Kal Raustiala
Good afternoon, everyone. I'm Kal Raustiala, and it's my pleasure to welcome you to this book talk book discussion this afternoon with Elizabeth Economy. This will be popping on screen momentarily. We are really happy to have Liz with us today to talk about her new book The World According to China. And we're going to discuss the book and of course, there's so many aspects to the US China relationship to China's relationship to the entire world. They're all covered in this book, which we will send a link around about the book. I know from Liz herself that the book is a little hard to get at the moment. But some bookstores have it still and it will be back in other bookstores and booksellers shortly so I urge you to get it. Before I jump in with her. Let me just take a moment to to introduce her properly. So Liz is currently on leave from her normal role as senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford. And she's currently serving as Senior Advisor for China to the Secretary of Commerce, though, of course, the book and everything that she will say today do not represent the official views of the US government. She's here in her personal capacity. Liz is a longtime China expert, previously senior fellow and director for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, political scientist, and the author of many books, including The third revolution, The river runs black. And there another one I'm forgetting. I'm sorry, by all means,
Elizabeth Economy
By all means necessary. Yeah.
Kal Raustiala
Thank you. Yeah. So. So these are all works that look at China for various perspectives. And I'd say that the current book, the one that we're going to discuss today, is maybe the broadest in the sense that she really looks at the kind of broad sweep of how China sees the world and engages with the world. So Liz, welcome. Thanks for coming on.
Elizabeth Economy
Thanks so much Kal. It's really great to be here with you.
Kal Raustiala
Yeah, yeah, it's good to see you and see that you have this book out. I really, I enjoyed it. And even as someone who follows China moderately closely as a non expert, I've learned so much from your analysis and your kind of coverage of the waterfront of what's going on with China today. And Xi Jinping, of course, big part of the story. So I thought we could just start first with something that's right, happening at the moment, which is the Olympics. This is the second time that China has hosted the Olympics. First time was in 2008. And you know, these Winter Olympics are a little weird for many reasons. There's political issues, there's actually no snow. There's a bunch of environmental factors I'm sure you know a lot about. But I'm just curious how you see, one of the themes in your book is China's engagement with the world and the ways in which China is engaging in, I don't want to say a more aggressive way that I think that's true for certain things, but certainly a much more active kind of engagement. And the Olympics are often part of that story. So I'm just curious, do the Olympics matter in some way? Or what do they tell us about the bigger picture?
Elizabeth Economy
Sure. I mean, I think, you know, for Xi Jinping, personally, of course, when China hosted the 2008 Olympics, he was nominally in charge of ensuring that, you know, the show, the show went on, but it was a grand show. And it kind of earned him his stripes as a leader. Because, of course, it was, in many respects, a pretty spectacular Olympics for China, and also marked China's entry onto the global stage, I think, in a fairly significant way. Of course, there were problems, there are human rights issues, still, then there were a lot of environmental issues around there, but but by and large the picture that the international community saw in 2008, was of this, you know, incredible, you know, country that had emerged, you know, from sort of the, you know, travails of World War Two, but also, you know, its own, you know, cultural revolution and great leap forward, and now had triumphed. And so I think that was, that was the, you know, the story in 2008. And that was Xi Jinping in 2008. And if you fast forward to the 14 years or so now to 2022. I think in Xi's mind, when China, you know, won its bid to host the Winter Olympics, I think he had a couple things in mind, he has a fixation on sports, as we've seen with soccer with basketball, he wants, you know, he's, you know, telling all the parents that they need to get their children to be physically fit. So I think that element of it matters to him the sport, the competition, but I think he also saw it as a kind of second coming out party for himself. And it probably is an affirmation of his leadership. And again, another chance to have China shine on the global stage. Instead, of course, it's been a much more mixed picture For China. Obviously, there's COVID, there have been a number of stories of athletes and others who have been seemingly mistreated, or at least poorly treated, you know, when they have COVID, you know, tests that are positive one day negative the next day. And so a lot of I think, mixed experiences, certainly not uniformly positive from the perspective of the athletes. That but I think that of course, the the big shadow looming over this Olympics has been xinjiang. And, you know, the fact that a lot of the world is looking and you know, wondering what's happening to those, you know, more than million Uyghur Muslims who've been, you know, detained in labor reeducation camps. And, you know, is, you know, does this situation in China today with this type of, you know, really significant human rights abuses underway. Does this really represent the spirit of the Olympics, you know, and is China a country that merited or merits hosting the Olympics. And, of course, it's facing a diplomatic boycott from several countries, including the United States. I still, you know, 30 people turned out 30 leaders turned out there, you're so leaders turned out, and I think Xi has tried to make the best of it, by you know, meeting individually, making it a much more politicized Olympics, in some respects, meeting with the individual leaders having political discussions with them almost diplomatic negotiations. And of course, you know, having the big one with with Putin and Russia. So I think they're trying to salvage it, I think they'll have some, you know, big gold medal wins that they can celebrate at home. But overall, of course, this Olympics is not going to go down in history, as you know, in the same way that I think the 2008 Olympics did,
Kal Raustiala
Right. Yeah, no, I mean, I remember the 2008 kickoff, and it was incredible. And there was actually events here in LA. And it just seemed like obviously, the Summer Olympics are a bigger deal in some ways. But it was, as you say, very different time. And China, I think has become to most of us, or at least many of us here. Certainly in California, we're well aware of China's wealth and power. But in 2008, maybe that wasn't so clear to a lot of people. So I think that's I think that's a pretty apt description you gave. Let me ask you about Russia, just since you mentioned Putin. And obviously the world is pretty focused right now on what's happening with Russia and Ukraine. There's a couple of dimensions to that. One is just the the Russian China relationship and how China sees Russia. Maybe you can expand a little bit on both the history of that and how it's been today. But then also, many people have drawn parallels to Taiwan, and whether, you know, if something were to happen, and Ukraine was either absorbed or Finland dies or something And the status quo? Would there be implications for Taiwan as well? They're different circumstances, but there's some similarities. So you can take either or both of those as leads and kind of run with them. Okay.
Elizabeth Economy
So I guess on the on the relationship between Xi Jinping and Putin between China and Russia, I mean, they have had a very, you know, complex history, even just contemporary history, where they've been, you know, opposed where they had a border clash. I mean, they actually came to blows, of course, in the early 1960s. But since then, I think in you know, the, over the past few decades, we've watched as China and Russia, you know, primarily, they've worked together, I think fairly well, in the United Nations UN Security Council, they find sort of the the, sort of the emphasis that they place on issues like sovereignty, that's something that they share on the human rights front, you know, now, internet governance, there are a number of issues where they find common cause, I mean, a few years back, I remember when President Trump was talking about how much he liked Xi Jinping, and what a great friend Xi Jinping was. And then at the same time, Xi Jinping was giving a talk in some university, I think it was in in Russia, and he said that Putin was his best friend in the international community. And I wondered whether Donald Trump felt bad about that. I think I think Xi Jinping showed his hand, you know, at that, at that moment, for a lot of, I think outside observers, there are a lot of questions about the durability of the relationship, the reality of the relationship, you know, a lot of people question, you know, maybe it's, there's a lot of hype, but maybe the reality is not as significant, I tend to think that the relationship is only growing stronger. And in part, that's because Putin has, to some extent, I think, subsumed or subjugated his, his interest to that of China. Right. So if you look at, you know, he had his own big, economic, you know, integration plans, Eurasian Economic Union, but he basically has folded that in to the Belt and Road initiative. For all intents and purposes, you don't hear much about the Eurasian Economic Union. I kind of thought at one point that maybe they they'd reached some sort of agreement that China was going to, you know, spread its influence economically. But Russia would continue to be the more dominant player, for example, in the security front, in the Middle East, right, that there was some kind of tacit accommodation, where they would recognize Russia was a bigger player in one sphere, and China kind of captured the other. I think, increasingly, you know, that that relationship is not going to be tenable. Because I think China's growing in its military power, it's importing, you know, less in terms of Russian military arms is it develops its own capabilities, right. And in some cases, surpasses Russia's, the technology, the level of technology. So I think it's a relationship that and the last point I'll make sorry, is that their trade relationship was actually not that significant. You know, it's 50, 60 $70 billion. I mean, for two vast neighbors, you'd think that there would be more trade and investment but it wasn't that that great, but it's, it's jumped up now. I think it's about 150 billion or so. So, you know, I think from my perspective, as I look at the two countries, I think there's far more far, far more areas of cooperation and coincidence of interests, than there are areas of potential conflict. So frankly, I'm becoming increasingly concerned, because I think it's not even just about China and Russia, I think it's about China, and Russia and Iran, and, and then maybe North Korea, and then a vast number of, you know, authoritarian states that are sprinkled throughout the world, that you really are beginning to develop, you know, at least an informal type of coalition that can can, you know, take action, for example, in the United Nations on issues like human rights and try to upend, you know, traditional norms and values. So, I think it's something to watch and something I'm pretty concerned about.
Kal Raustiala
I mean, I agree, and I think already you're absolutely right, that's happening. It's happening. Certainly, you mentioned the internet as an example where you've already see that kind of alliance of autocracies or authoritarian regimes working closely together. I you know, China I'm sure sees itself as the leader of that group. It's interesting to think about the Russia China relationship, because Russia on the one hand, yes, very significant military power, permanent five member of the Security Council, economically Russia is quite small. And so you know, China just dwarfs. I think, Russia's smaller economy than California, not gonna swear to that, but it's pretty small.
Elizabeth Economy
I think I think that is correct. Yeah.
Kal Raustiala
So you know, we're not talking about a big economic player, and this is such a different world than it's, we should know that we are in the month. I forget the exact date of Nixon's visit and the Shanghai communique, but it was exactly 50 years ago this month. 50 years ago or 51, now I'm pausing on that. But something like half a century ago,
Elizabeth Economy
50,
Kal Raustiala
50? President Nixon goes to famously, famously goes to China. And I, you know, part of the reason for that was, of course, concerned with the Soviet Union and figuring out how to balance against the Soviet Union and how different things are today. That concern is so much more China, people will talk about Russia, of course in the beltway, but China is overwhelming. So it's a pretty different world. But all that said, I think you're right, that there's there's a lot of common interest, but but there's also scope for conflict. And we may see more of that. I think there are still some territorial disputes and some other issues where, yeah, I think, serious ones.
Elizabeth Economy
I think I would just say, I think at this point that we should, you know, consider them to me, for all intents and purposes, when it comes to US policy, I think we should consider them to be quite closely aligned. And I know, you know, there's been talk over the past few years of, you know, opportunities to kind of pry them apart. I don't see any interest in that. I mean, if you look at the statement that the the two leaders made, you know, during the Olympics, I mean, it talked about essentially, you know, a new form of an alliance that's better, not using that we're better than anything that came out of the Cold War. You know, and I think, signaling that they are prepared to kind of together to create some form of the New World Order. So I, you know, I don't think we can bank on the two, the two countries sort of fracturing over, you know, something,
Kal Raustiala
agreed, agreed. And the relationship does seem different, not only for the economic reasons that we discussed, but you know, when Mao visits Stalin, or you know, it's it's a different world, China's sort of a country trying to get off the ground. Today, China's incredibly powerful. And so you know, I'm curious about how you see how you see that as a sign or an indicator for China's approach. Generally, you have a whole chapter in the book, about China's interest in global governance and international organizations. And China's much more active, I want to talk about COVID and China's roll up the who and all of that, but China is definitely a much more active international player in the kind of conventional diplomatic world today than it was even 1520 years ago. So how do you see that? What's your what's your sort of theory of China's approach? And how do you...
Elizabeth Economy
I think, let me make two points. You know, first, one of the things that I found really interesting, as I was doing the research for the book was just this sense that China was really taking its model at home. And then, you know, elements of it, right parts of the development model parts of the political model, and then pushing it out into other countries through things like the Belt and Road Initiative, or sometimes to more coercive economic, economic coercion, and then looking to those global governance institutions to cement those same values and norms. So it's kind of like a multi level game that it's playing. And Xi Jinping himself has said that China, you said as early as 2014, but then really reiterated it at the 19th Party Congress in 2017, the China's should lead in the reform of the global governance system. And, you know, truth be told, and I think, you know, this as well as anyone Kal, the global governance system, you know, the United Nations and all those international institutions, you know, when you're working on your PhD, and you're, you're becoming a professor, and that's kind of, you know, slightly esoteric topic, there aren't that many people that immediately leap into that space. But Xi Jinping, I think, in China has made it a much more sort of attractive space for people to study, because so much is happening, right. And there seems to be so much push for change now as a result of China. And I think the way that China operates in that space is quite telling, because you sort of across the board, you know, China tends to, China and Chinese officials tend to represent sort of narrow Chinese interests, even though they even when they are officials within the UN organizations themselves. So not they're formally as representatives of China, but they are actually supposed to be, you know, employees, essentially of those institutions. But we see international civil servants. Yeah, sorry, exactly. But we see in many, many cases that for example, you know, I interviewed Dolkun Isa, who is the head of the World Uyghur Congress, one of the, you know, sort of most renowned activists. And he told me how, you know, he was supposed to he was, you know, was fully badged and everything was supposed to testify before a UN. Un group, and he was physically removed from the hallway of the UN inside the UN by security guards. And he suspected that it was China. But then later, you know, Wu Hongbo, who was a Chinese official in the UN, was on CCTV went on CCTV, Chinese Central Television, and boasted about how he was able to, you know, prevent Dolkun Isa from testifying instead, you know, as a Chinese, you know, official, it's my job to serve the Motherland's interests. So I think we see that played out in many different ways, you know, in the International Civil Aviation Organization, something so small, I mean, and seemingly petty, you know, as blocking, you know, people from from the Twitter feed who say that they want, you know, Taiwan to become a member. So, you know, there's, there's, there are all these examples, I think, where, you know, some seem to be very petty abuses of power, some to be much more significant. But I think, in any case, they are much more active, you know, they they seek to hold leadership positions, while I was writing the book they held for now they hold three, but they will continue to push to the UN system. Yeah, four out of 15 of the UN agencies, major UN agencies and programs, so very significant number more than any other country. And they're very, you know, capable. Their diplomats are very capable. And and they've been, they have treated the United Nations as a serious sort of domain of international politics for a long time.
Kal Raustiala
Yes.
Elizabeth Economy
And so, you know, their officials are very well embedded. And they have a lot of them young people and very senior figures who've been there for many, many years, who served multiple terms and leadership positions. And so they're quite deeply embedded, and they have a lot of influence. And they know how to know how to play the game, I think, quite effectively. But having said that, I think there's a case to be made that at this point, they may have overplayed their hand. And so you are seeing pushback from countries, I think, at least initially led by the United States,
to say, hey, you know, this is not the way that the UN should be used. And so on the one example, and then I don't want to go on too long on this topic. But there was a case in 2019, when China tried to have the Belt and Road Initiative written into a un reauthorization bill for sorry, you just say your UN authorization for the mission UN mission to Afghanistan. And the United States and some other countries said, well, Belt and Road initiative has nothing to do with this. But the Chinese pushed and they said, If you don't put it in, and it had been put in for the preceding three years, then we're going to veto this. I mean, can you imagine saying, like, we want the Belt and Road initiative written in or we're going to veto the, you know, UN mission to the Afghanistan. I mean, it's just seems crazy, right? But that's the kind of hardball that you can see them play. And again, they, other countries pushed back and the Chinese, you know, finally folded. But I think increasingly, China is going to encounter that kind of pushback, we see, you know, countries rally now to, you know, pursue candidates that they think for leadership positions to try to push back against new Chinese candidates. So I think there's a lot going on the space has become far more active as a result of concerns over potential abuses by China
Kal Raustiala
Just because it's come up a couple times. Just take a quick second to define the Belt and Road initiative, because it is such a big initiative of, of Xi's but also for China generally.
Elizabeth Economy
Sure. So the Belton Road initiative, I think is Xi Jinping sort of flagship foreign policy initiative. And he announced it in 2013, in two different speeches. Basically, three, it was a infrastructure plan, infrastructure connectivity plan, and and the Chinese government sketched out three overland routes and three maritime routes that were designed really to connect interior parts of China less developed, in fact, parts of China to external markets. So going through the rest of Asia sorry, through you know, Europe in the Middle East and out all the way to Africa. You know, over the past now nine years since it was originally almost nine years since it was originally announced its expanded to include the whole world it's no longer just hard and infrastructure like ports and railroads and highways, there's digital infrastructure so ecommerce and satellite systems and you know fiber undersea, you know, Cape optic fiber optic cables and you know, soon the you know, ECN why the digital currency and there's a health Silk Road that really came into you know, its own during COVID pandemic polar Silk Road to connect China to Europe more directly, I mean, everything can every everything can be a silk road, but it's a serious issue. You know, very serious initiative with some, you know, potentially transformative impacts. And I think part of it is that, again, it turned into be more than just, you know, trade and investment, it turned out to be, you know, political elements, right. So China can provide, you know, surveillance equipment can it can you know, Huawei can come in, come in and provide the 5g, you can get the surveillance equipment, then you can actually get, you know, training on how to conduct you know, real time online censorship, right. So China will provide two week training seminars for leaders of Belt and road countries, obviously, those who are more interested in you know, sort of more state centered approach to the internet. So that, you know, they're providing a kind of one stop shop, in many respects around the China model. And so I think this is one way in which they're exporting their their own development model.
Kal Raustiala
Yeah, they do seem to take it incredibly seriously. And I was in Beijing in 2017. And there was some kind of Belt and Road, big conference about to happen. And it was incredible every literally everywhere I went, or enormous billboards, touting the Belt and Road initiative, often in English, and I don't read Chinese, but so maybe there were ones as well, But the English ones I could certainly read, and I was just impressed at how seriously they took this from a kind of almost a PR point of view to the Chinese people, though, I guess the English billboards were aimed at others. I, I don't know, it was an interesting thing.
Elizabeth Economy
I mean, it is interesting to think, you know, what happens to the south second second Belt and road forum, I think what has happened is, is that, you know, there's been pushback against the Belt and road, you know, in countries in host countries, because, again, without export of the China model, you've got the benefits of you know, state led rapid infrastructure development, just the way that China developed. But you have also have all those externalities, like, you know, lack of transparency, and the corruption and the, you know, labor problems and the environmental degradation and pollution, all of those things have accompany many of the Belt and road projects as well. So a lot of protests, by civil society in host countries. And inside China, you know, you make an important point about communicating to the Chinese people. There's also been, you know, a lot of complaining about the Belt and road. So, you know, scholars, scholars complain, because they say, this makes no sense, you know, in terms of like the economics of it and make no sense business. People say, we don't want to do this, we're not actually going to make money off of this. It's not, you know, this is a strategic, a strategic plan. It's not an economic plan. And then the Chinese people have complained, because they say, why are you they think of it in terms of aid, which it really isn't. And they say, Why are you giving all this money? You know, to all these people everywhere, when we still, you know, are a developing country? So, you know, it's-
Kal Raustiala
Sounds familiar.
Elizabeth Economy
it's become Yes, it's become a very bumpy Belt and road.
Kal Raustiala
Yeah, yeah. No, do you see one of the things that you sort of alluded to this, but it is a kind of, even though it's covers virtually everything? Seems like it's a few slap VRI on a project, it's better. But it is kind of all about connectivity. And oftentimes, it is hard infrastructure, ports and railways. One of the things that's often tied to it is China's expanding military interests around the world and maybe increasing bases and you quote someone in the Chinese government, or maybe it's someone now forgetting whether it's when we talk to you at a conference, yeah, basically said, Yeah, we're gonna have a whole bunch of bases, kind of like the United States, right, which I thought was a really interesting point, which, you know, many have assume that, but China has been very cagey about its intentions. So what do you predict in the next, let's say, the next decade, in terms of China's ambitions to be not just a Pacific power, but maybe a broader whether it uses Belt and road or not kind of a truly global power with global reach?
Elizabeth Economy
Yeah, I mean, I think it's clear that they're going to build more bases. I think there's, you know, they've already said overseas bases, right, one in the Middle East, you know, Cambodia, maybe Pakistan will have to wait to see where they all, you know, emerge, but they have their first one is in Djibouti, right? It's a military logistics space. Yeah. So So a, you know, a military official, who's now a scholars is the one who said, you know, we're going to have, you know, ones that have more than 100. You know, we'll have as many as the United States. And the thing is, I think many people don't appreciate is what a fundamental shift this represents in Chinese thinking. has, you know, historically, People's Republic of China has been adamant that they will never, ever have overseas bases, right? Because one of the things they prize most is sovereignty, and you know, bases overseas are kind of a sign of like colonialism and you know, a great powers infringement. On the sovereignty of a lesser power, but that has kind of gone by the wayside. And now the argument really is that, you know, China, these bases, of course, are not going to be used, you know, for aggressive military purposes, right. But instead, they're just there to defend Chinese interests by Chinese people, Chinese economic interests, all of those are very far flung, you know, you find Chinese, you know, businesses everywhere throughout the world now. So China's making the case or trying to make the case that it needs its military there as well, to defend these people. So that's the argument. I, you know, I don't know how many people believe the argument. But but that's the argument.
Kal Raustiala
Yeah, I mean, in some ways, it's a very familiar story, the US didn't really, we did not have bases outside of the United States for a very long time, until really the early 20th century, and kind of a similar pattern emerged. And suddenly, we had some by some counts, 7, 800 faces at this point. So it's not surprising. I think, I want to talk about South China Sea briefly, but it is interesting to imagine, you know, we, the United States are very active in our freedom of navigation operations, for example, in the South China Sea. And, you know, I don't know what will happen when Chinese battleships maybe start doing that off the coast of California? Or maybe, you know, we're set could we imagine setting up something in Mexico? You know, there's ways in which if China were to behave in manner in a manner that the US does all the time, I think it'd be very unsettling to people in the US are just not used to that.
Elizabeth Economy
Yeah. I mean, I there's a slight difference here, of course, because the South China Sea is a contested area. And the reason that the United States is doing the freedom of navigation operations, in part, of course, is because, you know, China claims, you know, 80% of it, but there are also five other nations that that claim this same area. And so there's a, you know, there are a different, you know, there's a different situation there. I think playing
Kal Raustiala
I know everything, and I completely endorse that. And I think the claims are, are kind of absurd, but but in any event, those claims are there, I guess, without getting into details on South China Sea, because it can be a very narrow kind of thing. Why is it important to China? So there's this, you know, large area, I know, there's, there's fisheries and there's gas, and, you know, other kind of, but it's more than that, so what is it so important to China?
Elizabeth Economy
I mean, you know, from my perspective, there it is, it's the sovereignty issue, and there is no issue as important. I mean, aside from domestic stability, I believe there's no issue as important to Xi Jinping in particular, as this issue of sovereignty. And he has said, you know, for example, you know, there can be no great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, unless, for example, China reclaims Taiwan. So, and the South China Sea is part of that, I think, one of the really interesting things in the early stages of COVID, I mean, frankly, something that surprised me, there's not a lot that surprised me after 20 gazillion years of studying this, but but this surprised me was how assertive China was militarily during this period. So you know, there was the border conflict, the first deadly border conflict with India, there was certainly much more assertiveness with regard to Taiwan, the Diaoyu Senkaku Islands, you had, you know, China pushing into Indonesia,
Kal Raustiala
it was there, sorry to interrupt, but those are those are islands contested between Japan, and China.
Elizabeth Economy
Sorry, sorry. And then, you know, pushing into Malaysian and Indonesian, you know, sort of territorial waters even had them laying political claim to territory within Bhutan, during this period. So, if they used I think, the distraction of of COVID, right, in the fact that so many countries were consumed with battling the pandemic, to try to, you know, to probe to push to see what they could get. And again, I think, I think that issue of sovereignty is his core is core to China, but really core to Xi Jinping. And so I think that is at the heart. Yes, there's the fisheries, yes, there's potential the potential for, you know, oil and gas. And China's certainly wants, you know, to, you know, have control over those. But beyond that, I think it's, it's an issue of sovereignty.
Kal Raustiala
Yeah, it's just striking how, you know, if you look at about not that it's meaningful, that this area is actually not that close to China, and a lot closer to other countries. But it's interesting that China has dug in so much on South China Sea when the basis of their claim is actually really not that strong. And,
Unknown Speaker
of course, they they, you know, in the Court of International international law, right. It's not even not that strong. It's not recognized. It's not recognized. So, I mean, it's even not just not that strong.
Kal Raustiala
The I'm being charitable but they lost decisively in a tribunal. That granted they didn't participate in, But they, you know, they really lost on virtually every, every aspect I want to talk to there's a couple of things we haven't covered one, I want to get to COVID. Because COVID Such a big issue right now. And China's role in it is important not only for the pandemic itself, but just for the points you mentioned about global governance and the role of the who in China's influence and maybe pernicious influence, but also Chinese soft power. So we've kind of talked a little bit about hard power, and various ways in which China's throwing its weight around. But we also know that China, and you talked about this at length in the book about how China has tried to use soft power and somehow capture interest from things like the Confucius Institutes, which we used to have one here at UCLA, they used to be all over which were attempts at exporting Chinese culture, but maybe also exporting some more pernicious things. To You know, its influence in Hollywood, which you detail and is, is pretty profound at this point financially, but also on the actual substance, you give the example many people have of the upcoming Top Gun movie, and the fact that there's not going to be apparently not going to be a patch for Taiwan, on his jacket. And that's all Chinese influence. And there's so many examples like that, in which film studios here have, as I think he rightly point out, sort of anticipated Chinese objections to things that don't look good for China, in films, partly for boxoffice reasons, and partly for financing reasons. That's just one aspect of Chinese soft power. But one of the things you demonstrate I think, in the book is they're not very good at it. And China has not succeeded at being liked. And Chinese culture as incredible as it is, has not really had the impact around the world that I think the Chinese government would like it to have. But in the service of politics. And so just expand on that a little bit for us. What Why do you think China's inept at this? Or why they failed?
Elizabeth Economy
I think, you know, if you think I mean, everybody can have his or her own definition of soft power, but you know, in, in my understanding, and you know, Drawn as an original concept, it, it really, it springs organically, right, from the ideas and the culture and the creativity of a people. And it's those things that make it attractive to people outside the country, right, that's what the soft power, Soft power is. So it can be everything from your brands, your you know, Coca Cola, and McDonald's or whatever, you know, else might be to, to the music and to the sports, and, you know, all of those elements can be parts of, of soft power. And for China, it especially under Xi Jinping, that organic element is missing, because it is such a top down controlled society, right, and culture is controlled, and ideas are controlled. And so I think it's very difficult to find, you know, sort of the, the attraction, right? If, if it's all about control, and making sure people are just staying within the lines, you know, nobody's coloring outside the line, you know, limits on creativity, then you're going to be limited in your, in your soft power as well. So I think that's part of it. I think also with Xi Jinping, I'm not sure he understands soft power, you know, a couple of times, most recently, the last summer, he's talked about how Chinese diplomats need to go out and create an image of China that is, you know, respectable and credible and loved. Just even to say that you're going to create, you know, an image of your country that is this misses the point that the rest of the world can very well see what China is doing. It can see what some of what's taking place in China, and it can certainly see what China is doing in other countries. So it's not really that you can't control the narrative, you know, in other countries. But that is what China tries to do, as we've seen, you know, in the case of the NBA with Daryl Morey, as we've seen in the case of Australia, when Australia called for the investigation into COVID. And, you know, China launched a boycott against number of Australia's most important exports. China does try to control the narrative of other countries, right on a range of issues, anything that it believes is, you know, related to sovereignty or social stability. You know, I think one interesting one interesting example is is traditional Chinese medicine. And this is something that Xi Jinping himself is feel very strongly about. He believes and has said he believes that this could be an important source of Chinese soft power globally. Right. So, but but, you know, just last year, Beijing city considered and I don't know whether it happened or not, they considered passing a law that would criminalize criticism of traditional Chinese medicine. So imagine now you've taken what you think could be part of your soft power. And you're going to make it so that not only inside China, but right outside China, you're going to end up punishing people if they criticize it. So I think, you know, they often they shoot themselves in the foot a lot. Because basically, they're taking their own political model also. Right. And, and trying to impose it in some respects, that that kind of repression of freedom of speech and other countries, I think it's very hard to sell your soft power when, when that's how you are, you know, sort of transmitting your political norms to other countries.
Kal Raustiala
Yeah, I think that's accurate. I mean, it's, it's fair to note that the US was a pretty active seller of soft power during the Cold War, we would sponsor CIA funded a bunch of things behind the scenes. And more overtly, the State Department would send out, you know, jazz tours, and Louis Armstrong and things like that, which were definitely aimed at exactly this, but American culture was appealing to people. And so even though we were pushing it, we have something that people want it to, to absorb.
Elizabeth Economy
Yeah, look, I mean, if the Chinese government, you know, sells sends the Shanghai symphony, that that can work, you know, it's not that it can't, the government can't support soft power, but what we're talking about is the the origins of that culture, right, have to be attractive to begin with jazz is attractive to many people, and, and then putting sending it outside means that just more people can be exposed to it. Right? It's, it's not as though it's, you know, government mandated music, right? It's so you know, Chinese music from, you know, the Revolutionary period is going to have a very limited appeal to other countries. Right?
Kal Raustiala
That's fair to say. Yeah. And it's interesting, because obviously, Korea right now is enjoying incredible cultural hegemony in the West in a way that, you know, China would love to have. And as big of a country as Korea is, you know, it's tiny compared to China. And, obviously, there's a lot of commonalities, but China can't, can't get a break in this in this realm. So I want to get to questions from the audience. Let's just talk about COVID for a second. So, you know, obviously, there's a number of ways to think about the relationship between China and COVID, one of which is, you know, the epidemic, or pandemic starts Wuhan, China's huge detail, some of the ways in which the Chinese government, again shows these very strong authoritarian tendencies. People have alleged that the WHO really did not do its job in the right way, in part because of Chinese pressures. At the end of the day, you know, at the same time, there's been a lot of pushback, even here about even saying some of the things I'm saying right now, sort of identifying China too closely with it is maybe something that we don't want to be doing. And so there's no escaping this connection. But what do you think politically is going to grow out of it? So in other words, in a year, or two, or five, and this pandemic is really behind us? Do you think this will ultimately be something that's really damaging? or neutral or positive for China?
Elizabeth Economy
I think, you know, there are different narratives that come out of COVID. Right, then and so I think each one has the potential to, to be, you know, had to have sort of a long a long life. We don't know which ones will and which ones won't. But, you know, one narrative, of course, is that, you know, China very quickly and effectively addressed the pandemic, right, through brutal means, but nonetheless, right has, you know, incidence of death is very low in China, and also very low in Taiwan. Right, also very low in Taiwan. Yes. So there's, I mean, there's a counterpoint to this, but I'm just saying here is a narrative. There's one narrative string, you know, the other narrative string, of course, is that because of China's, you know, the fact that it, it wasn't transparent at the outset. And and did probably, either it directly pressured the WHO, or implicitly the WHO felt as though if it did take aggressive action that somehow, you know, China wouldn't give it the access that it needed to understand what was going on, in either case, that that feeling of coercion existed. And that's a second narrative, right, that because of that, that the rest of the world suffered. And so I think that's a second narrative. And then there's a little bit of a third narrative, I think, and that's around the vaccines themselves. And I think, you know, the fact is that, you know, the Western vaccines have proved far more efficacious than the Chinese vaccines. And I I think it's worth noting because it speaks to, I think, a bigger issue in in sort of how China's portrayed in the media and frankly, how the US China relationship is often portrayed and, and that is that you know, China has already arrived completely and is surpassing the United States, you know, in all these areas of technology, and a lot of people would say, in life sciences and biotech, this is an area of great strength for China. And, and yet, right, and yet, their vaccines are not particularly good. And so I think it's just, it's a reminder to us a little bit that we can buy into a lot of the hype about, you know, where China is. But we should remember that, you know, not everything that it does, you know, turns out the way that that it says it's going to be right, and I just think it's important to, to acknowledge that, despite the fact that you can open a lot of books, or reports, and read how, you know, Chinese, you know, s&t and their investments and everything else, or they're eating our lunch, you know, maybe not completely. So, that I think is a third narrative that, you know, doesn't get as much play as as the first two probably.
Kal Raustiala
Good, good. Okay. So I want to go to we have a lot of questions. audience questions, very good questions. Let me start off with one about, we didn't talk a lot about technology, which is a really big area of competition between the US and China. And in fact, if you think about Chinese soft power for a second, maybe TikTok is the single best example. I have teenagers, they seem to do nothing but spend time on TikTok. So that's one example where China has been pretty successful. So the question is, do you think federal legislation to break up the largest tech companies sacrifices American innovation advantages over China? Now that presumes we have innovation advantages? I think we do. But would that be a bad thing? In other words, in this in this kind of grand technology, competition, we're in.
Elizabeth Economy
you know, I, this is probably a little bit since I'm a China expert, this this question is probably a little outside my, you know, true area of expertise. I mean, I will offer up that, you know, I don't tend to be a fan of, you know, breaking companies up that seemed to be doing extraordinarily well, for the sake of breaking them up. I think we do want to make sure that we are continuing to support, you know, innovation at the grassroots level, and, you know, a lot of startups and so I think we want to make sure that we're doing a good job at that end. But I would say that, you know, I, I'm probably not the right person to ask about whether or not you know, Google and others should be broken up.
Kal Raustiala
Okay, fair enough. Okay, next question is, well, maybe a little bit more straight in your wheelhouse? Do you think the US should learn anything from the Chinese way of development?
Elizabeth Economy
I think, you know, one thing that China, that China does well, is that it does have a long term vision. And it does, you know, five year plans, they often don't come to fruition, there are problems, they have this campaign style. So you end up with a lot of inefficiency instead, and etc. But I think the fact that, you know, every four years, we have a presidential election, and it's entirely possible that, you know, important rules or even laws that were passed, you know, it during one four year period can be completely up ended in the next 40 year period, I think can be can be problematic. And, and I think China doesn't, you know, have that same problem. And I think that, that does work to their advantage. So, I think, a longer sense or a more coherent sense of what is truly in the US national interest, you know, in particular, when it comes to something like science and technology or national security, so that we can make sure that we are investing continually, you know, in a way that will enable us right to remain, you know, a leading innovation power, for example, over the long run, I think that could be helpful. Yeah, so if there's one thing that I wish we would do better that I think, you know, we could learn from the China model, it would probably be that sort of ability to cast out 5, 10, even, you know, to 2050 and say, you know, this is what we want the world to look like, right? This is the world that we are striving toward, I think that really helps you to organize your resources in important ways. So I think that's probably my that's the one takeaway, I would have.
Kal Raustiala
Strategic patience and things like that. Yeah, I think Kissinger is the one who often says something about go versus chess. And this is the reason that allegedly named but that's a comment, comment thing that said, Okay, next question. Is China trying to destabilize the domestic affairs of the United States?
Elizabeth Economy
I think we saw during January six, that there seemed to be a little bit of Chinese meddling we've seen certainly during the Black Lives Matter at the height of Black Lives Matter the Chinese engaged there. And you know, to try to exacerbate Yeah, Martin, what we've been seeing is also when Well, yes, horrible, horrible, horrible things coming out of the Foreign Ministry actually really appalling. But not frankly, exclusive to the US. I mean, China has has done this to many other countries as well. But nonetheless, so I think we've seen the meddle in ways that we really hadn't before. And trying to amplify sort of the polarization in our country. I don't know how much effort goes into, you know, on a daily basis, trying to create problems. I haven't seen much evidence of that. But I think clearly, they found, you know, a happy space in trying to enhance the challenges that the US, you know, sort of polity faces. So to that extent, I would say, there's an element of, if not destabilizing, at least, you know, causing, causing, you know, greater challenges for the US and also making the United States, you know, look fractured and and weak on the global stage, because that is also a big part of the Chinese narrative. Now, globally,
Kal Raustiala
we're not helping matters, you know, sort of giving them opportunities to do that. But it does seem, you know, comparing Russia, for example, Russia is a country that has very little that anybody wants in the world, destabilizing is actually not such a bad strategy for a country that sort of a waning power with not much that people want to buy from them? Not much, certainly not my soft power. China, on the other hand, has actually a lot and so Destabilize world doesn't strike me a destabilized US certainly doesn't strike me as really in their in their interest in the same way.
Elizabeth Economy
No, I don't I don't I think you're right. But I also think that Xi Jinping has a higher tolerance for disequilibrium than than previous Chinese leaders do. And I, you know, I'm not thinking in terms of the United States, necessarily, but I do think in terms of Taiwan in this regard. And so, you know, a lot of people assume, well, you know, he wants a stable international environment, because he needs to focus on domestic things. But, you know, look, again, during COVID, you know, he was right in the midst of this border conflict with India, he was very militarily assertive. And so I don't think we can trust that. And what we have traditionally relied on, which is that, you know, China wants a stable external environment so that it can continue to grow its economy and, you know,
Kal Raustiala
Agree. Yeah, only, you know, I think in comparison to prior Chinese leaders who are much more, you know, keep your head down, you know, don't attract attention, these kind of aphorisms are very common. He doesn't seem to know, he's not this-
Elizabeth Economy
He's the opposite! No, you know, and, and, and I love this, you know, his speech at the 19th Party Congress, which is, you know, kind of a really, I think, a 10 year defining speech in many respects, but, you know, he talks about how, you know, China, you know, first stood up right against the, the, basically, the Guomindang, this was the period of mounts of dung, and the Chinese Communist Party stood up against a woman dying and created the, you know, contemporary Chinese, you know, People's Republic of China, then, you know, China grew rich, that's the period of Deng Xiaoping, and now Xi Jinping is period is China's become strong and is moving towards center stage. Right. And so I think that that is how he sees his tenure, right? In the context of the past, you know, 70 years or so.
Kal Raustiala
back to center stage, right, where it always had been and should have been. Okay, next question. What are China's ambitions toward Korea, Vietnam, and Japan?
Elizabeth Economy
So, I mean, they're all different. They're all three different countries. I but I think broadly speaking, you know, China, and Xi Jinping would like to be the dominant power in the region, and would like the United States, you know, back across the Atlantic, back across the Pacific to be in Atlantic power. So he talks a lot about, you know, Asia is for Asians to govern. He talks about sort of shared values, shared history, all of these things. But when he talks about that, he doesn't mean that Japan is should lead but just Japan should be the leader, it means that China should be the leader. And so I, you know, he had China has very different relations with all three countries in many respects. And so it's difficult to say what does he want for each one of them? I would broadly I would say, He wants all three of those countries, each of which, you know, is is successful and strong in its own right. I mean, relatively speaking, you know, different ways. I mean, Japan is you No, very significant economy and his larger source of investment in, you know, Southeast Asia than China is and very close ally of the United States. Korea, as you point out has incredible soft power, also, military ally of the United States, Vietnam has become a closer military power. I mean, he would like to break down all of those bonds, certainly with the United States. And he's called for the dissolution of the US led alliance system. And so I think, you know, that's part of it, I think he really just wants to bring them all into China's orbit. And he doesn't want any of them to cause problems for China. And he certainly doesn't want Japan and Vietnam and South Korea to enhance their defense forces.
Kal Raustiala
Will China's demographic problem from a rapidly aging population weaken its economy? And the question goes on to talk about Taiwan and so forth, but you can take that in any number of directions. Many people have pointed out that China, you know, sort of done this reverse course, you know, one child policy now encouraging children, but it's facing some real demographic challenges. So what do you think the equations are?
Elizabeth Economy
Yeah, I mean, I think the Chinese leadership is obviously extremely concerned about this, because they've moved just in the past now, six years, from the one child policy to the two child policy to the three child policy, with no success, right, they had one year where they had a bump in the birth rate, and then it has declined steadily. So it is at the lowest rate since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Not only that, but marriages are on the decline and divorces, you know, are on the rise in China. So, you know, overall, the picture is not a pretty one. And there's a lot of sort of gender. They're jealous, significant sort of gender issues in China, that go beyond this. There's a really, I mean, it's fascinating, frankly, that just since Xi Jinping came to power, you know, China was ranked 67th, in the World Economic Forum's Gen X women's access to health, the economy, the political system, and education, so 67th in the world, so 2021, right, just just this period of Xi Jinping leadership, you know, China has fallen to I think 112 in the world. So it's extraordinary. Right. And, and there's an enormous amount of online hate against women. Right. And so, and, you know, pressure on women to have children, right, there was even discussion in some localities in China, of imposing a tax right on on families that don't have children. I mean, so in any case, sorry, that was a description of the problem, you know, the implications, I think, are a couple. So, you know, if they're already feeling the, the, sort of the challenge of having, you know, the one child system, the one child system have been in place for so long, having that one child be responsible for, you know, two parents and four grandparents and, and, you know, they don't have a robust pension system. And most of the provinces, several of them, are actually bankrupt, and they're, you know, by 2030, or 2035, they said, you know, the entire system will basically, you know, be bankrupt. And so, they're just not gonna have enough people feeding into the little bit like the United States, and enough people feeding into the system to pay for itself. And, you know, China's also had demographic change, where a lot of young people have, of course, moved to the cities, you know, the parents have been left behind, they don't have that same sort of social infrastructure setup that they did, you know, 50 years ago, right, where you had the grandparents to take care of the children and the children to take care of, of the grandparents. It's a very different, you know, system at this point. So their implications for the pension system, implications for consumption? You know, if China goes from, you know, 1.3 billion down to 850,000 people, it's very different. You know, Xi Jinping is hold dual circulation theory where China can innovate, manufacture and consume all in one loop largely, you know, becomes a less, you know, not just a less attractive proposition, but less likely, less likely proposition. And then I think the the interesting one, too, is innovation, right? Because young people are innovation, lifeblood of every country. And they're also the first adopters of new technology. And so as the population ages, you can imagine that there will be pressures in that sector as well. And so I think there are a lot of, you know, I think there are a lot of forces that are causing concern for that for the Chinese leadership and not apparently a lot of creativity or ability to think about how to address those problems, at least not today.
Kal Raustiala
Okay, well, that's a wonderful endpoint. We're right at the hour. So Liz, thank you so much for for coming on. And again, Liz's book should be available soon. Soon in some places, I know it's sold out of its first run. That's how good it is.
Elizabeth Economy
You can find it Barnes and Noble, that's for sure.
Kal Raustiala
Well, thanks. Thanks again for coming on Liz and thank you for joining us. Take
Elizabeth Economy
Appreciate it.
Transcribed by https://otter.ai