DOV WAXMAN: Welcome to Israel in Depth, where scholars, authors, artists and leading experts come to discuss topics about Israel in depth. You're listening to a podcast by the Nazarian Center of Israel Studies at UCLA. I'm Dov Waxman, the director of the Nazarian Center and the host of this podcast. Joining me for this episode of Israel in Depth is Professor Chuck Freilich, a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and longtime senior fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center. He teaches political science at Columbia University, NYU, and Tel Aviv University, and he's the author of a few excellent books, Zions Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy, which was published by Cornell University Press in 2012. And more recently, Israeli National Security: A New Strategy for an Era of Change, which was published by Oxford University Press in 2018. His next book is entitled Israel in the Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became A Global Cyber Power, which will be published sometime next year. Given Dr. Freilich's expertise in national security, he's been both teaching and writing about national Israeli national security for a long time and also been intimately involved in the national security making process in Israel. So on our podcast today, I want to really focus on the various national security challenges facing Israel today. Thank you for joining me, Dr. Freilich.

CHUCK FREILICH: Great, thanks. Thanks for having me.

WAXMAN: And so let's start with what is perhaps the most serious strategic security challenge facing the State of Israel today and that is coming from Iran, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular Iran's ongoing nuclear program, and its ongoing entrenchment inside Syria. Just recently over the last few weeks there's been been a series of mysterious explosions and recent and fires that have been taking place everywhere. And some of them have targeted Iran's nuclear program, most particularly Natanz nuclear reactor. So I want to get your take on this. Obviously, we don't know whether Israel is involved. But there are speculations that Israel is behind this. And just before this series of mysterious incidents took place, there was also a series of cyber attacks between Israel and Iran, which Israel did actually, I believe, take responsibility for. So what's going on here? What do you make of this is? Do you think Israel's in is involved, and if so, why?

FREILICH: Well let me let me start by putting the issue in a broader perspective and then I'll come to the recent cyber attacks. First of all, I think we have to take Iran's public statements - it's repeated calls for Israel's destruction - very seriously. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini formally announced a nine-point plan for Israel's destruction in 2014. And we hear Iranian leaders repeatedly talking about it. One of the things that Israel's learned over the years - and it's a bitter lesson - that when our enemy says things, we have to take it seriously. And in this case, Iran has put huge efforts, huge resources into this. They've paid a very, very heavy price for decades in pursuit of this objective. Now, obviously, the heart of it, the greatest danger is the nuclear program. And that's the only existential or maybe I should say, potentially existential threat that Israel faces today. I believe that the American withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, so-called JCPOA, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the Iran nuclear deal, I think that was a historic error on the part of President Trump. But that's water under the bridge. Iran is today, considerably closer to a nuclear capability than it was. And we're really at a point where it's up to them. If they make the decision in a year and a half, they've got the first bomb on a missile. The bomb itself they can have much more quickly, but they have to be able to finish completing the warhead process. A year and a half, maybe two years. It doesn't matter. It's in the grand scheme of things it's meaningless. That's the threat. There's a secondary threat, which is dramatic for Israel. And that's the Hamas rocket arsenal, which was given to Hezbollah by Iran. Hezbollah is an Iranian proxy - an organization that was established by Iran. Is directed and funded by Iran. At least 130,000 rockets maybe more. Now, most of these are dated technology with a limited range, very imprecise, but that doesn't matter. They've got, let's say, out of the 130 they probably have 120,000 like that. And they can hit all of Israel from Haifa and up. And then there's, that's a 10-20,000 that have got a longer range. And most of those, let's say are limited to Tel Aviv. But that's enough. And some of them can go all the way down to Eilat. In essence, there isn't a community in Israel that isn't in range today. And to slightly overstate the case, there isn't a home or building in Israel that doesn't have a rocket with its address on it. So that the next conflict with Hezbollah, if and when it happens, is going to really be devastating. The Israeli home front has never been hit, as it will, in this case. And yes, we'll hit them back even harder, but that's of limited comfort. At the same time. Iran is also trying to set up a permanent military presence in Syria. And it's not just trying to duplicate what they have in Lebanon, another hundred thousand rockets, but air, ground and naval bases of their own. And this is something that Israel just simply cannot allow to happen. And then the cyber attacks and I'll come back to that in a minute. I think the Iranian issue, and I say this with deep regret, has become a source of divisive partisan politics in the United States. Part of the issue of identity politics. So if you want to adopt the hardline towards Iran, and you want to pressure them, you're a Republican. If you want to deal, you're a Democrat. Well, that's absurd. And it's dangerous. We need elements of all these approaches. And what we really need is a comprehensive US policy towards Iran, a comprehensive Israeli policy. I don't think we have either one of them. Now so we've seen the cyber attacks, and other sabotage. Because most of the attacks that have taken place in recent weeks we're probably not cyber. Some maybe, yes. Sabotage is precisely what we need to avoid the need for direct military action. To buy time so that we can reach a new and better diplomatic deal with Iran. Now at the same time, so while we're sabotaging and gaining time, we should be applying as much economic and diplomatic pressure on them as possible. And here, I think President Trump's maximum pressure approach is right. Maybe with some military pressure as well. We all know that countries do not make severe concessions, and that's what Iran is being asked to do from its point of view, without pressure. Nobody doesn't it of their own accord. We should be countering they're going growing influence in Syria and Yemen - and that's not being done. In Lebanon, finally the US has begun. We'll see where that goes. And there seems to be a little bit of change in Iraq as well, but that's the work of the Iraqi prime minister as opposed to the US. But okay, so what have I said the first objective is sabotage, maximum pressure, countering their regional influence. We should also be ensuring that we have our allies, first and foremost, the European allies on board. You can't do it alone in the world today. And we should be trying to minimize the opposition of those who don't share our position. And finally, and maybe most importantly, what we should be trying to do is reach a new and better deal with Iran. Now, some people have spoken - if Mr. Biden is elected of going back to the nuclear deal of 2015. And I think that would be a terrible mistake for two reasons. First of all, five of the 10 to 15 years of the deals lifetime has now gone by, so we're left with a deal for five and parts of it for 10 years, not really that worth fighting for. But more importantly, again, I'm deeply critical of Mr. Trump's policy towards Iran, but we do have to give him credit for having gained considerable leverage through the economic pressure. And just to squander that and go back to the old deal would be a terrible mistake. Frankly, I don't believe that Mr. Biden will do it, regardless of what statements have to be made during the campaign. All right, if we want a new and better deal from our point of view, well, that means inherently by definition, this is a deal, which is worse for Iran. And there's no way that they're going to agree to that. So we have to figure out how we make something win, win for everyone. They're gonna have to benefit otherwise, because otherwise they're not signing. And I believe that only a diplomatic solution can provide a long-term solution. Military action can buy us time. Regime change is a great idea, but nobody knows how to do it and when it will happen, so we can bank on that. We have to get to a new diplomatic deal. Now, the truth is, we're probably finished. We're already in a growing US-Iranian crisis, which will probably come to a head in October. Because the US is correctly - the Trump administration - is correctly trying to bring about an extension of the ban on arms sales to Iran, which is supposed to expire in October. And that should not be allowed to happen. The US is trying to do it by threatening that, even though it withdrew from the nuclear deal, it will utilize the mechanism in the deal for snapback sanctions. The other signatories - not just the Iranians, the Europeans, Russia, China - are fit to be tied. You guys withdrew, how are you using this as a basis for? In any event, whatever the means used the US is right that the extension should happen of the ban. But it probably is gonna be a diplomatic crisis and maybe more starting in October just on the eve of the American elections. There's even talk of another round of Israeli elections in November as well. I hope it doesn't happen. So we have that: this impending crisis. We know it happens in October. This is after a period in which the two sides have traded a series of military blows, cyber and kinetic. And the biggest move, at least against the Iranians, was the targeted killing of Soleimani. The Iranians downed an American drone and they attacked a Saudi oil infrastructure big time. There have been a whole bunch of other cases, there's been a whole bunch of blows that have been traded. Iran has essentially withdrawn from the deal also now in response to the American withdrawal. And they think both sides have largely used up the diplomatic measures available to them. Okay, so we really may be heading to this crunch just before the US elections. We've got two unbridled leaders here, Mr. Trump and Mr. Netanyahu and both of them are fighting for their political lives. And in Mr. Netanyahu his case, he's fighting almost for his life or at least he's fighting to stay out of jail. So there is a logic to those who fear an October surprise. An attempt to distract attention from their domestic issues. I can't discount it completely. We live in a crazy world today. But COVID is surging both in the US and Israel - almost out of control. In both countries the economy is tanking. Public unrest is growing, including among the two leaders, supporters, their base. Netanyahu's trial has begun, but it really gets underway starting in January when he's gonna have to be in court three days a week. But I think there's one good thing that you can say both about Trump and Netanyahu is that they both been pretty cautious militarily. And in Israel, the prime minister is not the commander in chief. If he wants to launch something like this, he needs the support of the defense minister, who happens to be his chief rival, Mr. Gantz, and he needs the support of the foreign minister who's his other rival, Mr. Ashkenazi, and he needs the support of the chief of staff and others. And I would remind our listeners, of the wall to wall opposition from the defense establishment to an attack in 2012. So I think the chances of this October surprise are pretty low. We'll then talk now about the cyber attacks.

WAXMAN: Yeah, just just to follow up on this on this scenario of a possible October surprise that you've raised and whether these mysterious explosions might be seen in that context. In other words, you know, on the one hand, we can see this is consistent with Israel's kind of sabotage campaign, or sometimes referred to as the campaign between the campaign's that Israel has been conducting for for many years now. And obviously, the most famous incident in that context was the Stuxnet attack. So on the one hand, you can see this as a kind of continuation of this sabotage campaign. On the other hand, as you've said, given the background, the political background in which these attacks take place, given the belief in some quarters in Israel, that President Trump presents kind of a unique opportunity for Israel to do certain actions which other US presidents may not allow. Could we see these actions as maybe aimed at provoking Iran into some kind of a response, and therefore initiating a military confrontation with Iran in potentially in October. Precisely at the point at which Iran is now seen, because in partly at the impact of the COVID pandemic, but also the impact of sanctions, the Iranian regime is seen as weak. And there may be a hope, therefore, that a military campaign against it could succeed even in toppling the regime. Is this purely ludicrous speculation? I mean, you suggested that, you know, the Israeli military would not just follow Prime Minister Netanyahu orders, regardless. But is there? I mean, how do you assess the risk of this ...of a serious military confrontation with Iran in the months to come, particularly in October. Maybe as a way to draw the United States into that, while President Trump is still in office?

FREILICH: I don't think so. Okay, I can't discount the possibility of this scenario completely. It has, by the way, it does have a certain logic to it. I don't think that's where we're heading. I think also, there's always a natural tendency -and sometimes it's absolutely correct - to observe behavior and to infer intent from it. Okay, so we see this series of attacks. And it's a whole bunch. I mean, this catches your attention. Israel must be trying to do something or the United States. Because these could be American attacks or somebody is doing something. Well, it's possible that there is that kind of intent. It's also possible that there was a purely operational window of opportunity. Sometimes, usually operations like this, take months and even years to prepare. And so it may be purely by chance that it came together at this time. It may also not be. There may be the kind of intent. I don't think that either country really wants to launch, you think provoke Iran into a war so then we can respond. I really don't think that's the case.

WAXMAN: Can we also ask, you mentioned about Israel, speaking of kind of some of the most recent developments...Israel's actions to try to counter Iran's entrenchment in Syria. And you've said, you know how important it is for Israel to prevent Syria becoming essentially an Iranian military base. Right now we've seen, you know, in part, as it was as a result of the airstrikes and potentially hundreds of airstrikes that Israel has carried out against Iranian positions inside Syria and Iranian backed militias inside Syria, that Syria and Iran have just recently formed a new military agreement, which has allowed Iran to provide Syria with more sophisticated air defense system. So isn't there a danger first of all of these actions in Syria, actually bringing about the very outcome that they're designed to prevent, namely forcing and leading Syria to become even more tightly allied with Iran. And allow Iran to depict its entrenchment and its bases in Syria as necessary for Syrian defense. And so in other words, inadvertently, these these actions by Israel have actually entrenched help in entrench Iran's position in Syria. And the other point in terms of the dangers, or the the possible risks of Israel's actions in Syria against Iranian positions, is what we've seen just happening I think it was just a week ago, where a Hezbollah member was killed in this most recent, possibly Israeli strike in Syria, I think, and just on the outskirts of Damascus. Unusually, Hezbollah have said this. Have said that this was a Hezbollah member who was killed and had promised retaliation. Given what you've described as the really serious risk posed by Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles, more than 100,000 missiles, including precision guided missiles, isn't there also therefore a danger that Israel's actions in Syria may, again, inadvertently escalate the situation and lead to a renewed conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, which, as you said, would be potentially catastrophic for Israel's domestic front?

FREILICH: What's your alternative? If you look at it? I mean, if you if you start from scratch today, and you say, 'oh, well, Israel is conducting all these attacks, and yes, the Iranians and the Syrians are responding. It's led them to sign this new agreement. So it's a counterproductive policy.' This didn't start today. This has been going on in Syria for I think about four years, and in Lebanon since the 80s. So the question is what your starting point is. I don't think we can allow the State of Israel cannot allow Iran to do in Syria - and they're planning more to do what they did in in Lebanon. It was a mistake, I think, to let them do it there. And here it's I can express a mia culpa, which is that when I was in the National Security Council, I had the Lebanon file, much to my dismay, because I don't think there's anyone in the world who can really understand Lebanon, and that from 2000 to 2005. And that was just a period between the time that Israel withdrew from Lebanon, and just before the outbreak of the second Lebanon war. And there was an ongoing debate within the defense establishment at the time. We see the tremendous build up in their rocket capability. So in 2000, when Israel withdrew, it was a couple of thousand. And by the time the second Lebanon war broke out, it was about 13,000. We saw the buildup. Very clearly - great intelligence. And the question was, well, do we act now to try and stop it before it gets too bad? And the other consideration was, well, first of all, nothing is deterministic in life. We don't know for sure that there's there will be a war with with them. And in the meantime, Israel's totally bogged down with the intifada with the Palestinians, and with other issues that were on the agenda. And the decision that the government made at the time was, well focus on the intifada, and other things. We don't need a two-front war. And I was one of those who said, well, let's yeah, I think that's right. And let's just try and achieve the terms and achieve a balance of terror with Hezbollah. And in retrospect, I'm not sure whether I was right or not. As the years have gone by it become more skeptical. Okay. What do we do today? Well, I for one, we're convinced that we cannot go that route a second time because the thought of another arsenal like that in Syria, plus air bases, plus ground bases. Iran is a power, by regional standards it's a superpower. I don't think we can allow this. And I think actually what Israel has done. Now you refer to this before, it's known as the 'campaign between the campaigns' (Ma'arachot). This is an entire strategy, which is designed to keep things under the radar and keep it as a level that doesn't force the other side to respond significantly. And as you were saying, Israel has conducted at least hundreds of strikes in Syria, without eliciting a major response. Okay, this time they signed an agreement, they upped the level of cooperation. That's part of the game. Maybe we'll have to launch some more strikes. Maybe we'll have to up our strikes. So far, we've done a pretty good job. You can't...we haven't prevented it completely, or far from it. But in delaying, significantly delaying the intention of efforts.

WAXMAN: I want to turn to the other great kind of strategic challenge in many ways that Israel faces in the region today. And that is declining stature of the United States in the region. I mean, this touches upon Iran's entrenchment in Syria. It touches upon, of course, Iran's nuclear program and the the ways in which other regional actors are responding. Taking their own measures now in response to Iran. I mean, if we see the United States, not only under President Trump, but also under President Obama before him, as gradually engaged in a pivot away from the Middle East, or at least downgrading its involvement in the region. How great a threat is this for Israel? What what are. I mean, has Israel in a sense, put all its eggs in the American basket? And now it's going to find itself increasingly exposed as as US influence wanes. I mean shouldn't it have been the United States, for example, that was that is leading the charge to try to counter Iran. Rather than Israel finding itself, particularly in the case of Syria, you know, Israel's really trying to prevent Iran's entrenchment in Syria. And the United States is kind of largely AWOL. So how serious the threat is strategically in terms of Israel's strategic interest, this diminution or kind of gradual decline of American power globally, but particularly in the region?

FREILICH: I think that the US has pretty much always been a force for good in the region. Now, that doesn't mean it hasn't made some big mistakes over the years it has. But the question, of course, is the alternative who's good who's going to fill that role? And well, we know that the vacuum created by the American disengagement from the region, retrenchment from the region has been Russia. And Mr. Putin, I think he gets credit for playing his limited cards very effectively, but he took advantage of a power vacuum. And the result is that 40 years after the US threw the Soviet Union out of the Middle East and became an effective solo, the predominant superpower, the US just simply opened the doors for him. Even in Egypt, right? So Russia is now selling billions of dollars in arms to Egypt. They're building two nuclear reactors, power reactors in Egypt. They're trying to do the same in other countries. They tried unsuccessfully, so far to make an inroad into the American monopoly in Saudi Arabia. So that one didn't work. But slowly, they're building the presence in the region. And of course, Syria is the number one place. I am skeptical about the American ability to really withdraw from the region. There's an old expression, if you don't visit the Middle East, the Middle East will visit you. And I think sooner or later, it'll happen. And it happened in the worst way in 911. And then, there was ISIS and tomorrow, there'll be something else. I don't believe that the US really can pivot away from the region for long. I think it's dangerous. I think for the US, and I'm convinced it's dangerous for the region. You asked, did Israel put all its eggs in the American basket - and the answer's yes. Just about. Israel has tried in recent years, successfully, to build a very strong commercial relationship with China.

But what is for us a strong relationship with China is still minor for them. It's not something that affects their strategic considerations. We've begun to develop developing a whole really impressive array of relations with Gulf states. Who would have imagined? It took a 70 years to get there. There's strong military cooperation today with Jordan and Egypt, growing ties with some countries in Africa and Latin America. So Israel has tried to diversify a little bit. But in the end, Israel is absolutely in the American camp. There's no doubt about that. You have to be dependent on one country that I think it isn't doing too badly,

WAXMAN: Does it need to kind of find ways though, to mitigate its dependence upon the United States. I mean, if the United States is re-orienting its foreign policy. It's interests, even its power declining. Its influence is seen in the region, even if it's only a perception and not necessarily... the perception, something determines reality. So if the United States is perceived to be a decline, that then in terms also leads, countries like Iran to see Israel therefore as weaker. What can Israel do to...maybe does it need to find ways to reduce its dependence on the United States? Should it be trying to hedge its bets with China perhaps? Or is it really a question of, you know, there is n...US support is indispensable to Israel, and therefore, Israel must continue to kind of hitch its wagon to the United States, so to speak.

FREILICH: First of all, I think Israel is overwhelmingly dependent on the US. That's a fact of life. And there's no alternative. China can be a commercial partner. It's not a strategic and diplomatic partner. Russia can be a very limited diplomatic partner. It's not a military or commercial partner. If you look, who can Israel have a major alliance with - the list is very small: it's the United States, the United States, the United States. And that's it. Now, let me say, I remember there was talk of American decline back in the 80s. It was pervasive. Everybody - ah the end of the American era. All empires come to an end. And then of course, there was the high tech revolution. And in the 90s the US was back. And the 2000s, the US was the sole superpower. I think, the it's like the reports of Twains' death - they're premature. I'm not convinced that the US is really into decline. The next president or the president after can turn that around. But Israel is in the American camp. And that's not going to change for a very long time. I, in my recent book about Israel's national security strategy, I posed the question there. Can Israel even survive today without the United States? And for me, that was a painful question - what 72 years after our independence. It took us 2,000 years to restore Israeli Jewish sovereignty. And now we have to ask, can we even exist without the United States? And I posed this question colleagues. In actual in meetings - in the National Security Council, in the IDF, or the Prime Minister's Office, various places. And I thought that people were going to fall out of their seats. 'What, oh, my God, we can't live with that.' And all I got was a yawn. Yeah, okay. It's clear to everyone. Everybody understands that. And when you look about what's happening in the relationship in the last few years, I am very, very, very, very deeply concerned, because there has been a precipitous, a dramatic drop in support on the Democratic side, especially the more liberal and progressive part of it. And we know that most of the Jewish community votes Democratic and more liberal. And the drop is especially bad on young people. Now, for me, this isn't a partisan issue. I don't care - Democrats, Republicans. One of the sources of the US-Israeli relationship, the special relationship, was the fact that it was bipartisan. And we need that. And it's critical. We need the support of the United States, we need the support of the Jewish community. Now, part of this has been driven by Israel, by Mr. Netanyahu, who I think is intentionally pushed it to turn it into a partisan issue. And coming to Congress to take on President Obama, I think was an inexcusable error. But it's not all because of Israel. I think among the American Jewish community and maybe liberal community, generally, there's a misguided tendency to conflate, Mr. Trump, or Trump and Netanyahu and if they support each other, then you conflate that with Israel. Well, I think you can have a strong dislike and disagreement with Israeli policies without distancing yourself from Israel. Okay, the fact that people don't like Netanyahu doesn't mean that they don't have to like the State of Israel. Just like if you don't like Trump, that doesn't mean you don't have to like the United States. This is part of the whole issue of identity politics, and it's getting worse and worse. And in recent years, we've seen many American Jews, including Jewish leaders, getting up and publicly expressing alienation from Israel, disaffection from Israel. Israel was reborn 72 years ago, it's 75 years after the Holocaust. I have maybe a somewhat impolite suggestion for what people who are disaffected can do to themselves.

WAXMAN: Okay, thank you for that. As a final, let me ask you a final question. I mean, we haven't we haven't discussed the Palestinian issue. We could have another podcast just on talking about Israel's policies on that. But given the way in which the continuation of the status quo in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, Israel's continuing military rule over the West Bank, the continuing blockade on Gaza. Whoever's responsible for the status quo, the fact of the matter is that this status quo is clearly having an impact upon American attitudes. And as you noted, upon the attitudes of liberals in the United States, who the polls show have become, over time more sympathetic to the Palestinian position. And basically blame Israel for the continuation of the status quo which they see as fundamentally unjust to the Palestinians. And yet Israelis are either content to maintain the status quo in the West Bank or even to entrench it further through formal unilateral annexation measures. Does this not point then to a coming split between these two close allies. If the United States, and if Americans and particularly liberal Americans, are becoming increasingly impatient with the occupation now 53 years old, Israelis have maybe kind of, you know, maybe reluctantly come to terms with it, come to accept it as a as something that they would maybe wish to end, but they can't. And there isn't really any serious debate about ending it. It's only about, as you said, annexing, does this not bode very badly for the future of us Israeli relations? What can Israel do to prevent this trend from continuing to erode the foundations. And particularly, as you said, to bipartisan support for the US-Israeli relationship?

FREILICH: Well, the truth is, I think that the problem is going to get worse in coming years. And it's going to get worse for two reasons. One is that there. I think, it frankly doesn't even matter who's in our office in Israel. If we had a left wing government. The Palestinians aren't there yet. They're not. I don't think they're capable of making the decisions that they have to make. The kinds of decisions that two Israeli governments at least - Barak and Olmert - were willing to make and put truly dramatic proposals on the table. The Palestinians aren't there. So you're absolutely right, that the liberal community in the United States is increasingly putting the blame on Israel. I think they are deeply misinformed about the real reasons for this, for this situation for the status quo. Yes, there is a right wing government in Israel and has been for the last few years and it has also become an obstacle to a breakthrough into peace. But people forget that there were the two Israeli governments that I mentioned. And it started with Rabin and Peres, so it's more than the two. And the Palestinians have never once said yes to anything. They've said no to really dramatic proposals time and again. I think it's also quite amazing, I think most American viewers, listeners would be amazed to hear that the Palestinian issue did not appear....it played almost no role in the three rounds of elections in the last year. It was a non-issue in Israel. Why - not because Israelis don't care. But because people realize that it doesn't really matter. There's no chance to reach a breakthrough no matter who's in office. So if that's the case, that's dealing with issues that we can have an effect on. So it makes sense, even if it's a bit counter intuitive. But most people in Israel were against annexation, some wanted partial annexation. There's still about 20 years since the peace process, collapsed. Still about 50% support a two-state solution despite everything. And I have little doubt that if there wasn't a real possibility for a breakthrough today, you'd see that number go back up to its old, two-thirds. Because people are disillusioned. And then in those circumstances, they say, let's get on with our lives. So you said, what can be done about it? Well, if Israel elected a different government, that would be something that could be done about it, or this kind of government took a different approach. If there was pressure from the United States, say if Mr. Biden is elected, or four years from now, if there's another President. I think we can all as citizens do things to try and put some pressure on our governments. And maybe I'll take this opportunity to say one thing. There has been a tendency in recent years because people have been disillusioned about the prospects for a breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians. So the American Jewish community, at least part of it - the liberal part and I'm sure J Street - are trying to put pressure on the administration in Washington to put pressure on Israel. And people on the left in Israel, who were discouraged about the prospects of breakthrough also they say, well, we can't win in the Israeli playground so they're also going to Washington and putting pressure there. And I think that's a terrible mistake. Even if I may agree with the objective, and I understand the logic to what they're doing. Alright, so today, our side of the political map doesn't like what's happening in Israel. So we want to go to Washington. But tomorrow there will be a new Israeli government and the right wing will want to go. And the place to change Israel's policies in these areas is in Israel. So if people want to do things, help support those in Israel who think like you do. Don't play in Washington. In Washington, the thing to do is to support the US-Israeli relationship, because that is critical. We still have a country to keep strong and secure. If we reach a breakthrough with the Palestinians this year or five years from now is critical, but secondary to that.

WAXMAN: Okay, well, I think that's a good point to end this fascinating conversation. Thank you Chuck Freilich for joining me today. I hope all the listeners have found this interesting. I'd also encourage you if you want to hear more from Professor Freilich to go to the website of the Nazarian Center for Israel Studies where you can watch his webinar where he talks more about Israel's security challenges. You've been listening to an episode of Israel in Depth produced by the UCLA Nazarian Center for Israel Studies. Thank you for listening.