Transcript of Israel in Depth podcast, taped November 5, 2020

Dov Waxman: Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, policymakers, and leading experts come to discuss topics about Israel in depth. You're listening to a podcast by the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center, and the host of this podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is Scott Lasensky, a professor of Israel Studies at the University of Maryland. He previously served as a senior policy advisor on Israel, the Middle East and Jewish affairs in the Obama administration, from 2011 to 2017. He spent part of this time in Israel, where he was the senior advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to Israel at the time, Daniel Shapiro. He was deeply involved in all aspects of the U.S.-Israel bilateral relationship. He was previously a senior policy advisor to U.S. ambassadors to the U.N., Susan Rice and Samantha Power, focusing on Israel, the Palestinians and Syria. And before that, he was a resident scholar at the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Council of Foreign Relations. Dr. Lasensky is the co-author of The Peace Puzzle: America's Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, published in 2013, and Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East, published in 2008. Both of those books co-authored with former U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Daniel Kurtzer. Dr. Lasensky received his Ph.D. from Brandeis University, and I'm pleased to say his undergraduate degree from UCLA. It's a great pleasure for me to welcome Dr. Lasensky onto the show. We are recording this episode of Israel in Depth on Thursday, November 5th, which, as you may all know, is just two days after voting ended in the U.S. presidential election. And while the votes are still being counted in a few crucial battleground states, we don't yet know the outcome of this election. But it looks increasingly likely that President Trump has lost his bid for reelection; that Joe Biden will be the next U.S. president. So with that in mind, I hope it's not premature. But I'd like us to assess President Trump's record on Israel over the past four years and the Trump administration's record on Israel. To begin with, President Trump, I think, has undoubtedly been immensely popular in Israel. There are even city squares named after him and a settlement on the Golan Heights that now bears his name. And in the pre-election surveys that were held among Israelis, it showed the large majority of Israelis -- I think 70% -- prefer Trump over Biden. So Dr. Lasensky, based upon your knowledge of Israel and of Israelis and U.S.-Israel relations, why do you think Israelis -- and especially Jewish Israelis -- have been such strong supporters of President Trump? In many ways, he's more popular in Israel than perhaps anywhere else in the world.

Scott Lasensky: Well, first of all, thank you, Dov for inviting me. If I close my eyes, I can imagine myself back at Bunche Hall. Most of my memories are waiting for the elevators. Maybe you've waited for the elevators.

Waxman: Still the case today.

Lasensky: Nothing has changed, I see. Thank you. And yes, UCLA is an anchor of my education. In fact, my interest in Israel, if you don't mind, I'll mention, was sparked at UCLA. I made a decision that was more popular at the time, a little less popular these days, to spend my third year of my B.A. -- my junior year -- at the University of California's Education Abroad program. Took a full year in Israel and happened to be a very momentous year of the Gulf War, first Gulf War. And I think from that year, I've kind of stuck to the issue almost uninterrupted. What accounts for President Trump's popularity in Israel? First, I would say two things. One, I would argue with you a little bit, and I would wrestle with the question. I think it's somewhat superficial to cite some of the Israeli media polls of the last days and weeks, or even you mentioned this, quote, unquote, settlement in the Golan Heights. The last I heard it was just a sign that was sort of half tilted, and letters were falling off. Nobody lives there. Politicians in Israel, and others in the public sphere for them, they are opportunities to embrace the president. And to project that and to create almost, I would call it a theater around the relationship. Just like there's benefits for Trump. I'm sure in the course of the next half hour, we'll go back to the subject of domestic politics in both countries. First, again, I would say I don't think...it's a little oversimplified to suggest that Trump is widely popular in Israel, in the sense that a political leader is popular at home. For Israelis, a majority Jewish country, which has a Jewish political experience fused into 72 years of an Israeli experience where the world is often seen in hostile or adversarial terms where it's us against them, or the country is besieged. Under Netanyahu, it is experiencing a kind of renaissance of foreign relations, but that mindset is still there. So when a leader comes, particularly a leader from a major world power, a world power that's been Israel's primary global patron for the last 50 years and effectively (and forgive the use of this political science terminology), but effectively acts like the candyman, and comes around offering almost anything that the country's leaders are asking for, and asks for very little in return. Who doesn't love the candyman? And when you add to that the opportunities that Israeli leaders have found in the embrace of Trump, and also if you look back and if you did want to hone in on Israeli public attitudes broadly, beyond just political elites, well, you know, views are mercurial. If you looked at the polls, you'd see Barack Obama, maybe not quite the numbers where Trump is, but very popular after he came to the country, 2013 -- first trip of his second term. I spent a lot of time with Israelis, went all around the country. His numbers were very high. But pretty soon, the U.S. was doing what it's done for most of the last 50 years, not including the last four years, and was building a relationship that had some asks along with what the U.S. offered. Trump has been a unique and singular moment in this long arc of U.S.-Israel relations. And I think his popularity is mostly grounded in, I would say, the symbolism and the sentiment, and when it comes down to brass tacks, there were no brass tacks; he came as the candyman. He offered a lot and asked for very little.

Waxman: So just like to pick up on that point. As you know, President Trump's approach to Israel seemed in many ways to be very much in contrast to his approach to other countries, including other traditional U.S. allies, where his typical approach was kind of very transactional. You know, I'll do I'll give you this if you give me that. How much are we getting out of this relationship? You know, it's very much based upon this kind of quid pro quo approach to politics, which seems indeed to typify his genuine kind of worldview in many ways. But not when it came to Israel. With Israel, as you know, it was it was really a one way, you know, lots of free gifts, if you like. Why do you think that was the case? Why almost uniquely, as far as I can think of, did it did the president and the Trump administration take such a different approach to Israel as unlike its relationships with other countries around the world?

Lasensky: It's a great question, Dov. I would answer, I was told once limit your answers to three points at the most. I'll make four, if you don't mind. First and foremost, maybe I'll make three points but an initial point of context. You're asking about a period when it seems that Israel and the strategic interests that Israel brings into view, in terms of American foreign policy. We seem to be at a historic low point, you know. Look a half a century ago, Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the October War, 1973. There was an Arab oil embargo; there was a major crisis in the Cold War...nuclear alert -- could have been world war three. And I could give you half a dozen other examples when Israel, its conflict with its Arab neighbors, sometimes the opportunities for solving that conflict -- take the Israel-Egypt peace agreement -- had major regional and international and implications. You don't see that strategic context. And when you pull it away, I think...by the way, this is what we're exploring, and I'm writing with my co-authors, Dan Kurtzer, and also Shibley Telhami at the University of Maryland and Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, at the U.S. Institute of Peace. We're writing a new book, and we're exploring the current period and the opportunities for domestic politics to rise and become far more influential in a setting where the strategic context around Israel is probably at a...I'm not sure I could say an all-time low, but certainly a half-century low. And now, if you take that context as your main prism, I'll cite for you three factors that probably shaped this. You call it an exception to the typical Trump transactional approach. Rule number one, you have this alignment, ideological, and I would even say tactical between Trump and his foreign policy worldview, and the current Israeli leadership - Netanyahu and their current...and those around him. Take the question of the killing of Soleimani. Take the question of skepticism toward international institutions, sort of unilateralist bent. Finding informal alliances, not joining formal structures. There's a Republican and a Likud religious right alignment that's been brewing for many years. And I think that factor number one that kind of feeds into this approach of an alignment rather than initially looking for a transaction. Second, the president -- and I think it's clear from the very first visit in May of 2017 -- when he came to Israel. And some of the most potent images of him in the Old City at the Western Wall. For Trump, he found an issue that excited his political base. In fact, if you want to set aside the trip in 2017, jump ahead another year. The president, you know, we all read doesn't like to travel actually outside of the U.S. all that much. So he skipped the opening of the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem. Rather remarkable, but consistent with what we heard. But the orchestration of that event...I had my students at the University of Maryland just this last week, we watched the speeches of the Pastor Robert Jeffress and John Hagee. And what you can't see when you're looking at the speaker is the audience -- packed with Republican and evangelical figures. Yes, there were Jewish American leaders there, too. But there were Republican candidates for office and Republican officeholders. It was a dramatic display, I think, of how the president's voter base and political base became a major defining element of policy toward Israel. That's number two. Republican and Likud Israeli sort of ideological and foreign policy alignment, the president's political base. And I think in here, I'll leave political science aside, and maybe...at UCLA, I was a history major...You have to add individuals into this. And there are a number of figures in the Trump administration who have been highly influential, whether it's the current Ambassador David Friedman, or the current Secretary of State, Pompeo, and there are others. Nikki Haley, perhaps in the first two years. There are people in significant positions in the Trump administration in the last four years who have...who have agendas. They're certainly aligned with the president's. They're not out of alignment, but they brought up an extra focus and intensity, a drive to make some policy changes, and also make some policy statements, and project a certain image. And they succeeded in doing that. And these were things that they wanted to do without transactions, you know, at no cost. Nikki Haley didn't ask for anything in return, in terms of the posture she took at the U.N. on matters related to Israel. And as it seems, neither did Ambassador Friedman on some of the very significant changes that he's shepherded and overseen in terms of the U.S. posture on the Palestinian question. Where you've probably seen when you leave sentiment and symbolism aside on the Palestinian issue, I think that's where you've seen the most concrete and potentially some of the most lasting changes in American policy.

Waxman: So on that question. You yourself have advised a U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., as well as the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. So I think, probably better than anybody you could assess, to what extent the Trump administration, whether it's Ambassador Friedman, or Nikki Haley, departed from not only the Obama administration's, not only the policies and approach of his immediate predecessors. But I think as you're suggesting that actually a much more long standing tradition of ambassadors. I mean, to what extent is David Friedman's become kind of a norm breaker, almost in terms of the role he took...he's taken on as U.S. Ambassador to Israel.

Lasensky: First, just so you know. Ah, the election just passed. I'm right at the point where I'm feeling comfortable talking about it. I just felt it necessary to observe my own personal set of this, you know, silence. I left the American Embassy, he (Friedman) and his team came in shortly thereafter. Until today, I'm not commenting on him and those around him. I think one term is enough of a...if you would allow me. I'll allow myself. Yeah, Ambassador Friedman has had an extraordinary impact on U.S. policy, on driving changes, particularly on the Palestinian issue. He also represents something that is not different, but an acceleration of a trend. The U.S. tends to have professional foreign service civil servants to serve as ambassador to Israel until relatively recently. I believe Martin Indyk might have been the first political appointee, and then it was sort of alternating back and forth. And with Ambassador Shapiro, who I worked for, and now Friedman, Israel may be permanently shifted to the category of place where the U.S., you know, in this informal division of where a president sends his own appointees, and where the foreign service is utilized to produce ambassadors. Israel may be permanently shifted into that category of an appointee. Where Friedman is unique is in two respects. One, he came without any substantive background on foreign policy. And this probably is what explains the, I would say, the slow pace in driving some of the changes that he sought in 2017 and 2018. He had to learn the issues. How to kind of metaconcept of where you want it to go on settlements, on Jerusalem on a range of other issues. But he wasn't immersed in those issues. He's rather unique in that sense, though, he brought a lot of personal stock with him. And I have to say, for any ambassador to any country, for someone who's got what we often say, in Washington, walk-in rights to the Oval Office, that's an incredible source of influence wherever you serve. So David Friedman clearly came with that, perhaps more so than any American ambassador who's ever served in Israel, even more maybe than the legendary Sam Lewis or others. You know, a lot of rumors in Washington, Dov. The rumors were he came back regularly, once every month or two. Would always see the president. Would always go to the Oval Office. But his lack of a background in foreign policy was certainly significant. And second, and I know you won't remember because for some of us, this is seared in our minds, his confirmation hearings in 2017, and how stark they were. How, you know, he squeaked through with, I think it was just a handful of votes. The vast majority of Jewish American communal leadership raised either serious questions or opposed his appointment. Unheard of -- never, never happened before. The American Ambassador to Israel is seen informally as an ambassador of the American Jewish community, and to have that sort of anchor community raise issues was really quite extraordinary. But again, he's not...he's not the only one. I think when you put it all together, and you find I mentioned Nikki Haley, Pompeo, they courted conservative voters, evangelicals. There's some opportunism and agendas that have merged with the president's directives, and with longer-standing patterns of where the Israeli right and religious right and the Republican Party on foreign policy have been headed for a while. One on top of the other, on top of the other.

Waxman: So, one element of this emerging alliance has been the growing role of Christians United for Israel. And you mentioned the opening of the U.S Embassy in Jerusalem. I think CUFI, Christians United for Israel, the largest pro-Israel lobby group now -- with the most members, and by far -- larger than the entire population of American Jewry, they claim -- took a lead role in lobbying for that decision. Do you think that... I mean, CUFI, and evangelical Christians more generally have kind of eclipsed the traditional role that say AIPAC and Jewish Americans have played in terms of the domestic, you know, group that's most mobilized, most influential in shaping the U.S. policy?

Lasensky: It's a great question. Before I answer it, I'll just throw in a methodological quandary, which is, you know, how does one identify (and you're a better political scientist than I am)...How does one identify the connection, the causal connection from advocacy and activism to impact and to political outcomes? You can have, you know. Take any example you'd like to have, Dov. I know you have 100, in your mind. Take the letter of 70 some senators in 1975 to tell President Ford stop, you know, reassessment. Was it Jim Baker's tough testimonies with the Democratic-controlled House in the late 1980s over peace process policy. Take, you know, their numerous examples. Can you say definitively that because the outcome is aligned...matches the advocacy agenda? Can you say definitively that one is the result of the other? So I think there's a there's a methodological question, and we just have to find and document enough indicators. I think it's less than meets the eye; that's why I raised the methodological question. And second, I would say, they haven't replaced, I would say...it's just added to the mix. You have J Street and other voices in American Jewry that have diluted or complicated, what for AIPAC was largely a monopolistic role in terms of trying to channel American Jewish advocacy through a single organization in Washington. So that has become more complex and diverse within the Jewish community. In the broader foreign policy and domestic advocacy around adding CUFI and evangelicals. It's just added to a more complex array. What the...what these last four years emphasized for us, I think is something that we learned...that we teach our undergraduates, which is that in foreign policy, the president, in practice and by the Constitution, has inordinate authority and influence. This is a realm of incredible discretion by the president. Congress has its role, limited roles: oversight, ratifying treaties, confirming ambassadors, foreign aid, of course, the power of the purse. But on a day to day level, unlike virtually every domestic issue, the president has tremendous discretion on foreign policy. And when you take away the lack of overwhelming strategic imperatives when it comes to Israel...Again, this is...We can dispute this, but I think this is what's distinctive about this period. And you take a president, whether it's Donald Trump or anyone else who has incredible discretion, who brings in a team that is also driven and has a clear set of goals that they want to accomplish. It's very easy to rewrite the rules, the U.S.-Israel relationship -- and they have been rewritten in the last four years.

Waxman: So that leads me to my next question. I mean, in terms of the rewriting, you mentioned earlier in your comments that you thought some of these changes could be permanent, or at least...What would you assess in terms of the legacy? I mean, how do we...What should we expect in the future now...another...You mentioned the transformation of the U.S. ambassador's role. The extreme closeness that the United States took vis-�-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with regard to Israel. Kind of the abandonment of the U.S.'s traditional attempt to the so-called honest broker, and instead really heavily favoring Israel over the Palestinians. To what extent do you think those shifts will last? Was this just the kind of aberration over the last four years and now if a different administration comes into office, things will revert back to the status quo ante? Or do you actually think that there's a kind of a lasting impact?

Lasensky: First, I have a general view in life, which is progressive. And I think foreign policy also, it accrues and moves forward. And there is no such thing as a reset. We don't we don't move backwards. I would divide the agenda, or I would split your question into three parts. You know, one, there's the core tenants of the U.S.-Israel relationship. What are the core tenants of the U.S.-Israel Alliance? Close intelligence sharing, really intense defense cooperation, U.S. aid -- no longer economic, now entirely security and defense-related. We have an effective alliance with Israel, it's come via because of common interest. It's come because of common values. To a large extent, I think you and I agree (that's been part of our own research over the years)...To a large extent, it's a byproduct of American peacemaking efforts and commitments and trade-offs we made over the decades when we were most successful in brokering Arab-Israeli peace. So a big chunk of the alliance is a legacy. That effort partially completed. And I think that is something you can that...That has remained consistent under Trump. He probably would have liked to add a lot more. But there's not that much to add when you have such close relations in those realms: security, defense, intelligence -- an effective alliance. If you look to the Palestinian issue as a core element of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there you see, I think a mixed bag. Some of the changes will be permanent. It's hard to see in practice or politically, let's say, renouncing, the recognition of Jerusalem, or the symbolic moving of the embassy in practice. And it's a dizzying array we'd use up the entire remaining minutes we have for this podcast if I was to describe to you the footprint of the U.S. government in Israel on the ground, which I learned during the years I served there. We're all over the place. There's institution and buildings all over the place. There is no actual single embassy. But I think it's a mixed agenda on the Palestinian issue. Some of the policy shift...Some of the changes in policy probably will get amended; some will evolve; some will remain. And then third, I would say on other elements that have been such a signature of the Trump approach to Israel, let's say at the U.N., I would take almost, or I would encourage you and others to take almost a neutral position because they're largely derivative of other issues. If a new president takes office and is deeply committed to the U.N. and to multilateralism and wants to invest there the way that let's say Barack Obama did, then that's how we deal with and treat Israel is going to be deeply connected. Perhaps even derivative of that. But again, at the U.N., sort of like with the overall alliance, you know, there are some core elements. The U.S. has been defending Israel and trying to protect it from unfair treatment in the international realm under many, many presidents. It's just that, you know, President Trump has added an accent to it and an effect that is a little bit different. But he hasn't done and again, I guess it's a derivative of his policy. Since he hasn't invested in the U.N. And he's taken such a skeptical, adversarial, and standoffish approach to alliances and to the U.N. and to multilateral institutions. Therefore, he hasn't been investing and trying to get Israel more involved or included. When I work for Ambassador Rice, we would call it the positive agenda. That we were out there at the request of Israel, not just to defend them against unfair treatment, but to get them more involved. I mean, the U.N. is both a real place where things get done in the international realm on a whole range of issues, from health to poverty to security issues. It's also symbolic in many respects. And there's no arena in the international system that's as symbolic as the U.N. terms of Israel's long standing desire to be recognized and to be involved. And Israeli ambassadors to the U.N. and political figures don't get votes by making speeches about that. But I can guarantee you from three years in the trenches, and from what I've watched before and since, that's what Israeli diplomats are doing all the time. They're trying to get more involved. When I was there, 2013-14 -- or actually were 14-15 -- worked on this incredible idea. I thought it was it was nuts. Ron Prosor, former Israeli ambassador to the U.N., wanted the United Nations to recognize Yom Kippur. You know, you had Christmas, and Eid, then there were Islamic, and Christian holidays, American holidays as host nation. Who wanted Yom Kippur War, the holiest day of the Jewish calendar? A lot of people thought that was crazy. But with the help of the U.S., we found a majority. And since 2016 or so, Yom Kippur -- I don't know if you even know Dov. It's sort of a sideline issue, but very potent for Israelis. And it's something Ron Prosor wanted. Did he get headlines for it? I think they were on page seven, page eight. Did you get headlines when he would trash the Security Council or some other U.N. body with a fire breathing speech? Sure, that that sells better in Israel. But that positive agenda matters a lot. You didn't see a lot of it under President Trump because he wasn't investing, let's say in an arena like the U.N. But you saw him under President Obama, you may see it under the next president.

Waxman: Of course. I mean, you've been at the U.N. and many -- I think many of President Trump's supporters would point out...would remember...Many people remember most when it comes to the Obama administration, the thing that most people seize upon and remember is the decision not to veto the resolution in the waning days of the Obama administration to criticize Israel's settlement building. And it's kind of one...That's probably the most, you know, that the kind of parting shot that many people remember. And I don't want to litigate that.

Lasensky: December 23rd around noon. It was seven o'clock Israel time. I remember where I was.

Waxman: Oh yeah. So that's...But in terms of the kind of difference...the different approach that the Trump administration adopted, both at the United Nations, where it was a very kind of a strong supporter of Israel and critic of the U.N. But more broadly, as well. I mean that I think the Trump administration and the supporters would argue that, in fact, their approach to Israel wasn't just a slight shift, but a repudiation in many ways of all of the accumulated wisdom of people such as yourself, who said: you can't do this; you can't move the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. We need to have quid pro quos.

You need...So their whole approach was...

Lasensky: The president actually relishes. It's interesting you bring that up. He relishes, and it's part of the larger Trump political profile. He relishes taking the unconventional view. In fact, if you've heard him speak about the decision on Jerusalem, he often says in his typical kind of slightly inflated way, he says, oh, the, you know, the intelligence people or the defense people, you know, they all told me, the Middle East would catch on fire. All hell would break loose, or things like that. And he says, I did it. No other president. Every president promised it, I did it -- and look all hell didn't break loose. While there actually were some pretty concrete costs that we that we did pay, but he doesn't like to pay attention to this. That dozens of people were killed. Actually, the day the embassy was open, in some pretty intense violence in Gaza. Palestinians at the leadership level haven't spoken to the U.S. in three years now. It didn't come totally cost-free. But he does relish that breaking of conventions. And in fact, the whole peace, from Kushner to Friedman to Greenblatt, they've relished in many interviews actually saying, well, you know, what did the last administration or the last 20 years of peacemaking get us? They've pointed to failure as a rationale for doing things that are totally different. But in fact, they've broken conventions in ways that...I'll say something about where they have made some progress. But they've broken conventions in ways that have...They've fumbled, and they've wasted American capital. Just take the issue of the Trump peace plan. They drew a map. American diplomats didn't draw a map. We talked about principles. We do want to get bogged down in the details. We didn't want to lock ourselves. And we talked about principles, whether it's the '67 border or swaps. Our position on swaps kind of changed over time. It used to be a conversation about percentages under Clinton, and then we moved on from there. But we scrupulously avoided, you know, drawing a map. It was widely considered to be a dead-end approach. You know they did that in a way that didn't get them much. They still had settlers against...and a lot of the Israeli right saying they didn't like the map. Didn't go far enough. It certainly was a non-starter with Palestinians and with most of the Arab world. But what they did get right, and it goes back maybe to your earlier question about transactional approach to foreign policy. It's interesting by their fourth year, the president did find a deal out there. Now, maybe it was spurred by his desire for deliverables and for good news stories, as the reelection campaign heated up. But he did find a trade space with the U.A.E., Bahrain. From press reports, we see that maybe there were other countries that were approached -- Oman, Sudan just a couple of weeks ago, and he found a way to push forward. These are not paradigm-breaking agreements. This isn't shifting something like the Cold War when Israel and Egypt made peace, but they shouldn't be undersold as well. They're very meaningful agreements. They involve side payments by the U.S. Transactions that I think we still don't know all the details about. But he didn't move that ball forward. Israel has a more open and stronger relations with some countries. It came with some costs. It's not cost-free. But he found a way to transact that, and it was a way to actually to walk this Israeli government back from what their stated plan or their seeming intention to go forward with annexation, something that for many of us who watched that issue, thought would be a fool's errand. So despite the setting aside of the transactional approach, as I said, fueled by ideological alignments and political considerations and a team of advisors who really had their agendas set, the transactions kind of came into view toward the end. Perhaps his most lasting impact will be there.

Waxman: So given lots and you know, these normalization agreements, particularly between Israel in the U.A.E., but also Bahrain and Sudan, given the moving of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, which as you've said, will be permanent. It's not going to move back to Tel Aviv. The recognition of Israeli sovereignty or Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. All of these things. I mean, when you put up this list, isn't it...wouldn't not suggest that as the Trump campaign was insisting over the past few months to Jewish voters, and his way to do that, that President Trump's record in office has been, from Israel's point of view...has been the stellar record. Or do you think that, in fact, as far as the Trump administration's critics have argued, that actually, you know, that's kind of shiny toys. But in terms of Israel's core interests, Israel is worse off today. So ultimately, how should we evaluate these past four years?

Lasensky: I'm not sure...I'm going to duck your question but answer it in a different way. I think you touched partly on a phenomenon that I've been calling Trump's soft support in the American Jewish community. That we know from poll after poll and election after election, for decades that Jewish American voters don't have Israel high on their minds in presidential elections. That doesn't mean Israel doesn't matter. Of course it matters. Perhaps its issue number one in Jewish American organizational life, advocacy. In survey after survey over the last 12 to 15 months, plus some anecdotes (and I'm happy to add the anecdotal examples if you want them). I've detected a pretty discernible degree of what I call soft support. The decision to move the embassy to Jerusalem, other decisions that relate to Israel, in public or in private, have been applauded by Jewish American voters, American leaders and voters. Just look at the most recent survey American Jewish Committee on Israel. Trump gets 40-some percent. The Jewish Electorate Institute back in February, I think had Trump over 50% in terms of Jewish American support on the question of Israel. Asked if they feel less secure, Jewish American voters -- sure, much less secure. Asked about health care, ask about anything else, and you have, I think, the largest degree of opposition. The biggest numbers opposed to Trump, second only to African Americans. But on the question of Israel, you see a degree of soft support. So I just wanted to add that in because that's a complexity and a nuance that often gets missed when someone cites or you just look at, let's say, voting in the voting booth. But this question you asked about the ultimate...the balance sheet in terms of president's contribution or benefit vis-�-vis Israel, I think it brings into view something you and I Dov, we wrote about in an essay some years ago. And remind me, the Journal of Modern Jewish Studies, maybe. Maybe you'll correct me. When we wrote about the Jewish foreign policy, and we wrote about instances when conflicts do arise between Jewish interests and Israeli interests and how they get sorted out. The Trump presidency in some respects, perhaps in a large respect, brings into view that conundrum or that tension, particularly for American Jews. I would hope for Israelis, as well, the self-declared Jewish state for whom the welfare of the Jewish people inside and outside of the country is a high order concern. Sometimes they have blinders, and they don't see impacts on Jewish communities abroad. Sometimes they see them and they choose, as you and I think, quoted in our essay, sometimes it's a classic Ben Gurion approach. In a conflict between Israel and Jewish values, you know, Israel, I think, what's the, quote, Israeli interests should prevail because Israel is the ultimate interest of the Jewish people. But you know, on questions of anti-Semitism, political polarization, bigotry, a sense among American Jews that they're feeling less secure. All the surveys show a Jewish American public, and of course, the anecdotal evidence shows a Jewish American leadership, deeply, deeply concerned about trends in America -- about their own safety. They feel worse off today than four years ago. And yet you combine that with what I described as soft support for the president...some of his policies on Israel...and you see a very complicated picture and a real conflict. How that gets sorted out, you know, I'm not sure. But it's there and it's present. I mean, it's largely, I think, been sorted out in this election through what you see is overwhelming Jewish American decisions to not support the President. And I say to not support the president in reelection. Why? Because I think that's where the largest, I'll call it a supermajority, comes into view. And I'll just cite one statement. Maybe you say it. It's gone around a lot the last two months. Abe Foxman, the former CEO, president or leader of the ADL, he wrote a statement published in September (and it's been widely circulated). Less of an endorsement of Biden and more of a indictment of Trump, that he's been on the whole, on the net, damaging to Jewish American interests in very serious ways. Elections are clarifying moments, but when it's not an election, when it's 2017, 2018, 2019, I think American Jewry had to find this very difficult balancing act and struggle with what some...again, I'm not saying a supermajority, but a large majority, sometimes half or more, we're celebrating in terms of the president's approach toward Israel. And yet this anxiety and fear. Was that fully understood in Israel? I fear that it hasn't been. I feel, and I worry, it's not absent, but most of the political elite, and certainly those in and around the prime minister of Israel, I think haven't fully understood or internalized have threatened and how anxious American Jewry -- the largest Jewish community outside of Israel -- has been over these four years. Or they perhaps they've seen it, but they've chosen to look away.

Waxman: Well, if that's the case, then I think what's going to happen over the days, the hours, perhaps in the days to come is going to be a very clear manifestation of this differences as large numbers. I mean the overwhelming majority of America...According to the exit polls, you know, somewhere between 70 to even 78% of American Jews, voting for Biden, they're going to be celebrating if indeed, President Trump loses office. While many Israelis will be having a very different reaction. We're really seeing this play out just today (Nov. 5), in this very different reaction. So in that respect, you know, this...the last four years, where as you put it, Israel's interests have been served, or at least, depending on how you define those interests, have been served to some extent by the Trump administration, while the interests of American Jews have been threatened. And as they see it...in many ways just creates a divide between Israel and American Jewry, which will be difficult to repair I think.

Lavensky: I think it will be difficult. And I think you're absolutely right, Dov. But as you know, we're in these hours. I think you mentioned at the beginning, we're in these days and hours where the outcome seems partially clear, but not entirely clear. But assuming there is a new president starting in a couple of months, transitions are a time for reflection. And it would be my hope, I might even say my prediction, that there'll be some degree of stocktaking both in Israel and among American Jews in terms of the importance of traditional core principles. One of those is bipartisanship and what should be entailed in trying to promote and sustain bipartisanship. That will require different approaches and behaviors by both sides. Israel isn't necessarily...and I don't blame either Jewish American or Israeli leaders for the intense partisanship that now colors so much of what goes on between the U.S. and Israel. In many respects, it's a casualty of a larger atmosphere of political polarization. But a lot can be done to try to mitigate. And in my recent writings, I've been bringing up this issue. And at least I can say, with confidence for Jewish Americans, it's been a core tenant of Jewish American political life, particularly for a small community. A small community that largely votes liberal and democratic. As the pendulum swings in American politics back and forth, as it has consistently, in recent decades, Jewish American society has a deep interest in bipartisanship. And a new president, I think, can help...can be very clarifying. But there's a lot of work that needs to be done, as you know, more than anyone, Dov. The organizational array is dizzying. The Jewish world is also in the last, let's say, ten years, I would say, has taken steps toward looking more fragmented and polarized in its organizational structure, not less, so. It's looking more and more like the broader array, where we see in almost every realm, community and religious -- even think tanks, you know -- looking more and more partisan, and less and less nonpartisan, or above the fray. So I would hope if we didn't have a transition coming up, there could be some stocktaking both in Israel in the U.S. on this question. But, you know, there will be tensions that will...in the relationship...that will continue for some time. I mean, I'll just go back to the issue we talked about earlier, the issue of peacemaking. The U.S.-Israel alliance in many respects, it was born, yes of common values. Yes, of common interests. But also, yes, very much of this still to be completed question of Middle East peace. When you have one gaping open wound -- the Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- I think it tugs at the alliance. And it takes a very deft American leader to try to square those two.

Waxman: We will see whether the next president, perhaps President Biden, will be able to square that challenge. Dr. Lasensky, Scott, it's been a pleasure. Thank you so much for sharing your knowledge and your insight of this important, tricky, complicated, contentious relationship that I'm sure will continue to attract a lot of attention in the years to come. So thank you for joining us. You've been listening to an episode of Israel in Depth, produced by the UCLA Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. Thank you for listening.