Verbatim Transcript of Israel in Depth�podcast

Taped Aug. 17, 2020

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Dov Waxman: Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, authors, artists, and leading experts come to discuss topics about Israel in depth. You're listening to a�podcast�by the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center and the host of this�podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is Dr. Marwa Maziad, a visiting scholar at the University of Washington's Jackson School of International Studies, and a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. She's also a senior fellow at American University's Center for Israel Studies. An Egyptian-American, Dr. Maziad has held academic positions at Qatar University and Northwestern University in Qatar. She's the co-editor of�The Arab Gulf States and the West: Perceptions and Realities � Opportunities and Perils,�published last year. And she has written extensively on Gulf security affairs. Given her expertise in the Gulf region, I've invited Dr. Maziad to be my guest on Israel in Depth, so that we can analyze the new agreement between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Brokered by the Trump administration just last week and announced with much fanfare. Welcome to the show, Dr. Maziad.

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Marwa Maziad: Thank you for having me.

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Dov Waxman: Let's start with what bought this agreement. Israel has long sought, as we know, to establish full diplomatic relations with Arab states in the Gulf region. But until now, these countries have refused to normalize their relations with Israel until a two-state solution is reached between Israel and the Palestinians. So what changed in your opinion? Why do you think the UAE decided to become the first Gulf Arab state to normalize its relations with Israel and break from this Arab consensus?

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Marwa Maziad: The importance of your question is locating Emirates within Gulf relations and also within the region at large. I think the paradigmatic shift is that the region now experiences new fault lines that are emerging and that seem to have differed from the classic �Arab versus Israel� dominating the 60s and the 70s, until the 1973 war between Egypt and Israel�and settling that with peace. The emerging fault line currently (or at least over the past decade) was one that even extends beyond the classic �Saudi Arabia versus Iran� or �Israel versus Iran.� I think another fault line that was very important, and that helped actually shape this development between the UAE and Israel, is the emerging rivalry between Turkey-Qatar on one side, versus what became called the Arab quartet: Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain on the other side. So beyond the classic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, the Shia-Sunni division, I think the focus that brings why Emirates is actually very important and why it's the first to take that step, is the rivalry between Turkey-Qatar vs. Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia. This Pan-Islamist, Sunni version of things that were to be led by Turkey and Qatar, [that] would rise and in relation actually to Hamas and Gaza, and all of that. That wing of affairs has been confronted at least since the mid, you know, 2015, '16, '17 � around that time � by Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. And they [the Quartet] became a statist, militarized, secularizing pact that is resisting this kind of Sunni Pan-Islamism. So the rivalry between Turkey and Egypt as big, populous countries in the region manifested in each of them, aligning with one of the Gulf states. Turkey aligned with Qatar, a small, but emerging and upcoming and exciting and all of that. And Egypt allied with the UAE. And then both pairings, basically, Turkey and Qatar versus Egypt and UAE, kind of competed over Saudi Arabia. [The question was] Which direction would Saudi Arabia take, especially following the death of King Abdullah in 2015, I believe (around '14 and '15)?�That�pairing: the Egypt-UAE secularizing, statist, militarizing, and not necessarily Pan-Islamist in the sense of the word, won over Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia leaned towards that. And mind you, it was not a given because up until then, Saudi Arabia could have been more flexible around more Islamizing ideologies and, you know, living with the changes that were taking [place] after the Arab uprisings. Even though it [Saudi Arabia] resisted [pan-Islamism starting 2011], but it wasn't in a crossroads anyway, [until 2014-2015]. And I think that pairing of Egypt, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, manifested now where Egypt has relations - a peace treaty with Israel. Egypt, as I say, is more interested in deterring the encroachment of Turkey into the Mediterranean and into Israel-Palestinian affairs anyway. And that pact manifested and pushed for a�new convergence of interests that would include Israel.�So I want to bring that to the forefront because I think it's often missing. In all, the classic delineations are about Iran: Iran is a threat; Israel is interested in building Arab relations to deter Iran. That's all true. And we can talk about that, especially Iran's presence in Lebanon. But I think what's really shaping is this kind of new Mediterranean identity also that even includes Southern Europe, Greece, France, Cyprus, and Israel would be part of that. And interestingly, UAE, a non-Mediterranean country, is very involved in the Mediterranean through Libya. So I think there are fault lines that bypass the classic Iran versus Saudi Arabia or Iran versus the Gulf [or versus Israel].

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Dov Waxman: So this is very interesting, you suggesting then that this isn't primarily, simply a kind of UAE-Israeli de facto alliance against Iran. In actual fact, this is part of a kind of intra-Sunni division, if you like, and that it needs to be seen in terms of this growing rivalry between Qatar and Turkey on the one hand, and the UAE and Egypt on the other. How, though, does this agreement then strengthen the UAE's position vis-�-vis Qatar and Turkey do you think?

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Marwa Maziad: Well, that's the point. (Jared) Kushner made a statement. I think he said something like some other countries are regretting that they weren't the first to make the deal or something. I think he might be referring to Qatar. Now Qatar is almost... Qatar was... before Emirates, [Qatar] even had a representation of Israeli trade. It has an office. It was the first through�Al Jazeera,�of course, was the first platform where Israeli officials or even thinkers would appear and debate with Arabs. So Qatar was almost at the forefront of being that kind of small and agile and interesting player that can talk to everybody. And it's too small to be even taken so seriously. But then it does do things. So I think Emirates almost, you know, quickly it took the quicker step here. I think Qatar is burdened by the Turkey relationship. And I wrote that in my chapter, "The Turkish Burden." [Earlier] Qatar started thinking that [through] an alliance with Turkey, they would fly together up high. But I think now they are... I think Qatar is somewhat stuck. What does it do now, right? So I think that's why Emirates is feeling. I mean, not feeling, but it's taking the bold [move] that each of the smaller Gulf countries were about to take anyway.

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Dov Waxman: I see. So what about. I mean, so I can understand why Qatar then which as you, as you pointed out, was a kind of pioneer among the Gulf Arab states and its relations with Israel, in terms of developing commercial relations with Israel and is now kind of in danger of being left behind. Turkey, on the other hand, still enjoys, you know, diplomatic relations with Israel and an ongoing commercial relationship. And there's already a lot of tourism or a lot of at least Israeli tourists who go to Turkey. And yet President Erdogan has really come out very strongly against this agreement and denounced it despite the fact that Turkey itself has diplomatic relations with Israel. So why are the Turks so angry about this? Why are they so upset?

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Marwa Maziad: The thing is like, we're talking about different �Turkey�s� at this point. The Turkey that actually was the first Muslim majority country to have acknowledged or accepted the establishment of the State of Israel back in 1948, is a different Turkey from Erdogan�s Turkey of today. So in a sense, Turkey�when it was an emerging republic in 1923, that was westward looking�was less interested in the region because it had the legacy of being the Ottoman Empire. And now [back then in 1923] each of these components of the empire was gaining their independence. And [the new Republic of Turkey] was kind of saying okay, good luck to all of you, including Palestine, including Arabia itself: Saudi Arabia was formed by the 30s. Including Egypt. Including each of these countries. So, Turkey was going to be a republic looking elsewhere. Now, the exact opposite is what happened under Erdogan, who is becoming very interested in [ideologically expansionist] Pan-Islamism. He wants to collect each and every country within that locale, that region, into more of recreating the influence, the trade, the relations, the ideology of an Islam-based empire anyway. He inherited the relations with Israel, but he didn't cut them, he didn't change them drastically. But he changed them significantly. Also, establishing a relationship that is clearly aligned with Hamas and Gaza, as the Islamist version of Palestinians as opposed to the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organization] and the more liberal secular or such. So you can see that each of these players � important regional players � allied themselves with a component of the dynamic there or the relations [forming in the region]. And then they played the game. Now it's very important to see that these are all regional dynamics. And when maybe we get to the question about where the United States is, in all of that, you'll find out that how I see it is that the United States let the regional dynamics play themselves out. And I think that gives a little bit more agency to the players in that region. And that's why they sorted out things their way. But I'm just emphasizing how these alliances formed along lines that go beyond Iran, and [definitely] include Turkey. But definitely do not exclude Iran either and, we can talk more about that.

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Dov Waxman: Right. So it's one of the difficulties I think in people's perception of the region, is to this day that they tend to simply see it in a kind of very binary way. It's either, you know, as you point out Sunnis versus Shiites, or Israelis versus Arabs, or Arabs versus Iranians. And in actual fact, there are all sorts of kind of cross-cutting alliances and different regional relationships. And it's a lot more complex than the way in which the region is often perceived thousands of miles away, particularly from the United States. One of the things that's come up from this agreement has been the claim that's being made, particularly by some commentators in Israel, that the willingness of the UAE to sign this agreement with Israel is indicative of a major shift in Arab attitudes toward the Palestinian issue. That essentially, Arab states have given up or are in the process of abandoning the Palestinians. They've grown tired of supporting the Palestinian cause. They're no longer willing to sacrifice their own interests for the sake of the Palestinians. And they no longer are willing to wait for the Palestinians to make peace with Israel before they forge their own relationships with Israel. And do you agree with that reading? I mean, should we see this as evidence of a historic shift in our attitudes toward Israel? Are Arab states moving away from support for the Palestinian cause?

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Marwa Maziad: I think there is a shift in the definition of what Palestinian really actually means. For a long time, it used to be the Arabs �there,� [in that Holy Land] right. The Arabs and Muslims there. Our Arabs, our kin, because the division. The 1948 war was about Jews and Arabs, and Arabs at that time was like the entire Arab world, right?��It was about calling on the Arabs from everywhere or the Muslims from everywhere. And then gradually, after a succession of wars�and then the peace between Egypt and Israel�the Palestinian identity as a people of [their] own, or a group of people of its own, not just the representatives of Arabs and Muslims in that region in that particular geography, became formed and forged and got its own depth. And [they] became the �Palestinian people.� And then it became �a cause� that people morally can stand by, or maybe based on interests might ignore or not, or might not know much about it. [So] it became the �Palestinian people,� anyway. I think today, what we're seeing is more of the Arab countries. And I think that's what (Israeli Prime Minister) Netanyahu managed to very cleverly do, I guess, managed to have a relationship with all the Arab states. He wants one by one actually. So he wants now Emirates, but maybe Bahrain and maybe Oman, and maybe Sudan, and maybe all of them � the 19 remaining out of the 22 members of the Arab League. He wants the Arab countries to have a relationship with Israel. [As for] the Arabs of that region in that area, namely the occupied territory or Israel proper or that locale, that part of the land, Yeah, he would pledge or promise that there will be some rights, there will be some things better. But it's no longer the idea that the Palestinian people would stand as a prerequisite for a relationship with every other Arab state. And I think that's the significance of that change. It's not a new moment because I think around the peace between Egypt and Israel, the idea was that states, established republics or established monarchies that are really independent, can have that peace with the state [of Israel]. The acknowledgement of a new state of Israel for Jewish people, all while managing how �our Arabs� and �our Muslims� over there are going to have their polity. Is it going to be self-autonomy only? By the way, there was no mention per se of a particular state [for Palestinians] and where. Or is it going to be an actual state side by side, and that is��[what] manifested in the subsequent initiatives? Or would it be...and I think that's what's really starting to happen since 2005 and (Ariel) Sharon's withdrawal. Are we going to a very theological, old interpretation of The Philistines, who would be the [ancestral] coastal people in the Gaza region [exclusively]? And this [is] the actual etymology of the word [Philistine]. And maybe yeah, the Palestinian state would be Gaza, which can be an enemy state, by the way. But we're going to have a completely different conversation about what the West Bank of the Jordan River is to become, or what Israel usually refers to Jordan and Samaria. So I think all of these things that [maybe] used to be part of conversations within Israel and within Jewish ideas and writings, [and of which] Arabs on the other side might have been completely oblivious of; these references of what the connotation of these pieces of land to a Jewish side might be� [For all of this], I think now there is a reopening of what actually all these places mean to the respective parties. So instead of just the Muslims and Arabs having a claim on the land in the name of religious connotations and meanings, ironically, Israel has become so integrated into the region that it has tried a thing or two in terms of having a very theological [claim] and ties to the meaning of the words of the cities and the places it's occupied in present time. So in a sense, we are witnessing a new reformulation of the meaning of these places. And I think, towards a closer emphasis on what an Arab, or what a Muslim might mean, but not necessarily what a Palestinian in the West Bank of the Jordan [River] means today.

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Dov Waxman: This is an interesting shift in thinking. I mean, how far does the shift extend into the Arab world? I mean, you know, it's one thing to talk about the opinions of Arab leaders. But as we know, you know, none of these Arab leaders are really representative or freely elected - and therefore you know, that policies aren't necessarily representative of the opinions of their own populations. What about Arab republics then? I mean, is there also a similar shift in how Israel is viewed by Arab public opinion? Has Arab public opinion become less hostile to Israel? I mean, you mentioned Egypt was, of course, the first Arab state to recognize Israel and make a peace agreement with Israel in 1979. But Egyptian public opinion didn't really change dramatically toward Israel, and it's remained a cold peace with Israel. There hasn't really been the kind of full normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel. And this is now decades later. So how much things really shifted in terms of public opinion, if at all?

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Marwa Maziad: Well, I slightly disagree with...Again, it seems like a cliche a little bit to say that all those leaders are unelected, unrepresentative of their people. Actually, that's not quite accurate. When (Anwar) Sadat won battles in 1973, enough to pressure Israel to feel, you know, taken aback militarily to lead to peace, for instance, he was seen by his people as a leader who got them from complete humiliation in the war of 1967 to the point where he can show military ability as to be a counterpart in a peace [treaty]. And actually, signed a peace (deal) that got the Sinai back. And actually, you know, Israel started thinking that it shouldn't get in any more wars with Egypt moving forward. So I think actually, the idea that they are non-representative of their people's interests or policy direction, that�s not very accurate.

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Dov Waxman: But the Camp David Accords wasn't popular among Egyptians.

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Marwa Maziad: In retrospect, this is the irony of this. In retrospect, everybody [today] is saying, well, we should have done that 40 years ago. So leaders sometimes lead their people, and then it takes a generation to interpret these things. But let me just get to the present moment. I think public opinion is shifting. There are no accurate measures for it right now, so I'm not going to cite a study or such. But I think, for instance, when there was the move of the (U.S.) embassy to Jerusalem, so many expected uproars or kind of classic protests in the street, and that did not happen. And it did not happen because often the mobilizing on the street had been happening in an organized fashion. You're coming to protest Palestine or something like that. But actually what you're concerned with are local domestic affairs in a country like Egypt or elsewhere. I think right now, there is more satisfaction with where Egypt is heading in terms of being a secure state from, you know, in terms of borders. In terms of foreign policy, there is [a societal] agreement on the foreign policy direction of the current president. So, that's why you don't see that the people are looking at these affairs the way they were looking at them at the mid-90s, for instance. So that's a shift.

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Dov Waxman: So what about...I mean, it's obviously very early days, the agreement between Israel and UAE was just announced last week. But in terms of your reading of the reactions in the Arab world to this agreement. How would you characterize those reactions? I mean, has it been generally positive with some notable exceptions? Or actually, has the reaction been in some ways similar to the reaction across the Arab world when Egypt made its peace agreement with Israel back in 1979, where Egypt was, you know, denounced and then ostracized for the next decade?

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Marwa Maziad: Exactly. And then [Egypt] came back, and everybody thought they should have done the same thing. So that's the end line of that. [Being��ostracized] was very momentary. So I think when Egypt, for instance, made the decision to make the peace, it was looking at its own interests; had its own calculus. It understood that its national interests were going to be satisfied, and it took that decision. I think in a similar fashion, UAE decided that this is good for UAE. They are...[UAE] is going to be now paired with Israel and the descriptors of �an emerging,� �up and coming� and �technologically advanced country,� [will be attributed to both]. So there were interests and calculations in that. I think people - you're asking about the public opinion within different countries. First of all, of course, the Palestinians. Yes, of course, the verbiage they've used about �the stab in the back,� �this is the end of world.� I think this is exaggerated, to say the least. It's not a stab in the back, because everybody knew that the relations [between Gulf States and Israel] were forming. So it's not in the back. It was actually covert, but people who knew, knew relations were forming between the Gulf states�including Qatar� [and] Israel. So what we end up seeing is that fault line I told you about, whether it's Turkey-Qatar, those who want to be in the Pan-Islamist realm of things, side with the denunciation that the Turkish president said. [They] side with the�Al Jazeera�coverage of like, �yeah, how horrible maybe that is.� [So] those who have been for the past decade, really since the uprisings, have been on that side [of Pan-Islamism] followed on that side. Those who do believe in a strong military, in a statist republic, [in] borders, a people, citizens within, and less so have [support for some] pan-Islamist existence of hegemony that takes over the land of everybody else, [those] are more or less saying, [about UAE-Israel deal] �yeah, that's pragmatic. Egypt has already done it, so there's nothing really new in that. Good for you or whatever.� You know, that�s the a matter of fact. And also, as I say, in retrospect, everybody says, �well, bless your soul, Sadat. You said that 40 years ago.� So I think this is where each individual within the Arab world or the Muslim world for that matter lies [ on the Turkey�Qatar pan-Islamist side or on the Egypt�UAE, Saudi Arabia�Bahrain Arab Quartet�s side]. Now, it's interesting that a lot of the Muslim and Arab public does not know that a lot of Muslims, maybe Pakistani, or British Muslims, fly from Britain to go visit the holy sites, the Aqsa Mosque [and fly directly to] Tel Aviv. I've seen some of them, and that came as a shock that all those Muslims from everywhere else other than the Arab world, fly, go do their prayers, go to Jerusalem, while the Muslims of the Arab world haven't been because they believe that they shouldn't go when Jerusalem is "under occupation," quote-unquote. So now you'll [start seeing] Emiratis showing up, taking pictures in the Aqsa Mosque. And more people will say, I actually don't want to be denied access to seeing these heritage sites. And I think that's the shift in the discourse. So if you're asking me what's the difference between 40 years ago, and now - especially maybe 30 years ago, the 90s and the 2000s - is that, at the time, the political leadership almost bargained with Israel itself. You know, state to state relations was like, I can have a state to state relationship, but I'm not going to good mouth you to my people. Just to have that as a token there just in case I don't really like what's going on between [us] in our state to state relations , then I can always say - and it's true - that the people won't accept that, they don't like that, and there are protests against this. Now, I think there is more congruence between [official state] policies, and actually what people [are] starting to think, via the narratives that will be in the discourse, in the media, in the columns. So you're asking who wrote what columns�more have written in support of Emirates right now, for instance, than not. And everybody who would be against that is [already] in the camp that is against this. So I can see a shift in discourse right now.

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Dov Waxman: So that's fascinating. So what this agreement represents then isn't just, as you say, a kind of an agreement among elites or among leaders of countries. But it also indicates, or at least the reaction to it indicates, that there is a broader kind of popular shift of attitudes as well and that gradually, slowly, sometimes invisibly, Israel is being accepted into the region by public opinion and that this process of normalization is happening. And in that respect, this agreement really symbolizes this broader rapprochement between Israel and the region in which it's located. Would that be a fair kind of summary?

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Marwa Maziad: I would say so, uh, but just in order to be thorough in my reflection of what people think. I'll tell you all the critique against that too. Some� both by the way in Israel and within the Arab world� are very critical of the idea that that happens�now. So they are not against the idea that Emirates and Israel would have a relationship. Let all the Arabs have a relationship [with Israel]! But the criticism is like, �why now exactly and why with Netanyahu?� They'd rather have that peace with the leftists or the more liberal [among Israelis] or the peace camp or such. So that's almost a grievance. Like, �are you rewarding the right-wing politics? Are you rewarding those who are going to ignore the Palestinian rights in terms of even the secular version Palestinians?� I heard from an Israeli who said, like, �are we rewarding terrorists?� What do you mean by that? �Well, if that [deal] happens, then Hamas wins � and it was a little bit of a twisted [logic] that somehow now, Netanyahu and those on the extremist side are winning over those who are more [pro-]peace and on the liberal side. Now that's an honest reflection of what people really think. So that's what people say. In response to that, I almost think that well, Israel has been shifting. People who really think that Israel is a liberal, socialist, leftist country because they're thinking of Rabin or they're thinking about, you know, the Labour Party, [I would say to them], Israel has changed by virtue of being in the region where other right wing and religious trends have been taking shape over the 40 years. And in a very interesting way, Israel is more or less very similar to the rest of the region. So much so that now we use vocabulary that used to be exclusive to describe the Arab world [to describe Israeli politics], meaning the autocrats, the people who are going to be in power for 20 years onward. Netanyahu has these descriptors right now. Protests against him, "go away Netanyahu." These are the same with Erdogan, by the way. So it's almost like the region is not divided along these classic [divisions], where Arab means a certain connotation that's usually bad. And Israel somehow as a foreign kind of different, interesting, unique country. I don't think that's what�s [currently happening]. I think Emirates now [has very positive connotations as an Arab country]. I saw Netanyahu's eyes [when I think he said] � �I want to go to Dubai. I want to see your architecture, and the hotels.� And there is actually some fascination with how advanced the Arab Gulf countries have become, as opposed to maybe Israel, where they are struggling with the housing and with legacies of socialism�but not really fully adjusting to the capitalist market economy. Israel in that respect is way similar to Egypt, by the way, with its socialist legacies, and then the state is withdrawing its support. And now the people don't know what to do exactly. That�s different from the Gulf. So [right there] two Arab countries, Egypt and the Gulf states, are dissimilar in that case, whereas Egypt and Israel are similar [in their socialist legacies]. And both Egypt and Israel are looking at the Gulf as kind of like, how can we pair up with that and maybe do something new. So there are so many new ideas, and the public is not out of that conversation as it might be [thought]. A lot of Arabs worked in the Emirates and the Gulf over the past decades. And there's a flux of new ideas by having held positions there, and then living in Europe or the United States. So as Israel, the Israelis who go back and forth. So there are almost more similarities now among the trajectories that are shaping than not.

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Dov Waxman: So, in that respect, Israel has been joining the region becoming more like its regional neighbors, and its regional neighbors have been accepting Israel. This is a profound attitude change on both sides. And I think that is very interesting to understand and to position this agreement in terms of these broader regional developments, which are often not really understood from afar. So Dr. Maziad, I want to thank you for joining us on Israel in Depth. It's been a fascinating conversation, just to talk about some of the complexities of the region and the multiple fault lines and trends that are shaping regional politics today. Thank you again for joining us. You've been listening to an episode of Israel in Depth, produced by the UCLA Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. And I thank you all for listening