Israel in Depth Podcast - Episode 11

Guest: David Makovsky

Host: Dov Waxman

Recorded: 01/21/2021


Dov Waxman: Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, policymakers and leading experts come to discuss topics about Israel in depth. You're listening to a podcast by the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center and the host of this podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is David Makovsky, the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of the Project on Arab-Israel Relations. He's also an adjunct professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where I happen to have gone to graduate school. In 2013 to 2014, he worked in the Office of the U.S. Secretary of State, serving as a senior adviser to the Special Envoy for Israeli Palestinian Negotiations. He's also the co-author with (Ambassador) Dennis Ross of the 2019 book, Be Strong and of Good Courage: How Israel's Most Important Leaders Shaped Its Destiny, and the 2009 book Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East. He also himself hosts a podcast series called Decision Points, which explores how Arab and Israeli leaders reach pivotal decisions that made history. So I would strongly recommend that podcast for all of you. Before joining the Washington Institute, Mr. Makovsky was an award-winning journalist who covered the peace process from 1989 to 2000. He's a former executive editor of The Jerusalem Post, he was diplomatic correspondent for Israel's newspaper Haaretz and is a former contributing editor to the U.S. News and World Report, where he served for 11 years as that magazine's special Jerusalem correspondent. So he knows a great deal about Israel and about U.S.-Israel relations. And I'm delighted that you're joining me on this podcast to discuss U.S.-Israel relations and how that's going to change over the next few years with a new administration in office in Washington. Welcome to Israel in Depth.

David Makovsky: Delighted to be with you, Dov.

Waxman: So I want to begin, first of all, with your assessment of the Trump administration's legacy In this regard. I'm sure you probably read the recent interview that the former Trump administration's ambassador to Israel, David Friedman, gave to the New York Times in which he described his belief that many of the changes - the dramatic policy changes and shifts that the Trump administration had made with regards to Israel, and particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - will endure. Will persist long after the Trump administration. Do you think that's the case?

Makovsky: It depends. There's some areas, yes; in some areas, no. You know, what, what will endure, on the positive side, I think will clearly be that the American Embassy is in Jerusalem. And new President Joseph Biden has said as much. And I don't see any American president, you know, turning it back. I think the Abraham Accords of normalization were important. They don't solve Middle East peace. And I, you know, you and I, I think see very similarly to this that, you know, there's no, you know, dealing with the Palestinian issue, which is really key to this. And, and here, the Trump plan kind of joins a long list of other ideas that are, you know, that did not lead to a conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But I think on the positive and the opening to the Arab states, is something that is, is driven by the self-interest of both Israel and the Arab states, given Iran's role in the region and a sense of an American retrenchment, not withdraw or isolation. But pulling back has been facilitated by that interest in Israel's technology. You know, certainly, the bilateral benefits at the Emirates got. But I don't think those things are going to be, you know, rewound. Could there be, you know, pauses at different places, you can't rule out what some of these countries given other developments. But I think those are very beneficial. And, you know, but I...but where I didn't see, you know, where Trump, I think, missed in a certain way, is not understanding the dangers to Israel of a slide to a one-state reality that Israel, the twin engines of Israel, and Zionism has been a Jewish state in a democratic state. And a one-state solution on the right, I fear, is not a solution. It'll, it'll just lead the Palestinians to say, okay, if there's no hope for two states, we want to vote. And Zionism can't permit that, or it won't be the twin engines or the two wings of the Zionist aircraft, so to speak. And that will create pressures in this country. So I think the Trump people missed that whole part. But I certainly applaud the efforts they've done and other elements in other dimensions. Like I said, I think the embassy thing was was overdue. I wish it was done in the package way. But okay. And I think the Abraham Accords are bringing Arab states and Israel together, are changing the shape of the conflict in the past. Yes, there have been some underground relations in some of these countries. But this is, especially with the Emirates is it's on rocket fuel, I think. And actually, if Shimon Peres was alive, he'd be very...he'd be very pleased because this actually has a chance of more people-to-people peace. While the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, which I think you and I agree, are more consequential because they ended the state of war, and those countries actually fought Israel on the battlefield. This, because there's no baggage. It's not just the peace between government...there's a chance of a peace between people. So I think those are good things. So I'm not...I don't think it's black or white. I think there are elements of this that are useful - are very important. But I am concerned about the inability to, you know, to see that the dangers of what happens when you slide into this one-state reality about how that's going to be interpreted, how that's going to create pressures maybe in this country for the very existence of Israel. So I'm concerned about that.

Waxman: Absolutely. I want to...I want to just pick up on the point you made about the Abraham Accords. Because I agree with you, if we look at some of the kind of positive legacy, there's much to criticize about the Trump administration's handling of Middle East issues and issues regarding Israel. But certainly, the Abraham Accords stands out as a very positive legacy. Although there are concerns that have been raised about whether these accords, or at least some of the bilateral agreements, will survive given the fact that what really brought them about, or at least facilitated them, were these kind of side agreements that the Trump administration, or incentives, if you will, that the Trump administration provided these Arab states. I'm thinking particularly, of course, not only of the deal with the UAE and the agreement to sell F-35 fighter jets and drones, which seems likely to go ahead. But the kind of quid pro quo with Morocco over U.S. recognition of Western Sahara. Do you think with a different administration that those agreements will last? Or is there a threat now that the Biden administration may reassess some of the commitments that the United States made, whether to the UAE or to Bahrain or particularly to Morocco.

Makovsky: So I think these are great points. Look, I do think the F-35 with the Emirates is a done deal. And if there's more congressional scrutiny, it could, you know, slow down a little down here or there - a delay. But the contours are clear, and F-35's are going to happen. You know, you had this extraordinary joint letter, the Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Gantz saying, you know, we're not objecting to this deal. Now, there might be issues, questions about technology transfer, questions what does this mean, in a different context. But it has nothing to do really with Israel, per se. And so I think that is definitely going to happen. I think, Bahrain, we're not aware. And we really looked into this, if there any specific commitments made to Bahrain. In the case of Sudan, they had to pay money to get off the terrorism list because this was money that was owed to the victims in the 1998 and 2000 bombings. But that money has been paid, and maybe by one of the Gulf states. But it's done. I think you raised an important question about the Western Sahara. But I think those, you know, the direct flights are going to happen. Whether it's a full embassy, I think Morocco is just waiting for a reaffirmation on the Western Sahara before they call it. You know, actually sent their ambassador, although Israeli...showed me the documents they've signed. They're going to be doing it. You know, it hasn't happened until it's happened. And so, you know, I think there's some questions. And you point out something interesting, which is, you know, is in the Middle East, anything that looks to you like a duet between two is actually more complex. It's trilateral. You know, if you look at the Egypt, Israel thing, they were commitments made by the U.S. Now there was some by the U.S. to Israel. There was future U.S. military aid and the aid to the U.S. aid to Egypt. I don't think it was foreseen in the late 70s that it was going be so many, you know, tens of billions of dollars. But there's always...there's been an American component in the U.S. military sale to Jordan. So in the Middle East, a lot of these Arab calculations are based on what is America going to do. And that's why you're right to ask and what the Biden administration's approach is going to be. But I don't see anyone rolling these things back. But the question is, is that okay? It's one thing to say I support what has been done. But how much am I gonna invest in taking it to the next level, with some of the remaining states? And a lot of people are looking at Saudi Arabia as like kind of the, you know, the mother of normalization. But it's going to be a little complex cause there's a lot of questions about the Saudis here in Washington. And there are some generational differences there. And I talked to a senior Saudi officials that said, look, here's the good news. Under 30, the public wants more normalization with Israel. But you know, there are a lot of people over 30 on the other side, including the king, who is more focused on the traditional Arab peace initiative that is sequential. First, do the Palestinian issue, and then come to this. And I think what's really the analytical point Dov, as I see it, is that is that the distinction is, is that a lot of the Arab states in 2002, when they agreed to the sequence, give the Palestinians what we want, well withhold normalization, is they couldn't really foresee normalization 2002. But the Middle East has changed in 18 years. And therefore, they're not willing to defer their bilateral interest with Israel in the way they were in 2002. So I do think a lot of these pressures will lead it forward. And I do think the administration is committed to it, too. And now we'll see how they do it. Is it Is there gonna be a creative way to use this also to make some, at least incremental progress on the Palestinians? I have some thoughts on that.

Waxman: That was exactly what I was going to ask you. Because when it comes to the kind of the broader issue of normalization, as you, as you've said. You know, previously, normalization between Israel and the Arab states was held up upon the condition that Israel first degree to a Palestinian state. And the Abraham Accords have kind of broken that linkage and undermined the Arab peace initiative as a result. But is it possible now to kind of reestablish some kind of linkage? And how would that...what would that look like? Particularly maybe with Saudi Arabia?

Makovsky: It's a great question. I really, this is something that for me is very much what I'm thinking these days - is the focus. Because I, you know, if this was an American football field, I'd say the people in the right end zone, look at the Abraham Accords as a bypass road or on the Palestinian issues, and they're thrilled. And the people in the left end zone, look at it as a bypass road. And they're, you know, they're mourning it. Seeing it as...meaning that the Palestinian issue will never be addressed. I see myself more in the middle of the field. Then instead of a bypass road, I think it's a bridge, I look at Egypt and Jordan. And I see that the countries who've made peace with Israel actually become more invested in others making peace as well. They don't want to be politically isolated. And Egypt and Jordan have been pivotal over the years. And I tend to think they will be a bridge. There'll be much more touching points between Israel and the Emirates with all these business interests...that seem to be you know, have a huge potential. The tourism during a pandemic. Reports, I don't know if they're fully accurate, but even if they're, you know, a large percent accurate. Even if it's 70,000 or 50,000 Israelis going during a pandemic to Dubai. And these Arab states are going to have more influence with Israel rather than less. And I think that's good on the Palestinian issue. What I would like to see is, look, I don't think any grand deal is possible with Israel and the Palestinians. The leadership between Netanyahu and Abbas, the Venn diagram does not overlap. And whenever it's all or nothing in the Mideast, it's always nothing. And again, because I can't resist sports analogies, American sports analogies, excuse me, is whenever we try to hit the home run ball, you know, we when you swing for the fences, you tend to strikeout. So I think we need some solid singles. We need, you know, to make some progress. And here, I think you create a package that would say, okay, and the significant step that the Saudis or the other Arabs would take towards Israel will be met by a step that Israel takes towards the Palestinians. What do I mean by that? I mean, if the Saudis say, listen, for my own domestic reasons, I can't normalize fully. But I'm willing to have a trade office. I'm willing to have an investment office. I might even be willing to have a tourism office in Israel. But I also got to know you're making progress. And that means that you're leaving open the door for two states, even if you can't achieve it. You're leaving that door open. And that means no building outside of the security barrier. Eighty-five percent of the Israelis are over the green line. That's you know, the pre-67 line that live over that - 85% live in about 7% of the land of the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. And I think if you don't build over it, and then about 90% of the Palestinians live over it, and 85% of the Israelis live within it. You begin to see how two states is possible. So I tend to think what you want to do is just keep your options open. And don't preclude the option of two states. And force you into that one-state reality slide that I said before in our discussion. So I think you could see a situation where here the Saudis take a big step. And Israel, the Palestinians, take a step. Neither is taking the ultimate step. But I think you need to incentivize the parties that way. And I think, you know, we should not. You know, we need to think creatively and avoid these all-or-nothing straitjackets.

Waxman: Absolutely. And I'm in the spirit of that, in terms of, you know, areas where there may be possible to make some progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front. I wonder going back, you mentioned the Trump peace plan. And while that was kind of categorically dismissed by the Palestinian leadership. And I think most analysts believe it's, you know, not likely will outlast the Trump administration. Maybe there are some points within that. Some ideas that actually could be picked up. In particular, the idea of transferring more parts of the West Bank to Palestinian Authority control - moving areas from Area B to Area A and parts of Area C to Area B. In other words, expanding - not the control of the Palestinian Authority. And this is something that was put forward in the in the peace plan, and that Netanyahu has at least signed onto. Is that something now that you think the Biden administration may pick up on?

Makovsky: I think you got to look at all of it. I mean, right now, they, you know, the Biden ministration have got so many other priorities - COVID, COVID, COVID, all the economic aftermath of COVID, the climate change issue, China issue. It's clear, this is not going to be the number one issue at this time. And also, what's also clear is you're going to get a fourth election (in Israel). And until they form a government, that's going to take time. So I think the administration in a certain way does have some breathing space to review. And I hope the review is to say, look, we're not going to swing for the fences. We're not going to do a grand deal. But there might be some partial arrangements here. Like what I said about not building outside the fence, or as you know, you point out correctly, the C to B, B to A. The land classification issues that you can do as well. And that I think... I see that all as part of the mix of, let's see if we could do interim arrangements that avoid the core issues. That's where much of the passion and the opposition is. If it's issues on Jerusalem, if it's issues on refugees - all these kinds of hot button questions. And just say, look, the parties aren't there. But here are things we can do that will make Israel safer. And that will show the Palestinians that, that the idea of two states is still open. So I think we just, you know, gotta be creative. Look, I think historically what happened is, is that the Palestinian critique through the 90s was it's too incremental. But the United States really internalized the Palestinian critique. And if you look at the year 2000, and with the Camp David Accords, and you look at, you know, Condoleezza Rice's efforts with Abbas. It was called the Annapolis Process. And you look at the at the effort I was a part of with (John) Kerry in 2013 and 14. And now the Trump plan. What is really the common thread here, while the plans were very different. The common thread was this belief that incrementalism had its limits. And so the American side really bought on to the Palestinian side. But what we've seen in these four efforts is that...it was, you know, there was no deal. And some of these...some of these offers. I see the Trump plan a little differently, I must say...we're very generous to the Palestinians. Yet they still said no. So there's no political ...for America to keep knocking its head against the wall. So I just think avoid all or nothing. Do what's doable, what's practical, what's pragmatic, and try to tie it into some of these normalization things that are great. And I think we just have to be creative and avoid the all-or-nothing straight jacket.

Waxman: Right. So in a way, ironic, the much-maligned Oslo Accords, which did take this incremental approach, maybe looking better today, given the failure of these attempts to arrive at a comprehensive agreement.

Makovsky: I think so. I know that's not the Palestinian view. But the point is, is that they don't seem to realize we tried four times the other way. 

Waxman: Right?

Makovsly: Oslo, to be fair, to be fair...Oslo was based on there would be a final status deal. And Camp David also was really was based on what was written in the Oslo Accord after five years, etc. But you can't say yes, and there's an issue here. And so I just think, do what's doable, and even if you don't reach the destination in one go, you know, I think the public will see if you're making progress in this regard. And it's got to be good for both sides, or else it's going to work.

Waxman: Absolutely. I mean, it will be difficult to I wonder...for the Palestinians. As you said, they've long been opposed to incrementalism. But maybe after the experience of the last four years with the Trump administration, and maybe Palestinian leadership, President Abbas might look differently today about the prospects of at least harnessing some achievements rather than nothing.

Makovsky: Yeah, absolutely. And look, to be blunt about it. To make, you know...to even sharpen the point is that the Palestinians kind of lost their veto here on the Arab side. And, you know, in a certain way, they fear that. But, you know, there needs to be some introspection; how did they lose that veto? I mean, you know, you or me were students of this conflict. Think about it, Khartoum, 1967. All the Arab states said the three "no's" - right. And now Khartoum has normalization with Israel. 1979, right - the Arab League moves the seat of its headquarters from Cairo to Tunisia in protest of Sadat's, you know, the Egyptian Treaty of '79. And now 2020, you know, when the Palestinians said they were against the UAE move and alike, they didn't get a single vote on the Zoom call. It's gone from Khartoum to Zoom. It's a real shift here. And I think Abbas smartly has realized maybe a couple of months too late, but that he instead of cursing the Emirates, he needs to coax the Emirates. He's returned his ambassador. He decided not to criticize the Moroccan normalization deal. He kept his ambassador there. And I think they understand that these things are not going back. And now the question is, how do you harness it? How do you shape it? How do you use it as a bridge? You know, to build these bridges. Look in Gaza, the Sheikh Zayed neighborhood or city. You know that's MBZ's father. Yeah, that's, you know. Imagine if they did a ...Gaza. They could do clearly do two cities on the West Bank. I mean, I think you can use the ...the Arab states would like to be helpful. But cursing them is not going to exactly motivate him.

Waxman: Right, right. (left off here) Now, of course, one issue - that kind of fly in the ointment here - and an issue that, you know, you know better than anyone, is the question of Israeli settlements. And this is an issue that has obviously real practical ramifications. But there's also highly emotive issue on both sides. And, and it seems that however much the Biden administration, and I agree with you would prefer to wait and not have to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, recognizing that it's quite intractable, and it's not likely to deliver any sort of win for them. They may not have that luxury of...because just this past week, as you know, Israel's moved forward with construction plans in the West Bank, particularly in the kind of the area of Givat Hamatos, which is a big issue. So how do you see is it - are we gonna see a kind of redux of the Obama administration's recurrent frictions with Israel over settlement building? Is it possible somehow to avoid this? Or is it really a conflict on settlement building inevitable?

Makovsky: No, it's a great question. And I do think Biden is different than Obama. You know, Obama was, you know, very cerebral, and he saw things through a certain lens. And Biden is someone who's been in public life for 47 years. You know, I think he is really a visceral Zionist, in a way, that I don't think any president has been. Maybe Clinton was like that. But as someone who really, you know, after the Holocaust, heard stories from his father about what happened to the Jews and a moral obligation that they have their own state. He takes his grandchildren to visit, you know, Buchenwald or I believe. He's someone who, you know...He has a sense of existential...He understands the existential fear of Israel; he tells that story with Golda Meir. I think I've heard it almost 50 times in public. But the way he tells it, you can tell that he's internalized it. And that she gives him this briefing on the eve of the '73 War. And this is like his first trip abroad as a young senator from Delaware. And he's like, his face is really, you know, ashen. And she has to calm him down and said, it's going to be okay. And he said, how can you say to me that after this briefing you just gave me about Egyptian war efforts? And she said because we got a secret weapon, senator. And he said, what's that, madam prime minister? Yes, our secret weapon, senator is we have nowhere else to go. And if you know the way Biden delivers it, you can see this is someone who really understands kind of the sense - the contextual sense of Israel's historic vulnerability. And I think that he's, he's an...in general, his view of foreign policy is usually about a relationship between leaders. He talks about the, you know, the foreign aid is the best investment in Israel that the U.S. makes, and not anything. I think his approach will be to try to solve this behind closed doors. He won't try to ignore that there's a difference. But I think if there's any way to get what I would call a differentiated policy on settlements, which is to say, I will judge settlements, not the way it was done in Obama, which is any settlement is bad. But rather, is this a settlement that impedes a two-state solution or one that does not. And once you have that lens, then I think you might have a broader conversation here quietly with the Israelis and reach a set of quiet understandings. Doesn't mean you embrace any settlement - not one. But it might be that your public posture is going to be different, depending on where the settlement is located. So I'm hoping for that kind of mature conversation of leaders and of their staffs that could say: okay, let's be smart about this. We're not gonna agree on everything, but there's gonna be areas that are, you know, that we think, you know, really impede two states and those that don't. And we're going to want to differentiate between them. That's what I'm hoping for.

Waxman: So, I'm going to be a little bit more pessimistic than you on this, because I think there's a couple of changes that make it may it may be more likely that there'll be conflict. First - obviously, the Trump administration, the kind of green light that it gave the Israeli government to expand settlements, not just in the major settlement blocks near the green line, but also in outlying settlements where a lot of the construction has been taking place. That may have reset Israeli expectations and that they now have kind of believe that, you know, where they had this green light in the past. So anything that to the Biden administration...any objections that the Biden administration makes...will be less well-received. And the other thing, I think, of course, is the Israeli domestic politics. And one of the things that Prime Minister Netanyahu did quite effectively during the Obama administration was use the Obama administration's opposition to settlement building as a way to garner support with his own right-wing political base. And so, you know, there's a temptation now for Netanyahu or indeed, whoever may succeed Netanyahu, let's say Gideon Sa'ar, who is also very committed to Israeli settlement building and even annexation, to actually pay off against to use the United States as a foil if you like. And, and instead of kind of seeking compromise, actually, maybe to use the confrontation with a U.S. administration, particularly a Democratic one, as a way of appealing to their base of support?

Makovsky: No, I think it's great, excellent analysis. But here's where I disagree, because using the same point that you made - the second point about the domestic dimension of this, and the dynamics of that using settlements to kind of build. I think that you know, any Israeli leader who follows America, you know. I watch, like, two primetime newscasts every day in Hebrew, in Israel, of the main channels. And it's clear, they see, you know, there's a nervousness about the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. And I think, you know, I see it bubbling now. That people say, well, look, if we can't work with Biden, you know, we're going to get the progressives. And if we lose bipartisanship, I mean, next to the Israeli Defense Forces, itself, is a pillar of Israel's security has been bipartisan support in America for Israel. If we write off half of the American electorate, you know, we are, you know, just totally undermining, you know, the fundamental support for us. So, I think the fact that Biden is a moderate, a centrist in a certain way..I personally think that's the right approach. But, B, I think, Israelis are saying, if we can work it out with this guy, what we're going to get is much worse.

Waxman: Absolutely.

Makovsky: And that, I think, could be a cautionary tale of saying, you know. Because I mean, I just see the way the Israeli media is. They know that Biden isn't Trump. And your point about, if I would say, another analogy, is a non-sports one for a change. You know, if you're used to 6,000 calories a day, and you know, let's say, what the average ...eats 2,200 calories. But maybe you've been getting six. And so if someone says no, it's not going to be 6,000, it's going to be 5,000. You'd still say, wow, my G-d, your very well fed. But you know, you might say, yeah, but I feel the difference. That, you know, the, to your point. But I think, on the other hand, they also are aware that if many Israelis...that if they don't find common ground with him, the alternative is going to be much worse. So I do think that there is a sense that this isn't the Trump era anymore. But it isn't the Obama Obama era either. And this is a president who said this is not the third term of the Obama administration. He's his own man. And so I think that's good. And I do hope that there's a kind of an understanding in the coming months on yes, we may disagree. But the question isn't whether we agree or disagree. The question is, how do we handle disagreement? Can we find ways to communicate in a certain way, that is, you know, so we can proceed amid disagreement? And I think that's, you know, I think, you know, that I'm hopeful that they find that approach on how to deal with disagreement, I think, a differentiated approach on settlements is the way to go. The prism should be in each case, does this settlement impede two states or does it not? And I think I hope that that would be a tool on how to think about these issues in those kinds of consultations.

Waxman: Right? And I think you're right that it's going to be a lot harder for an Israeli leader or Israeli politicians to kind of demonize...

Makovsky: Exactly.

Waxman: Biden in the way that Obama was demonized. He's just a different...

Makovsky: Right. When you've been in the public life for 47 years, and you have visited Israel dozens of times, and you have voted for every foreign aid request for Israel. And when you speak in such visceral terms about why Israel is important to the American national interest and why America has a moral obligation that Israel always exists. You're not going to be able to demonize that person so easily. He's not going to make it easy for you. And what we what all these leaders have learned, they don't always know it in the past, but I think they've learned is that...and I think Obama didn't learn the lesson early on, but, you know, if you don't make that connection with the Israeli public early. Like when he didn't visit Israel, and he went to Buchenwald instead, or, you know, went to Cairo, Turkey. If you don't link up with at least half the public...that half the Israeli public understands what you're trying to do, it's a completely different context. The publics are important. And I think Biden has that decades, decades-long of connection that will make it very hard to marginalize him in any way.

Waxman: Right. I think the one we haven't discussed; this is the kind of the elephant in the room of U.S.-Israel relations, is obviously going to be the Iranian issue and the desire to rejoin...The Biden administration's apparent wish to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal, the JCPOA. Already, you know, we're already hearing from the Israeli media today. And kind of, you know, signals about how concerned Israel is about this. This is a broad, widely shared concern by the Israeli public and across the Israeli political system.

Makovsky: I would say on that one, just briefly, that, look - first of all, I think Tony Blinken and, you know, the incoming Secretary of State in his confirmation hearing, you know, said it crystal clear. That we wanted to consult early with the Israelis and our Arab friends, because if we're not together on the takeoff, we won't be together on the landing, so he's saying you have a chance to influence our thinking before we lock in on a strategy. I think both Israel and the U.S. want to have a new and improved JCPOA Iran nuclear deal. But the question is, is the pathway there, through, you know, a reaffirmation of the existing agreement, or not? The Israeli fear is that America is going to squander its leverage. And by just to reaffirm the first deal, and therefore won't have any leverage left for, you know, JCPOA 2.0. And I think this kind of philosophical question on how do you maintain your leverage in dealing with Iran lies at the heart of all this.

Waxman: Absolutely.

Makovsky: And you need that quiet consultation here, too. And so I've tried to tell some Israeli journalists that are calling me, you know, you've got an American commitment and was probably reaffirmed that the first White House press briefing by Jen Psaki, the day of the inauguration, to consult early with allies. And I think that that's what you want. You want to be able to say here, I'm concerned about whether you're going to be able to retain your leverage. And I'm glad you're giving me the opportunity to talk with you early on, on how to retain that leverage to get to a deal that we all want. You know, when Biden says I want to lengthen and strengthen, meaning I want a longer sunset clause, that means more - a longer period of restrictions on their ability to enrich LEU, low enriched uranium. And so, you know, we all know where we want to get to, but the question is, what's the best way to get there. And I think a conversation on leverage is the way to get there. It's a philosophical point. And it stands at the heart of a lot of this jitteriness in Jerusalem, which is, is the U.S. going to squander leverage?

Waxman: Absolutely.

Makovsky: And I think that needs to be addressed.

Waxman: I completely agree with you. I think it's really...it's not about the kind of substantive goals, but really about tactics and timing.

Makovsky: Exactly. Exactly.

Waxman: And the challenge, of course, though, is that, you know, a while there is I think, on a desire on both the part of the Biden administration, and Israel to consult more. To kind of try to arrive at a common position, although that may be impossible to do. There's obviously...Iran has its own timetable. And there's Iranian elections coming up, presidential elections in June. The Iranians are already turning up the heat on the Biden administration to try to get them to do something as soon as possible to meet Iran's demands of relaxation of sanctions. I mean, one of the great complexities of this particular year is the amount of political change that's going to be that's taking place. Not only in Washington with the new administration, in Washington. We're going to have elections in Israel. There's going to be a new government in Israel. There's going to be elections, or there may be elections in the West Bank and Gaza, maybe in East Jerusalem, for new Palestinian president and legislature, and also Iranian elections.

Makovsky: That's right. But look at it in a flip side, Dov. Which is in a strange way...while sometimes, you know, you think about elections hardens the positions, because these politicians have to appeal the vote. It also could give time for the two systems in Washington and Jerusalem, to have the consultations because it's going to take time for the Israeli election. And you know, we you know, the post-election period could be six weeks easily.

Waxman: Right - and they could do a fifth election.

Makovsky: Right. That's true. So in a strange way, while elections sometimes the nexus point between policy and politics, elections people can, you know, sigh, oh, we're gonna have to wait for that. But the fact is it allows each system to reflect and to really engage with the other side and not be forced into immediate action. And look, I mean, the case of Iran, it's not just the election. I mean, but Biden has said they have to come into compliance, the Iranians. There are 2,300 kilograms of low enriched uranium that they are doing above the limits that they are allowed under the deal. They'll say, well, you America, you left the deal. Now you're complaining about us. And so..all I'm saying, this decision does not have to happen immediately. The media is going to obviously going to go for conflict. But there's time for both systems to reflect and to engage quietly with each other. And there might be a bit of a blessing there that the election period imposes on the policy process.

Waxman: I want to thank you first for giving me some optimism. As a pessimist generally, it's been very encouraging to hear your analysis and your insights. So I really want to thank you for that. I'm sure, on behalf of all our listeners, as well. So thank you so much for sharing your insights about this and for giving me at least some optimism about the situation. So thank you. You've been listening to an episode of Israel in Depth, produced by the UCLA Nazarian Center for Israel studies. I want to thank you for listening.