Israel in Depth podcast, Episode 12

Dov Waxman:

Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, policymakers and leading experts come to discuss topics about Israel in depth. You're listening to a podcast by the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center, and the host of this podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is Kenneth Stern, the director of the Bard Center for the Study of Hate at Bard College. An award-winning author and attorney, he was the American Jewish Committee's expert on antisemitism for 25 years, and was the lead drafter of the International Holocaust Remembrance Association (IHRA)�s �Working Definition of Antisemitism," which has now been adopted by many countries around the world. He�s also the author of a new book titled, The Conflict Over the Conflict: the Israel/Palestine Campus Debate, which examines why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become such a divisive and toxic issue on campus and what can be done about it. I highly recommend the book. The Nazarian Center recently hosted an event with Ken discussing his new book, which you can watch on our website, so we won�t be talking about his book. Instead, I asked Ken to come on Israel in Depth to talk about the IHRA definition of antisemitism. Now you might wonder what has this got to do with Israel? Well, nowadays, Israel is often brought up in discussions about contemporary antisemitism, especially concerning antisemitism on the left. The controversy about the IHRA definition of antisemitism focuses on the �illustrative examples� it mentions, most of which concern certain kinds of anti-Israel expressions. Some of these examples of antisemitism are pretty obvious and non-controversial. For instance, �Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.� Clearly, I think, that is antisemitic. But two examples, in particular, have proven to be very contentious. First, �denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor,� and second, �applying double standards by requiring of it (Israel) a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.� Now before we discuss these two specific examples, I'd like to begin with some background on the IHRA. So Ken, can you tell us a bit about why and how this definition came about?

Kenneth S. Stern:

Sure, Dov. First of all, thank you for having me here today. I appreciate the opportunity to continue the conversation. I'm very much a fan, as you know, of your work at the center and your books and your writing. So it's an honor for me to spend some time with you talking about these issues. The definition's background, and it started, it's actually called first the EUMC Working Definition of Antisemitism. The EUMC was a group in Europe that had the responsibility for looking at racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, and so forth. And in the aftermath of the Second Intifada, in the early 2000s, there was an uptick in attacks against Jews in Europe. And EUMC, put together a report that came out in 2004 that raised some fundamental issues. It was a fairly decent report in terms of what it covered. But it said, look, we have these different data points in different countries in Europe. And there's no common definition of antisemitism. So we're asking people to identify something, and there's no common frame of reference across borders. So they felt that there needed to be something that was more standardized. Everybody was looking for the same thing. And there was a second problem with it too. They came up with a sort of a temporary definition that they were going to use, which looked at antisemitism as a series of stereotypes about Jews. Now, to me, intellectually, that's somewhat backwards because the stereotypes are reflection of what antisemitism is. But putting that aside, there was a political problem there too, because they were wrestling with what to do if you had a Jew who was attacked as a stand-in, for an Israeli. If Israel did something, and a Jew in London or Paris or Bratislava, whatever, was attacked, and they said, well, if the person had these thoughts about Jews - these stereotypes. Applied them to Israelis and reapplied them to the person in front of them, who they beat up, or otherwise attack; that was antisemitism. But not if they had an animus towards that action that Israel did, and then pick on this poor Jew in front of them. That's lamentable, but that shouldn't be counted. My first reaction was, I thought that was just nuts. If I grew up in the United States in the 50s and 60s, I could imagine if a Black person was strung up and lynched in the 50s, or 60s, because somebody thought Blacks were shiftless or lazy or any of the stereotypes about them. That would be classified as racism. But will we not classify it if somebody had the same fate, and somebody did the same act but was upset about legislation being passed for civil rights or speech by Martin Luther King. So that, you know, that got me to have some concern. As it turned out, the director of the EUMC was coming to an American Jewish Committee annual meeting. And a few weeks beforehand, there was a firebombing of Montreal Jewish day school that was in retaliation for Israel, having assassinated a Hamas leader. And according to what they were operating with, that would not be classified as an act of antisemitism, which was, you know, again, nuts. So I challenged her publicly about that and created an opportunity. My colleague, Andy Baker, started working with her on the political side of getting this adopted. And I started doing drafting of trying to get a definition that would be useful for those purposes, including not having to look subjectively did a person really hate Jews but looking at the character of the act and trying to find some language that would be helpful to data collectors so that we can make comparisons across time and across borders. And that was the beginning of the drafting process. There were other people who were part of the consultation process, but I did the drafting of the examples that you're talking about, and the lead crafter or the definition itself. So that's the background of why it was created. Those two examples and the other examples about Israel we thought were important because the...you have to remember the time that this came out. Between 1975 and 1991, the UN had equated Zionism with racism, and we saw that institutionalized in places where there was discrimination against Jews. The equation with Jews were Zionist; Zionists were racists. Therefore, Jews were racists and should be excluded. That was withdrawn in 1991 by the UN. But then we saw at the World Conference Against Racism in Durban, 2001 an attempt to reinstitute that as a practical purpose. So to keep sort of a gauge of the level of antisemitism, there was a correlation that we thought that needed to be included, to look at some speech that was about Israel holding Jews collectively responsible and so forth. And also aspects of anti-Zionism. There were charts that people had that colleagues in the UK that could show attacks on Jews and mentions of Israel, including anti-Zionist things in the press, and they could almost be imposed one over the other. Not to say there was a causation, but there was a correlation. So those two things we thought were important, and I can explain a little bit more detail if you want.

Waxman:

Yeah. So first of all. There was a need to have this sort of standard definition.

Stern: Right.

Waxman: And then there was a need to expand or understanding, if you like, about antisemitism because there was this blind spot when it came to Israel. There was a need to recognize that antisemitism today is different from antisemitism before Israel's existence, before there was a Jewish state. And that nowadays, it can manifest itself - not always, but it can manifest itself in criticisms of Israel or in attacks against Jews because of Israel's actions. I would like to ask about the process of drafting this definition. I know being an academic, I serve on many committees where we have to collectively draft a document that has been kind of painstaking process. You know, too many cooks in the kitchen. How..Can you tell us a little bit about the process of drafting it itself? I mean, were you working with people around the world with this? Was it generally an agreeable process, or were there disagreements that you were trying to bridge in the drafting process?

Stern:

It was a collaborative, interesting process. There were people around the world. There were people from Australia, people from Israel, people from the UK, from the US. Some academics, some Jewish communal people. And what my job was, was to come up with a first draft of a definition, which I did, and then bouncing off ideas with people. They would have comments about what should it include, this should include that. And I'd draft the line which you try...and then build consensus around it. And again, the idea of was not to have a definition to say, "You're an antisemite," or "This is antisemitism," you know in a black and white..because that's what definitions do. It was, again. It had two primary purposes, right. One was to be able to take a temperature over time for data collectors. You know, for bean counters. Should I include this, or should I not include it? It was not to do a deep dive into the character of antisemitism; it was to look at a report that was going to be useful. And for other people that we're going to write reports beyond the EUMC, including like the State Department. We thought it would be useful to for them, too. And then the second thing was to try to get away from the idea that you had to analyze it - did somebody really hate Jews who committed a hate crime? And I took some of the jurisprudence from the United States, there's a case called Wisconsin v. Mitchell. That was the landmark hate crime case and said, you really didn't have to do that sort of subjective analysis of somebody chooses a Jew to be a victim of a crime based on who they are. Or somebody associated with, you know, with chooses, as a victim to...but based on who they are, as opposed to really have animus that was the basis for categorizing it as a hate crime. If somebody chooses a Jew to be a victim of a crime based on who they are, or somebody associated with Jews is a victim too. But it's based on who they are, opposed to really have animus. That was the basis for categorizing it as a hate crime. So if somebody decided, "Jews are rich - I'm going to burgle Jewish homes," which happened in Montana. That's a positive stereotype. Or there was a case that subsequently happened where a Jew was in France was kidnapped and held for ransom, because "Jews are rich." Right. Right. Right. And it was it was precisely thinking about cases like that. You don't want to have to analyze that. If somebody is selected to be the victim of a crime based on who they are. So those were the two primary things: for the data collection to compare over time and for the idea of thinking about hate crimes this way. But again, it was never to categorize anybody as an antisemite. And there was, you know, the one of the big issues now is about using it in the academic setting. And I could tell you, I mean. I've done work before this for the American Jewish Committee on how do you deal with bigotry on campus. And the clear recommendation from everything that I've always done is, you can't do anything that sacrifices academic freedom. But now people are trying to use this definition, in my view, to try to chill and suppress speech on campus, which is, you know, beyond amazing to me that people would try to use it in this way. It was never the intent.

Waxman:

So can you give us an example of this kind of misuse or weaponization, as you put it, in your book of this definition?

Stern:

Sure. So what started happening around 2010 is that there was a wedding of this definition to a power that was related to a law, or an interpretation of a law, regarding the campus. So that's without going too much into the weeds, there's something called Title Six of the U.S. Civil Rights Act of 1964 that requires that campuses avoid a pervasive environment of harassment, discrimination or discrimination against students on the basis of race and some other characteristics, but didn't say religion. And the Department of Education in 2010 clarified that Jews and Sikhs and Muslims, as ethnicities had protection under Title Six, which was great. I mean, I actually brought a case. I was the complainant for high school students and outside of New York and near Binghamton...There was a kick ...they were bullied and they were harassed and they were pushed. And now they had a remedy, because in theory the school district couldn't lose its funding if it has a Title Six violation. But what happened is that there are some groups on the Jewish right, that decide, aha, let's blend the definition with this new power. And they started bringing Title Six cases against universities. Some of those cases did allege things that were actions, but they they were replete with references to a speaker. Talked about the occupation, or said that the creation of Israel was a travesty or tragedy for Palestinians, or talked about texts that were being assigned in class. Or ...a purely academic exercise, saying that these violated the definition. Therefore, they should serve as a basis for a Title Six case. And that's what first caught my attention to the abuse. It was never intended to be used that way. And it harms Jewish students and the academy if you're trying to instead of answering speech that you might find problematic, and using ways to teach about it. Instead trying to get the state involved to try to suppress it and to chill it, especially when you know administrators have their number one job is to stop threats against the university being sued for things it does or doesn't do.

Waxman:

So I just want just to clarify. Is the issue as you see it, that this definition is being applied in the wrong kinds of contexts, such as the university setting? Or that...So in other words, that these things are all antisemitic, but it's not...you know, but they shouldn't be clamped down upon by university administrators, even though these should be regarded as antisemitic? They're just...we should allow them to happen - the kind of free speech argument. Or is it that actually, these things aren't antisemitic in and of themselves?

Stern:

Well, two things. One is, again, the definition was never crafted to say, aha, you just said that - you're an antisemite. It's ...It was to look at reports and data collection, you know, over time. And it wasn't to go into this. We tend to think of things that we want it to be on, you know, yes or no, black and white. And lots of speeches are much more complex. So it was, you know, to take an exam. I maintain, it's still perfectly reasonable, seeing a correlation with some anti-Zionist speech and seeing that as correlated with the temperature that you want to take about antisemitism. But to say that anti-Zionism, even of itself is antisemitism, to me is offensive. One can be anti-Zionist, whether you're a sophomore Jew who doesn't believe in the state, or you're a Palestinian who thinks that I'm having my rights suppressed by having a Jewish state on land that I see is my birthplace and birthright to. You know, antisemitism - the core of the definition to me, is seeing antisemitism as conspiracy theory that posits Jews are trying to harm non-Jews, and gives an explanation for what goes wrong in the world. You know, the blood libel and Holocaust denial and so forth. And there's some anti-Zionism that plays into those tropes, but one can be against the Jewish state, without believing that somehow, Jews are conspiring to harm non-Jews. When I when I teach about this, I use an essay by Derek Penslar, who teaches at Harvard, that sort of a "what if-ish" essay. And he posits, what if the Templars which were a Christian group that had a connection to the land of Israel had been the people that have come and established a state there rather than Jews? Would the reaction to that be different, worse, or better than, you know, the fact that Jews have a connection there? And it's a....again, it's a complex situation. I have in the book, both the why people sometimes refer to it as settler colonialism. In some ways it is, but also ignoring the fact that Jews have a connection to the land in history and religion. Culturally, they speak a language that was spoken there before the current inhabits. It's a complex situation. And the definition was never meant to say, "Okay, let's avoid that complexity. You're anti Zionist, you're antisemitic." But people are trying to use it that way.

Waxman:

In fact, I mean, the definition I think, quite clearly states or at least the way it's phrased that the examples could be antisemitic, but depending...it depends upon the context. And there's a lot of conditional phrasing in there, to kind of make clear that these things aren't necessarily antisemitic. I wonder, you know, now that you know how this definition has kind of almost taken on a life of its own. I mean, it's not...It's being adopted not only by governments and universities, but even you know, Premier League soccer teams, and a host of organizations. Would you have rewritten it in a different way, particularly this...You know, in trying to capture, as the definition does, the fact that Israel does sometimes...that opposition to Israel, anti-Zionism, does sometimes invoke antisemitism, or or...Would it be a different way? Would you kind of phrased it in a different way or taken out some of the examples altogether?

Stern:

I don't think so. I think that, to me, the problem was not what the definition contains. It's how people are abusing it. You know, somebody writing a review of the book had a point that's worth engaging and said something to the effect of, "If you if there are witch hunters out there, and you give them a manual to hunt witches, they're going to use it to hunt witches." And there's, you know, some...I think any definition people would use who want to suppress speech that they don't like. There may be other definitions that would be more difficult to abuse that way. But I think it becomes a target for people to try to censor speech that they don't like, rather than answering it. And the the thing that bothers me most in some ways about this, aside from what it's doing on the Academy, is that it's blinding us to what we should be doing about antisemitism on the academy and further out. It's like a black hole. The debate has become recently. Do we adopt the definition? Do we apply the definition? Or do we not? Is it good? Is it bad?

Waxman:

You describe it as a sacred symbol.

Stern:

Yes, yes. Yeah. There's a whole bunch from, you know, hate studies that tells us...When our identity is tethered to an issue of perceived justice or injustice, we try to simplify things, we try to see it in black and white, good and bad. And our juices get stirred and we do try to see it as is like a flag, or something that that you're either for or against, or a traitor or on our side. And that's not a productive way. Because antisemitism has been an organizing principle for thousands of years. I mean, you know, we just saw people at the Capitol insurrection without Auschwitz T-shirts, and "six million wasn't enough." We know that their white supremacy is animated by antisemitism. And we're talking about a definition as the totality of what we should be doing about it. It's nonsense.

Waxman:

Yes, certainly in the American context. think that's absolutely true. That it it seems a diversion in many ways from the greater threat around antisemitism on the far right. In other contexts, you know, such as the UK, which I know pretty well coming from the UK, the focus has been less so on kind of far right antisemitism. And on, you know, far left antisemitism in particular, in recent years. Antisemitism in the Labour Party. In that context, the IHRA definition has really become a kind of totemic. You know, the demand that Labour adopt this definition in its entirety, including the examples. That was part of the the concerns ...Labour's reluctance to do that was part of the concerns that British Jews had toward the Labour Party. I wonder, given the power, the status of this definition now, what should be done? I mean, you've spoken very eloquently about how the definition has been applied in contexts that it wasn't designed for. A and how it's been weaponized by groups who wish to suppress or chill or silence criticism of Israel. So given these, given these problems, and given the fact that this definition has become very controversial in some quarters, what should we do with it? I mean, is it a question now of rejecting this definition? Can it be revised? Should it be replaced? What do you think is the way forward?

Stern:

Well, I think that the...As I said before, that, even though one could think of other definitions that might be less capable of being so easily abused to suppress speech. I still think that, regardless, any definition will be a target for people to try to use in that way. So I think the question has to be first, how do we think about opposing antisemitism? And you know, the parallel for me - it's always been issues of bigotry - is to look at other scenarios. Change the players and see if the same rules apply, and that sometimes gives you some clarity. So let's think about this past year and George Floyd and Black Lives Matter and so forth. And imagine, instead of talking about looking at how systemic racism applies, and looking at how policing might be reformed, and looking at all these large issues in society: the demand that Black Lives Matter was. Let's have a definition of racism. Let's include opposition to affirmative action, or removing Confederate statues as components of things to indicate, perhaps there's racism there. And let's get it adopted by law. Let's get it adopted by policy. We'd say that's nuts. You're not looking at the big issues. You're looking at something that's symbolic. You're having a fight inside and outside the community of what should be in and what should be out. So I think we have to have a larger lens of what antisemitism is, how it functions and how to fight it. The debate about the definition and where its proper uses can and can't be certainly could be part of that that debate. But to have it suck all the energy out, you know, to me is nuts. And that's why my day job is to look at issues of hatred, how it animates it. Antisemitism is a subset of that. But the more that we get a better understanding of why we see the world so much in the us versus them fashion, why we get sucked into these black holes, that are just silly in terms of trying to actually give some prescription for what we can do about the fact that human beings define...us versus them and hate and antisemitism has always been a part of that, at least for the last couple of thousand years. We're missing the boat. So I think we need to change the conversation in some ways. And that's part of what I'm trying to do. It's not just about, I oppose the abuses of IHRA. I'd like us to start thinking about why we get into these fixes to begin with, and how to think more productively about combating antisemitism and hatred at large, especially since we, you know, tend to think of antisemitism as just about somebody vilifying Jews. We don't, you know, to give one example. We look at Pittsburgh, and the Tree of Life synagogue, clearly antisemitic, right? The person who did that was animated, it seems, by statements by then-President Trump about "invaders," "brown-skin people" coming across the border. And he saw Jews as facilitating that, because that's what he believed....The antisemitism fit into the white supremacy. The shooter at the Walmart in El Paso had an identical ideology. He just saw a different target that day. But we wouldn't classify that as anything to do with antisemitism. As long as we keep these narrow lenses, we're not going to really provide answers about what to what to do about it, especially as we get into more complex times in our society where we're each in our own buckets and vilifying people with different politics, or different backgrounds.

Waxman:

Absolutely. And that seems very wise advice. I wonder, as a final question, you're absolutely right that we need to kind of, in essence, shift the conversation and enlarge the conversation. But the Israel part of this - just coming back to the role that Israel....that it...Do you think, I mean. It seems to me that the IHRA definition got people to start talking about at least the way in which Israel can come up in antisemitism today. That it's not just enough to kind of hue to some, you know, early 19th century definition or a 20th century definition to recognize that Israel and Zionism and anti-Zionism do feature. Do you think because of the role that Israel plays in this. And the kind of complicating role it has, do you think it's possible for there to be any kind of consensus when it comes to recognizing and combating contemporary antisemitism, given the fact that Israel is now embedded in this in this conversation? I mean, or has it become so contentious. Because, you know, views about Israel are divided. And there's so many...so much debate about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So in a sense, what I'm asking, is the...Is there a danger that our discussion about antisemitism, and our ability to address it and combat it, is hostage now to disagreements about Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?

Stern:

I think to a degree, yes. Look, there certainly - and I detail in the book and elsewhere - that the anti-Zionism can be expressed as antisemitism. You know, "the world would be better off without Jews," "the world will be better off without Israel." You know, classic antisemitic tropes, just cut and paste and put Zionist or Jews You know, Zionists or Israelis, instead of Jews. I mean, those...those things are clear. But where it gets thorny is where we started this conversation about some of the examples that deal with questions of anti-Zionism. And the reason why I think it's so contentious is that there's a debate inside the Jewish community of what it means to our identity in terms of our relationship with Israel. And on, you know, one hand - as I put in the book was a student who said, we can get together at a campus Hillel if we have different backgrounds and religion - atheist, Orthodox, Chabad, whatever. We can't break bread, if it's about Israel. It's a third rail issue. And I don't know how that gets settled. But we're fighting this out as a proxy battle about demanding that people have Israel as part of their identity. Or people saying, Wait a minute, my Judaism is informed by repairing the world and I don't see my sign Zionism as being part of it. I might personally disagree with that. But I understand why a young person, in particular, might feel that way...or whatever. So, you know, the that Israel identity question is a key one in terms of why this debate about Israel has become so contentious inside the community. And the fear I have too about allowing the anti-Zionism to be defined as antisemitism in this context and law is that we're as a community, basically saying that we want the government to decide this issue for us. And however you feel about whether we should say that Jewish identity today requires, it doesn't require certain things about Israel. Everybody should be scared about the idea that we're going to accede to government this purpose of deciding that question for us.

Waxman:

Well put. Ken, it's been a pleasure. Thank you so much for sharing your insights on this very important, and now, sadly, highly charged and contentious subject. You've been listening to an episode of Israel in Depth produced by the UCLA Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. Thank you for listening