposes. I mean,
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Very large populations will lead in via the parole power and the entry of those populations. Well, their access to legal status then generated for the legal migration.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: And so, and isn't that true, more generally, I mean, you kind of presented undocumented immigration as an inevitability that given its presence. Well,
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: It was inevitable that the policies that would be pursued would be punitive but one could well imagine that the President could have decided know what we're going to do is we're really going to employ
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Enforce employees standards. We're going to make employers really inflict significant pain if they're going to employ undocumented workers and a whole series I think of other possibility possible instruments were available.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: To take another example. So last I'm teaching a course on refugees and and of course we read through the Geneva Convention and I
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Was reading the article on naturalization which and but for the first time I wait. I want to bring this up on the computer. Let's do that and do it quickly without a disaster. Well, in any case,
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: One of the things at the end that says, and that naturalization should be made available at the lowest possible cost. So instead of charging refugees. So this is a statutory
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Instead of charging refugees $680, it could be zero or 25 and one. Yes, that is what I mean is, sorry, whatever it is, it's, it's a shell funding.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Agency, but you could triple the charges on all the business immigrants and and and this is all within the capacity of the President. So isn't there an imbalance in your argument, that is, you know,
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: The expansionary potential, but then you push it to the side and focus on the punitive as if that's the only possibility.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: So I can, I can take these
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Questions. So I think that one of one of the goals of the book to answer Sophie's question at the outset is to underscore that the scope of presidential power over immigration laws, not the results of our Polarized Politics.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Which is to say that it is a product of this system of de facto delegation, the shadow system that Adam started up by describing that evolves over the course of a century. And so regardless of who is in charge of each of the branches of government and whether we have divided government
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: If we have a system that looks like the one that we do now and it's it's arising proceeds are hyper polarization of the last decade, or however many years, you want to describe, is it encompassing
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: You have a system that empowers the president and the unfortunately Roxy, and the executive branch.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Now, I think we're not necessarily equipped to answer the question of whether the feeding of that system by appropriations by Congress, the refusal to
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Adopt a legalization program and otherwise address unauthorized immigration, the expansion of the grounds before station that helped to feed this
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: This system of presidential power is itself a product of polarization or is exacerbated by polarization that certainly is.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: True, on some level that the inability to reform the system where you might reduce the power of the President or the enforcement regime is must be related to the way which is increasingly have moved
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Away from each other and hardened with respect to their views on different sides of the spectrum, on immigration, that does not mean, however, that polarization doesn't affect the what you see in any given administration right so
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Given divided government President Biden is probably more likely to engage in executive actions earlier to a greater extent than he would, if he thought he could get legislation through Congress.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Remember that during the Obama years the administration tried initially to reform the law through legislation and Dhaka did not come into place until 2012
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Eight years, eight years, four years after three or four years after the president was elected, when it was clear that legislation wasn't going to succeed, and there was an attempt slight a year after that and and so
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The politician certainly affects those dynamics.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: If you're looking at a
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Day to day kind of level feel good discrete periods in time. But generally speaking, what we see the President's power is not the result of polarization
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: To address Rogers question. I think it's a it's a complicated. Why don't we try to take kind of two positions on discretion that might seem contradictory.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The. The first is that our goal in thinking about how to manage the the shadow system is not to eliminate discretion. Right.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: One view and we haven't really talked to the constitutional theory piece of this is that the President is usurping legislative power by exercising discretion in a way that seems to create rules or create policy, something like Dhaka
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But our view is that discretion is actually vital in a system where all these choices have to be made about whether to enforce the law is going to be exercised at the line level by lying agents and so
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: It's vital that higher level officials who have a holistic systemic purview and and are not motivated primarily by enforcement to buy a mix of considerations.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Have discretionary powers or powers to shape the system through discretion. And I also think you add them in response to her, she said something that's important.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And that is that there is something irreducible or inescapable about the President's use of discretionary power every time. Congress tries to eliminate it. Historically, the President finds a way of exercising it to advance
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: An agenda that is maybe political maybe humanitarian, whatever it is.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: And that is within limits. Right. It's not the President's making up the law, but it's through exercising discretion and innovating.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That the law gets pushed forward so descriptive Lee and normatively you're right that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: You cannot eliminate this with the system. We don't want to eliminate it from the system. But what we're arguing instead is in the second than the very I guess the last
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: chapter of the book is that the way that the shape of discretion takes now and the fact that the President's power arises through the decision whether to detain
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Or to release whether to arrest or not, whether to remove or not.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Creates an untenable system for millions of people in the United States, it's inconsistent with the very same rule of law values that the kinds of discretionary control that we are defending also seeks to advance. And so a perfect world.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Is one in which the shadow system does not exist at all, but where the executive branch still has the ability to respond through discretionary actions to changing dynamics.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: In order to ameliorate the effects of the law or an injection antiterrorism into the law. So I hope I've squared. The, the problem or resolve the tension that you see in that way.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay, let me pose. One more question isn't the goal. So Adam did you want to respond to kind of go ahead. No.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Isn't the goal of the strategies for keeping asylum seekers outside the US, not just to prevent immigration or danger to the community, but to prevent them from forming meaningful and stronger social ties.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: With residents in the country, which will then make it easier for them to have a stake
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: For easier for them to stake. The claim to remain in the country and harder to deport slash remove them, it seems to me as if the danger to community argument is a bit of a red herring.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: And you can rethink this as a struggle over how many social ties prospective prospective immigrants have with inhabitants of a country.
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Adam Cox, NYU: That's a good question, and it is, I mean,
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Adam Cox, NYU: I guess I didn't mean to suggest that those are the only two potential reasons why the government adopt the policy. I think the two main legal arguments that the government makes you know to advance
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Adam Cox, NYU: The detention policies and Romania, Mexico, policies, and if we're adding this one, which is about, you know, kind of preventing ties. I guess I got a fourth which is
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Adam Cox, NYU: Not just to prevent people from being here and developing social connections, but also to deter other perspective migrants and I think
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Adam Cox, NYU: Part of the very design of the detention policies are many Mexico policies, the family separation policies.
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Adam Cox, NYU: By the administration is to send a message to tell people that it'll be very difficult and your life will be disrupted and awful all kinds of ways. You'll be stuck in a jail you might you might have children taken away from you. You might be
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Adam Cox, NYU: Stopped at the border and forced to remain in Mexico, which is not the country from which you initially immigrated where you might not have any connections and the goal is just to to persuade other perspective migrants, not to make the journey.
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Adam Cox, NYU: And so I do think at that level.
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know there along. There's a long history of American immigration policies being adopted either to deter people who might want to come
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Adam Cox, NYU: Or to make it more difficult for them to develop social connections United States are temporary worker programs that we have on the books for example are pretty openly designed to do that.
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Adam Cox, NYU: to structure the labor markets for those workers in ways that reduce their abilities to develop connections and ties.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Now, interesting. I will say, in the context of asylum asylum seekers who are rolled, you know, remain in an asylum only removal proceedings, where it is difficult for them to raise other kinds of claims.
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Adam Cox, NYU: To belonging, and in fact, while the, you know, in a way, when I think it was that the moral claim, people might make
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Adam Cox, NYU: If they've waited five years for an asylum hearing. They've now spent five years in the country working and developing social connections, the moral claim at that point to be permitted to remain may be very strong
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Adam Cox, NYU: Their, their, their legal ability to raise that claim is actually not significantly affected by the fact that they've been parole.
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Adam Cox, NYU: That's true for them. It's also true, a similar kind of category of people are people who are here on temporary protected status. You know people who have been in the country for decades.
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Adam Cox, NYU: On temporary protected status. Their, their moral the moral weightiness of their claim to be permitted to remain at this point because they've just built entire lives here is quite strong. Not, not even built lives in the shadows, but built lives with the explicit
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Adam Cox, NYU: Acceptance of our government of their presence in the country. And yet you know the moral weightiness that claim doesn't automatically kind of
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Adam Cox, NYU: Mature into a legal legal claim that can protect them from deportation and politically, I guess we got morality and legality, we should talk about politically politically. Interestingly,
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know my rough read on the politics of it, is it also the TPS context is different in the asylum context.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Many, many Americans don't understand that the situation of many asylum seekers is not that they are actually
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Adam Cox, NYU: You know, recent arrivals who have been pursuing their claims, but that they've been here for years, pursuing their claims and therefore I don't think that the parole policies previously really changed the political dynamics around asylum or the kind of legal rights remain for perspective.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay, so let me ask one more question, then I think we will have to call call it a day. This is from Rick bell goes at Oberlin College. How does the fragmented.
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Adam Cox, NYU: Architecture of the US.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Political system stymie policy innovation and limit presidential capacity to effectively sweeping change to effectuate sweeping changes in the US selection regime.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: I can, I can take a stab at that, and maybe I'm also wants to say. So this is our final our final question. I think that we're both also professors of constitutional law and it has
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Become invoke to talk about how our presidential list system really stymies the ability to achieve lasting change or even to produce public policy that solves
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Social problems in a way that is responsive and immediate and some of that a lot of that has to do with divided government and with polarization, but it's also structural because of the divergent interests and powers of the legislature and the executive and and i think that
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: That
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Is clearly a dynamic in immigration policy making and it doesn't even necessarily require
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: divided government. It just requires the parties to be in opposition to one mother, making it difficult to create the coalition's that are necessary.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: To achieve lasting change. And I don't know that immigration is unique in this regard, but it does have this feature where there are a number of different
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Interests and groups that have to, or it's come to be that they have to work in combination
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Engage in trade offs in order to produce something that any one of them wants and that that makes the bargaining especially difficult and that might just be a feature of
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Modern regulation, but it seems very palpable in the immigration setting. And I think what that means.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Is that in our system of government, you have a lot of tacking back and forth between entirely different conceptions of what the legal regime is supposed to accomplish are supposed to be.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Some of that is at the surface, right, or in the political rhetoric that presidents us because as we suggested at the outset beneath that there's a lot that that happens. That's quite similar across administration's because of the size of the system and the nature of
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The, the bureaucracy, but that that back and forth.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: Presents on some level for for theories of the executive branch a problem, how can the long mean to an entirely different things depending on which political party is it is in power and that's part of
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: The resistance of behind things like Dhaka or some of what President Trump is trying to accomplish the sense that it cannot be genuine or sincere because it's so different from, from what preceded it.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But I think we're both of the view that that is precisely what the system enables and you can marshal legal arguments to defend them.
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Cristina Rodriguez, Yale Law School: But ultimately it underscores the the policymaking power of the of the President and the officials who are in charge of the operation of the system and and that is, in part, the result of the structures of government that you're describing as part of the premise of the question.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Okay. All right. Terrific. Adam, any final thoughts.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: So, okay, alright, so thanks to Christina and Adam for joining us today and for right right writing such a terrific and stimulating book and thanks Hiroshi for your
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Comment, and so we look forward to seeing you. One more time, this quarter next Friday, same time, same place for discussion of Lauren hide brings a book migrant hood and then starting again in January. Okay everyone, so thanks very much.
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: And
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Roger Waldinger, UCLA: Of course they hear a bye
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Adam Cox, NYU: Take care.