Israel In Depth Podcast - Episode 10

Taped Dec. 16, 2020

Transcript

DOV WAXMAN: Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, policymakers, and leading experts come to discuss topics about Israel in Depth. You are listening to a podcast by the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center and the host of this podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is Raffaela Del Sarto, an associate professor of Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she works at its European campus in Bologna, Italy. Dr. Del Sarto is the author of�Contested State Identities and Regional Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Area, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2006;�Israel under Siege: The Politics of Insecurity and the Rise of the Israeli Neo-Revisionist Right, published by Georgetown University Press in 2017; and�Borderlands: Europe and the Mediterranean Middle East, soon to be published by Oxford University Press. She's the editor of�Fragmented Borders, Interdependence and External Relations: The Israel-Palestine-European Union Triangle, which was published by Palgrave Macmillan, in 2015. She received her PhD from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and has had visiting fellowships at St Anthony's College at Oxford University, and at the European University Institute. Dr. Del Sarto, thank you for joining us on this podcast.

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RAFFAELA DEL SARTO: Thank you very much. A pleasure to be here.

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WAXMAN: So, I want to begin with the latest news regarding Israel and its relations with the Arab world. And that is the announcement that President Donald Trump made on December 10th, that Israel and Morocco have agreed to normalize relations, which makes Morocco the fourth Arab country to recently normalize its relations with Israel. When he made this announcement, President Trump also said that he signed a proclamation recognizing Morocco's sovereignty over the disputed Western Sahara region, in the apparent quid pro quo for Morocco's agreement to normalize its relations with Israel. As an expert on the Mediterranean region, I'd like to know how you view this announcement - and what's your response to it?

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DEL SARTO: Well, first of all, of course, Officializing relations between states that had some sort of relations before that and making peace agreements are always a very positive development. And indeed, Israel and Morocco had some ties under the table for a long, long, long time. So certainly, this is not really surprising in a way that in this whole context of the normalization deals that have been going on that Morocco would also come forward. And if we want to be particularly mean, we could say obviously, that Trump's "Art of the Deal" is about bribing countries to recognize Israel. And I think that, of course, the biggest reward for Morocco was Trump recognizing its sovereignty over the Western Sahara, as you just mentioned. So, of course, this is a bit this is rather problematic since there are clear international law provisions regarding the Western Sahara conflict. And it is also problematic for the region, let's say, because fighting has just resumed along the side of the Polisario Front. And which had been a conflict that was largely forgotten and not that violent. And of course, the risk is that now, the regional tensions around the Polisario with the, with the Polisario Algeria will resume or intensify.

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WAXMAN: So, I'd like to know, do you think this declaration of sovereignty has any real impact? We're quite used to President Trump's periodic announcements, and many think that they may simply evaporate once he leaves office. But do you think this announcement regarding the recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Western Sahara region will have a longer-term impact? How will it shift attitudes toward Morocco's occupation of Western Sahara?

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DEL SARTO: And this is a very good question. It's a bit difficult to answer. I mean, as a matter of fact, although international law is very clear, it is also true that most Western powers, including France, for example, and the Europeans, generally speaking, have somehow acquiesced to Morocco's kind of control over the Western Sahara in recent years, Although there was a decision of the European High Court of Justice that actually specifically free trade with fisheries agreement, excuse me, between the EU and Morocco was not applicable to the Western Sahara. But then basically the European Council, which is the member states, they sort of ignored it. Right. So, there has been in the recent years, there has been a more position of many European states and in a way also the United States to, to close both eyes with, let's say, regarding Morocco's continuous control over the Western Sahara. So, of course, the moment that you have an official recognition of what is in fact, already a reality. Although it is against international law, whether this may change is difficult to say. It certainly has given more legitimacy to Morocco's claims.

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WAXMAN: So, it's interesting, I mean. Jared Kushner, in the announcement, basically said, you know, we are acknowledging reality, right. And that, you know, that Western Sahara is basically Moroccan, or at least it's going to remain under Morocco's control. So, we're, in a sense, a very similar statement he might have made with regard to the West Bank and Israel. You know, we are bringing a reality-based approach, I think his way his put it. Discards international law, but focuses on, you know, the reality on the ground. And I suppose maybe the same might be said, with, with Israel and the West Bank. The European Union, on the other hand, at least declaratively continues to adhere to the international law. They seem to value that much more.

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DEL SARTO: Yes, definitely. Although, as I was saying, in practice, that has also changed a little bit in recent years. The rhetoric of certainly...the European rhetoric are certainly much more focused on international law. But in fact, I mean, if fishing rights are an important issue. And so, the European - particularly the member states - have also been, in a way, acknowledging reality, although they haven't said so explicitly. Now, of course, I mean, that that's, that's the big question, right? I mean, should we just accept realities, even if it violates international law, and populations may have a very different opinion on that? I think, generally speaking, this is a very dangerous development to say, oh, that's how just how it is, and we just recognize it. And we're thinking about all the efforts to resolve the Western Sahara conflict. The attempts to establish a referendum, which has been going on for I mean, has been going on for years and years and years because both sides cannot agree on who's allowed to vote. Right - that's the main problem. But I think it's just to say, okay, that's the way it is, and let's just move on. I think this is, generally speaking, a dangerous development for international relations.

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WAXMAN: It certainly complicates the EU's position with regards to Crimea.

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DEL SARTO: Exactly.

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WAXMAN: On the flip side, you know I want to ask you your thoughts on what this agreement and other recent agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and Sudan. So, there's been this trend in recent months toward Arab states normalizing their relations with Israel. In your book,�Israel Under Siege, you describe a really well, very powerfully how this kind of siege mentality, if you like, to become entrenched within Israel and within the minds of Jewish Israelis in particular. I wonder whether you see this normalization process as changing that, as undermining that siege mentality, whether it could bring about a different attitude toward Israel's position in the region and in the world at large.

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DEL SARTO: Ah - Zvi Bar'el had a very interesting article today, a little op-ed in Haaretz ("The Threat of Peace With the Arabs," December 16, 2020). Like he said, now that all the Arabs are basically queuing up to become our friends, what are we going to do, right? What are we going to do with our siege mentalities� It was an interesting, interesting piece. Definitely, I think that the fact that this normalization things have been going on, they certainly will lead to a reassessment of the siege mentality, because as we see, I mean, not the whole world is against Israel, right. And not all the Arab states want to destroy all the Arabs, as the narrative goes in Israel, want to destroy Israel. So, from this point of view, I think that particularly the psychological effects of will be very, very important. And as you know, Israelis are already dreaming about holidays in Dubai and so on and so forth. And the problem I see is that once you have the siege mentality so entrenched, and perhaps more importantly, once right-wing governments have profited so much, they have benefited so much from it, because it basically allowed them to stay in power without showing results. Once you have that entrenched, I'm afraid that it may shift to someone or something else, right. And so, what could happen is that Iran as an existential threat will become much more central, for example. And another implication may be that now, the Israeli-Palestinian, the Palestinian issue, may become securitized even more. And in a way, it may also become a sort of a domestic problem. And I'm not sure whether this is a good or a bad development. Right. So, I think that there will be some sort of a shift. Whether public opinion will follow that. I mean, how, how powerful this re-assessment of the siege mentality will be, we will see, right. I mean, certainly, the narrative has changed. And, as you certainly know, Netanyahu at some point tweeted that the Emirates are an advanced democracy. He then had to delete that tweet after that. So, the narrative is shifting - and I think that this is important. Although we should not forget that, you know, the normalization agreements with, particularly the Gulf states, with the Emirates in particular. We should not forget on what they are based, right? It's not...what lots of it is basically, a business transaction: arms deals and surveillance technology is a large part of that. And again, you know, thinking about taking the bigger picture and taking off flooding a region, which is already one of the most militarized regions in the world, if not the most militarized region in the world, with additional weapons and, and surveillance technology that then goes to repressive regimes. Again, this is perhaps not exactly the right way to think about peace and security from a broader perspective. But as far as Israel is concerned, I would agree with you that that may really lead to a change in the mindset. But then there is, of course, there's also another aspect to that, right. And this is what Israeli politicians and people from the security establishment may tell you off the record now. That if Israel has an issue, as long as it's terrorism, as long as there is threats, as long as Iran is depicted as an existential threat, Israel does not have any incentive to tackle the Palestinian problem. But on the other hand, if there is no threat, there's usually no incentive either. So, this is also important to keep in mind.

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Absolutely...I want to now move to another dimension of your work, which is Israel's relations with the EU and with the European Union. This is initially a very broad question. My apologies if this is too broad. But when you look at this relationship today, from the perspective of Europe, and from the perspective of Israel - Israelis are always fond of kind of dismissing Europe. As seeing Europe as a place that is deeply hostile to Israel, if not hostile to Jews, and I'm kind of missing criticism that comes from Islam. And yet, the EU is Israel's major trading partner and has important bilateral agreements with Israel. How do you see this complicated relationship between European countries in particular and Israel? Is it moving in a more positive direction in terms of strengthening ties, or do you see this relationship becoming more strained over time?

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DEL SARTO: A friend, a colleague of mine, once put it very bluntly, Israel loves to hate Europe, and I think there is a lot to this, right. Because, um, the rhetoric around Europe, as you were just saying, is very unconnected to the reality of relations between both sides. That still the idea that Europe is a hostile place. And what I have heard more recently, which I find very worrying, in a way, the myth that Europe is financing terrorism, and it's Europe financing Hamas, for example, is sometimes made by pundits and politicians who should know better, right. So, the absolutely right, that there is this idea that Europe is hostile. And there is a complete disconnect between that and the reality of economic relations. And it's not just economics, it's not just trade, it's also Israel participating in various programs of the European Union and having a status that is hardly - you find it very difficult to compare it to other countries that are not EU member states, right. Where we can also think about the cooperation on research and development, for example, and other issues. So, what has been somehow working in favor of Israel's right-wing policies. Here I'm not saying in favor of Israel, because I think that very often in the public discourse, the mistake is made that Israeli policies or the State of Israel are equated with Israel's right-wing governments. And I think that the two are different that we have to distinguish between the two. So, what is usually...what is at the moment working in favor of Israeli right-wing governments is that Europe is internally very divided. It has different problems it had to deal with. Last but not least, Brexit, COVID of course, issues regarding migration, divisions among member states regarding the rule of law. And so, the Europeans, they continue to make the declarations, which have actually particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian issue - on the Palestinian question - which have been relatively, which have not changed much over the last 20-30 years. So, there's a clear commitment to international law and relevant resolutions. But at the same time, the fact that that the European Union is so much divided has actually prevented the Europeans from taking any other step, let's say. And I think even more important is that Israel was the Israeli governments was really skilled in building up relationships with countries, for example, Hungary, Poland to a certain extent, more recently Greece, and other countries. They're not all related to each other, right, Greece and other countries that has to do with the gas issue in the Mediterranean. Relations to Hungary and Poland, and other countries in Eastern Europe. That's again, that's a different story. But basically, Israel has managed to build very good relations with these countries, which will make any decision on European policies towards Israel and the Palestinians much more difficult, because the main issue is that particular declarations are the same that have always been made. So, there is no major change here. Trade policies is the purview of the European Commission that works almost as an automatic process. But for any other issue, any other policy, you need agreement among 27 member states. And so, of course, if Israel has allies, Hungary, Poland, Germany has traditionally been always very supportive of Israel because of history. Now you also have Greece and so on and so on. It makes it impossible to find a common position on any policies that would basically mean, I don't know...use our leverage in order to put the two-state solution back on the table, for example. That has become increasingly difficult.

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WAXMAN: So, I mean, cynically, I might suggest that was Israel's - at least Prime Minister Netanyahu's strategy - was to kind of peel away with the Central European, Eastern European countries in order to prevent the EU from making any sort of concerted intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Given that and given this kind of disunity among its 27 members, is it just a fantasy when people talk about the EU taking on a more important role in trying to mediate the conflict. In the past couple of years in the United States, the Trump administration has seemed to, you know, depart from the kind of traditional role of a mediator or trying to be a "honest broker." There has been some discussion that maybe the EU could step up. And least that's what the Palestinian Authority would like, the EU to...If I'm understanding your analysis, are you skeptical of the EU's ability to ever take on that role in this internal disunity?

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DEL SARTO: Yes, I'm skeptical. I mean, if being a mediator means to be able to exert pressure on both sides, let's say, which means exerting pressure, carrots and sticks, for example, as well, on the Palestinians, and on Israel. I mean, if this is the role of the negotiator or mediator, then I find it very difficult. And then I'm very skeptical to see a greater European role, although the Europeans are so heavily invested in Israel and in the Palestinian territories, that they do have a lot of leverage, theoretically. Right. The problem is really to find 27 member states agreeing on using that leverage, either with the Palestinians or with Israel. And here I'm very skeptical.

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WAXMAN: We have a government talking formally about annexing parts of the West Bank on that, at least, at least rhetorically, it seemed that European Union took a strong position, a united position, against formal annexation. Do you think that had any impact on Israel? I mean, is that really one of these rare instances where the EU was able to use its leverage.

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DEL SARTO: Well, the whole issue of the annexation that remained pretty much at the rhetorical level. I mean, certainly, the Europeans were thinking about some steps that could be done, had Israel really proceeded towards the towards the annexation of the West Bank. But as a matter of fact, the Europeans were very, very...They didn't really know what to do and how to find a majority for specific steps that could have been taken. So, I think that the Europeans were very, very happy when, when the annexation was taken off the table. Because on the one hand, sure, it's exactly I mean. The Europeans have always maintained and upheld the two-state solution. And they have also invested in that type of off-solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the moment that...so they had to have this very strong reaction. And I think also among the European public, the idea of annexation was definitely unacceptable for the majority of European populations, right. But then the moment is one thing to make a strong declaration. But then, you know, what if Israel proceeds with that, what do you do then? So, do you impose some sanctions, which is already, you know, very difficult. Even the word is difficult considering Jewish European history. But do you exert some pressure? Do you threaten to suspend the free trade agreements? Do you threaten to suspend discussions on other issues, right? And for that, you need a majority, not only majority, in many most cases, you need unanimity. So, I think that once the topic was off the table, there was a big sigh of relief in European capitals, and in Brussels in particular.

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WAXMAN: So since then, but he wasn't really backing up its words with actions. It's more rhetoric then than anything else. Is this also the case when it comes to its so-called differentiation policy in trying to exclude the West Bank and specifically Israeli settlements, from the EU's bilateral agreements is this also something that's more rhetorical than real in your in your opinion? Or do you see this moving forward? And if so, is this how the EU is at least trying to cling on to the possibility of a two-state solution to the conflict?

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DEL SARTO: Yes, it definitely is. It is. It is also I mean, that the idea is really to have the exclusion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank anchored in every any other agreement that will be signed between Israel and the European Union. Now, of course, there are different assessments as to whether this is very effective. Some will tell you that, well, there are funds from the Israeli government that compensate the settlements for this loss, right. There are ways around it in the sense of not exporting to having different lines of production, for example, production lines for products that then go to Israel and rest of the world, and those that are then moved to, let's say, Tel Aviv in order to export to the European Union, and so on. So, this is proceeding and some will also tell you that, at the end of the day, the trade of the Israeli settlements with the European Union is not that important that it would really hurt, right. So suddenly, there is this issue. And as I said before, I think there, there certainly are some proposals that policymakers in Brussels and other capitals, have been discussing and have been discussing for many years, usually off the record. And several options how the Europeans could exert or could play their leverage...in order to get to a two-state solution. But the political will and the unanimity among more member states is lacking. And then I think another aspect is also with looking at the broader Middle East. You know, Israel is a stable country, and the Palestinian Authority is also providing stability, for the time being at least, right. So, there is also the idea, maybe not the idea, maybe it's not something that is very explicit. But certainly, one interest of the Europeans is to have stability and stability in the neighborhood, right. So why would you try to rock the boat considering that the neighborhood is already so complicated, and potentially unstable and potentially unstable, right.

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WAXMAN: In an article you published last year in the Middle East Journal, you described European policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as quote, stuck in the logic of Oslo. Why is that the case? Is that also because of the EU's preference for stability over change?

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DEL SARTO: Now, definitely, I think that there is. There is a preference for stability that characterizes the European Union, or the European foreign policies towards all of its so-called neighborhood, because whatever happens in the Mediterranean, Middle East is affecting Europe more directly, than it affects the United States. For example, not think only about refugee issues or other issues. So, there's certainly a preference for stability, and also what I think is important to consider that the European Union is a very large and slowly moving party, right? In order to say, oh, we got to change the policy. I mean, it takes time. And then as I said before, I mean, you still need you would still need the unanimity among the member states. So that's why I said, okay, so the basically, the European Union is still stuck in the Oslo process. Certainly, I mean, it, it doesn't mean that. I mean, you could also reach the two-state solution by moving away from the from the Oslo logic, right. And, for example, one of the issues that is being done behind closed doors, and that is being discussed, is recognizing upfront the unequal power relations. And that would mean recognizing the Palestinians as a state. So that, then you would have negotiations between two, they would still not be equal, right. But there would still be more equal negotiating partners than before. And here we see that some parliament's in single-member states, as well as the European Parliament, they have passed resolutions which are not binding in most cases. Actually, in all cases, they're not binding to recognize Palestine as a state. And then take it from there. And then you start negotiating, right. Or even the idea of saying we could recognize Palestine as a state, and that should then work as a natural carrot or stick in order to put the negotiations back on the table. And Sweden is the only country that has actually officially recognized Palestine as a state. So instead of waiting, I mean, I think that single-member states maybe perhaps be more eager, it may be easier to see policies coming from the single-member states. But expecting the European Union as a whole, to really change policies, I think this will be very, very, very difficult, although there have been many European intellectuals and former policymakers and people with high-ranking political positions that have called on the European Union, to change the policies. Because the policies that the EU has been adopting in the last 20-30 years, they have not really worked, right. I mean, if the objective is to see the resolution of the conflict, well, in a way, many criticize that the Europeans have actually been keeping the status quo in a way, right. They have supported, they're supporting the Palestinian Authority, which is becoming more and more repressive, and so on and so forth. And the status quo is not static at the same time because settlements are expanding, right.

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WAXMAN: One area that's come to mind in terms of the EU's relations with the Palestinian Authority...Europeans, at least in recent months, seem to be making some progress on is the so-called what in America is called this "pay to slay," you know, the payments for Palestinians in Israeli prison for security offenses or for terrorism. And you know, this in the United States has been a big domestic political issue, a controversial issue. ...Given that the EU is the largest funder of the Palestinian Authority, the EU seems to be applying some pressure currently to get the Palestinian Authority to change its kind of payment structure.

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DEL SARTO: Yeah, yeah. Yes, yes. There are certainly some discussions on that. And some, I'm not sure how much the policy and how much I mean Some pressure is being exerted. I'm not sure how much there is. This would not become an official policy, but some pressure there is certainly being exerted. But altogether, the European Union, and its single member states are the largest supporters and the largest financial contributors, not only for the Palestinian Authority, but also to Umrah. And so they have a leverage on that side as well very obviously, right. And as I said before, the discussions that you have in some European capitals and off the record in Brussels as well. Some say, right, I mean, perhaps the EU should stop us should stop supporting the Palestinian Authority, or together phasing out the support for the Palestinian Authority, because that may then force Israel to take up its responsibilities, right.

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WAXMAN: At risk of instability.

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DEL SARTO: I don't think that will happen.

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WAXMAN: Ah yeah right. Yes, well, so I suppose to sum up, then there's likely to be more continuity than change in the EU's relations with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Perhaps maybe it's at the level of individual member states that we may see some shifts in terms of their policies. But the kind of fear or hope, depending on your perspective, that the Europeans will be able to play a different, more constructive role in resolving the conflict seems to be some way off at this. Dr. Del Sarto, thank you for that really enlightening discussion of both Israel's relations with Europe and Europe's attitudes towards Israel. I think, certainly, both in the United States and Israel, there's often very little understanding of how the EU operates and the internal politics and the internal decision-making of the EU. So, I hope all of our listeners have really benefited from learning a little bit about how complex that is. And the various forces driving the EU's policies. Thank you, Dr. Del Sarto for joining us. You've been listening to an episode of Israel in Depth, produced by the UCLA Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. Thank you for listening.

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