Ann Karagozian 0:06

Good morning good afternoon and good evening depending on where you are located. I am professor Ann Karagozian and it is my great pleasure as the Inaugural Director of our newly created Promise Armenian Institute at UCLA to welcome you to our first Distinguished Lecture, to be delivered by professor Taner Akcam. While this lecture had been originally scheduled to take place in person at UCLA in the Spring of 2020, the COVID 19 pandemic and campus closure led to its delay. But we are absolutely delighted that professor Akcam has agreed to provide this distinguished lecture to us via the Zoom online platform and because of this we are able to reach so many more of you from around the world currently numbering on the order of 300 in this live webinar which is also being recorded for future viewing. Before we begin our lecture, let me tell you briefly about the Promise Armenian Institute or PAI which was established at UCLA in late 2019 and early 2020 through the vision of Dr. Eric Esrailian and made possible by a 20 million dollar gift from the estate of Kirk Kerkorian. The PAI is designed to be a hub for world-class research and teaching on Armenian Studies and in addition for coordinating interdisciplinary research and public programs across UCLA and with the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Diaspora. The Promise Armenian Institute's size scope and interdisciplinary approach make it the first of its kind in the world, and UCLA's long-standing programs in Armenian language, literature, history, music, sociology, archaeology, and medicine and public health make it ideally positioned to be the home for this Institute. It is my privilege to be the inaugural director of this Institute and we look forward to providing impactful programming as well as supporting scholarly and educational endeavors designed to enhance knowledge and preservation of Armenia and Armenians. Today our distinguished lecture pertains to one of the darkest periods in Armenian history that of the Armenian Genocide in the first part of the 20th century. It is entitled “When Was the Decision Made to Annihilate the Armenians?” and will be delivered by Professor Taner Akcam of Clark University with discussant commentary provided afterward by professor Dirk Moses of the University of cal.. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Our lecture is co-sponsored by the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research or NAASR, the Ararat-Eskijian Museum, the UCLA Richard Hovannisian Endowed Chair in Modern Armenian History, and the UCLA Center for Near Eastern Studies. My UCLA colleague Professor Sebouh Aslanian, will provide formal introductions for our speakers in a moment. But first let me note that for those of you watching via live zoom webinar platform, you have an opportunity to send questions to us by clicking on the Q&A button at the bottom portion of your screen and typing in the question. Please be sure to be as specific as possible in your question as well as being respectful and polite, of course, and we will direct as many of the questions as practical to our lecturers when they are finished speaking. We anticipate that the lecture itself will take around 45 to 50 minutes and that the discussant commentary will take around 15 minutes approximately. And now it gives me great pleasure to turn the webinar over to Professor Sebouh Aslanian of UCLA's Department of History. Professor Aslanian is the new Director of the Armenian Studies Center within the UCLA Promise Institute our Armenian Institute and has been the holder of the Richard Hovannisian Endowed Chair in Modern Armenian History since 2012. He is the author of “From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa”, as well as numerous scholarly articles pertaining to early modern and modern Armenian history. Sebouh I'll now turn this over to you.

Sebouh Aslanian 4:52

Well thank you very much Ann for that wonderful introduction. It is my distinct pleasure today to provide first a brief introduction for our distinguished speaker Dr. Taner Akcam, followed in short order by some remarks on our discussant Dr. Dirk Moses. We are truly honored and grateful to have both of them join us today in making this event possible. We are also grateful to many of you out there for finding the time to be present with us. Dr. Taner Akçam is the Kaloosdian and Mugar Chairholder in Modern Armenian History and Genocide Studies at Clark University. Akcam is widely recognized and credited as one of the first Turkish scholars to write extensively on the Ottoman-Turkish Genocide of the Armenians in the early 20th century. He is the author of numerous books including the award-winning Princeton University Press publication, The Young Turks Crime Against Humanity The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire, as well as his latest work, "Killing Orders: Talat Pasha's Telegrams and the Armenian Genocide," published by Palgrave only two years ago. He is also the founder of the Krikor Guerguerian Online Archive, an innovative digital commons project, that I encourage all of you to take the time and learn more about from the Clark University digital commons webpage available online. His discussant today Dr. Dirk Moses, is no less illustrious. He is the Frank Porter Graham Distinguished Professor of Global Human Rights History at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Dr. Moses is a historian specializing in genocide and human rights and the author of numerous publications, including his 2007 German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past. He has also edited several several scholarly anthologies on the topic of genocide and human rights and is the editor of the Journal of Genocide Research where Dr. Akcam's essay on which much of today's presentation will be based appeared in July of 2019. So without further ado I now turn the virtual floor over to Dr. Akcam to deliver his talk following which Dr. Moses will offer some brief comments before we open the floor to questions from the audience. And once again, let me remind you out there that in order to ask us questions you need to go to the Q&A feature at the bottom of your screen, type out your questions, make them succinct, to the point, and as relevant to the topic of today's lecture as possible and we will get to them as we can after the lecture and discussion session are over. So for now I turn the floor over to you Taner, my friend, thank you for making this event possible.

Taner Akcam 8:09

Thank you so much, thank you Ann, thank you Sebouh, thank you both for this nice introduction. And let me start first by thanking UCLA Promise Institute for hosting me even even virtually, and NAASR and Ararat Armenian Museum for co-organizing this event. I would like also use this opportunity to welcome the newly established Promise Institute and wish them a lot of success in the coming years. So let me first share my screen. I have a powerpoint presentation for you so that you can easily follow my presentation.

Taner Akcam 9:08

So in this lecture, I will attempt to address a set of questions all revolving around one larger one, namely: Did the Committee of Union and Progress take a conscious and specific decision or series of decisions to annihilate the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, and, if so, when was it taken? If it was actually a series of decisions, what was the time frame over which they were taken? I'm not claiming to resolve the matter here, but I would like to advance some new ideas on the matter in light of a number of newly unearthed historical documents from Ottoman Archive. The question of a possible dates for a final decision for the extermination of Armenians is a topic rarely discussed in the field of Armenian Genocide research, largely due to the lack of relevant documents. As a result, the determination that it must have fallen within the period between late March and early April 1915—a determination advanced by Professor Vakakn N. Dadrian and myself— has been widely accepted. Even so there has been some discussions as to both the accuracy of this determination as well as the process leading to such a decision. The reservations in accepting this judgment have largely revolved around the problems of continuity versus contingency in other words, around the question of whether the genocide was the product of premeditation or gradual radicalization due to the exigencies of the First World War. Which we call, I mean I call this, Ron Suny, Dadrian – Ron Suny Controversy. Some historian (most probably prominently Vahakn N. Dadrian) have claimed that the wartime conditions only served as a pretext for implementing an extermination policy decided upon long in advance. As he put it "the central issue here revolves around premeditation and the prewar initiation of some plans for genocide." He asks the question, Did the Ittihadists contemplate and make preliminary arrangement prior to the outbreak of World War I, to achieve the intended final solution or the day not? And Dadrian's answer The question has been answered in the affirmative in several published work of mine. And he adds: The first critical phase of genocide premeditation attaches to the coincidences of the disasters of the first Balkan War in the fall 1912 and the revival of Armenian reform issue. So for Dadrian a pre-meditation a decision has been already made in 1912 Balkan War and 1914 during the Armenian reform agreement. Others, such as Ronald Suny and Donald Bloxham, see the decision for genocide as the result of the Ottoman authorities' developing response to the adverse wartime conditions. For example Ron Suny that there was premeditation and pre war initiation of plan for genocide as Dadrian has often argued. It is certainly clear," he continues, "that anti-Armenian disposition existed among the Turkish elite long before the war. It is also undeniable," he says, "that the war presented an opportunity for carrying out the most revolutionary program against the Armenians. But this i submit," says Ron, "is not the same as a premeditated, long-laid plan to exterminate Armenians." According to other scholar, Donald Bloxham, There was no prior blueprint for genocide, rather it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures in a process of cumulative policy radicalization. Thus it is only in the early summer, he claimed, early summer of 1915 that we can speak of crystallized policy of empire-wide killing and death by attrition. So according to him there was no decision late in the summer 19 early summer 1915. I have no intention of entering into this debate here, since this is my position the lack of conclusive documentation has been the main problem and any opinion on the topic must be derived at least in part speculation. So this debate was for me also a kind of a speculative discussion or debate. Instead I will here present some new materials that will shed some light on the Union and Progress Party's decision making process. I have four arguments main arguments for this talk. I will be setting forth four main arguments.

The first argument is that the main decision to to annihilate the empire's Armenian population was taken before march 3rd, 1915, and exactly sometimes between February 15 and March 3rd. I will tell you why I picked up these dates. And not as we claimed-Dadrian and myself-not early April as we really wrote before. I based this claim the new claim largely on a letter written by Bahaettin Şakir on March 3rd 1915. I will talk more on that letter. Second argument to be made here is that initial decision to eliminate the Armenians was not initially taken by the Central Committee of the Committee of Union and Progress party or central government in Istanbul, but was instead taken by the Central Committee of Erzurum branch of Special Organization, so my argument here is there was a decision way before the final decision and it was taken in the province of Erzurum by the local Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa leaders. And this decision was limited to specific group of Armenians as they formulated in the documents seen as either potential leaders of the revolt or as liable to carry out attacks against muslims. The date of this decision is 1st December 1914. The Third argument is that provincial governors played a special role in the exterminatory decision against Armenians, both in regard to those within their respective provinces as well as in the ultimate decision by the government in Istanbul. I will show you some documents where it is clear that the provincial governor pressing Istanbul and party and the government for a final decision to exterminate Armenians. So the active role of governors they were not only receiver of the orders from central government. And as a result of this, my fourth argument is the radicalization of policy vis-à-vis the Armenian population was first experienced in the periphery and only later adopted and expanded by Istanbul. In past years Vahakn Dadrian and I discussed and debated in detail the question of possible date for annihilation. Our shared view, the Dadrian's and myself's view was the Union and Progress party did indeed take such a conscious decision and we believed that it was mostly most likely taken over a series of meeting took place at the end of March and early April in Istanbul 1915. We arrived this conclusion on the basis of following evidences. Number one: the most important evidence for us was the memoir of a Unionist “Responsible Secretary” (Katib-i Mesul) Arif Cemil in his memoir he stated that Bahaettin Şakir, went to Istanbul in mid March 1915 to discuss Armenian question, And Bahaettin Şakir returned to Erzerum around April 10 1915, sometimes early April. Upon his return Şakir brought with him the deportation decision.

Taner Akcam 18:50

Second important source that we used the Unionist Central Committee member Dr. Nazım, without giving a specific date, he states that the decision to annihilate the Armenians was taken at the conclusion of a serious lengthy discussions within the party's Central Committee. This statement of Dr. Nazım was read during 1919-1922 trials of Unionist leaders in Istanbul is found in the indictment in the post-war trial against the former Union and Progress party. And third important sources that we thought very crucial in this final decision it is a major and number of major changes was made in the make-up of Special Organization's during the March month. Towards end of March even the organization Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa which was established actually uh 1913 but reorganized 1914 August and according to some trial materials we know that this special organization was first within the Defense Ministry and in March 1915 the organization would be removed from the authority of War Ministry and army and placed directly under the supervision of the Union and Progress party so its principle directive would now, it is written in the documents also, content with internal enemies namely Armenians. As of beginning of April, there was no more special organization activities in the War Ministries. On this day, towards end of March Special Organization came under control of the Union and Progress party at the head of this organization was a person named Bahaettin Şakir. And fourth important source that we used in our decision-making process evaluation the ultimate Chamber of Deputies concluded its last session on first March 1915 and went into recess and in his memoirs Talat Pasha wrote that the reason for chambers recessed and delayed reopening was the Armenian deportation. And the last evidence that we used in our calculations was a visit of Halil Menteşe, he was foreign minister of Ottoman government during that time he traveled to Berlin and in the middle of March 1915 Talat sent a cable to Berlin to Halil Menteşe. The date is sometimes between 18 to 23rd March 1915. We know this date exactly because it is written in the diaries of Cavit Bey finance minister he was also during those days in Berlin. And Talat issued the directive to the minister that he should meet with Germans on the matter on a matter he doesn't says explicitly what this matter is but In his memoirs Menteşe, the foreign minister, recounts that Talat met him on his return to Turkey and said, "So let's hear what did you speak about in Berlin in regard to Armenian deportations?" So putting all these uh factors together they you may think that they are not so very strong arguments to pinpoint a date but this is what I meant with the scarcity of documentation. So the argument that the decision was taken in early April late March has up to now being widely accepted by scholarship, I believe that this thesis must be now re-examined. I'm not claiming that meetings weren't held at end of March or early April in Istanbul, they were, on the contrary documents in our procession as I mentioned some of them have clearly shown both that the meetings were held and that the number of decisions were taken at that meeting. However, there is rather strong possibility that the extermination decision had taken way before late March this is probably late February this is the central argument. How and I claim this. My main claim here is that there was a conscious decision taken to annihilate the empire's Armenian population taken between February 15 and March 3rd. And the most compelling evidence I offer for such a decision having been made during that date between 15 February and 3rd March is two letters written by Bahaettin Şakir to Union and Progress party representative Murahhas, as they call it in Ottoman, in Adana. This city name is very important I would like to bring your attention uh the letter of Bahaettin Şakir was addressed to a man with the name Cemal Bey he was the representative of Union and Progress party in Adana and the date is march 3rd 1915. And these two letters was published in were published in 1921 by the Armenian journalist Aram Andonian in his Armenian language work (Medz Vocirı) the Great Crime. And this is the second letter of Bahaettin Şakir as it is published by Aram Andonian. And here are the two letters. In first letter, first this the date is march uh 3rd mMrch 1915 and the committee it says uh the Committee of Union and Progress has decided to annihilate all of Armenians living within Turkey not to allow a single one to remain and has given the government broad authority in this regard. On the question of how this killing and massacring will be carried out, the central government will give the necessary instructions to the provincial governors and army commanders." This is from the first letter. And the second letter, it is dated April 7 1915 one month later Bahaettin Şakir would reiterate his earlier message and says, "the committee has decided to now annihilate and fundamentally extirpate the various forces with which it has contended for years it means Armenians and adds, the Committee sees no other way to maintain the country's existence." This is a very central issue the existence question of a state and country. This is very crucial in genocidal decision in Ottoman case.

Taner Akcam 26:49

Here is the interesting background information for you. When Andonian published his letter these two letters he was not aware that they were originated from Bahaettin Şakir. In his book there is no reference to Bahaettin Şakir. From a private letter that Andonain wrote in 1937 to a genocide survivor in Geneva we learned the story how Andonion became aware that the signature belonged to Bahaettin Şakir. In his letter on Andonian writes, "At the time my book was published I did 679 00:27:30,799 --> 00:27:34,159 not know that these letters were from 680 00:27:32,799 --> 00:27:37,200 Bahaettin Şakir Bey 681 00:27:34,159 --> 00:27:41,120 and at the issue was revealed to me 682 00:27:37,200 --> 00:27:45,600 in 1921 in Berlin." We know Aram Andonian in 1921 he went to Berlin and to participate as a witness in Talat Pasha process and his friends gave him old Armenian newspaper clippings published in Istanbul. In one of the newspapers Andonian saw that image of the letter from his book, this Bahaettin Şakir's letter with a heading that the letter is signed by Bahaettin Şakir. And Andonian was surprised and he continues in the letter he says "I was naturally curious to know why Behaeddin Shakir's name was written in the end of the translation. I therefore wrote a letter to the newspaper and learnd that the initials at the bottom of the two letters reproduced in my book compose the words “Beha,” the name Beha a nickname given to Bahaeddin Shakir by his close friends." Now of course big question. Weren't these letters fabricated? What is the authenticity of these letters? Şakir's letters were actually found among the 26 original documents sold to Andonian by an Ottoman bureaucrat by the name of Naim Efendi. the ottoman bureaucrat was an officer working in the deportation office in Aleppo during the war years and this office was in charge of Armenian deportations and killings. He took these 26 documents among which these two letters and sold them to Aram Andonian you can read the extensive story of these documents and Naim Efendi's stories in my latest book "Killing Orders." It's all about these documents, Naim Bey, and other telegrams. Regarding these two letters which I didn't use in my "Killing Orders" book, the most important claim of the denialists against their against its authenticity was that they were these letters were addressed to a person in Aleppo by the name Cemal, and the denialist argued it is inconceivable that this letter could be found in the Alepo deportation office in which Naim Efendi had worked. Even though Andonian claimed in his book that Cemal was a party representative in Aleppo we didn't have any document to authenticate Andonian's claim. So the denialist arguments logic was very convincing, how can you find in 1915 a letter sent to Adana in the deportation office in Aleppo? So so much so this was really convincing that largely discouraged subsequent researchers including ourselves from basing their research on the latter attributed to Şakir and that the date of the decision to annihilate the Armenians 3rd mMrch 1915. Earlier 3rd of March 1915 was in effect ignored. And here is my first discovery, in the Ottoman Archive I discovered a document that confirms the accuracy of the information given by Dadrian, I'm sorry given by uh Andonian. Cemal Bay was indeed appointed as Committee of Union Progress representative in Aleppo and additionally from this Ottoman document we learn that an investigation against Cemal and his activities was opened during the first war trials post-war trials in regard to his role against the Armenian massacres. So it is clear he was in Aleppo and even there was a court case against his crime that you committed during the Armenian deportations and killings. This was the first discovery and I have some other discoveries for you. The second discovery related to Şakir's signature. I found several documents that I can authenticate the authenticity of this signature. The second discoveries that I made was or the following: number one Şurayı Ümmet this is a journal a newspaper published in Istanbul 1919 I'm sorry 1909 and Bahaettin Şakir was chief editor of that newspaper, and in that newspaper you can see at the back it is here I will show you a closer image of that signature uh in that newspaper you we can find the Şakir's signature under a number of editorial columns he published here. The second source that I found this signature is a book, published in 2017. And the book is about the Union and Progress parties notebooks. Those who are watching me or listening now, the scholars, they know by heart that Union and Progress party when they were in Paris they were keeping notebooks they were sending regular letters communications to provinces Caucasus, Egypt, Anatolia, Balkan everywhere and and hand written copy of this letter that they were sending to provinces they kept in certain notebooks. And these notebooks was originally is still available in certain libraries in Turkey and a group of scholars as you see there uh Kudret Emiroğlu and Çiğdem Önal Emiroğlu they translated and published these notebooks as a Turkish book. They did another great service, at the back of this book they published the entire original versions of these notebooks where you can see the original signatures of Bahaettin Şakir. So in these notebooks one can find around 100 examples of Bahaettin Şakir's signature, and despite this striking non-uniformity of some of these signatures a great many of them are nearly or exact identical with those of the letters. So these are the signatures in the letters that Aram Andonain published, keep try to visualize this signatures. And these are Bahaettin Şakir's signatures that he used in Şurayy-ı Ümmet, the newspaper Islamic Community it means the uh name of the newspaper. And here you have your uh according to my I talk on your on our uh right side on the screen is Bahaettin Şakir's and the left side is the newspaper signature of Bahaettin Şakir. And one is of course newspaper prepared the other is very fast signature of the man. And here are the Şakir's original signature some samples from the Paris notebook of Committee of Union and Progress published in Turkish 2017 as you see how similar and identical the signatures are. And here as you see on your on our again according to me on the right side I assume it is the same for you Bahaettin Şakir's uh it is Bahaettin Şakir's telegram signature in the book and the others, five of them, are the signatures from these notebooks. And these are again as you see the three of them from the notebook and you can hardly see any difference from the signatures published in Aram Andonian's book. And don't think that really all signatures of Bahaettin Şakir was similar, as you see here these are also from notebook. If they were in Andonian's book everybody would claim that these Andonian's document Bahaettin Şakir's signature were forgery. Can you see these signatures? I mean even he at once even signed the letter with Turkish on the top with the latin alphabet as you see these are non-consistent signatures, but at least we can now surely say that the letters were authentic. So there is another important information contained in Bahaettin Şakir letter. In this letter I read this but I would like to repeat the sentence again, Şakir says that, "the government would give the army commanders and provincial governors the necessary instructions how to carry out the killings and massacres," and I discovered two Ottoman documents from Ottoman archive dating from the same date 14 March 1915 they were sent to several provinces, mainly to the cities like Bingol, Van and so on and in that telegram the interior minister says need "to refer to the third army command in regard to urgent measures to taken in response to Arminian action." So the governor should get in touch with army authorities to implement their plans.

Taner Akcam 38:47

So if these letters are authentic it is necessary to conclude that number one: A clear decision was taken by the Unionist Central Committee to annihilate the empire's Armenian population. Number two: the decision was taken before March 3rd 1915. Bahaettin Şakir might have written the latter couple days of course after the taken decision several days after this decision. And the third important point this is really a very puzzled important question, we know the scholars know, that Bahaettin Şakir actually left Istanbul August 19 no I'm sorry August 1914 beginning of August, 4th or 5th of August 1914, and he never came back to Istanbul until March 16 or 17. So the question to answer if there is a decision before march 3rd Bahaettin Şakir must be in Erzrum and then we can ask the question: how can he participate in a Central Committee meeting in Istanbul? The answer is very simple, he joined Central Committee meeting telegraphic. Now like our visual meeting here that, we are through the Zoom meeting we can see each other and discuss and talk, during those times they could be able to organize telegraphic meetings between Erzrum and Istanbul. And in the article that I published related to that topic, I published already a couple of Ottoman documents where Talat for example asking Bahaettin Şakir to join a telegraphic meeting. We don't have much records of these meetings, they didn't took records of these meetings. So this is the answer to the final decision this is sometimes taken by February 15 I tell you this also, Bahaettin Şakir was leading the Teşkilat-ı Mahsus operations in Caucasus and after the passing of third army commander he was immediately called to Erzrum and we know the exact arrival day of Bahaettin Şakir to Erzrum, it is February 15 1915. So this is the reason that I'm and I have Talat Pasha's telegram asking Bahaettin Şakir to join a telegraphic Central Committee meeting. So this is the reason that I put the time frame February 15 and March uh 3rd. So I would like to move to another topic that I came across in the course of my research, there was another Central Committee that possessed the authority to take decisions not only at the local level even make suggestions to the central government so then they took some decision for their region it was binding it was not an advisory corrector and they had the authority to take decision at the local level. And the first decision to annihilate the Armenian what was taken in this regional central committee located in Erzrum on December 1st 1915, and Istanbul was informed about the decision immediately denied following the meeting. The name of the organization was actually the Central Committee of Caucasus Revolutionary Organization. This organization was established in by Bayburt, north of Erzrum in September 1914. We know that Bahaettin Şakir used the title “Head of the Special Organization” Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Reisi, this is the title that he used in documents in several telegraphic cables we have him as Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Reisi and thus it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the Caucasus Revolutionary Organization and Erzrum based special organization, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, were the same. Because in some telegrams Bahaettin Şakir writing about the members of the Central Committee members of the Caucasus Revolutionary Organization and these were also the member of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa organization in Erzrum. We do not know the exact list of the members of the these individuals but on the basis of some archival documents I can assure you that the provincial governors Trabzon, Bitlis, Mamüretülaziz (Elazığ today), Van, and Sivas, these five governors were in the Central Committee. We do not also possess sufficient documentation to draw clearly delineate the relationship between Union Central Committee in Istanbul and the Special Organization in Erzrum. The reason why we don't have much telegrams or documents related to communication between Erzrum Central Organization and Istanbul was the actually the lack of evidence. Number one, the existence document are not being made available to researchers this is number one. And the second the important matters they sold this without keeping records and they used other channels. We know these from two Ottoman documents that I discovered on the in the Ottoman archive. In one of these letters, for example it is a telegram sent October 7th this is not on the slide October 7th 1914, so during just beginning of the first World War the Ottoman entrance in the war Bahaettin Şakir a face-to-face meeting and saying that in that telegram, thoughts and opinions that cannot be put on paper. So I cannot write these to you with telegram even it's quoted I will like I would like to come to Istanbul to discuss this issue with you. And conversation and conducted via telegrapher another method used for such discussions, unfortunately we do not have uh also such documents, but we have at least two documents where we read the following in that document in because they had to really write this in a telegraphic way to Istanbul and the governor Tahsin who was the guy who wrote this telegram the also decision to annihilate, he says “the copy of the cable was burned here on he spot." So I burned it here in Erzurum, "please ensure that Istanbul burns their copy," or then in another in the second telegram that I mentioned you "destroy this telegram along with the copy in the telegram office." So it is also important that this telegram the decision for the first December of 1914 were not simply was not a simple proposal to be sent off to Istanbul for approval, rather the Committee could take binding decisions and had the authority to direct others to carry them out.

Taner Akcam 47:35

So this is the image of the document that I'm talking about, the document that openly clear openly says that there was a decision to exterminate the Armenians. And it is also important the term extermination, imha, openly used in these documents. And this is the telegram, it start, "To Interior Minister Talat Beyefendi Urgent and Secret; to be opened by him only alone.” And then the sentence following, “those Armenians, both in the centers of city Bitlis and Van, and in the surrounding towns and villages who are suspected of being potential leaders of the revolt, or who would attack Muslims are to be arrested in advance and in case of attacks on Muslims they, those arrested, are all to be deported to Bitlis immediately in order that they be exterminated." And there were other decisions also disarming the Armenian soldiers, and some other, there were several, eight altogether, eight decisions in that cable and it was related to the war also. And in a second telegram dated December 20 1914, so approximately 20 days later governor Tahsin proposes that the previous decision of Erzrum Central Committee which was uh only for Erzuruum I'm sorry only for Bitlis and Van reason it should be put into effect in other provinces too. Now the final topic is related to the role of governors, this brings me my last point, the role of governors. To better understand the dynamic of the relationship between Istanbul and the Erzurum Central Committee we must also examine the role of provincial governors. As I will show, recently discovered documents from Ottoman archive clearly indicate that the governors were not passive recipients of the decision from the center, but were an active part of the decision-making process and pressured Istanbul for more radical decisions. There were really interesting what we learned from these telegrams, the provincial governors were often communicating and meeting with each other and there were series of written or oral decisions at meetings among them. Some provincial governors would frequently travel to Erzurum to take part in these Central Committee meetings. As member of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Erzurum branch the Central Committee governor Tahsin took a particularly active role in this process. For instance in the cable that published March 3rd 1915 he informed uh Istanbul we are communicating with the regional governors and arriving at decisions. So they were making certain decisions regarding the policies towards Armenians, this is important. Another example Muammer for example the provincial governor of Sivas in a cable that he sent on March 23rd 1915 states that communication will be undertaken with the Province of Ma'muretü'l-aziz and the result achieved will be gradually reported. So they will report Istanbul about the decision that they already took there. One of the significant aspect of governor's report to Istanbul was the rather radical suggestions that they contained in regard to what should be done to with the Armenians. Some of them demanded that a clear decision be taken in regard to extermination. So let's look closely in some of these documents. Here couple example for you. This is very early document, it is from November 17 1914. So just after the first World War officially started for the Ottoman government. Governor of Erzurum wrote to Istanbul, "Top secret. To be deciphered by the recipient [by interior minister Talat Pasha] alone," and he says, "the time had come to take permanent decision and orders in regard to the Armenians." So he is asking a final decision for the Armenians early November 17, 1914. It's very important for our discussion. But also the report, the answer of Talat Pasha very important. Talat Pasha answers immediately the next day says, carry out what the situation demands but with well considered measures until a decisive set of orders is given in regard to Armenians. So Ottomans entered the war November 10th or 11 and one week later Talat informs Erzurum governor that certain deliberation there on the way on a possible final solution on Armenian, and this is December, I'm sorry November 1914. And a similar telegram in the same timeframe November 28-29, almost 10 day after governor Tahsin, this time Erzurum Tahsin, this time it is Cevdet the governor of Van, and he says, to intentionally wait, in his letter, until the blaze/fire gets off the control it would be disastrous for us. In his view the Ottomans "stand before another, disaster like what was experienced in, Rumelia-Balkans." Thus it was necessary he says, to act without waiting for the Armenian rebellion to spread and behave as forcibly as possible. So it shows that replying to this telegram Talat says, "Until decisive orders are given, it is necessary to carry out the measure demanded by the situation, but judiciously implemented." So this telegram shows also one thing very important the role of Balkan war the defeat and the traumatic effect of this war. And governor says we should not wait the same result as in Balkan what happened 1912. We have preemptively act and do something with the Armenians and Talat says, wait until final decision will come to you. This is the other important point for you. And two more examples from December 1914. Again from Van governor December 23 1914 and he says, the governor Cevdet, without a doubt sir, we will be setting accounts with the Armenians. And two days one weeks later, December 31st Cevdet asks as a local governor, a general order and decision to be taken "regarding the Armenians." He's really not happy that the Istanbul postponed the final decision and he says it is absolutely necessary "a secret order should be given that could be acted upon accordingly." So November and 1914 December telegrams shows us that the governors of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, I didn't put some telegram from Bitlis, were demanding radical measures and the government gave them permission only for the conditions, the local conditions necessary. And even so, no decision had yet been delivered concerning the entire country. And we arrived March. I mentioned that the decision was taken sometimes towards end of February-early March, and in March in telegrams Ottoman telegrams we read the term imha annihilation clearly. So it is very interesting, it is very noteworthy related to these telegrams in the month or month of March and April that the governors did not see the need to use vague language or euphemism in referring to the annihilation of the Armenians, but spoke of it openly, even offering a number of tangible ideas regarding how such extermination could or should be carried out. From the same cables, it can also be informed that they were aware of a decision to annihilate the Armenians having already been taken and wished to get the relative orders at the earliest possible moment.

Taner Akcam 58:07

And here couple example very fast for you.

This is a telegram from March 29 1915 governor of Sivas in his telegram he asks, "if a decision has been taken by central government that would ensure the orderly persecution and elimination, I ask that you permit its communication without delay." And in the same telegram he says, "if a decision has been made for 1363 00:58:44,000 --> 00:58:48,640 the annihilation and elimination, 1364 00:58:50,160 --> 00:58:55,760 it would be most conductive time 1365 00:58:53,520 --> 00:58:56,960 to carry out, this is the perfect time to" carry this elimination extermination decision he says. This is another telegram from Bitlis governor, and in his telegram this is April 18, he says "the annihilation of Armenians to the greatest extent possible together with their material and moral power" this is original ottoman documents this is today this document is available in Ottoman archive in Istanbul, you can go and have this document. April 18th 1915 and it says the "annihilation of Armenians to the greatest extent possible together with their material and moral power." And according to governor, Armenians are the constant threat to the very existence of the empire. And in other governors in the same telegram I'm sorry in the same telegram he used that the term again "exterminatory measures 1392 00:59:58,960 --> 01:00:03,200 implementation, and it says ""this" extermination measure should be implemented according with the condition of the war." And then this is the last telegram that I would uh convey to you, it is the from the uh April 19-22 telegram in the first governor of Tahsin Erzurum says, "the time has came thoroughly solve the 1404 01:00:30,160 --> 01:00:32,960 problem." So they have the decision they can go ahead and then in April 22nd Bitlis governor says that they already sent the forces towards Van province and these forces "comb sweep the area," so they clean the villages, exterminating Armenians in that villages. So here is my conclusion. It is clear that the first extermination decisions was taken by the Central Committee of the Erzurum branch of the Special Organization on 1st December 1914 Armenians who were suspected of being potential leaders of the revolt or who would attack Muslims in the Van region, and it didn't stop there, it went over the civilians also, I mean not only man population, the decision was related to man population but it went on the children and the women also. We know from the records. And the second, the radicalization of policy of army against the Armenians began first in the affected regions and only subsequently made its way to Istanbul. And the third reason, important conclusion, the provincial governors played an active role in the decision-making process. Fourth important conclusion CUP the Committee of Union and Progress party Central Committee took a decision regarding the annihilation of the Armenians between 15 February and 3rd March. And fifth, the early decisions for extermination are significant for having been taken in the period before either the British Gallipoli landing or Ottoman defeat at Sarıkamış. This shows us that actually our previous assumption, that the final decisions they were taken towards the very bad period of the time during the 'Frustration Period' we call it Euphoria versus Frustration dilemma,' and as we see the first extermination decision was taken on the early success of the war, this was the period of Euphoria. And it is also an important determination to understand Ottoman decisiveness to exterminate its Armenian population. Thank you very much for listening to me. Sebouh it's your, your words. Thank you.

Sebouh Aslanian 1:03:18

So thank you very much for that fascinating uh lecture Taner, I now turn over the floor to Dirk for for some comments.

Dirk Moses 1:03:32

Thanks very much for the invitation to join this afternoon. I'm very pleased to be with you. I guess it's late morning in LA. Now, I'd like to start off by saying that I'm not a research expert on the Armenian Genocide, or even Ottoman history, I'm just a genocide studies generalist, but I hope I can make some useful points and ask some useful questions. Uh I think there are two ways historians can add to the store of knowledge about an event or a series of events like the Armenian Genocide. One is about detail, and the devil being in the detail, and of course that's the kind of paper you heard today. And it's worth bearing in mind how this kind of knowledge comes into existence. It requires years of ferreting around archives, which really only an academic career or private financial independence allows. You require language skills, you require the ability or cultivate, the ability to identify clues, clues like the ones you saw today as part of a story as part of an unfolding process. And this kind of knowledge takes years to develop and to acquire, it's highly specialized. When you think about it, only someone who has the time and resources to do that can go about finding these kinds of documents, A. finding and B. understand how they all fit together, and be able to then make a broader statement about them. Otherwise they're just disconnected bits of information. Right? Now without the support of the Armenian community in funding professor Akcam's chair at clark University, it's hard to imagine this paper we just heard. And of course the corpus of professor Akcam's research over the last few years. That's sort of a material basis uh for all the material conditions of possibility for this kind of research, and the kind of knowledge that is based on the devil it being in the details, the needle in the haystack. Genocide historians are always looking for a smoking gun document, sometimes it's many documents, and judging by professor Akcam's paper today we're nearing we're nearing the stage where we can talk about many smoking guns. But there's also another way historians produce knowledge, and that is by placing facts and events in context. Now there's not just one context different context will produce differing interpretations. And then you need to have a debate about which is the most plausible, you know which context helps you understand the documents that you've found in the archives, the most plausibly uh to give the most complete explanation. Now one of them is alluded to in this paper, one of those contexts, and that was expressed at the beginning and noted when professor Akcam pointed to professor Dadrian's thesis that the genocide was a culmination of intense Turkish-Muslim hatred of Armenians and the war was really just a pretext for the actualization of this prejudice, rather than a crucial ball in which genocidal intention uh developed. The war was just an occasion when a pre-existing intention could be carried out. That's very a vulgar version of the thesis, but I think it hits the essentials. Now professor Akcam gave us an important refinement of this thesis, namely the significance of center- periphery dynamics. In this case, he shows that security concerns of Eastern governors led to a campaign against potential Armenian security threats. Namely, some men who could lead a rebellion or a military campaign, paramilitary campaign. Now the key here is preemption, which uh is something that both Taner and I have been interested for a long time. Preemption, I believe, is elemental to genocide. It means acting before the others can act. So you have to anticipate danger which leads necessarily of course to a kind of paranoid cast of mind, because you're always looking around for security threats, and then you're actually neutralizing people who are who actually haven't done anything yet, you just think they might. Now how and why that fear develops is something that's very important to discuss and understand in trying to nut out how and why genocides occur. Now it was unclear to me in this presentation of women and children were also targeted immediately, in late 1914 when these memos and letters we saw today begin. But we do know that they were eventually targeted and not just as potential combatants, so the entire Armenian population was targeted. Now of course women and children are innocent and international law uh stipulates that. Uh in what the Geneva Model or the Geneva Convention is called the Principle of Distinction, distinguishing between combatants and civilians. But if you think of women and children as integral parts of a collective, as vital components of national life, as all nationalists do, then it seems quite rational even if inhumane to eliminate the potential for group regeneration. After all who said that the fight for collective survival was consistent with humane precepts. This is something actually I'd like to raise in the discussion if professor Akcam can get to it. Now this leads to a second contextual approach which I want to mention, and they are the concepts of racialization and securitization that are common in the social sciences. It sounds a bit jargon-like but they're really important concepts, and really not that difficult to understand. Racialization is a process by which a group of people are identified as racially different. Now it needn't necessarily be a pernicious process, there are groups that self-racialize or ethnicize. Maybe Armenians? You know we are different from everyone else in key respects, these are our traditions, we keep to ourselves. I mean certainly in the Ottoman Empire despite uh lots of uh fraternization among the millets, the millet system implied that. Now the other concept is securitization, and it's when an identifiable group of people whether on ethnic or racial grounds or political grounds, say a political party, are considered a vital security threat. Now the notion of securitization implies is the process by which this takes place. I think we can see processes of securitization against populations in many societies taking place around the world right now. And this leads to the question, to what extent did the perception of a security crice.. crisis in late 1914, so you know well before the April 1915 crisis, which is usually postulated as the moment for the genocidal intention. How does this perception play a role in Ottoman policy development. Now professor Akcam gave us a big the beginning to an answer for that question, and this leads then into the third context which I believe might be the beginnings of an answer as well, and that is that the Balkan wars ended only just over a year before this period in august 1913. The war was, we will recall, a catastrophe for the empire which lost virtually all of its Balkan holdings and along with that many many thousands of Muslim refugees who poured into Istanbul and into the Western parts of the empire, and bringing with them stories of massacres, rapes, and land confiscation.

Dirk Moses 1:12:29

And judging by contemporary reports by European journalists and observers, and modern research today, these stories were largely true. Bulgarian forces, in particular, massacred entire villages, they raped Muslim women, and they executed Muslim POWs Ottoman soldiers. All the christian powers of the Balkan league Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria, which attacked the empire in 1912, turned out uh Muslim villages in order to change the demographic complexion of territory, so they could claim it as their own in the anticipated peace negotiations, so that it was you know ethnically and demographically in their hands rather than in enemy hands. And Ottoman forces behaved in the same way in retaking some of this territory in the second Balkan War. Now many observers at the time noted that a new type of demographic warfare marked by massacre and expulsion featured in these two Balkan Wars. The Carnegie Commission for instance stated that Serbian and Montenegrin armies perpetrated large-scale violence for the entire transformation of the ethnic character of regions inhabited exclusively by Albanians. And that's just one example. Now the logic of demographic warfare is frankly genocidal, entire populations and that means the women and the children, the non-combatants, are held to be combatants by virtue of their nationality. And they're held to be collectively guilty and that logic extends across time and place. By virtue of ethnic affiliate ethnic and racial or religious affiliation. So on this logic, Christians who committed atrocities against Muslims in 1912 and 13, say in Montenegro, could be avenged by Muslims committing atrocities against Christians on the other side of the empire, so in the Caucasus a year or two later. Now the literature I've read indicates that talk of revenge was central for many Muslims in the empire after the Balkan Wars. And it's also no accident that many of the Young Turks hailed from the Balkans, from Salonica which was lost to Greece, from the region around Lake Ohrid and from Pristina in Kosovo, where many of the worst massacres took place. Şakir, who we heard a lot about today and regarding the authenticity of his letters, was himself born in Salonica and served as a medic during a Bulgarian siege of a Ottoman town and was briefly imprisoned by the Bulgarians, after they surrendered. It's really no surprise, I think, that such hardliners who were brutalized by the loss of the Balkan Wars and by the way it was fought, determined that multi-confessional Ottomanism was no longer viable in the wake of what they considered to be treacherous Christian Independent Movements. That is the the Balkan ones. Yeah this was a terrible situation for the Armenians, different when they were caught up in such hostilities for then the demographic model of warfare could be applied to them. I think this is the key for explaining statements that professor Akcam shared from his research, like uh this one which I'll repeat was on one of his slides from governor um Cevdet in November 1914 I quote him "to intentionally wait for the blaze to get out of control would be disastrous for us, we stand before another disaster like that which was experienced in the Balkans in Rumelia. Thus it was necessary to act without waiting for the Armenian rebellion to spread, and to behave as forcefully as possible." You can see here the dimension of anticipation of preemption. That said, I wonder if professor Akcam can give us more context if he has time in the discussion. Who were these governors? Were they Young Turk plants, or were they career civil servants? And if the latter, would you say they're escalating rhetoric about eliminating eliminating threats followed a military or an ideological logic, or a combination of the two? In other words, were they acting in accordance with the model of demographic warfare we saw in the Balkans? Which leads to another question. Why were the governors so hyper-vigilant in late 1914 about the environs of Bitlis and Van, what was actually going on there? And that then leads to my last question. Were the actions of these governors who wrote things like, our very existence.. the the very existence of Armenians is a constant threat to the stability of the homeland, um were these perceptions and actions based on auto suggestion, you know on paranoia or was there actual interaction between whoever these Armenians are that they're talking about and Turkish authorities. So what was happening on the ground there? Now that's important, not in order to engage in the unfortunate game of pointing to Armenian provocation as that Turkish apologists tend to do as if they justify what happened, it's to get at the dynamic that is actually more typical in genocides. Unfortunately, though it's understandable, the way that the Holocaust unfolded exerts a kind of serpentine fascination for historians, and also for many in the public. In the following, well in many ways, but in in this respect uh in the following way, that is that the model of an entirely passive civilian population of Jews, who were not engaged, didn't have any paramilitaries and weren't engaged in any kind of national independence movements, uh seem to have been attacked solely on ideological grounds, purely because of the nadi the Nazi's paranoid auto suggestion of about of a world Jewish conspiracy, which has no basis in fact. Okay. Now that model of how genocide takes place is often then applied to other genocides. Now why is pretty obvious, it's because about the utter innocence of the victim who was seen as an exemplary victim, sacrificial almost. When when you look at how other genocides take place, or other conflicts that we now call genocidal, you'll you'll actually see it's a little more complicated and that in in parts of the theater there were instances of agency on the part of victim groups. Now it's important to disaggregate the notion of a victim group, that is there were say paramilitary small paramilitaries here or there and then you had 99% of the rest of the population, the victim population, as bystanders, as innocent civilians. And yet, the state regards the entire group as guilty, potentially guilty, potentially dangerous and eliminates them, deports them accordingly. For me that's obviously a genocidal logic, but you can see that there is a kind of distorted interaction between victim and perpetrator, which is mediated by paranoia. But it's not entirely auto suggestion, in any event I wanted to just put those uh those dishes on the table and uh see if professor Akcam, who's an expert on these areas, of course, and if he had more time could have gone into them. If he can respond to those. And I see many many questions in the chat as well, which will keep him very busy. Thank you.

Ann Karagozian 1:20:56

Very good, thank you uh perhaps we can all be um made visible um by our IT team. Thank you so much uh both professor Moses, professor Akcam. Professor Akcam, would you like to respond to a few of the points that Dirk has made before we go to the posed questions? There are a great many of them, so we won't be able to get to all of them, but would you like to do that? I where uh I believe you need to unmute yourself.

Taner Akcam 1:21:33

So of course, uh I cannot answer of course all of those questions, and this can be maybe the entire lecture and the discussion, thank you Dirk for your intervention great points you raised. I hope this will give some incentive to people to read further on that issue. It's impossible for me to answer all of them. Very short answers about the relationship between the government and the governors. The central and the individual governors, it's an excellent point Durk. They were all member of a revolutionary organization this is how they understood themselves. When we read their writings to each other, their telegrams, these were not letters that subordinate writes to another guy on the top, this was not bureaucratic letter exchanges, they Dr. Reshid is a very famous example from Diyarbakır or Cevdet and so on. They were they considered themselves as equal member of radical organization, this is number one. And number two, in Turkish case we have to add one more, they were relative of each other. Cevdet was married Talat's sister and so on so. There were a lot of intermarriages, I mean very in that sense uh it is not correct to consider that these were certain exchanges between bureaucratic hierarchies. Yes they all considered themselves member of a revolutionary group, and they felt themselves also in charge of the overall general policies. What was going on in Van and Bitlis area? Dirk I have been searching young scholar who should extremely exactly should work on these both provinces for 1913, 14, 15 to understand what was going on. This is unfortunately the ... we have now an Armenian a student from Armenia in my genocide graduate program, and hopefully she will look into the activities exactly in that area. And I can not give you detailed information because lack of information is the main problem. But paranoia played a very central role in those areas. There were already uh special units of Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa Special Organization operating in Iran during that period, and there were also Armenian volunteer units operating within Iran and on Russian or on Ottoman-Iranian borders. Then the perception is very important, this is what you call the preemptive measure. They thought it is going to happen the same thing, but with the Armenians we will learn more. My own guess from the limited sources that I know, actually lack of, not lack how should I describe, the resistance the idea of resistance was not so very strong among Armenians in that region. We know from, my knowledge is very limited, from some leaders of Dashnaktutyun, the Dashnak party leader they were my, understanding from their memoirs, they were too conformist. For example, in Van and Bitlis area there were a young generation of Armenians who were really propagating for an early resistance, but central uh Dashnaktutyun and in Istanbul and in the region they all really advise to be calm. So this is the other important development for the area. The question of security was really central and I would like to repeat something that you wrote a lot Dirk, the idea of permanent security, that the security question was always there. We have to know what keep one thing in mind, Ottomans acted as a result of an accumulative knowledge, this is what I called accumulative knowledge. Accumulative knowledge is the experience of Ottoman state throughout 19th centuries. Ottomans knew every attempt of Christian minorities ended with an independence of that Christian group. Because they didn't really gave the autonomy that this Christian wanted, equality and social justice, this was a demand, and in Armenian case also they knew, that the demand of Armenians for social justice and equality, which crystallized in 1914 February with the reform agreement, this was a security threat for the Ottoman government. And the question was, this is this is not what I'm saying, this is a famous, according to me, famous, written communique from interior minister Talat to Presidential Office May 1915 he says, that the Armenian reforms talk was a security threat for the very existence of the country, because he was referring the experiences of 19th century century. And in that letter he was saying that we were contemplating some permanent solution for it. So they were searching a permanent security solution, and as you rightly wrote in your essays, Dirk, this was the permanent security is the end of politic. If you start to look for the permanent security, politic negotiation, giving comfort making compromises, giving some reform demands, and so on accepting the reform demand, it ends, politic ends, and the physical extermination starts. I think Ottoman case is one of the really very important case studies for your theory in that regard. So this is so far let's take some other question, I don't want to go further so.

Ann Karagozian 1:28:28

Very good, thank you so much. So we will be now going to our posed questions. Uh thank you very much to professor Taner Akcam as well as Dirk Moses. Let me reiterate for our audience that this lecture is being recorded it will be available on our UCLA Promise Armenian Institute website, in a few days, including the question and answer session. So we have received a very large number of questions during the lecture, as well as the discussant section, so first let me pose to professor Akcam. Many non-historians, in the Armenian community, such as myself, I'm an engineering professor, are wondering how you have been able to obtain such documents from the Ottoman archive? And perhaps you could describe the challenges you had in obtaining them. Are these archives truly as open as the Turkish government claims? For example, maybe you could answer that briefly. Uh very briefly.

Taner Akcam 1:29:43

Yes, Ottoman archive archives archive is better, this is the one Prime Ministerial archive, it's open for all researchers, and until 2016, until these failed coup d'etat in 2016 I was able to go to archive and work there. I have to I repeat this every time, Ottoman archive is one of the best archives in the world, and uh maybe the listener will be surprised now they can even order this document that I showed them on online. There is a possibility to create a identity there with your password and so on, and you can even buy these documents. The major problem is, of course, lack of available materials. Every state keeps certain archival materials secret, let's say the American archive may be only 90-95 percent available but in Turkish-Ottoman case maybe it's only 50 percent available. So the available documents are open and everybody can go and take them. It is one of the really best archives in the world. So especially beginning of 2000, the condition get better and better for these documents, I can give you the information. I worked in Ankara, the archive is in Istanbul, so you can even electronically enter from Ankara archive to Istanbul, so in that sense, there was not big problem, there is not a big problem uh archives are open in that sense, but the available documents are limited. Again maybe general information, we have another very important archive in Ankara, this is Military Archive which is one of the most important archive maybe for our topic, it is practically close to all researchers.

Sebouh Aslanian 1:31:40

Thank you. Okay well I have a question uh to kick off some other questions as well. And uh first, thank you very much Taner for that talk. Uh my question dovetails from a comment that Dirk made and also connects to several questions from our audience, relating to the question of, why there was essentially so much hate towards one particular targeted group, in this case the Armenians. And so my question to you is having read your essay, I'm wondering whether you find any particular role uh for the for ideas uh and ideologies of hatred and racialized thinking that preeminently uh or predominantly uh began in Europe, in the mindset of the Young Turks and in did those ideas have any role uh in the genocide? And I'm thinking here of ideas such as Social Darwinism, which as some of you may know was a very popular uh trend in the 18th 19th century in Europe, uh privileging certain groups over others in terms of supremacy and uh uh Ziya Gokalp I think was a fan of Social Darwinistic thinking and Herbert Spencer in particular. Uh was Bahaettin Şakir also involved in that, and do you see any role for ideas in this continuity versus contingency spectrum of things?

Taner Akcam 1:33:12

It is an excellent question Sebouh. I think we should wait Dirk Moses' next book that discusses exactly this dilemma or the issue ideology versus security or the role of hatred and generally social psychological factors and the contingencies that is evolving on the ground. In Ottoman case, it is a topic of another lecture, of course. I personally haven't encountered any material that Ottoman authorities or Young Turk leadership made a conscious distinction between Greeks and Armenians when it comes to the question of hatred or considering them potential threats. I think the ideology there, was mostly nurtured by Islam and secularized over the period, and this ideology radicalized in form of nationalism. And in that sense, social darwinism played an important role among the ruling group, but and it existed there. So this overall the ideology, a combination of Islamic religion, the culture that downplayed the role of Christians in the society, considered the Christians as second class of citizens, along with these Social Darwinistic European identity ideologies, Young Turks considered themselves doctors of the society. They thought they are the doctors, they cure the illness, and what was the illness, illness were the Christians. We were asking certain demands. We call it this a certain mindset. The problem is whether or not this mindset was so effective in decision making, determinant on that problem. I would argue that there was not a coherent ideological orientation within the Union and Progress party members. Yes Ziya Gokalp was more uh Social Darwinist, Bahaettin Şakir extreme nationalist, but we know Camal Pasha was more or less Pan-Ottomanist. Talat didn't care much about the ideologies he was a man of practical pragmatic, he was a very pragmatic man. So the role of ideology in genocidal process played a little bit different than what we saw in Holocaust. Here is the important part, maybe to cut the answer short, I would really recommend to all people who are interested on this ideology versus contingency dilemma, a wonderful article of Leonard Newman. In 1990s he dealt with that problem because some argue that it is the mindset, ideology, hatred, that caused the genocide or the killing. And the other argument, no no ideology was there but it was not so important, it was the contingencies, the war development, the ground what was developing on the ground, it was the effective one. And Leonard Newman is a social social psychologist, he developed a theory for all of us, saying that actually behaviors cannot be determined only by ideologies, the situations also determined the behaviors of the individual regardless their ideologies. An individual which is not racist, an individual which is not extremely nationalist, can behave genocidal if he feels under certain circumstances threatened by the others. So this is a dialectic relations and this is the reason that I'm this is the entire talk that is about, we should not only speculate and juxtapose this contingency versus ideologies, we should really look very closely in the process because those both elements played an important role in the process.

Sebouh Aslanian 1:37:57

Sure, thank you. A very quick follow-up question from the audience and it's more technical. Could you elaborate on how Bahaettin Şakir's letter, that you mentioned, in 1914, to a certain Cemal Bey in Adana reached Aleppo? I assume that's how it ended up in in uh Andonian's collection. Oh I

Taner Akcam 1:38:21

Oh I mentioned in my talk, Adana, he was in Adana Cemal, then he was appointed as a responsible secretary to Aleppo, and he was in charge of, uh in Aleppo working along with the governor to deportation and extermination of Armenians. He went to Aleppo and worked along with governor and the deportation office. This is how the letters arrived Aleppo and in the Ottoman document I showed, uh very clear there was a criminal investigation against his activities in Aleppo. Okay. The problem was I mean Andonian was writing in his book already that this guy the Cemal was in Aleppo but we didn't have any confirmation of it. This is the document that I showed in my talk.

Sebouh Aslanian 1:39:11

Okay, great. Ann and do you have any?

Ann Karagozian 1:39:14

Yeah maybe, I'll pose one of the many uh questions from other historians um. So professor Akcam is it your argument that is uh consistent with the Suny-Bloxham argument, that there was no premeditated decision before before World War I, to carry out the extermination of the Armenians and Assyrians? Can you explain how Tahsin turned from criticizing the CUP policies toward the Armenians when he was in Van to his support for the extermination from Erzurum?

Taner Akcam 1:39:52

You know this Suny-Dadrian uh debate, thank you. I mean, I thank to both of them that they really made this rare debate, it was published I think 2001 or 1999, in one of the Armenian English language journal, and initiated by an article of Ron Suny and can be classified in this traditional intentionalist versus functionalist dilemma that we know from holocaust. We are way beyond this discussion. So I cannot say as I said this uh Dadrian-Ron Suny dichotomy I'm way beyond it, if I may allow to say this. I don't use the term premeditation, it is a wrong term because it implies that there was already a decision made before 1914 August. As we saw from, one thing before continuing, take Ottoman documents seriously. They mean what they wrote there. And these telegrams, as you saw in the presentation, are numeric Arabic letters, ciphered telegrams only communication between high officials. So these documents were not produced for public perceptions. It is very obvious that they didn't make their make their mind what they should do with Armenians. It is very clear though that there was already a mindset I used the term, a mindset, that this problem should be solved. This is again Talat Pasha's May 26 1915 letter to the Prime Ministerial office, he says before the war started we were contemplating, we were thinking how to solve this problem. So they were planning that they should get rid of this Armenian issue, but they didn't know how and when, and this was the central issue. So in that sense, I'm way beyond Ron Suny's or uh Donald Bloxham's argument. War was not the simple triggering element. Before the war already there was a mindset, this is the very important. The first decision to exterminate, this was the period of Euphoria, I mean it was not they didn't threaten, they didn't considered themselves threatened, this Cevdet letter that Dirk Moses referred to, this is towards end of December, and the early decisions the seeking for a final decision is in November, they already decided really try to find a solution uh to this issue. I haven't uh introduced some other documents you know already 2nd august 1914, when the Ottoman government declared the general mobilization they already declared Armenians suspicious element, they already considered them as a threat. But they didn't know exactly how should they deal with that threat. So mindset, I think, were there before especially with the Armenian Reform Agreement, because for them it was very clear beginning of an Independent Armenian State, and they would never allow it. And with the beginning of first World War, first thing they did, they annuled the Armenian Reform Agreement, they repudiated first thing just they entered the war. So but the decision to exterminate it comes towards, in a process that we can reconstruct slowly along the documents that we have. As you see Dadrian and Ron Suny controversial the polls can be now, along with the other materials that we have, more more fine. We can have a more fine debate now discussion.

Ann Karagozian 1:44:33

Thank you. Do you have another question you'd like to post Sabu or I can go next?

Sebouh Aslanian 1:44:37

Um well, there's one other question. Uh we don't have too much time left, but I think at least two or three questions can maybe squeeze in. Question I have now, is a question regarding the motivation behind the heightened secrecy, behind the communications between Erzurum and Talat in Istanbul. And so our questioner uh asks, whether there was there were fears of opposition from within the Ottoman government or military to a decision regarding the extermination of Armenians, and whether that was connected to the heightened secrecy?

Taner Akcam 1:45:14

To my knowledge there was not a serious opposition within government. Uh in Ottoman government there were couple ministers who were against entering the war, like the Cavit the finance minister, and they resigned and they remained also how do you call it loyal to Talat and the government. So there was no serious opposition, and maybe the listeners know already there were even talks with Dashnaktutyun 1914 August mid-August in Erzurum. And actually, Union and Progress party leadership wanted to make a deal with Dashnaktutyun leadership for a possible uprising in Caucasus against Russian authorities, which then Dashnaktutyun leadership declined, because of the situation in Caucasus. So my personal view on the issue with Erzurum is the following, when the first World War started, it was not only the Ottomans it was the Germans also who decided on possible military operations, and the first Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa units which was under the leadership of Bahaettin Şakir didn't organize any operation against domestic factors, against the Armenians. Their main target was Iran and Caucasus. They were planning to organize Muslim uprising in Caucasus and Iran and they sent military unit paramilitary unit in Caucasus. Even though Ottomans entered the war 1914 November the war in Caucasus and inside Iran already started towards end of August. We know from the materials, so they were the original plan was to organize upright Muslim uprisings against Russia and in Iran, possibly to go all the way to Iran and Afghanistan. I think Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanism as an ideological element played also an important role in the establishment of certain war strategies.

Sebouh Aslanian 1:47:55

Okay wonderful, thank you. Ann.

Ann Karagozian 1:47:58

Okay so I have I'll, I'll ask one more quick question and so will professor Aslanian. Um so we've actually gotten this one from a couple of viewers uh Tanner. How does the 1914 timing of the conscription of Armenian men into the army and being put into hard labor factor into the timing? Was there also for example a jihad declared in November, or later in 1914? So this is on the conscription.

Taner Akcam 1:48:29

It is a very great question actually. I mean regarding the jihad, this is today very well researched and accepted in academia. We know jihad, as such, didn't much played a role in the development of the war. Jihad was an ideological factor, maybe in the area of Mardin-Diyarbakır when some Kurdish tribes attacking mainly Assyrians. Beyond that, jihad was not a very important political ideological factor. It was a German invention, and they thought with the jihad declaration they can create mobilization of the Muslims in the world and against the Great Britain, France, and Russia, but it didn't work, because how can you call Muslims in a jihad along with German government, along with Christians against a again another Christian nation? So jihad in that sense played a minor role, and this is very well accepted in the scholarship. Regarding the conscription of Armenian man population between age 18-45, August 2nd with the general mobilization. Yes, it was very important and this was in the sense important that it broke the resist.. possible resistance of Armenian people. Armenians were, we can debate on it you Arminian I mean the listener Armenian listener can tell more on that topic than my limited humble knowledge, they were more submissive, very much to the authorities. And most of Armenian young population, they conscripted in the army. And in very early stages, because they were considered as a threat, labor battalions were established already in August 1914, and Armenian man population put in these labor battalions. And I cannot remember the exact date, now either October 1914 or early November 1914 all Armenian male population within the third army area, this is the historic Armenia, they were disarmed and put aside, they were taken out of the army control, and especially with after Sarikamish defeat February 1915, all Armenian male population were taken out from the military and put in the labor battalion. And they were first group who were exterminated. But again, I have to repeat one thing, we don't have enough research in our field, because we don't have a serious genocide research institute, we don't have any research on Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army. (Could you please repeat it) Oh my siri is talking here sorry. For example I know from Ottoman documents, despite this taking all army disarming the Armenian young people in the army, there were for example Armenians in combat units, in 1917 even. And we know in 1917-18 there were a lot of young Armenian released from the army, and in 1917 in Syria, those survived Armenians when they came to their age 18 they were conscripted again in the army also. It is very complicated history, it is not true that we have I mean I know that among Armenian friends there is a perception all Armenian youth between age 18-45 they were put in the army, and they were put in the labor battalion, and they were exterminated by the way 1915 March, and there were no Armenians left in the army. It's not true, there were so many Armenians. But we don't know how much number one the military archive is closed in Ankara, this is one. And second, there is no researcher that worked on that topic. Someday I hope, a young scholar works on these Armenian youth in the Ottoman military service. It's a very important question, and thank you for the question.

Sebouh Aslanian 1:53:15

Thank you. So our final question, and we must end unfortunately after this one, comes from a listener, viewer, who is interested to know what place you see in the use of these documents that you have unearthed, and I assume have placed on your digital humanities hub at uh Clark? What role do you see these documents as playing in the curriculum and in pedagogical uh in the pedagogical field of teaching the genocide in the U.S. or elsewhere? Could you elaborate on that a little briefly.

Taner Akcam 1:53:52

I mean it's a part of our education, and I'm very much hoping that this will be part of our continuous effort to develop Armenian genocide research. You know in my lecture also, you notice that I have been giving example from Holocaust. Holocaust research is so well advanced. I mean Germany and Israel they do not have any problem with each other, and there is no political issue there, also still holocaust research is advancing. And my purpose is to advance Armenian Genocide research in a way to understand past what happened in the past, and the main aim of the pedagogy, main aim of education, this is what you do Sebouh, and Dirk does, every scholar. How we can prevent the similar mass atrocities in the future. This is all about the education. We have to educate young generation for future and they should be contributing really to prevent further mass atrocities. Even though I mean we can be very pessimist on that regard, but important thing is, we should advance the education.

Ann Karagozian 1:55:18

Wonderful. Thank you again um professor Taner Akçam, professor Dirk Moses for a very stimulating lecture and discussion. This has been a very important contribution to our understanding of the planning and the origins of the Armenian Genocide and you've given us all a great deal to think about um and I hope that our audience will pursue learning more about your scholarship as well as that of professor Moses' because much of it is available online. Let me close our webinar by again thanking our audience for their uh participation, for their questions. And let me announce that there will be a second Distinguished Lecture to be provided by professor Taner Akçam, again one that was postponed from the spring. This next lecture will be is scheduled for Thursday, October 22nd at 11 a.m pacific time and will also be provided via the Zoom platform. The subject matter of this second lecture will be professor Akçam's new research pertaining to the role of Cemal Pasha in the Armenian Genocide, addressing recent scholarly controversies on his role in planning and perpetrating the Genocide. So please be sure to sign up on our Promise Armenian Institute website, to join our email list or connect with us via social media and we'll be sure that you receive updates on this next Distinguished Lecture. And also in the planning stages as well is a Promise Armenian Institute Distinguished Lecture to be given by professor Ronald Suny, of the University of Michigan. This Distinguished Lecture will take place sometime in early 2021. So again please be sure to sign up on our website to receive further updates on this and other PAI programming. So again thanks to all of you for your attendance at this Distinguished Lecture. We look forward to having you participate in future events for the Promise Armenian Institute at UCLA. Thank you and have a good rest of the day.

Taner Akcam 1:57:35

Thank you so much.

Transcribed by https://otter.ai