Refugees and the War in Ukraine

Okay, let's go ahead and get started. Hello! 

Welcome to our panel discussion on "Refugees  

and the War in Ukraine". My name is David 

Scott FitzGerald. I co-direct the Center  

for Comparative Immigration Studies at UC San 

Diego and we're co-hosting today's event together  

with our colleagues at the UCLA Center for the 

Study of International Migration, the UCLA  

Center for European and Russian Studies, and the 

International Institute at UC San Diego. Following  

the February 24th Russian invasion of Ukraine, 

around 12 percent of the population has fled the  

country. The UN refugee agency, the UNHCR, reports 

that as of yesterday, more than 5.4 million  

refugees have left, including 3 million who are in 

Poland alone. Six countries have received 350,000 

or more, including Romania, Russia, Hungary, 

Moldova, and Slovakia. The Biden administration  

has recently announced that it will accept 100,000 

Ukrainian refugees and has opened a new private  

sponsorship channel to do so. There's an even 

larger number of people, an estimated 7.7 million,  

who have been internally displaced within 

Ukraine. The UNHCR estimates that even more,  

or unable to leave because of the conflict. These  

dynamics come on top of other displacements caused 

by the war in Donbas since 2014, and the movements  

of asylum seekers and other migrants from Asia 

and Africa, who intended to transit Ukraine,  

many of whom stayed long-term as Ukraine 

itself became a host country. Our panelists,  

who are here to help us understand these 

dynamics, are professor Marta Pachocka, Head of  

the Migration Policies Research Unit at the Center 

of Migration Research of the University of Warsaw;  

professor Marta Bivand Erdal, Co-director of the 

Peace Research Institute in Oslo; Martin Rozumek,  

Executive Director of the Organization for Aid 

to Refugees in Prague; professor Raphi Rechitsky  

from National University and an expert on 

experiences and policies of forced migration  

within, to, and through Ukraine; and professor 

Rana Khoury currently at Princeton and soon  

taking a faculty position in political science at 

the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.  

A special thanks to our colleagues in Europe, who 

have given up their Friday night to join us live.  

The order of activities today is that each 

panelist will take five minutes to make an opening  

remark about a particular aspect of the situation. 

I'll then pose a set of questions to the whole  

panel, and then for most of the event, that'll 

be devoted to a Q&A with everyone on the call,  

including the panelists and the audience. 

During that open discussion period,  

please electronically raise your hand and you'll 

be unmuted to ask a question, or you can use the  

Q&A function at the bottom of your screen 

and I'll pose that question to a panelist.  

So, let me start by inviting Marta Pachocka 

to make her opening remark. Please!  

Thank you very much for this invitation. 

Hello, everyone! It's my pleasure to join  

for the very first time one of your webinars. 

So, very briefly: What is the current state of  

play in Poland regarding the crisis going on 

in Ukraine? The first point is, I would say  

that we have two different crises going on. 

One is the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine,  

and another one is the refugee crisis going on 

in Poland. As we know from the data provided  

by the UNHCR on a daily basis, so far Poland 

received almost 3 million people fleeing Ukraine.  

Intentionally I say people or forced migrants 

from Ukraine, because these are not only Ukrainian  

citizens. We assume that 95% of those that are 

coming to Poland are Ukrainian nationals. Poland  

is considered by the UNHCR the primary country in 

terms of receiving forced migrants from Ukraine.  

What is interesting, and if we compare 

it to the developments in Europe in 2015,  

the issue is about the very large scale of 

forced migrants that came to Poland within  

If we look at the developments and numbers from 2015  

in Europe during the so-called migration refugee 

crisis connected to the Mediterranean region,  

that time it was 1 million within one year and not 

only to one country. These were mostly Italy and  

Greece, as you remember. So, very large-scale 

influx of people. Then Poland is not a typical  

destination country for forced migrants. 

So, the question was: How can our country,  

how can Poland address this challenge? And the 

reaction was very positive. I would say that we  

are, as researchers but also as Poles, surprised 

how positively, how openly the society reacted,  

and to what extent it provided support. So, maybe 

going directly to the actors that played a key  

role in receiving forced migrants during the first 

two months as of now. I have to stress that the  

key role was played by our non-governmental 

organizations and by civil society.

Also, they were supported by local governments 

from border towns, so the towns that are close to  

the Polish-Ukrainian border, including Przemyśl 

and Lublin, and also big cities, including our  

capital Warsaw. Then we should also mention, and 

it was stressed very often by media and also by  

our politicians, our volunteers – simply every 

Polish citizen, but also the Ukrainian diaspora.

We have to remember that Ukrainian 

migration is not a new phenomenon in Poland.  

Before the crisis of February 2022, we've 

received many, let's say economic migrants,  

voluntary migrants from Ukraine. So, the

number of these Ukrainians from pre-2020 

is estimated at 1.35 million people. 

Some researchers stressed that this  

phenomenon of high inflow of 

economic Ukrainian migrants to Poland  

before 2022 is a kind of Ukrainization of 

labor migration to Poland. I just said about  

NGOs, local governments, volunteers, and 

then the government. So, the government

played a crucial role two weeks later, because 

the politicians provided a new legal framework  

to receive migrants. Simply, the new law was 

announced on March 12th - the law providing support  

to Ukrainian migrants. The point is that this 

law is very selective, so it addresses the needs  

and access to public services of

only Ukrainian citizens and their  

families. So, it might be an interesting 

issue for you to discuss later. And finally,  

we should remember about a huge support 

provided by the international organizations.  

We have the UNHCR office in Poland - very active. 

The so-called Regional Refugee Response Plan was  

launched. At the beginning, the assumption was 

that it will be implemented by August. As of now,  

we know that it will be implemented at least by 

the end of December 2022. Another important actor,  

obviously, is the European Union, because we,

I mean Poland, we are one of the 27 EU Member States.  

So, we are also covered by the EU asylum policy, 

and EU legal framework regarding international  

protection. What is the state of play as of today? 

We have moved from this short-term emergency  

humanitarian period, and we are in fact now in 

the reception phase, that may take up to one  

year and a half. Because this is the time that 

our government provides a legal status, legal  

stay for Ukrainian refugees according to this new 

law I've just mentioned. And finally, we should  

take into account another international actor, IOM.

But IOM is mostly involved in the support to  

third country nationals other than Ukrainians. So, 

the first two weeks were important in these terms,  

because there were also for example non-Ukrainian 

students leaving Eastern part of Ukraine. They  

moved to Poland, and then they were supposed to 

return to their countries of origin - many of  

them from Africa. I think I will stop here and I 

will give the floor to my colleagues. Thank you!

Thanks very much. Marta Bivand Erdal.

Thanks very much, and thanks for having me. 

I'll also keep this quite brief. David asked  

me to speak a bit about the response in European 

countries beyond those that are neighboring to  

Ukraine. I think it will tag nicely onto what

Marta already said. So, I thought I should just  

start with some of the context. I'm sure most 

of you know that the EU has decided to have this  

temporary protection scheme, which they actually 

regulated already in 2001, but they never used it. 

So, on March 4th, there was this unprecedented 

move to actually use this protection system,  

and I'm sure we can discuss later why

now, why not before, and these kinds of  

questions. And it was sort of unprecedented, 

the way it went about on a systemic level,  

because of course, migration and asylum are 

extremely contested within the EU as a political  

issue. And the specific political context here of 

the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and its proximity  

to EU countries is sort of, it's everywhere. And I 

think I want to stress that also in this context,  

because I'm sure you all know this, but the 

proximity of these things within Europe are  

something, which I think just can't be stressed 

enough, especially if you're looking at this maybe  

from a North American or an Asian context, 

where it's just much further away. So that's  

the systemic level. Now, that's all interesting 

and good, and in principle that's great.

Ukrainians who were already in EU countries, or 

who arrived after February 24th, and indeed also  

residents of Ukraine who exited Ukraine and 

entered into EU countries after that point in  

time, were then supposed to have a fast track to 

protection similar to asylum, but not through the  

regular asylum route. Now, the reason why not 

is mixed. One reason is, of course, the sort of  

proximity to the war, and the political backdrop 

of that as much already underscored. Just this  

unprecedented scale. And again, I think this is 

important to stress, although I know we know this,  

all of us that are on this call. But if you 

look at the numbers of arrivals, not just  

in 2015 or 2016 within Europe, you know across 

the 10 last years in terms of asylum seekers,  

what has happened within the last two 

months are just much higher numbers.  

So, I think this sort of scale and 

proximity just cannot be stressed  

enough in this context. Now, the EU regulations. 

I think one of the interesting things about this  

protection mechanism is that, I think many 

people working in this field agree that this

actually would be a good idea overall in terms 

of how we relate to people seeking asylum,  

because what the system means is that you 

have a fast track, where you don't put people  

basically in waiting centers, where they have to 

wait for months, years sometimes, and basically  

become completely passive. But instead you allow 

people to have residence permits and to work.  

And it's a temporary protection. In European 

context, we've had this before in relation to the  

wars in the Balkans. And sometimes that protection 

becomes permanent, sometimes it doesn't.  

And I think that's also important to stress in 

this context, that it is a temporary protection  

mechanism, and what will happen down the line, 

none of us knows. But that's also the context  

of it. Which is the reason why it can be 

fast-track in a way. If it was permanent,  

politically that wouldn't be possible. So I think 

it's an interesting question – how this will  

affect the way we deal with these issues in Europe 

later. Because this approach solves many of the  

huge problems we've had with the current asylum 

system here in Europe, which is, I think, as most  

of us know, incredibly flawed on very many levels. 

I'm not going to go into numbers deliberately, and  

I think some of our colleagues later on will come 

into numbers a little bit more, as well. I'll say

a couple of things in relation to why I'm not 

really wanting to say anything about numbers.  

The numbers are incredibly uncertain. Some of 

you already mentioned some numbers in terms  

of border crossings into Poland, and also 

into Romania, or Hungary, or other countries  

neighboring Ukraine. We don't know 

how many people are going back.  

We don't know how many of these 

crossings are multiple border crossings.  

Because Ukrainians, who initially had biometric 

passports, and later on anyone, could move freely  

between the EU countries, and also 

into the EEA. We don't actually  

quite know who's where. And we do know that there 

are a lot of people in Germany. Germany is also  

close to Poland. There were also many Ukrainians 

there from before. We know there are quite a few  

also in Italy. Again, there was a diaspora there 

before. We know there are quite a few in Spain. 

Turkey has many, as well. Interestingly, Norway 

has been preparing for a lot of refugees to  

arrive. They don't seem to be arriving. So, 

there's kind of a capacity to receive people,  

but there seems to be perhaps a desire 

to remain rather closer to Ukraine,  

because there is this hope of peace. And I'll 

actually end on this broader comment, that we  

might want to come back to in the discussion 

later on. I think what is interesting from this  

sort of not neighboring country perspective, is 

that what is happening with the mobilities out of  

the war in Ukraine, is in fact, I think, very 

similar to what we see in many other conflict  

contexts around the world. But this is now in 

Europe and we're not used to that in Europe.  

So, the EU, and the European states, and also 

populations to an extent, are behaving as if  

this was kind of something we know. And we don't. 

This is like being Lebanon, or like being Jordan,  

or like being Turkey in relation to Syria, or like 

being Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran for many years. 

And hopefully this situation will be resolved much 

faster than that, but I think that just sort of  

flips completely how we relate to the issue. 

And I think it does something to how we can try 

and understand it, as well.

I think I will end there. Hopefully,  

we can come back to some of these issues in the 

discussion. Thanks! Thanks very much! Martin.

Good afternoon! Thank you for 

inviting me to this event.  

I represent the Organization for Aid to Refugees, 

shortly OPU, and we celebrated the 30th anniversary of  

our work last year. Basically, we started with the 

war in Bosnia, when the Czech Republic received  

returned, one third of them integrated in the  

Czech Republic, one third was reunited with 

family members in other EU Member States.  

Since that time, we never had large numbers of 

refugees. After we entered the European Union,  

we never had more than 2,000 asylum seekers 

coming to the Czech Republic annually.  

So, for us the arrival of 300,000 

Ukrainian refugees in less than two months  

is something very extraordinary and it requires a 

lot of new recipes and policies to be established,  

because we are a rather small country.

Out of it, 700,000 are foreigners, or immigrants 

in the Czech Republic, and less than 2,000 annual  

asylum seekers. On the other hand, Ukrainians belong

to the largest national group in the Czech Republic.

Before the war, there was a minority of 200,000

Ukrainians in the Czech Republic – mainly  

labor migrants. So, I was pretty sure that 

the Czech Republic would become one of the  

final destination countries. It is not the Syria 

scenario, because the Syrian community is almost  

zero in the Czech Republic. So, it was pretty sure 

that they would not come and stay for a long time.  

With Ukrainians, it's a different story.

We expect that out of these 300,000, probably  

would be our task to help them integrate quickly.  

Our organization immediately on February 27th 

opened a hotel for Ukrainian refugees of 250 beds.

It was full in two days. Then we started an 

operation in cooperation with the city of Prague  

in the main train station, and the main bus 

station. So, on average we received 6,000  

refugees in the Prague train station daily, which 

is incredible for us, because usually we know  

every single asylum seeker personally. 

With these 2,000, we are present in all  

refugee camps and five cities, so this 

is something very demanding for us.  

The temporary protection - I think it's a good 

tool. It was activated for the first time in  

Europe's history, and what worries 

me is the uncertainty of what will  

come after the temporary protection scheme 

is over, because the Czech authorities  

are not willing or able to say whether Ukrainians 

would be able to stay or not after the temporary  

protection scheme is over. In fact, it would be a 

huge opportunity for the Czech Republic, because  

we have had the lowest unemployment in the 

EU for the last five years. So basically,  

there is zero unemployment in Prague. Everyone, 

who wants to work, finds a job easily. And the  

salaries, of course, are not high, but basically 

we need everybody. I think we could be grateful  

that 300 mainly young persons, because we are 

talking about 80% mothers with smaller children,  

so I think it's also an opportunity for the 

Czech society and for the Czech government.  

The temporary protection scheme allows immediate 

access to the labor market, immediate access to  

the full-scale health insurance, so we see 

people coming with very difficult diagnoses.  

I must say that people coming now are in worse 

shape than the people coming at the beginning.  

We see a big demand for psychological health, 

because the people fleeing the war need this  

care very urgently. We always lack the capacity 

in this specialized care. So, I think that will be  

the main challenge. Where to find enough doctors? 

Where to find pediatrists? Where to find teachers?  

Czech language teachers? It will be a 

big challenge for the whole society,  

but I think we will manage. Thank you! 

Thank you, Martin. Raphi Rechitsky.

Hello! Thank you again for having me 

– this is a wonderful event – and for  

David and CCIS organizing it. It's great to 

be here. I wanted to begin by acknowledging,  

as has already been said, not just

the scale and proximity of this crisis  

to Europe, but also the speed. You know, we're 

witnessing a very fast-growing refugee crisis,  

possibly the fastest one since World War II,

I think. I'd be difficult to rely on many of the

data that are coming out on flows, as has already 

been said actually by some of my colleagues,  

within the EU. But besides the very understudied, 

you know David mentioned 13 million who are  

immobilized and mobilized within Ukraine. But 

if we were to think about just those who are  

internally displaced and are able to move, 

they're in addition to the 7, I think 7.5  

million as of last week. I'm happy to talk about 

this later. There are also 4 million people who  

have departed Ukraine. And I think 4.5 million,

if we consider that about 600,000 that have  

supposedly returned according to Ukrainian 

government data. But regardless the scale  

of the crisis and its speed, it is fundamental to 

understanding before we engage in any discussions  

and some of the current hot button questions 

about the legal, social, political complexities,  

that could explain why refugees from Ukraine 

versus refugees from other countries to Europe  

have been perhaps or perhaps not treated 

differently. So, we can look at current  

debates about Danish refugee admissions, or the US 

Title 42 at the US-Mexico border and it's assumed  

possible demise. But my goal is not to 

entertain some of these debates themselves,  

but rather I want to begin 

by observing that the concern  

for justifying or problematizing the equity 

between Ukrainian refugees and the other refugees,  

both from the left and the right, from rights 

groups, and politicians, and Europe assumes  

that there's a supposed division between refugees 

from Ukraine and refugees from other countries.  

But this assumption, even though it is very true as my

colleague who spoke first mentioned, the rate that  

it's still important to understand this because  

the assumption takes for granted that in a world 

fraught with many conflicts and a withering  

refugee regime, that people move around, force 

migrants move around and settle many times  

in different countries. Also for a second reason, 

I think non-Ukrainian refugees, it is important  

to understand those who flee Ukraine. Also

because we assume that refugees can be divided  

into kind of primordial ethnic categories, or 

primordial national categories - those from  

Ukraine, or those from outside Ukraine, those 

who are ethnically Ukrainian or not - without  

observing and understanding the multicultural

legacies, and even current realities of  

Ukrainian society. So first of all, as kind of 

a disclaimer, we should still mention that many  

Ukrainian refugees speak Russian, even though 

they speak Ukrainian. And if we were to take  

seriously this idea – that Ukraine is a Ukraine 

from post-colonial lines with respect to Russia,  

we should not justify Ukrainians

being excluded from various social,  

informal benefits, as I've heard reported 

from the ground from different NGOs.

For instance translators being hired by German 

welfare agency that discriminated against  

Ukrainians, who can't speak perfect Ukrainian. 

So, excluding Russian-dominant Ukrainians only  

plays into Putin's kind of ethnic imperialism 

that's used to legitimate this war. But outside  

of that important issue, what I really want to 

bring to light, is a further, broader issue of  

that 5% Marta mentioned, the right of refugees, 

and why that's important to consider. Because  

they really are the most vulnerable, most of them 

are excluded from temporary protection status.  

I want to turn our attention to their 

reception and really begin to think about it  

in light of the history of the reception 

of refugees in Ukraine. These are people,  

perhaps least likely not just to be displaced 

internally within Ukraine, but also least likely  

to return to Ukraine perhaps from abroad. 

We're talking about, in terms of numbers,  

there's only 2,200 recognized refugees in 

Ukraine from 63 countries. But there are also  

tens of thousands of asylum seekers. There's been

between 1,100 and 2,300 or so asylum seekers  

in Ukraine every single year between 1996 and 

the war, as estimated by UNHCR partner in Ukraine.  

This is all on top of, we can take educated guess of

much larger populations of international students,  

that grew on top of, and then 

during and after independence over  

two decades of Soviet worker and student exchange 

programs. There's many private universities and  

public universities in Ukraine that attract tens 

of thousands of engineering, medical, and other  

students from Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa,

as well as Southeast Asia. So, when we're  

talking about these various figures, on one hand 

international students, labor migrants, we should  

also not forget refugees are also part of those 

flows, and asylum seekers are a part of those  

flows. And it's important to think about this 

also. You might have seen images of a young boy,  

who was in the early days of the war, highly 

circulating the press. He's walking to the Polish  

border alone, he's crying, he has a small backpack 

on, and you can see other press taking pictures of  

him. And he was touted in the press as a Ukrainian 

boy, but he is a Syrian boy. He is a Syrian boy,

who grew up in Ukraine and whose

parents had supposedly perished  

in Syria, and who had spent as an orphan in 

Ukraine with perhaps some distant relatives.  

We underappreciate just how significant some of 

these early flows are for non-Ukrainian refugees.  

I can later tell you a little bit more about where 

these refugees are in discussion, that I try to  

keep in touch with on daily and weekly basis. But 

I want to go back for a minute to 2012 and 2015,  

when I spent 15 months in Ukraine studying refugee 

reception, interviewing refugees, international, 

state and civil society groups.

So, there's importance to telling you  

a little bit more about how some refugees, who 

had intended to stay in Europe, often arrive in  

Ukraine. And they often end up settling in Ukraine 

even though their intention is to go to the EU.  

Many, about more than half of the refugees 

I spoke with, end up settling in Ukraine  

and making lives there, even though their 

intention had been to go on to the EU. But  

refugees themselves don't have a say in their 

own fate. And at least not in the constraints of  

the international refugee regime, right? 

They're part of the local integration program.  

There was a lot of international funding that was 

supported by the EU for a UN program in Ukraine,  

for the local integration of refugees that I've 

argued, and some of my work kind of pertains to,  

a soft remote control. As David refers to remote 

control in his work, I kind of talk about this  

as a soft remote control, as humanitarian kind 

of incentives, as we've seen in Turkey, on a much  

smaller scale in Ukraine. But I think this is also 

relevant for what we end up seeing in Ukraine down  

the road with internal displacement actually. 

And I can talk about that a little bit more.  

I wanted to spend the introduction by saying 

that the crisis with Ukrainian refugees presents  

an opportunity, since many of whom are stuck in countries

like Moldova, [inaudible] present an opportunity to support and rethink  

the international refugee regime, both 

support and rethink, right? And how we treat [inaudible]

the secondary destinations in Europe today, 

as well as how the international refugee  

regime shares responsibility across Europe 

and the world both for Ukrainian refugees,  

and how they are seen. Because many of these 

refugees, many of the most vulnerable refugees,  

who are in Europe right now, who came from 

Ukraine, don't have access to temporary  

protection. And so we need to make sure they are 

also, if not centered, a part of the conversation.

Thank you for that set of 

issues, Raphi. Rana Khoury.

Thank you! Thank you so much to the organizers 

for putting together this impressive panel.

I should say when David first reached out 

and invited me, besides my initial sort  

of pleasant surprise of him being in my inbox,

I said: But are you sure this is intended for me?  

Because this is a panel about Ukraine. So I'm here 

to give some perspective in comparison with my  

area of expertise on the Syrian refugee crisis and 

And so please feel free in the 

discussion to tell me where I've gotten  

some of these similarities and differences, 

that I'm going to try to point out, wrong.

So, as soon as the Ukrainian conflict began and 

refugees began fleeing, many people in the media  

were crying out, or on Twitter, about the 

selective empathy, and the double standards  

at this site of Europeans being just so very 

receptive to people fleeing conflict. And this  

apparent difference was not just a difference from 

Denmark was pushing Syrians to return, when Poland 

and Bulgaria were jockeying over people in their  

borderlands, who were freezing in the forest. And 

people calling this out, pointing to the role of  

race and producing such different receptions, 

also religion. And of course, in addition we  

can argue about how much these different factors 

are shaping reception. But of course there's also  

politics. There's geographic proximity. These 

same dynamics matter in the Global South, where  

countries that host most of the world's refugees, 

geopolitics and proximity also play significant  

roles in shaping refugee reception in the Global 

South. And those similarities are notable,  

given that those countries in the Global 

South enjoy far less capacity to host  

large numbers of people. So, I want to talk 

briefly about some of what I see. What I  

see is some of the similarities in the Syrian 

refugee crisis and Ukrainian crisis, because

maybe just through the passage of time, some of us 

can forget some of these dynamics. So first, with  

Syria and the conflict in that 

country - nobody expected it.  

Syria was a refugee host state. So, despite that

some ideas that conflict is endemic to the  

Middle East and North Africa, or MENA,

Syria was considered a very stable country.

As well, people didn't think it would last 

long. When I first went to the field to do  

my research in Jordan, the Syrians I 

encountered told me again and again:  

We thought we would be coming for 

a few weeks, a few months at most.

Syrian refugees, there are 5.7 million 

of them in neighboring countries, and  

about half of the country's pre-war population.  

These numbers are really quite similar to the 5.4 

million Ukrainian refugees and the 7.5 million  

internally displaced in Ukraine. There's nearly 

which is quite similar to Turkey, where there's 

countries can come out as really hosting a 

very large number of people, who have fled,  

although of course the Polish population is 

smaller in size than the Turkish population.  

But here especially, we see the role of empathy of 

the geopolitical variety. There's rivalries with  

the state responsible for causing the displacement 

in both the Turkish and Polish cases. There were  

also periods of sympathy for Syrians in Europe. 

In September 2015, the tragedy of Alan Kurdi,  

whose body washed ashore, Austria and Germany were 

prompted to open their borders. We remember images  

of Justin Trudeau in Canada meeting Syrians at the 

airport. So there was some sympathy for some times,  

and I am wary of putting all of 

Europe together as being sort of  

blocking so much migration. Germany suspended the 

Dublin procedure for Syrians. By the end of 2018,  

there were 1.8 million people with a refugee 

background in Turkey, the majority of whom were  

Syrians. As well from Syrians' perspective, 

Syrians are voicing far more empathy with  

Ukrainians than they are resentment at the double 

standards, not just for shared experiences with  

displacement, but also in their views, the 

cause of that displacement, as they see Russia  

as an aggressor in the Syrian conflict, as well. 

Now, I want to turn to some of the differences.  

As has already been pointed out by the presenters 

is the pace. Syrians were relatively slower  

to displace. Their displacement only began its 

significant numbers in 2013, which was nearly a  

year and a half into the violence. And it took 

them about three years to reach the similar  

numbers as Ukrainians that I pointed to at the 

start. While Syrians were slower to displace,  

Europeans were slow to act despite that ample 

lead-up time to respond to the emerging crisis.  

Ukrainians, as we've heard, were quick to 

displace, and Europeans have been quick to act.  

They've been acting collectively, giving 

Ukrainians the temporary protective status  

that we've heard about, they've been 

cooperating as the European Union,  

and their cooperation is producing different 

outcomes. In the Syrian case, that cooperation  

within the EU was in striking deals, for instance 

with Turkey, to keep Syrians from crossing.  

Another difference is the danger. In 2015, more 

than 3,500 lives were lost in a journey to Europe.  

The routes got more dangerous as more obstacles 

were erected. In March 2016, Slovenia, Croatia,  

Serbia, Macedonia closed their borders within 

even the EU, and the Balkan route to Germany  

became tighter. I think it's an open question as 

to whether the mixed migration is different. Often  

in 2015 in the European crisis we hear that it was 

a mixed migration, that there were people who were  

coming for all sorts of reason and not just as 

refugees, but 75% of those arriving in Europe,  

in fact, were from Syria, Afghanistan, and 

Iraq. These were conflict-wrecked countries.  

I think the politics, whether it's different, is 

to be determined insofar as the rise of the right  

wing in Europe, that has followed the migration 

crisis. I think we don't know the answer to that,  

because that took time. We don't know what 

European reception for Ukrainian refugees  

will look like in one year, in two years, in three 

years and four. So, the big takeaways for me are:  

While we do see this greater sympathy of 

European reception for Ukrainians, we also see  

quite a different sympathy with regards to the 

war itself. There is an investment in the war in  

Ukraine in a way that there is not an investment 

in the conflicts in these other countries, 

rather than just sympathy for the externalities 

of those wars. And of course the pace, which is  

strikingly different. We see here clearly 

that displacement is endogenous to borders. 

It is endogenous to reception. The drivers of 

displacement are not just in the conflict country,  

but in the options for people to flee it. Thank you. 

Thanks very much, Rana. So, let me start by posing  

a couple of questions about reception and taking 

up Rana's issue that she raised, about the future  

of reception, to her colleagues on the call 

who are based in Europe. As of last month,  

again just according to the UNHCR, 90% of Ukrainian 

refugees were women and children. And how is that  

low percentage of men shaping refugee experiences, 

public perceptions, as well as policy responses? 

And then relatedly, are there any signs suggesting 

whether this initial welcome will be sustained?

Should you indicate who is going to answer or can 

we just go ahead and jump in? Go ahead and jump in.

Okay, perfect! Thank you very much. I also 

took notes when my colleagues were discussing  

their points of view. In fact, my feedback is 

directly to your questions, but I would also like  

to refer to some points that were raised by 

other speakers. In terms of the structure  

of the refugee population that is coming to 

Poland, it's true that women in productive age and  

kids prevail. Most of them are really kids, not 

even teenagers. So, the question is if it helps to  

receive them in Poland. For sure. Because this 

is natural – when we have this picture of family,  

lonely women, kids, we have this feeling that we 

should support them. But it's not the only point.  

As I've mentioned before, Ukrainian migrants, 

both males and females, are not a new group  

of foreigners for Polish people, because we 

know many. We have many Ukrainian colleagues  

in our work. We have many Ukrainian students 

at the public and private universities 

and we are simply familiar with Ukrainians.

So for us, I say here on behalf of the society,  

it's much easier to accept them. The question is 

– and we already see it – how, even if they have  

the full access to all the public services, they 

can be matched for example with the labor market?  

Because as in the case of the Czech Republic, 

and Martin mentioned it also, in case of Poland,  

the unemployment rates for the national economy 

but also for local labor markets, are very low.  

And for us, it is rather very 

easy to absorb a huge number  

of newcomers to the labor market, but there is the 

issue of structural gap. So, we are rather in need  

of male workers, not female workers. So far, 

we see this discrepancy. Another issue is  

that there are linguistic skills that are 

very often necessary to work in Poland.  

So, here comes the question of language 

training, language courses in Polish here for  

newcomers, and there is a lot done in this 

domain by non-governmental organizations,  

and also by for example some universities offering 

free of charge Polish courses. Then obviously,  

the issue of taking care of kids. So, according 

to the Polish law, and this is something positive,  

any child between the age of six to eighteen has 

to join a public education system, so it covers  

primary and secondary education. High education 

is excluded. Even with an EU temporary protection,  

or our specific Polish temporary protection 

for Ukrainians, any kid is allowed, even should

be enrolled in schools. But it does not 

concern all of them, because once again  

comes the issue of the language. So, 

many mothers are supposed to stay  

at home with their kids to take care of them. This 

is the issue of labor market. This is the issue of  

kids, of language. Then when we are discussing the 

issue of perception, what really matters is also  

the narrative or discourse that is launched by 

the government. This time, in comparison to 2015,  

there is no negative, hostile discourse launched 

by the government. And as we know, since 2015  

it is the Law and Justice Party that has 

the power. And in 2015, 2016, even 2017,  

the political and public media discourses 

regarding migration were very hostile.  

It was also reflected for example in our 

unwillingness to implement the two-year  

temporary relocation scheme for asylum seekers 

from Greece and Italy, even if we were forced  

to do this, because it was strongly rooted in 

the EU primary law and then followed by two  

Council decisions. So, we see this difference 

in the narratives. The narrative is not even neutral.

It's rather positive. So even

today, I just found the new  

stance by President Volodymyr Zelensky 

saying how Andrzej Duda, our president,  

is a great friend of him, because he, I mean the president, 

provides great support to the Ukrainian society,  

and to the Ukrainian politicians. So, we see this 

big shift. It might be explained by different  

reasons. Maybe because if this is about the 

elections that will come in the following months,  

so maybe it's about the political capital. But 

maybe it's also about the geopolitical context,  

and our own interests, so security and safety 

of Poland. It was also mentioned by, I think by  

Raphi. The issue where we are located, and 

the fact with whom we have borders. Just to  

draw a short picture of the geographical 

context of Poland on the map of Europe,

in the East, we have only one short part of 

Eastern EU border with another EU country. Simply,  

there is Schengen Zone with Lithuania, but then 

we have a long border with three non-EU Member  

States, so third countries. This is Russia, Oblast 

Kaliningrad, then this is the border with Belarus,  

and we know that Belarus is strongly influenced 

in political and socio-economic terms from  

Russia, and then comes the Ukrainian 

border. Simply, it's in our vital interest

not to have such a long border, being 

at the same time an Eastern EU border  

with a country like Russia, that should 

be considered as a country that is very  

unstable these days and very unpredictable.

I think that this political and safety related  

issues also matter a lot to narrative 

that is launched by our government. Also,  

you mentioned, Rana, the issue of double standard and 

selective empathy. I have to say that we have this  

in Poland nowadays. I assume that you've heard 

what is going on, or what has been going on  

since September 2021 on another part of Polish 

border with Belarus. We have double standards.  

We are open and friendly and very supportive to 

Ukrainian refugees, but at the same time, we are  

still rather hostile to those that are trying to 

cross, even if illegally, our border with Belarus.  

Obviously, the migrants coming from this direction 

are mostly from Middle East. And even they are  

not allowed to submit that asylum claim for 

regular proceedings, for a refugee status.  

So this is also about this double standard and 

selective empathy. I think I will stop here.

Anyone else? Yes, Martin.

Thank you for the question. I would like to 

react to David's remark and Rana's words.  

It certainly plays a role that in vast majority 

women with small children came to the Czech  

Republic. The level of solidarity is incredible. 

I would never expect that from the Czech society.  

The positive role of politicians is very 

important, and as with Syrians, all the  

politicians were very much against. Now, there are 

no politicians who would question this level of  

solidarity and who would play against Ukrainian 

refugees now, which is a very important thing.  

To react on Rana's words, I see three big 

differences if we compare the Syrian situation  

and the Ukrainian situation. First of all, with 

Ukrainians, it's much easier because we all  

know them, we have lived with Ukrainians for 20 

years, my children are at schools with Ukrainian  

classmates, we have Ukrainian friends, so there 

is no fear of unknown as it was with Syrians.  

And this is a big advantage for 

Ukrainians. Then another important thing is  

that they are not coming illegally as Syrians. 

I think the international refugee law is  

constructed in a way that you have a right to 

refugee status, but you don't have a right to  

select a country, where you would like to go.  

So basically, you should stay in the neighboring 

country and that country should accept you and  

give you the rights according to the 1951 

Geneva Convention. So this discourse that  

Syrian refugees are illegal migrants, because they 

did not have this legal way to come. This is very  

different with Ukrainians, because they have the 

visa-free regime and basically they can choose  

any EU country they want to come and 

stay, which is much easier for them,  

and also much easier for the society to accept 

that they are not illegal migrants like the  

Syrians were labeled, which I didn't like at all, but that was

the case in the Czech media and in the Czech political life. 

Then, I would also say that there is a difference 

in a sense that unfortunately, Syrians came  

during the time that there was this wave of 

terrorist attacks in Europe committed by Muslims,  

and Syrians were considered a dangerous group 

that could pose a risk to the Czech society,  

or to the societies in Europe, which was totally 

unjust. I didn't like it at all, but that was the  

discourse – that basically, terrorists are coming 

with the group of illegal migrants from Syria  

to Europe. As Rana, I see a lot of similarities 

and I think the crises are very similar,  

but I think these three differences make a big 

difference in the reception of Syrians and during  

the reception of Ukrainians. Thank you. David, can 

I just jump in briefly? Thanks. I'll also try and  

respond to your question, but I also wanted 

to respond to a couple of things that  

my colleagues on the panel mentioned. It's 

especially the issue that Raphi was mentioning –  

with refugees displaced again, and again, and 

again. Especially we know that there were Afghans,  

who were quite well integrated in Ukraine before, 

which doesn't mean there was no racism in Ukraine.

There happens to be racism in pretty much every 

society around the world, including in Ukraine.  

But still that was their home, and many 

of them have been there for a long time.  

And so it really is a question of sort of global 

protection issues. And I think that's important  

also because of what Rana was mentioning in 

terms of the similarities and differences. I've  

also been trying to sort of grapple with: What is 

it that is similar and different? And I would say  

I pretty much agree with everything you said.

I think one of the things that I find really constitutes  

a key difference is that the crisis in 2015-2016 

was a border crisis, a border management crisis.  

There was a humanitarian crisis at the border 

to the EU, and as Marta was also mentioning,  

that border crisis is still there. And we 

have deaths in the Mediterranean ongoing  

pretty much on a daily basis. And we have 

this situation on the Poland-Belarus border.  

So the EU borders are deadly, and that's the sort 

of crisis there, whereas the crisis with refugees  

from Ukraine is the war and the brutal invasion of 

Ukraine. And so that doesn't justify any racism,  

obviously. And it doesn't justify the incredible 

inequalities, and mobility rights people around  

the world have, which directly affect which 

opportunities for protection they have.  

But it does shed light on the difference in what 

is going on and how and why European states are  

responding differently to it. Because one 

situation is within the EU borders de facto,  

which is the neighboring countries except for 

Moldova are EU members. And the rest is outside  

of EU borders, which means it's third countries. 

And they're beyond these deadly borders. I think  

it's a very sort of banal point, but I think it's 

also really important to understand, because it  

really explains some of these crucial differences 

in treatment, which is just incredibly unfair.  

Just briefly on the population composition. I 

think it's the same in pretty much all countries  

because these are the people that are leaving 

Ukraine. So, women and children.  

I think there's two reflections. One from 

the Norwegian context where, as I mentioned,  

there's very few that actually have arrived. And 

among those that have arrived, relatively few,  

more or less half, have registered so far. They're 

being asked to register in order to get the rights  

that they have through these protection mechanisms 

that are there. But the reception system isn't  

geared up to receive them, even though there's so 

few that come to a country like Norway. And this  

is the case for other countries as well that are 

further afield from the neighboring countries.  

So, there seems to be sort of crisis of reception, 

even though compared to not just Poland,  

but compared to the Czech Republic as well, 

there's just so few, a fraction, that is arriving.  

And there is this sort of sense of not knowing 

quite how to deal with it in terms of schools,  

and kindergartens, and these kinds of things 

as well, which compared to what is going on in  

Poland, or the Czech Republic, or other countries 

that are receiving many more people, seems quite  

absurd. I'm mentioning this because maybe it's 

hard to spot that looking at this from the US,  

but there are huge differences within Europe, 

and how Europe is sort of collaborating on this.  

I think the jury's still out. I'm really curious 

what will happen, if the war is not resolved  

and people can't return. How will actually the 

other European countries be supporting Poland  

especially, but also the other neighboring 

countries, and also the Czech Republic and Germany,  

who may be other countries, who have the most 

refugees? There's money involved. There's talks  

of all kinds of compensations and things. But how 

will that European solidarity actually work?

I think we still are in an unknown territory. 

And it is this huge question of uncertainty  

in terms of time frame, that I think is sort of 

omnipresent when we're discussing these things.

Thank you! I'd like to pick up on what you 

said about return and invite anyone on the  

panel to weigh in on what do we know about how 

people who have left Ukraine are thinking about  

whether or not to return? How are they making 

those difficult decisions? Obviously, the nature  

of the battlefield and the war is also highly 

dynamic. What can you tell us about that? Anyone?  

If I may jump in very quickly with some 

numbers, because just a few days ago,  

we were discussing it with directors of the 

Warsaw higher education institutions. We are,  

as we know, we are still missing the good, 

reliable, and comprehensive data on any aspect  

of the crisis. But obviously, very often we 

rely on the data that are provided by UNHCR  

in this case, or by the EU. I have just 

in my hands, I think still the most recent,  

results from April 19th by the UNHCR. 

The research was on movement of Ukrainians back  

into Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, 

Romania, and Moldova. So, we see that in recent  

weeks, so let's say that from early April, the 

rate, or the absolute numbers of Ukrainians  

coming back to Ukraine, is slowly increasing 

especially in case of Poland. But does it mean  

that this is a long-term return? Or rather 

this is what is typical for Ukrainian migrants

in Poland at least? Circular migration. 

Another explanation might be the fact that  

last week, I think, was the week of Orthodox 

Easter, so many people wanted to reunite with  

their family members, with their husbands, with 

their brothers, that have to stay in Ukraine  

because of the mobilization. Simply, males aged 

the respondents were asked what are the reasons 

for their return. So, 32 percent stated that  

it's about how they perceive their safety

in area of return. Simply, we know  

that Russian soldiers are moved 

closer to Eastern part of Ukraine,  

so Donetsk and Luhansk, so it might be the 

reason. But it does not mean that there are no  

aggressions still going on in for example the 

central part of Ukraine, or Western one. 31 percent  

stated reunite with family, as I said,

and 20 percent that this is about something  

temporary to be fixed, like shopping, bringing 

family, or just visit the family members. So even  

my students - at Warsaw School of Economics, my 

first university, we have many Ukrainian students,  

and female students mostly - now, they decided to 

get back to the country just for two-three weeks,  

because of the Orthodox Easter, but also to 

try to convince for example their mothers and  

grandparents to join them in Poland. We see that 

there are many people that do not want to leave  

their country. So, my feeling is that this war just 

enforces or makes the Ukrainian identity stronger.  

Even now, we assume that from the Ukrainian 

forced migrants we host as of now in Poland,  

so more or less 1.5 million - these 

are our estimations, out of these  

three million that crossed the border - we 

think that many of them, if the war is fixed,

they will return, because they want 

to, because this is something to prove  

Ukrainian statehood and 

Ukrainian identity as a nation.  

This is in terms of return. We see them 

rather temporary, rather circular mobility,  

and we do not know what the future will bring, 

because it really depends on the developments in  

terms of war. Marta, that is all very helpful on 

the survey. I'd love to see what the results were.  

I was going to add that I think we can learn a lot 

from the war before the war, from the Ukrainian  

displacement from Luhansk and Donetsk occupied by 

Russian separatists in the last eight years, and  

the patterns of those displacements both within 

and beyond Ukraine. If we just look internally  

within Ukraine in light of some

of the motivations why  

Ukrainians today might take a trip back,

or come back to move, or to return, we can  

look back at the situation during the war. And 

if you can look at even UNHCR, there's great UNHCR  

data there about where and who moved within 

Ukraine. Out of 2.2 million people displaced from  

that war, there's more than

and Donetsk Oblast, not from Crimea -

and a lot of them, if you can look at

where the women and children are,  

and where people with disabilities are,

they're they're usually within

Ukrainian controlled Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast,

so they don't even go very far to Ukraine.  

And this can be explained by several factors. 

When I spoke to people on the ground,  

it was clear that unlike today, where there is 

cash assistance even internally within Ukraine,  

then social benefits, even the meager social 

benefits that people with disabilities and some  

families rely on, were tied unto and based on 

where you live. So, people would stand in 

checkpoints just to go back and receive  

their benefits, their social benefits

in Ukraine. Well, we think that  

people move as they're able to based 

on their resources, based on their abilities,  

you know, we should also consider some

of the constraints to their mobility based  

on social policy. But I also want to echo  

Marta's point about the

importance of the gender  

dimension of the migration, that women and children 

are visiting their families, there's multiple  

reasons for that, such as men who've stayed

back. Many men cannot leave. Unlike the

war before the war, when a lot of Ukrainian men would 

often try to sometimes ditch the draft, try to  

emigrate. Today, that is strictly enforced and 

men stay. Unless you have a disability granted  

by the Ukrainian state, you cannot leave.

And this is a coveted document.  

You know, wars often don't resolve 

corruption issues that, unfortunately, remain.

You know, these are documents that

are often only accessible to those  

who have resources. And a vast

majority of men cannot leave at all. 

So, it makes perfect sense to me, Marta, what 

you've heard back on your survey that women and  

families are coming to visit perhaps and also get 

convinced their elderly parents to leave, as well.  

Thank you. Thanks, Raphi.

Toward the end of the event I'll give  

everyone on the panel maybe three minutes 

to wrap up with whatever comments they would  

like to make as reaction, but now let's open 

everything up to everyone else on the call.  

If you have a question that you'd like to 

post directly, that would be the most efficient  

way forward. Just raise your hand, please, 

and we'll unmute you. Or you're welcome  

to use the Q&A function, as well.  

So, questions from the other participants.

Yes! Go ahead, Irina. Thank you so much for 

this really insightful discussion and an amazing  

panel. My question is about public institutions. I'm curious

if there is any information about the ongoing activity,

if there is any ongoing activity in public 

institutions, such as education, maybe health  

as well? We've been talking about comparisons 

between Ukraine and Syria. Can anyone speak to  

a comparison of public institutions operating 

or being limited in their operation? Thank you!

Should I jump in or leave the space

to my colleagues?  Go ahead.

Okay! So, the issue of different stakeholders 

involved in this, let's say Poland's response  

to the crisis. Obviously, the public sector is a 

key stakeholder in terms of the infrastructural  

and financial capacities. So, I would say that 

from the point of view of the implementation of  

real actions, these are local governments, 

in case of Poland, that are really crucial.  

Let me give you the numbers that we have 

from public institutions and their services  

from Warsaw. These are the very recent data I got 

from my colleagues from the City Hall just for  

Tuesday evening presentation I mentioned 

I had. So, the situation is, we have to say,  

pretty good in terms of big cities because 

simply big cities have the capacities to receive  

foreigners in general. So for example in big 

cities like Warsaw, Kraków, Wrocław, or Gdańsk  

or Lublin, we have language schools, we have also 

NGOs very often cooperating with local government.  

And these NGOs, being the main provider of the 

very field work support, like language, like care,  

like labor market and so on. So, the numbers for 

Warsaw. From the 26th of April, as an overview,  

what was the state of play? So the number

of people, that let's say went through or  

passed through Warsaw from the end of February, 

is estimated by the City Hall as 700,000, but  

only 300,000 are considered as those that decided 

to stay in Warsaw so far and benefit from this  

Polish version of temporary protection. 

Also the new act for Ukrainian refugees

allows them to register with the municipality of 

any city or town to receive a very specific ID.  

In Poland, each of us has its own number. It's 

not precisely ID number or passport number.  

Let me give you the full name in English 

to be very precise. So we have something  

that we call PESEL, so Universal Electronic 

System for Registration of the Population. So,  

of a specific person. So, Ukrainian refugees that  

came to Poland after 24th are allowed to apply 

for this PESEL and it makes possible for them  

to access any services, also with online access. 

So, these numbers are also important for us and  

public authorities to estimate how many of these 

people are really staying in the country. The  

numbers from late April in terms of these PESEL 

applications are for the whole Poland almost  

region where Warsaw, the capital, is located, is  

more than 190,000, and for Warsaw itself, 90,000. 

Then the numbers of children and teenagers that  

are covered by primary and secondary education

is 16,000 for Warsaw. Then the number of people  

that are registered as unemployed, so simply 

those that declare their will to search for a job,  

is up to 2,000. And then the places, let's say 

the places of city accommodation where people  

can stay for a short time. So, let's say the 

short time accommodation is as of now 86,000.  

So, we see that the local government and local 

level institutions provide rather a good support.  

The problem is with the support provided from 

the central level, especially with the money.  

This is now our main issue when we are discussing 

this with colleagues from municipalities. Even  

this afternoon, we had an open seminar about 

the capacities, relocation, and housing.  

So, housing is accommodation. At least mid-term 

accommodation is necessary, and simply cities  

do not have enough place to offer these 

people proper housing and living conditions.  

I think that maybe that's it for this moment,

not to monopolize the discussion. Laurie Hart.  

Hi, thank you so much for this

extremely informative panel. It's wonderful  

to hear your thoughts. I had a question 

about European solidarity. I found those  

comments really interesting, particularly 

with reference to the relative absence of  

solidarity for reception previously during 

the Syrian crisis in 2015 and afterwards.

There were, of course, individual countries 

who made generous gestures at various moments,  

but with reference for example to Greece, a lot of 

concern about being left to handle the migration  

crisis by themselves. Obviously, there 

was support, but very kind of erratic,  

so I'm just wondering what your thoughts might 

be on a change. There was, of course, solidarity  

against the reception of migrants and I wonder 

if this shift in relationship to Ukraine.  

What are your thoughts on the promise of more 

solidarity around reception a more coordinated  

and future-oriented policy in the EU itself, or 

with reference to EU solidarity and migrants?

Thank you! I can maybe start and then others can 

chip in. I obviously don't have an answer, but I  

can try and comment and offer some reflections 

on it. I'm relatively pessimistic, I think,  

for a couple of reasons. You know, between 2015 

and 2016, there was quite a lot of movement  

of migrants across Europe. And so while 

Poland and Hungary did not accept many,  

and there was a kind of sway towards the Northwest 

of Europe, of course Germany received many,  

Sweden proportionately even more, and 

countries like Norway, and Sweden, and Finland,  

and you know, basically all the other members of

the EU, and the EEA especially in the Northwest,  

but also along the Southern part of the EU, not 

only sort of to the Southeast, did receive and did  

give asylum in the end to quite a few of those 

people who arrived. And because there were so  

many countries, even though the numbers weren't 

that high in each one of them, apart from Germany  

and Sweden, you know, there were quite a few that 

actually went on. I think that picture is also a  

little bit mixed. And since then, the numbers of 

asylum seekers have fallen and that's not random.  

That is exactly because of the EU-Turkey deal. 

Now, Poland is a member of the EU, so they're not 

going to make a Poland-EU deal, 

because it doesn't work like that.  

But still I think that's an interesting reference 

point to think through, because it is about who is  

going to actually be doing the work of assisting 

people, providing these places in schools,  

in hospitals, and making sure that all 

these social benefits systems work etc.

And of course, within that context,

there is a question of what do people  

themselves think. In this case, people who 

have moved out of Ukraine. I think there's an  

important question there, as well. I think there's 

a couple of reasons why there hasn't been a more  

organized approach to relocation.

There are political reasons within  

Poland on that, which I'm sure Marta could say 

more intelligent stuff about that than I can,  

but there hasn't been a political pressure 

from the Polish government at all to do this.  

Quite to the country, weirdly enough. One 

of the reasons that is maybe more sensitive,  

easy to be sympathetic to, is that many Ukrainians 

have also not wanted to move further afield. 

And those that have wanted to move where they have 

relatives, which makes sense. And they've done so.  

And they haven't had to have help, or papers to do 

so, so it's kind of a bit of a chaotic situation.  

I think one of the reasons why it's also been so 

chaotic is that it was this unprecedented scale  

and speed, and the war that is actually happening 

in Europe. And so it's not mainly in Europe on  

our news. It's not mainly about migration, 

refugees, displacement. It's not, sadly,  

mainly about the humanitarian crisis and 

the suffering of civilians in Ukraine even. 

There's a lot of that on the news, as well. 

But it's mainly about the war and the military  

questions around the war. I think that sort 

of contextualizes in Europe what is going on.  

Hopefully, after there is peace, we can take a 

step back and actually try and learn something  

from this. There will be lessons learned and I 

hope that that will also involve solidarity within  

Europe. But far more than that I sincerely hope 

it will involve solidarity with people displaced  

around the world. Because I think that's the real 

problem. Within the EU, they'll figure stuff out.  

I think Poland and the other neighboring countries 

may have reason to complain. Well, let's see.  

But I think the real issue is the one, which 

happens beyond the EU borders. I'm not so hopeful,  

but I do hope that there will be lessons learned 

about solidarity beyond the European borders,  

as well. I can chime in here, because we can think 

about European solidarity or support as a matter  

of being receivers and receptors of refugees, 

but we can also think of the money that they can  

provide to refugee host states elsewhere in 

the world. And traditionally this has been  

the sort of grand bargain - that global North 

states provide the funding to international  

organizations to support refugee host states 

in places like the Middle East. However,  

on the one hand, you could be optimistic and 

say that, you know, maybe Europeans have gained  

solidarity for people fleeing conflict situations, 

but you can also see how it can very easily go,  

and already has gone, in the other direction, 

where in fact humanitarian aid funding has  

already been redirected from other 

crises around the world to respond to the  

Ukrainian crisis. You can also even see the money 

itself flowing in these ways that are unlikely to  

revert back to those other places anytime soon. 

And then, to continue that line of reasoning  

that Rana has proposed, if we look at refugee 

policy in Ukraine and how the EU has approached  

that part of the world long before the war, 

and even before the war in Donbas, after the  

accession of Poland, and Slovakia, and Hungary, 

and Romania. And there's a growing mobilization of  

resources towards building up Ukrainian migration 

control, capacity building with the border guards,  

working with trainings from EU lPU agencies. And 

eventually, after some criticism, and human rights  

issues, and immigrant detention, eventually more 

money for for refugee affairs. I've written about 

this a little bit. Even some of this, some of the 

support for refugee programs has been aiming to  

root refugees in Ukraine, and prevent them 

incentivize programs that drew people  

in place, programs for local integration, 

while we've seen slashing of resettlement programs  

not just in Ukraine, but all over the world. 

So, we see even the ways in which humanitarian,  

that we see this regime shifting as Alexander 

Betts calls it. He has kid of a rosy picture of  

how these resources start moving towards 

humanitarian affairs. But I think even if they  

stay, even within the refugee system, we see kind 

of hollowing out of that international structure.  

Instead we see European solidarity based on some 

kind of, if not a primordial, then kind of  

security-based sympathy for 

Ukrainians. And they're from their  

policy framework, as opposed to one based 

on that grand bargain, that Rana mentioned.

Yes, Martin. When it comes to 

European solidarity in the future,  

I am not optimistic at all. I think, as Raphi 

mentioned, European Union is willing to pay  

anybody anywhere to stop refugees on their way. 

Be it Libya, Sudan, or Ukraine. I myself was  

conducting a research in Tajikistan and the result 

was that there is a flow of European money to stop  

Afghans already in Tajikistan from coming 

to Europe. So, I'm not optimistic at all.  

I think just Ukraine is too close and they have 

free access, because they do not need any visa,  

but I think the direction is more the UK approach 

– to think of processing all claims in Rwanda.  

I heard that Danes like it, as well. This idea 

to process every asylum seeker's case in Rwanda  

and then to locally integrate even the successful 

ones in Rwanda. So, I'm afraid the solidarity  

of Europe with refugees will not improve 

in the future. Even now, I think it's our,  

let's say central - Polish, Czech, Hungarian - 

picture of improved solidarity, but I think for  

countries like Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands 

nothing has changed. It's the same like  

it was with Syrians. The same situation 

with Ukrainians even in terms of numbers.  

So, I'm not really optimistic when it comes to 

the future improved EU solidarity with refugees.  

I will maybe follow up as the last one with 

what Martin said. I have to fully agree  

with this rather pessimistic stance regarding the 

future of the EU solidarity. The question is how  

we understand this is solidarity. Because 

if we look at the primary law of the EU,  

just for example in the case of asylum and 

migration policy, Article 80, solidarity  

is there. It's mentioned in terms of sharing 

any responsibilities among new Member States  

in case of crisis or emergencies, but also 

it's about every aspect of crisis management,  

so infrastructure and money. The point is that 

we've seen, and we've tested, we had a small  

pilot project - let's put it this way - in 

we compare it to the current situation. There was 

a good plan expressed in the European Commission  

communication, European Agenda on Migration. 

There was a good mechanism, at least in my view,  

the relocation scheme, and it failed, because 

the idea of relocation was to move up to 160,000  

asylum seekers checked from two EU countries to 

other EU countries. That success rate, let's call  

it this way, after two-year scheme was only more 

or less 34.7 thousand relocations. And this is  

the answer to why this time the EU, and especially 

the European Commission, did not decide to launch  

the relocation scheme based on the Article 

Because it has to be followed by the Council 

decisions, and unfortunately it did not work  

in 2015. Simply, the concept, the idea 

was to leave this crisis management to  

the countries themselves, especially a country 

like Poland. We see that it brought some results,

because finally within two weeks, the country that 

was so hostile to forced migrants from Middle East  

simply put on the table a fully new law – 

rather comprehensive, and rather pro-migrant,  

and pro-refugee. So, it worked. Then, it's also 

about the capacities of receiving forced migrants.  

So, Poland counts 38 million people. For us, 

receiving 1.5 million Ukrainian refugees now, is  

not so much. We can still do this. We can absorb 

them to the labor market and other segments of our  

public life. The future of the EU solidarity, if 

we look at the efficiency of the EU asylum policy,  

we know that the reform of the 

common European zone system  

launched or proposed by the European Commission

in 2015 did not happen and now

we have the new European Commission framework 

called New Pact on Migration and Asylum. It's an  

asylum policy that is rather strict and rather 

selective. And it's still not implemented. So,  

the only change that has happened is the change of 

the name and some responsibilities of the former  

European Asylum Support Office. Now 

it's called EU Agency for Asylum.

Other questions?

We've been talking mostly about Europe so far, 

but I would also be interested in bringing in  

these other cases into the conversation. Both the 

U.S. and Canadian governments have spoken about  

resettling numbers of the Ukrainian refugees.

Perhaps you know, Raphi or Rana, can you  

break down for us the politics and the likely 

outcomes of those North American schemes?  

Yeah, thanks for that question, David. So, 

it was originally, I think, several weeks  

ago that president Biden announced that he 

would be first allowing for the relocation,  

but then it was announced as part of a 

resettlement scheme. And then more recently,  

it looks like the system that's being built is 

the scheme, as you referred to it, as outside of  

actual refugee resettlement. I mean, it's also 

going to be based on contact and established  

primary family within the United States. 

So that excludes the most vulnerable people  

that don't have resources and contacts in the

United States. I can't really speak to  

how effective the prospects of this 

might be, except to say, you know,  

it sounds like it's not benefiting the people that 

are probably most vulnerable. But also trivially,  

I have been in touch with some Ukrainians, 

who are in Poland and Germany, who are  

considering coming to the United States, just 

various friends. I give you this one interesting  

case about somebody who was already planned to be 

resettled under the refugee resettlement program  

to the United States. A family with four kids who 

had a missile hit. They were on their resettlement  

track for religious persecution a year before 

the war. They had their resettlement interview  

with IOM office in Kyiv, and then they 

had a missile hit two doors down from  

their house in Kyiv. And so they were actually 

involved in the initial early March. And then  

they fled to Germany. They are so scared. They 

think the war is going to come to Germany too, 

so they still intend on going to Tijuana instead 

of waiting for a resettlement, because they've  

been calling the consulate, and of course there's 

so little infrastructure. They haven't been able  

to receive any update based on their case. They've 

been there for four weeks. They have their very  

secure and relatively opportune situation with 

friends of friends in Germany, but they're still  

thinking of just packing their bags and going to 

Tijuana and hoping to cross, even as you know, the  

current U.S. scheme of letting Ukrainians in at 

the border is about to come to an end, allegedly.  

They're still hearing the information that this 

channel is open. And still wanting to leave  

aside even their refugee application. They have 

family in the United States, a sister at least, so  

they don't think they'll be reunited with 

their sister because it's only for parents,  

right? And children. Those who have 

parents and children in the United States.  

But even those who have some relatives are 

looking to go around the system. I don't  

think it's a way for them to 

come to the U.S. anytime soon.

Thanks! And I'll just add, I think we really 

can't overstate how much the U.S. refugee  

resettlement system was decimated with the 

cuts that Trump made during his administration,  

so that even when Biden lifted the severe 

caps that Trump had implemented last year,  

I think something like 11,000 refugees were 

resettled only, even though I think the cap was  

something closer to 100, because the resettlement 

agencies have just completely lost their capacity  

to take on this work. And just to note that 

prior to this crisis, there was the Afghanistan  

crisis caused by the withdrawal of the U.S. and 

so the U.S. head also was sort of quite slow,  

but fairly steady in re-bringing Afghans 

to the U.S. I think something like 50,000,  

but they also spent months on military bases just 

because there was such a limited support system.

Another question for anyone on the panel who 

would care to react. Obviously, there's been  

a huge outpouring of media coverage around 

the war in Ukraine, but what is that coverage  

not getting about experiences of involuntary 

immobility, internal displacement,  

refugee experiences that you're 

aware of as experts in this area?

What should the journalists be covering more?

If real quickly, I want to just jump in and say 

I think the elephant on the table is migration to  

Russia and mostly literally forced expulsions from 

the newly occupied territories in Eastern Ukraine,  

and Southern Ukraine. There's been a report. The 

Russian Foreign Ministry I think announced in a  

press release - take it for all the salt that 

it's worth - I think it was around just under  

some of them all the way to Vladivostok, put on  

trains and just sent out like very kind of classic 

Russian population transfer scheme. Many folks,  

many Ukrainians, who are basically being put 

on buses and sent to Russia against their will.  

A few of the ones that have privileged folks, 

who are able to come to Europe, have relocated,  

and exited, and entered Poland via Belarus.

I've heard several stories there.

But most people are relocated to 

various parts of Russia through these...  

I don't know. There's very little information 

on it outside of this press release. But even  

earlier in the war, the UNHCR reported there was 

like hundreds, it was like 17,000 people have  

gone to Russia. I think it's much more than that. 

Even if we do take the Russian Foreign Ministry's  

press release with any grain of salt, I think it's 

much more. And we should consider and we should  

think about it in terms of a forced migration that 

is different than the one we're seeing in Europe.

Just to underscore that, I was trying to 

respond to questions on the Norwegian state news  

channel had asked questions from the public. 

And there were some people who were asking  

about that. I had already tried to find 

information about it, but then I thought:  

Okay, let me try and actually find more. I don't 

speak or read Russian, so that's not very helpful,  

but I can speak and read Polish. So, I tried 

looking for things in English and Polish  

and I couldn't really find anything that was 

verifiable and sensible, except the fact that  

there are reportedly hundreds of thousands of 

people according to different sources. How many?  

We don't quite know. And some of them probably 

have been forcefully removed from Ukraine to  

Russia, others probably tried to escape bombing 

and gone to the closest place where it was safe.  

And then we don't quite know what's going 

on. I think that would be the one thing

I completely agree that we don't know enough 

about. Not just the media not covering it. We  

actually don't know. And that's kind of scary. And 

then in terms of media representations otherwise,  

I guess a couple of things that I thought about. 

One is – it's not really politically correct to  

report about men, who maybe aren't happy about not 

being able to leave. That's a very obvious thing,  

but that's something that we don't hear so much 

about. Another aspect of that relates also to  

the political nature of reporting, at least in the 

West. And I think that goes for most European news  

outlets, and probably North American ones, 

as well. Probably quite different, I think,  

if you look at news reporting elsewhere in the 

world – in terms of anything that's being recorded  

instead of through this prism of how we see the 

war, and there are sort of things that I think are  

objective, so the crimes against humanity,

that probably have been happening, that we're  

seeing evidence of that. There aren't two ways 

of reporting that. I'm not arguing for that, but  

the more broader geopolitical context of the war 

and how it's understood is reported differently.  

I do a lot of research in Pakistan. I try to read 

the media there and the whole debate around the  

war is very different in media in South Asia than 

it is in Europe for instance. And also, if you  

read things like the New York Times, which are not 

that different from mainstream European media, as  

well. I think there's something about which media 

are we speaking about that maybe is worth just  

flagging up, as well. And I think it relates to 

the fact that, of course, everything is political.  

I think that resonates with something that Rona 

mentioned earlier – in terms of how people that  

arrived in Europe in 2015 were from predominantly 

Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Of course,  

at that point in time, Europe didn't really want 

to have refugees from Afghanistan, because it  

didn't really fit the narrative. Because at that 

point, we were building democracy there, so we  

couldn't really have refugees from there. I think 

it's how we have media reporting about conflicts,  

not just displacement, but just the conflict as a 

whole is always connected with broader questions  

of the politics and geopolitics of those wars. 

And I don't think that's any different here.

I was just reading and there's a comment in the 

chat from Carolyn Rose Avila. My friend in Chicago  

helped receive a Ukrainian family. They came 

across the border at Laredo, Texas about a month  

ago. They had no problem being allowed to cross 

the border, nor is there a court date on their  

request for asylum. They got a bus to Chicago, now 

stay with other Ukrainian community in Chicago.  

I've worked on the Tijuana border and in Texas 

and rarely does a family come across without  

being detained at least for a few days. And 

this is the policy that Raphi referred to  

of basically a more favorable treatment for 

Ukrainian asylum seekers. In fact, the uniquely  

favorable treatment at the border, certainly in 

Tijuana – San Diego, although we've been told that  

treatment has either ended or is 

about to end in the next few days.

Okay, any other questions from the  

audience? If not, I would like to go ahead and 

just invite every one of the panelists to take  

three minutes and give your final impressions, 

react to what's been said by the other panelists.

We'll just go in the same order of  

the beginning of the presentation, 

so let's start with you, Marta.

Thank you very much. I have to leave you in five 

minutes because it's almost 11pm here. So firstly,  

I really appreciate joining this group of 

panelists, because usually we are discussing  

any EU or EU Member States related topics mostly 

within the European academic community. Only  

during some conferences we have this chance to 

exchange our experience, our lessons learned,  

or our perceptions with colleagues from other 

research units in other countries. I'm very  

grateful because what I've heard especially from 

colleagues like Rana and Raphi, this is very  

fresh. So, what can we say? We are trying to do 

what we can as migration researchers, but also as  

human beings: to provide support to people in need 

on a daily basis, also to collect as many reliable  

data as we can, and on these basis to be able to 

form any helpful policy recommendations for our  

governors. I know that the crisis is about 

crisis management, supporting people,

but this is also about learning what should 

be done in the future not to have this kind  

of crisis, or to solve this kind of crisis as 

soon as possible. How to address this kind of  

challenges? The Ukrainian case is only the next 

case after the Syrian one, and Afghan one, showing  

us that there is a huge need to revise, in my 

opinion, not only the European asylum framework,  

but in fact the global protection framework. 

So, the question is, for example, whether the  

UN Geneva Convention 1951 is still valid. Maybe 

it should be revised. I think that the list of  

questions that can be raised, having this kind of 

crisis, is very long. But it's not only local, or  

regional, or European issue. It's something bigger 

because if not now, soon there will be other  

emergencies connected to, let's say, forced 

mobility and forced migration. It can be also  

induced by environmental factors, not 

only war or humanitarian issues. Thank  

you very much. I apologize but I have 

to leave you in two minutes. Thank you  

very much once again for this great event. 

Thank you, Marta, and good night to you.  

Thanks very much. And thanks also to Marta, and 

also to her colleagues at the Center for Migration  

Research in Warsaw. If you're interested in 

these issues, definitely follow them on Twitter.  

They have reports and things that are really 

priceless. A couple of points. I think they'll  

sort of dovetail well with what has been said. 

I don't think this panel necessarily disagrees  

on many things, but that maybe isn't a problem, 

I think. First of all, I think this discussion,  

and generally as I've been trying to follow 

what's going on with displacement from Ukraine,  

it was really striking how it is actually very 

similar. And I think Rana brought that up in  

terms of the Syrian case, but if you look 

at for instance refugee reception in Uganda,  

which is often brought up as an example that many 

of us, I think, know a little bit about, with  

refugees from many different contexts, including 

South Sudan, and DRC, and many others. And with a  

different approach to receiving refugees than what 

we know from many European countries historically.

I think it is interesting, because it seems to me 

that what Poland is doing, and as Marta said, it's  

to a large extent the civil society and 

population. And then the state is sort of  

following on from that slightly. It is perhaps 

more similar to what we know from Uganda than  

what we know from certainly Scandinavia. I think 

there's something interesting there that we can,  

hopefully, learn from in terms of how refugees are 

met in crisis situations. I think that also poses  

some really difficult questions in terms of these 

global refugee protection mechanisms, that we have  

in institutions. I think it's always scary to even 

suggest that we should touch the 51 Convention  

because I don't think any of us thinks that the 

world is going to come up with anything, which is  

better at this point. At the same time, we know 

that it doesn't really quite work. Of course, just  

the 51 Convention alone wouldn't give everyone 

who is leaving Ukraine protection, because  

it's focused on individuals and their fear 

of persecution, of course. I think there are  

some difficult conversations that we could have 

when the political climate is ready for that.  

I'm not too optimistic about that, to be very 

honest, but I do think that there is no way around  

it. I think the European context really shows that 

because of this crisis at the border of the EU,  

we have and we continue having discussions 

in the European Parliament. What the European  

Parliament members are saying is not 

what is happening at the EU border. So,  

there isn't a democratic legitimacy for 

what the EU is actually doing at its borders  

even within the EU Parliament. Yes, there are 

right-wing politicians in most countries that  

support some of these rules, but actually, most 

politicians don't. So, why this keeps going on  

is incredibly surprising, really. And I think 

one possible avenue to consider going forward  

is really trying to look at the refugee and the 

migration issues more jointly. I think there could  

have been an opportunity there for that with 

the Global Compact that didn't quite work out.  

Maybe with the IOM being part of the UN, maybe 

there are opportunities there going forward.  

But I do think that this situation underscores 

that that is necessary because of other mobility  

rights that Ukrainians have. This situation has 

been, in a way so far at least, resolved without  

deaths at borders, which has been the main problem 

in the EU before. And it is also through the fact  

that they had rights to work in many EU countries 

before the war, people from Ukraine, that

that is automatically now being granted. I don't 

think we can assume that would have been the case  

otherwise. I think that suggests that connecting 

working rights for refugees in ways that are  

very uncomfortable and uncommon in Europe, 

but not in North America in the same way,  

is something that needs to be looked at further 

in the European context going forward. And I  

think that could be good for both, refugees and 

European societies. I think there are sort of  

difficult conversations to be had about how that's 

going to happen, because it shouldn't be the case  

that you compromise protection rights by giving 

people the right to work. And in Europe, those are  

two different conversations. So, either you come 

to work as a migrant, or you come as a refugee,  

because you need protection. So potentially, 

there are things to be learned maybe from Uganda,  

maybe also even from the North American context, 

although I know that in the North American context  

perhaps, the perception is that you don't really 

have that many lessons to teach, but maybe you do.

Thank you. I just want to thank all panelists and 

people asking questions. I think it was a very  

interesting panel. And for me – the first time 

to be in this US environment. Our discussions in  

Europe are always too much Europe forecast. As my 

friend in Germany says: It's all about Dublin. So,  

I hope that even this Ukrainian opportunity gives 

us the chance to start a new level of cooperation  

within Europe, but also between the continents, 

on better protection of refugees, because what I  

see now in Europe is a lot of illegal activities 

somehow not supported but tolerated by states.  

And I wish that this Ukrainian lesson will 

give us a chance for a new start. Thank you.  

I also want to thank everybody who has attended 

this panel: Martin, Marta E., 

Marta P., as well as Rana.

I enjoyed this very much. I have been thinking a 

lot about some of the implications of the previous  

conflicts over the last eight years, and of the 

EU's external and Russia's external policy towards  

Ukraine and how it has shaped a lot of these 

displacements we've seen today. I've been wrestling  

with a lot of these questions. Hearing your 

thoughts, I think we all agree that there's a lot  

to be pessimistic about in terms of what lessons 

Europe can draw, the limits to the lessons that  

Europe can draw from the solidarity that's

experiencing towards Ukrainians on one hand,

and in terms of creating an international refugee 

policy and opportunities for this at the moment.  

At the same time, I also want to echo what 

Martin said. I think this is in the end  

an opportunity, unfortunately. One that, I 

hope, not only Europe but also the United  

States can learn from. I think David and I were 

just speaking a couple of days ago about how  

support for Ukrainian refugees, for any 

refugee group, is highest it's ever been  

in the United States at the moment. I hope 

that there's some spillover effect there. But  

the mechanisms by which that might 

come about are unclear. I hope that  

we can have further conversations with various 

groups that are working on the ground, such as  

Martin's group, or working with refugees, 

and keep collaborating on projects, where  

we can work with civil society to envision 

a better world and better policies together.  

Thank you, Raphi. We'll give the final word to 

Rana. Well, David, I hope you will take the final  

word, but I want to echo what everyone has said. 

I've learned a lot by participating in this panel,  

so thank you for the opportunity and the unique 

perspectives you each bring. One thing that I've  

been thinking about a lot is how the nature of the 

conflict itself is producing different outcomes  

for refugees. In particular, most conflicts over 

the last several decades have been civil wars,  

intra-state wars, and so Ukraine is different 

not only in all the ways we've talked about,  

but also in being an inter-state war. I think 

that has implications for many of the things we  

talked about today. For example, the question of 

gender or the sex of refugees, and how in cases  

of an inter-state war, it seems there might 

be less opportunities for men, for instance,  

to either defect by going to the other side, 

or defect by leaving the country all together.  

So, I don't know if there could be more lessons 

that we can take from historical examples of  

inter-state warfare, including in Europe from 

many decades ago. Just to sort of chime into  

the question that David brought up about media 

coverage and what can they be doing better.  

Part of me wants to say: No, I want them to keep 

doing more of the same, but not just for Ukraine,  

because I think that their sort of humanization 

of conflict processes focusing on how civilians  

are targeted, focusing on the difficult decision 

making that goes into displacing, into leaving,  

I think it would be a great virtue to bring 

all of that more into coverage of other regions  

of the world. Even though I am also wary of what 

Marta mentioned – of the good and evil narratives,  

and how those sometimes too much dominate the 

coverage. I'll wrap up my two minutes there.  

Thank you again. Well, thank you, Rana, and thanks 

to all of our panelists. Just a quick programming  

note. Our next event is a research seminar, which 

will be next Friday, May 6. Same time and place,  

via Zoom. We'll be hearing from Jiaqi Liu of 

the Department of Sociology at UC San Diego  

on the question of Chinese politics of outbound 

student migration, the relationship between the  

Chinese state and Chinese students abroad. 

So, I hope you will join us for that  

and for all the other activities that 

we're co-sponsoring this year between 

UCLA Center for the Study 

of International Migration, 

and UC San Diego's Center for 

Comparative Immigration Studies.  

Have a good weekend, everyone.