Israel in Depth Podcast with Dr. Uri Resnick, recorded September 14, 2020.

Dov Waxman: Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, policymakers, authors, and experts come to discuss topics about Israel in depth. You're listening to a podcast by the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center and the host of this podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is Dr. Uri Resnick, the Director of Policy Planning and Net Assessment at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Resnick has held many positions in Israel's Foreign Ministry. He's been Policy Advisor to the Foreign Minister, the Deputy Director of the Department of U.N. Political Affairs, and here in Los Angeles, the Deputy Consul General of Israel, among many other positions. In addition to working at Israel's Foreign Ministry. He's also worked at Israel's Ministry of Defense, where he headed its International Security Affairs Division. Dr. Resnick immigrated to Israel from Canada in 1988 and received a Ph.D. in international law from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He's written numerous articles on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and authored a book on asymmetric territorial conflict that was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2013. He's also taught courses on strategic planning, foreign policy, public diplomacy, and territorial conflict. Given Dr. Resnick's extensive experience and expertise, both as a diplomat and as an I.R. scholar, I've invited Dr. Resnick to join me to discuss the state of Israel's foreign relations and Israeli foreign policy. Dr. Resnick, thank you for coming on Israel in Depth.

Uri Resnick: Thank you so much for having me.

Dov Waxman: So we're recording this conversation on Monday, the 14th of September. And this is a very big week, I think it's fair to say an Israeli diplomacy. Tomorrow at the White House, the agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates that was announced a few weeks ago will be officially signed, as well as the just recently announced agreement or at least statement that Bahrain would also be normalizing its relations with Israel�establishing its diplomatic relations with Israel. From a diplomatic point of view, Dr. Resnick, how significant do you think these agreements are? Let's start with that. And then I want to dig into a little bit about how they came about.

Uri Resnick:�Right. So there's no question that both of these breakthroughs are signal achievements. I mean, then we'll have will have a lasting impact. I don't think there's any question about that. But one of Israel's main goals throughout the years - really, since its inception - has been to normalize its relations and its standing in the region with the other states of the region and the other nations in the region. This has been a major ambition, and it's been a, to put it mildly, and an uphill battle. So when we have the two states in the Gulf, in close succession, agreeing to normalize relations with Israel, this is really a tremendous diplomatic signal.

Dov Waxman: As you know, Israel has been seeking this kind of diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Arab states since its founding in 1948. And in fact, in recent years, Israel has enjoyed a warming relationship with Gulf states such as the UAE and Bahrain. And there's been this development of fairly kind of not so secret relationships. Why now then what explains off Israel has been pursuing this goal for so many decades? And it's been having this kind of relationship with the UAE and Bahrain behind the scenes for some years now. Why do you think these agreements have come out now in particular? What explains the timing of this?

Uri Resnick: It depends on what resolution you ask the question. At some point, all diplomatic developments. You know, you can find the answer to that question of timing at different levels of analysis. So, in one sense, there's obviously political schedules and so on. But that's really the I think the most superficial level. What you really have here, I think, is the combination of a process of maturation in the mindset, certainly amongst the Gulf states, and I think it represents something that's deeper, even though we don't see it yet really spreading more broadly throughout the region. But I don't think we should be surprised if we see in, you know, in the coming future, in the not too distant future additional developments, because I think there is this maturation and the sense of not wanting to subordinate national interests of other countries in the region, and the general interest of the region in gaining peace and instability and in cooperation, whether it's in the economic realm, or the security realm. Or in you know, when it comes to things like energy and agriculture and water security. All sorts of technical domains where Israel really has a lot to offer and also want to gain from cooperation in the region. So I think it's this process of maturation, which has combined with with key interests of these countries. Whether it's the threat of Iran, which the Gulf countries feel, particularly imminently, or whether it's, again, these challenges. And Corona is another example. One of the main points of, or fields of cooperation already between the United Arab Emirates and Israel, is with regard to developing technologies and working together to come up with ways of contending with Coronavirus. So I think it's really this the sort of more maturity and understanding where the genuine interests lie.

Dov Waxman: And do you think, I mean in terms of when we might trace back as historians of this process the beginning of this, would you say it kind of begins maybe in the post first Gulf War and then 1991, the Madrid Conference -- was even earlier than that? I mean, where would we begin to see this kind of gradual recognition that, in fact, you know, Israel has not many shared interests with Arab states. And then gradually, the willingness then of Arab states to act on those shared interests?

Uri Resnick:�So I think it's a good question again. Maybe we may not have enough genuine historical perspective and even access to the right documents yet, right. So historians 20-30 years from now might be able to give a better, a more in-depth answer to it. But I think at the end of the day, these kinds of things, they are psychological processes, and their psychological barriers that have to be broken. And I think you rightly put your finger, you mentioned the Madrid Conference. And in general, the 1990s, the peace -- the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in the 90s -- already then we saw burgeoning signs of a change, right. We had offices opened in Oman and in Qatar, and in North Africa, also in Morocco in Tunis. These were since shuttered. But already then, you saw that taboo being broken in a way. So I would say it's a gradual process, with a number of key turning points. But definitely, I think the 1990s sort of saw a process of momentum where this kind of psychological barrier had begun to be broken. But I think this time we're on the cusp of, of (again, no one can forecast the future). But we're on the cusp I think of a shift in mindset. Because one of the things really Israel has been after for so many years has been seeking is a depth of normalization at the cultural or interpersonal level. So we have formal peace with Egypt and Jordan - and we have excellent relations with both countries, certainly, you know, at the level of inter-governmental relations. But one of the things that Israel has always striven for has been to go beyond that to, you know, the interpersonal level into inter-societal exchange and genuine normalization. And I think for the first time, we have a genuine potential and prospect for seeing that process being further advanced than in the past. And I think that could have a lot of psychological significance that might filter across the region. I hope I'm not being just overly optimistic here. But that's the sense that I have.

Dov Waxman:�Certainly, from the UAE in terms of the messages that the UAE's rulers and diplomats have been sending, it seems that they are seeking a kind of warm peace as opposed to the cold peace that Israel has with Egypt, for example. I want to talk about..you've described this..I think it's very important to recognize that these kinds of agreements didn't just happen overnight. Right? This is, as you've put it, the maturation of a long-term process. I want to talk a little bit about the role of the Israeli Foreign Ministry in that because I think, you know, we very often and certainly overseas, don't hear much about the role of the Foreign Ministry. So, you know, we hear a lot about Israeli security and the IDF and the security establishment. But in many ways, the Foreign Ministry, I think, played a key role in in nurturing that kind of maturity and informing those kinds of things, and a role that maybe Israelis themselves aren't really aware of. Because the Foreign Ministry hasn't necessarily taken the credit for it. Is that fair to say? Can you tell us a bit about the role that the Foreign Ministry's played in either, you know, either these agreements with the UAE or with Bahrain?

Uri Resnick:�Look, there's one of the challenges that Israel has a country where there are countries that do not have full open diplomatic relations with us is that we'll have a disparity. So we have 107 missions around the world -- embassies, consulates, special missions. We're Israel's boots on the ground, if you like, around the world. And that goes for it for everything -- for international and in bilateral cooperation and all different levels. So this includes, obviously, not being physically on the ground in countries that don't have official diplomatic ties. But these are ... activity, which then fan out and spread out even to those countries where we don't have official ties. So well, there are many countries in the world that we don't have official diplomatic relations with that have very strong tourism, for example, tourist exchanges with Israel or commercial exchanges. So the Foreign Ministry, as you say, I mean, maybe it's not transparent enough, or well enough known, but there's a lot of discrete activity that goes on behind the scenes, certainly in the Middle East in our region. We have, I mean, the ministry has a Middle East division. One of our geographic directorates deals with the Middle East. Obviously, the most significant aspect of that is dealing with our relations with Egypt and Jordan. But there's an equally significant agenda of fostering cooperation, ties, and relations with the other countries in our region. So even short of full open diplomatic relations. So without elaborating further, suffice it to say that, as you said, rightly, there's been a lot of behind the scenes activity for many, many years. And this is something I always tell my students as well -- students of foreign policy or diplomacy. Look, diplomacy is a long-term show; it's a long-term endeavor. At the end of the day, it's about cultivating relationships, and building networks, and introducing this personal connection between people. And that takes time. I mean, that's really a generational effort. And at the end of the day, it culminates when it does in, you know, in an open ceremony, and it's terrific, and it's, it's a signal moment that then serves as a watershed event for then fostering and enabling future augmented cooperation. But there's a lot of behind the scenes work that goes into that for a long time.

Dov Waxman:�So in many ways, I mean, we can see these agreements then as the kind of, you know, as a culmination of this long-term process and as a victory of sorts for Israeli diplomacy. As somebody like you who studied Israeli foreign policy, you know, it's often said that there's a kind of skepticism among Israeli Jews traditionally, about the value of diplomacy, right. There's a kind of sense of the hostile world that is not welcoming to Jews. And there's a kind of, and there's an emphasis more on self reliance and a skepticism towards diplomacy. And those attitudes have been reflected in the dominance of the Ministry of Defense over the Foreign Ministry in shaping Israeli foreign policy. Is that an accurate characterization? Is that changing? Is the Foreign Ministry -- some have suggested under the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabi Ashkenazi is becoming a...is raising his profile again. Can you tell us a little just a bit about, from your perspective, the kind of the role of Israeli diplomacy and the Foreign Ministry in particular in shaping Israel's foreign relationships?

Uri Resnick:�Well, I think part of the problem is that our mandate isn't internally in towards Israel. So we obviously have a public diplomacy division and spokesperson's office and so on. But our audience is outside Israel. So we're not really engaged in conveying information to Israel internally about what it is that we do. And so I think this is part of the aftereffect of that is that people aren't cognizant enough of what the ministry does. But more importantly, and I think...This is the main point that what the ministry does is maybe a minor issue of the importance of this engagement with the international arena. Look, Israel's a small country, right. We're a small country with very, very heavy economic interests or dominant economic interests in export markets and drawing in investment resources and so on.

In terms of technological research and development, in terms of advancing science in terms of advancing Israel's vital national interest. And in this again also obviously touches on Israel's national security. Israel must be deeply, heavily engaged in the world, and in the international arena. And the truth is that it has been for decades. And I think you may be right that this isn't well enough understood maybe within the Israeli public, just general public opinion. But I think it is maybe shifting a little bit. And part of in a sense, maybe the Coronavirus, also has highlighted the importance of collaboration, international collaboration, whether it's on health or whether it's on promoting, again, economic interests of tourism. All of these things require a very prominent and effective engagement with the international arena. And that's what we're spearheading at the ministry.

Dov Waxman:�Absolutely. I mean, it's, as you mentioned, the Coronavirus. I mean, it was notable in that instance that the Mossad was charged with kind of procuring, you know, medical equipment. What I'm wondering is, is partly because, as you note, you know, Israel's Foreign Ministry was acting out in the world sometimes on in a way that Israelis themselves aren't aware of. That is often been a disadvantage in the kind of bureaucratic battles, let's say, within Israeli between Israeli ministers. And one area in recent years that I know that that's been a struggle has been terms of budgets, right, and there have been budget cuts, and indeed strikes among Foreign Ministry employees. Is that changing? Do you feel now ..is it no longer that kind of there was a sense, at least from the outset that it was demoralized? You know, it didn't have the same kind of prestige. Will this maybe with these agreements, and as you know, with the Coronavirus as well, will we see a rising profile for the Foreign Ministry and their importance now on the -- renewed importance, I should say -- on the value of diplomacy?

Uri Resnick:�I think it's possible. I mean, I wish I could maybe express the prognosis with respect to the budget that you've raised and so on. I think that was the Coronavirus and just the economic impact, everybody -- it's going to be across the board. It's not something specific to the Foreign Ministry; we're all going to be taking all I mean, all ministries and all government agencies are going to be taking a hit on the pocket as it were. And it's understandable.

Dov Waxman: The foreign ministers already had numerous budget cuts. Right. Is that all right?

Uri Resnick:�Yeah. So look, I think, again, without getting into, you know, intergovernmental issues within Israel, I would say that I think there is a sense that there's an understanding of the deep importance of having a strong presence internationally. Probably, it's something that could gain more traction internally in domestic public opinion. But I do think that, that there's an understanding of how important it is. And I can tell you from my perspective, and I've been in the ministry for about 18 years, in terms of other agencies, and I sometimes think a part of this is a little bit than the sensationalist headlines that are put out in the press. At the end of the day, all of the different governmental agencies in Israel that deal with the international arena work in very, very close collaboration. You know, we're all on the same team, the end of the day,

Dov Waxman:�Right. I want to ..the other big event, I want to kind of change and shift tack a little bit here and talk about the other kind of big event (maybe somewhat less significant in historical terms) that's happening this week, which is the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, which is for Israel often a time where Israel let's face it gets bashed. Now you've worked on the U.N. and you've spent a lot of time dealing with the various U.N. agencies. From your perspective, how would you characterize kind of Israel's relationship with the United Nations? You know, it's often said that the U.N. is biased against Israel. What's your take on this?

Uri Resnick: Look, at the end of the day, there's a two-pronged approach here from Israel's perspective, vis a vie the United Nations. Because, first of all, the U.N. it's a huge, I mean, it's a conglomerate of different organizations. Some are more niche professional organizations, either our political organs such as the General Assembly in New York and so on. So our experience with the U.N. is two-pronged in the sense that on one hand, we are contending with deep, ingrained, ongoing, entrenched bias against Israel. And it's something that can actually be quantified. I mean, just look at literally look at the number of resolutions or look at absurdities such as the permanent agenda of what is known and common parlance as the Human Rights Council in Geneva. Whether it actually genuinely is an organ which strives to promote human rights is a different question. But there you have in the permanent agenda, a fixed item singling Israel out. There are 193 member states in the U.N. system, and there's only one state in that entire system that is dealt with by the body ostensibly tasked with addressing issues of human rights dealt separately. That's an obvious and clear and just flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter itself, which asserts that all states and all member states need to be treated impartially and equally. So you have that, then you just have this plethora of annual this annual ritual, as you said, of Israel bashing. But we need to distinguish between that because that is something that we see in political organs such as the Geneva Human Rights Council or often in the General Assembly. But coupled with that, we have tremendous cooperation -- Israel has tremendous cooperation with so many U.N. professional agencies. And it's an important priority of Israel's foreign policy to be engaged in this global agenda, right. The main agenda of the U.N. as such as to promote the sustainable development goals. Those are goals that were passed -- 17 goals pertaining to human development, you know, including things like health and education and access to water, and so on and so forth. We have so much to offer. And we're so eager to be engaged with the different U.N. agencies on these issues. That's something that's less known, also in Israel internally. But I also think, as you said, you know, the immediate association of Israel in the U.N. is we have this, you know, we're at odds when it comes to the political issues. Where the truth is, I would say that, that there's, there's just a very, very broad array of domains in which we have excellent cooperation with the U.N. And so it's a bifurcated approach, I would say.

Dov Waxman:�Yeah, I mean, so..Often when I teach students about the U.N., that they think of it as a single organization rather than understanding that it's actually a system where there are all sorts of different organizations and so as you know, in some parts of the United Nations system may be hostile to Israel. But in other parts of the system, Israel is an active and very involved and welcome player. If we kind of look going back to the point you made about the U.N. Human Rights Council, you know, where the many resolutions that are targeting Israel and ignoring other human rights violators, sometimes sitting on the council issuing those very same resolutions. And I'm wondering, and I've often been asked this question myself, to what..how do you explain that bias? I mean, you know, the most convenient explanations for many in certainly, Jews in the Diaspora is that this is anti-Semitism, plain and simple. And I think you know, going back to Ben-Gurion and the 'whole world is against us.' in the 70s. There was that perception among Israeli Jews that this was an anti-Semitism run rampant. Based upon your understanding and knowledge of the U.N. and the U.N. Human Rights Council, do you think that's a sufficient maybe part of the explanation. I mean, why is there this standing item on Israel? Or why there are so many votes? Is it anti-Semitism, or is there maybe some other kind of internal politics within the U.N. that might account for this?

Uri Resnick: So I think I mean, again, obviously, there is an element of anti-Semitism, you know, in different pockets of the international arena. I don't think that's really where the thrust of the explanation lies. I think it has more to do with the mundane structure of human politics. And the fact that I mean, it's also an artifact may be of the Cold War and the division of the international arena, especially during the periods of decolonization in the 50s and the 60s where so many states entered the arena. And you had a bipolar system with the Soviet Union and the United States and the two poles. And then this emergence of developing countries forming what's still known today, the non-aligned movement, or the non-aligned bloc in the United Nations. So the way that U.N. agencies compete for positions and then often vote on resolutions is still by these different blocs. So I forget the exact number today, but it's roughly on the order of 120 or 118 members of the NAM -- the Non-Aligned Movement. There's a lot .. inertia in U.N. bodies. And so what will happen is and again, it's also a testament maybe to the skill, you know, we have to take off our hats in this case, just to the diplomatic skill, both of Palestinian delegations to various U.N. bodies and their supporters that they've managed to capitalize on the political structure of these organizations, whether it's the General Assembly in the U.N., or the Human Rights Council in Geneva, the Commission on Human Rights that proceeded it until 2006. Using these voting rules where a vast, slew of countries will vote on the bloc. And there's just this traditional voting stance amongst online countries. I can tell you that in our bilateral relations with the vast majority of these countries, many of them developing countries in Africa and Latin America and Southeast Asia. You know, they almost feel often uncomfortable coming up to some of these votes and tell us behind the scenes, yes, well, you know, this doesn't really impact our bilateral relations with the depth of our trade or the closeness and of our bilateral relations. This is, you know, ignore the vote there in the chamber. And that's often the tune that we hear. I'll be frank, and we're frank also. We'll be frank, as frank with you in this podcast as we are with our interlocutors, that's you know..we don't buy that anymore. At some point, we want our bilateral, warm bilateral ties to also be reflected in the U.N. And we're seeing some positive signs in that regard. It's possible also that this new step, this normalization, again with the UAE and Bahrain will be a harbinger of a bit of a shift also, amongst the both the Arab League countries and more broadly, the Islamic countries, it's 57 (member states). It could be that we'll see a shift in votes. And again, it's kind of a psychological shift that you're hoping will be maybe a turning point which will change some of these voting patterns. But I think ultimately, the real explanation is more there than in this, this issue of anti-Semitism. Even though anti-Semitism is a real problem..it is, independently of the U.N.

Dov Waxman:�Absolutely. Of course. So it so in terms of..I mean, it says, I think often people don't really understand, you know, the kind of how the arcane rules of the United Nations and how these voting blocks work and the different regional groupings. And I'm wondering then if Israel's kind of diplomatic goal and maybe the ultimate integration in the region will be Israel joining the Middle East grouping. That Israel's, you know, has always been in this anomalous and disadvantaged position in the U.N. because of the role that regional bloc's play and as you said, on all of these, you know, the combined non-aligned bloc. Is there..Would Israel be...What's the possibility particularly given this kind of regional thaw in the Middle East now and attitudes with or the willingness at least, to be public what was previously private right. And to close the distance between their rhetoric and their proclamations and their actual behavior. And we're seeing even the Arab League now, which is, you know, famous for its resolutions, and but actually now maybe being closer to the reality in terms of how states are reacting to Israel. Could Israel join the Middle East group in the United Nations system? Would that be in many ways the ultimate marker of Israel's acceptance in the region?

Uri Resnick: May be sort of in a long term, unforeseeable future, perhaps. I can tell him it's not really on the agenda. I mean, it's not something that, you know, it's an active goal. It's more of a kind of sort of a long term maybe. I would say that it's also deeper than that because Israel belongs to the West Europe and Others Group or WEOG in the U.N. since 2000. Until 2000, it was in the anomalous and dubious position of not belonging to any regional grouping, and it was the only country.. apropos U.N. charters that speak about equality and so on. But that's been rectified as of 2000. And we're part of way WEOG--West Europe And Others Group. In a sense, there's the..it's something that transcends this affiliation with WEOG, transcends the geographical element, because it also has to do with regimes and democracy. And you know, the kinds of the system of governments of these countries. And these are, this is our natural milieu in terms of being a free liberal democracy with a market economy and industrialized country. These are, you know, in that sense, these are like-minded countries and that we belong, and we see an affiliation there and innate one with WEOG. Having said that, should the Middle Eastern region, and the states in the region, undergo a transformation, right so that that kind of distinction no longer becomes relevant. So you'll see the emergence of strong, prosperous middle classes in the Middle Eastern states, a diminishment of socioeconomic disparities, the rise of stable liberal democracies. You know, that could be a completely different situation. And we'll cross that bridge when we get there. I mean, we need to be realistic. That's not something that's, you know, imminent. That's not about to happen. And until it happens, I think that that distinction and this ambition of joining the region in the U.N., it's not really on the agenda.

Dov Waxman:�But at the very least, perhaps some of those kind of resolutions that are sponsored by Arab states may diminish in terms of those resolutions getting a kind of automatic majority. That may be a more attainable short-term goal. Sure. Finally. Absolutely. I think there's room for some optimism.

Yeah. Finally, we've talked about Israel's relationships with the Arab world and how they are changing in dramatic ways and Israel's relationships in the U.N. I want to conclude by talking about many ways, Israel's most important foreign relationship, and that's Israel's relationship with the United States. And there's been a lot of discussion and I think some sense of anxiety in the United States, among Jewish Americans particularly about the future of this relationship given what surveys show, is a growing partisan divide. A division and debate..divisions between Democrats and Republicans in terms of their attitudes toward Israel. So are you concerned then about the future of this really critical relationship with the United States? And is it inviolable? Is it something that you think, you know, is Israel can count on forevermore, or as the United States may be disengages or tries to disengage from the Middle East to some extent and, and is increasingly, you know, focusing its attention on the rivalry of China. How is this going to affect Israel?

Uri Resnick: Okay. Yeah, look, I think here, the main, the most important thing to do is to try and transcend the headlines and transcend many of the things. Without beating around the bush, and you've raised some valid, valid issues, and it's clear, right to any observer,� Israel as well, that there are, you know, there's a disparity amongst certain sectors in American society with respect to certain things that Israel is doing. And maybe vice versa. There are issues of a loss, and to some extent of that sense of bipartisanship, which was so vital to Israel, and still is so vital to Israel. But what I would suggest is to zoom out of that. And I think we sometimes lose track of the bigger picture. It's not just a list of talking points to say that the special relations between the U.S. and Israel, they really aren't unique. I mean, just as..nevermind as an Israeli diplomat, but as an observer and scholar of international relations. There's something very unique about this relationship. You have a superpower, and you have a small, Middle Eastern country challenged by its surroundings, geo-strategically and so on and so forth. What explains the extent and the depth of these relations? So I think at their core, it really is a meeting of values. It's something that goes back to the founding fathers of the United States. And it's something that goes back to the deepest values, you know, in the United States and in Israel. Things like a belief in liberal democracy, in freedom in fundamental, you know, in the sanctity of life and fundamental civil rights and human rights. You can read the Bill of Rights of the U.S., and then you can read Israel's Basic Laws on Human Dignity and so on, and you see the commonality. So, at the end of the day, there's something very, very deep at that level of commonality. On top of that, there are other layers to the relationship -- strategic layers, layers which are based on interest. Some of this harkens back again to the Cold War, and sort of taking sides in the Cold War. Some of it goes back to the war on terror. At the end of the day, Israel is probably..if it's not THE, then it's certainly among THE most friendly, supportive, genuinely, and innately connected countries to the United States, especially in a challenged region, like the Middle East. Couple this with dealing with tangible threats, like the Iranian threat. Couple this with the potential and the implementation of research and development on anti-ballistic technologies on cyber technologies and things that are genuine, hardcore national interests of both countries. That's the real picture. I mean, this is really the basis of the ties. And that's not to say that there aren't disagreements. So you'll have certain segments of American public opinion, including amongst Jewish communities in the United States..will take issue with various aspects of Israeli society and Israeli politics. What I would urge our friends and our critics -- equally our critics in the U.S. and elsewhere -- is to remember that Israel is a vibrant, pluralistic liberal democracy, and all of those issues which you could take issue with, whether it's with respect to certain aspects of Israel's foreign policy, or certain aspects of our domestic policies. Israel is a liberal democracy, which is disproportionately challenged by its security exigencies and constraints, but no less than that. It is a highly segmented society. I mean, it's an immigrant society. I remember looking at the numbers..if you look at the numbers, I'm not sure there's any comparable instance. It increased its population in the course of several decades tenfold. That is dramatic, and that has implications. I mean, it's difficult to run a country, especially a functioning liberal democracy, in these kinds of circumstances. And at the end of the day, there are going to be difficulties in bridging different points of view within the society. And these are the things that then get reflected in criticism, I think in the United States community. So things like the role of the religious institutions in Israel or the relationship between Israel's secular aspects or more religious aspects. These are things that many people might take issue within the United States. Remember that Israel is a segmented society with different sectors. And these issues then bubble forth within this vibrant democracy, which is Israel. And ultimately, we have core coalition governments, and all of these different aspects of this variegated and complex society have to then get resolved by the machinery of liberal democracy. I don't think I'm going to be revealing anything astounding to the listeners, you know that we all realize that liberal democracy maybe is better than anything else, but it ain't perfect.

Uri Resnick:�And we're doing our best, and we're a 'work in progress' is what I would basically say. And I think maybe there should be more room for understanding that once you understand.

Dov Waxman: Well, I think in terms of the attitudes of Jews in the Diaspora and American Jews in particular. I think part of it is that there's a concern that while Israel is developing, they see it rightly or wrongly, they fear that it's going in the..it's developing in what they would see as the wrong direction. So there's this kind of nostalgia for, you know, in an earlier Israel and Israel where the, you know, Labor..Where the secular which was secular, social democratic, more egalitarian, etc, etc. And even though that's a kind of somewhat nostalgic and not entirely accurate image of Israel back then. That, I think, is.. it's not necessarily they didn't see these as changing, but there's a worry that Israel is moving further away from what the kind of country they'd like it to be rather than becoming the kind of country that they'd like it to be.

Uri Resnick: And, and, you know, criticism is fair, both within a democracy. But it's also fair, you know, coming..emanating from another friendly democracy. And I think Israelis, certainly in the Israeli government, but Israelis as such, need to be open to such criticism. And I think it's fair and legitimate to voice it and ..we need to take it into account. And I think it should inform the internal debate in Israel. But that's what it should do. You know, again..we have the political and social forces in Israel, and through our system of liberal democracy, this is then filtered up into the political realm and negotiated and compromises are struck as in any political system. And I think, again here, I would caution against being overly or unduly influenced by sensationalist headlines. It's not to say that there is no reason for some people to be concerned with these kinds of processes that you're describing. But I think still the big picture is, and this is often I think, the fault--not the fault--or maybe with the property of silent majorities.�Most liberal democracies, most countries have it. I mean, the vast number of people, you know, the mainstream, they tend to be less vocal, and they tend to be less active. And so you don't hear as much of that undercurrent of, yeah, you know, of people on both sides of political questions in the political divide, who have a firm belief in the institutions of liberal democracy and separation of powers and free speech. And in all of the substantive issues that play, whether they be civil rights or human rights or striking a fair balance, you know, on issues of religion and state and so forth. I can say I mean..In some sense this gains an expression also in our foreign policy. Because one of the things..we were speaking earlier about the U.N. But amongst the things that Israel is most known for in U.N. corridors, amongst the professional institutions, not so much in the political bodies, is how prominent we are on issues having to do with civil rights--whether it's disability rights or gender equality or promotion of LGBTQ rights or so on. On all of these issues Israel is a very prominent voice in the international arena. Well outside..I would say...(inaudible). On this issues we're particularly prominent I would say. And it's not an accident, it's not a fake. It's not like we're doing outside that doesn't reflect something that's deeply intrinsic to Israel. Tel Aviv is one of the most open liberal. Before the coronavirus it was on the circuit in all European capitals (even though it's not the edge of Europe) for places to go to enjoy the best things that a liberal society has to offer. I think that speaks volumes of the what's the real picture of Israel.

Dov Waxman: So, I want to thank you, Dr. Resnick, because I think it's very important. As you've emphasized to kind of go beyond the newspapers, the media headlines, and the sensationalist stories. And to try to look at Israel, you know, as we're trying to do on this podcast in-depth. Try to understand it behind the scenes and recognize that there's a much more complex and nuanced reality than the reality that's sometimes conveyed in media reports on Israel. And particularly when it comes to Israeli diplomacy and foreign relations, which often don't get the kind of attention that Israeli security issues do. So, I really want to thank you, Dr. Resnick, for in some ways making the case for this podcast and the importance of taking that bigger picture and looking behind the headlines. Thank you for joining us on Israel in Depth. And hopefully we'll be able to welcome you back again in the future.

Uri Resnick: I'd love that. Thank you very much. It's been a real pleasure.