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good afternoon everyone welcome I'm Kal Raustiala I direct the UCLA Burkle
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Center for international relations and
it's a great pleasure to welcome all of
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you here today to our annual Bernard Brodie lecture on the conditions of peace
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the Brodie lecture was first given almost
40 years ago I think next year is
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actually the 40th anniversary of this
lecture since then we've had the honor
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of welcoming as Brody lecture as many
many interesting and distinguished
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foreign policy luminaries I'll just name
a few for context Secretary of Defense
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bill Perry President Jimmy Carter Prime
Minister of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone a un
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secretary-general ban ki-moon ambassador
to Russia Mike McFaul and Los Angeles's
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own congressman Adam Schiff the Brody
lecture celebrates the memory of Bernard
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Brody as a famed teacher and scholar of
international relations and strategy and
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I've the great pleasure today of
welcoming to UCLA professor Joe Nye in a
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moment professor and I will get a proper
introduction
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but I'll just say a few words about how
we're going to conduct the lecture and
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then I'll invite Chancellor emeritus
Carnesale to introduce professor and I
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so professor now is gonna speak up here
for about 20 minutes or so then he and I
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are gonna take these two chairs if
you've been to this before you've seen
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this set up we'll talk for a little
while and then we'll open it up time
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permitting for questions from you
so they're a handheld microphones please
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raise your hands wait for me to call on
you and please keep your questions short
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and to the point so as as I mentioned
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Chancellor emeritus Carnesale will
introduce Joe Nye Chancellor Carnesale
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is a I would say a longtime friend of
the Buerkle Center but most importantly
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for today's purposes he's a long-term
friend of Joe Nye they work together
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at the Kennedy School where al was both
Dean and then Provost of Harvard they've
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done many many things together and so I
thought it was appropriate to have him
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do the welcome so please join me in
welcoming Chancellor Aparna South Thank
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You Kal it really is a pleasure to
introduce my friend longtime friend and
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colleague Joan I we were colleagues
well more than a couple of decades and
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friends for twice that long or a little
a little more I also want to welcome
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Molly Joe's wife hi Molly
Joe is a leading political scientist and
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that's understating it he's been named
the most influential scholar in
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international relations not a bad
background Princeton Rhodes Scholar
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Oxford Harvard ph.d Harvard faculty
immediately after the PhD now as you can
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see University Distinguished Service
professor emeritus at Harvard and the
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distinguished really does apply we think
of the university what it said about
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teaching research and service
Joe is distinguished in all three let me
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say a little bit about research and
scholarship the recent count is 14 books
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and well more than hundred 50 articles
remarkable depth and breadth so his
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areas of specialty areas in which I
would consider man most people consider
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them expert moral and political
philosophy political theory history
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international relations national
security politics
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real politics in the US and elsewhere
policy analysis and that combined with
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wisdom and judgment makes him a pretty
good scholar some examples of his work
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to give you an idea of the breadth not
by picking times I forgot to figure one
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book from each decade will give you one
idea pan-africanism an East African
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integration not what you would think of
first but it gives you an idea next
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decade transnational relations in world
politics next decade nuclear ethics so
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he's thought about these morality
questions before in the same decade I
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might mention he published a much more
important book called Hawks doves in
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owls an agenda for avoiding nuclear war
of which Graham Allison hi were
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co-authors
the joke and 90's is bound to lead the
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changing nature of American power in the
2000s the power game the subtitle is a
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Washington novel just to give you an
idea of the breadth it's a novel um
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2010 presidential leadership and the
creation of the American era and now
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this his most recent book just this year
do morals matter presidents and foreign
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policy from FDR to trump teaching a
devoted teacher and mentor undergraduate
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and graduate students his undergraduate
course and international relations was
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the most popular undergraduate course at
Harvard for a good while and to
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audiences beyond academia as well
service academic service many leadership
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roles Dean of the Kennedy School in
government important positions deputy to
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the Undersecretary of State for security
assistance science and technology that
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really meant in the Carter
Administration the guy that worried
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about nuclear proliferation and tried to
do something about it chair of the
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National Intelligence Council that's the
group that produces the National
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Intelligence Estimates the most
important big-picture Intelligence
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Estimates in the US and then assistant
secretary defense for international
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security affairs so he seeks it achieves
excellence in essentially everything he
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does research teaching and service
leadership intellectual and
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organisational awards too numerous to
mention as a colleague and friend as a
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fly fisherman and as a gardener nobody's
better as a matter of fact I must end
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this with one honest thing to let you
all know of the greatest failure in
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Joanie's life was trying to instill in
me the rudimentary skills required for
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fly-fishing now I'm willing to take
responsibility for his failure but it's
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a failure nonetheless so on that note
let me
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introduce and welcome the UCLA my friend
Joseph Nye thank you very much I'll for
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that excessively generous introduction I
should say that when I tried to take out
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fly-fishing and I was showing them how
to cast and it was a very windy day and
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my line kept getting caught on branches
at you know the wind would take it up
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and instead of landing on the water it
caught owl looks at me he says oh I get
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it
fish live in trees and more to the point
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is that generous introduction is often
countered by the fact that when our sons
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were younger and people would call the
house and say his doctor neither they
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would answer yes but he's not the useful
kind which is particularly relevant now
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with the problems of covent so forth but
it's a real honor for me to be here at
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UCLA and to deliver the Brody lecture
when I as a graduate student I read
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Bernhard Brody's books and we are trying
to make sense at that time what
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difference nuclear weapons were making
to the world we knew they were big we
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knew they made a huge difference but
thinking through what deterrence meant
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how you could have a safe system and so
forth Bernhard Brody was a real pioneer
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on that and his early work really has
stood this test of time
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many people who followed him who did
much more elaborate calculations really
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didn't go beyond some of the original
insights that that Brody had so it's an
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honor for me to be able to to give the
Brody lecture but and I'll come back to
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that in in a minute or two about when
you talk about nuclear weapons but I
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people ask me why which
at this stage write a book about morals
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and do morals matter and put a question
mark in the title and the answer is to a
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large extent because I don't think we do
a very good job of thinking about morals
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and foreign policy we we talk about it
but but don't do a very good job
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thinking about it and when I was
studying international politics or
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international relations the conventional
wisdom is Montano there was a danger at
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being moralistic you know Woodrow Wilson
was a negative effect in this view Hans
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Morgenthau George Kennan and others
argued that basically the danger for
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Americans was a moralistic tradition and
we were taught to just being realistic
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Ahsan the hard reality of things and not
to get not to get too concerned about
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morals and that was part of the way
people were trained and if you look at
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the literature Huw Google books on
morality and American foreign policy
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it's surprising there's very little work
that's done to actually think hard about
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it there's there ought there are lots of
criticisms there are a few books on it
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but it's as I mentioned the preface of
my new book it's not a career enhancing
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move for a young scholar but fortunately
I'm an old scholar so I can can't get
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away with it but the conventional wisdom
is that basically morality doesn't
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matter that interests bake the cake it's
all national interests that matters in
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fact I remember when I was in the State
Department talking to a French diplomat
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we were at some diplomatic event
relating to nuclear weapons and I said
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you know there's some really hard moral
issues here that we're wrestling with he
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said I don't worry about
morality at all he said the only thing I
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think is matters is the interests of
France and it I don't think it never
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occurred of what a profound moral
judgment he had just made but there is a
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great tendency of this so the
conventional wisdom has been interest
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baked the cake and then politicians come
around and they sprinkle a little moral
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icing on it to make it look pretty but
basically you know the icing is just for
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glorification it's really the interests
that bake the cake trouble with that is
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it seems to me it misses error
misrepresent what's actually happening
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in history so in this book what I've
tried to do is two things one I've tried
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to look at the 14 presidents since 1945
and look carefully at how they made
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certain decisions and ask the question
if you took the cynical view that morals
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don't matter
would you get history wrong and I think
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I've shown that indeed if you have that
cynical view you're gonna get history
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wrong you're not going to understand
what really happened and I'll give you
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example of that in a second the other
purpose of the book is okay if morals do
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matter how should we think about it and
in that part of the book I try to say
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here here's the criteria for a good
moral reasoning about foreign policy as
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opposed to cheap shots or easy ways out
of cop-outs if you want now on on the
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first issue or the first question did
morals matter in history were they
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actually an important ingredient of the
cake I suppose - icing sprinkled on it
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and this brings me back to Bernhard
Brody the best example of this I could I
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have in the book but there I think there
are many others but just the one I find
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most appropriate for a Brody lecture is
Harry Truman
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Harry Truman dropped atomic bombs on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki many people have
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condemned him for that and there was a
philosopher at Oxford who refused to go
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to the honorary degrees ceremony for
Harry Truman in 1948 and she said she
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would never attend the ceremony or
honors being given to a mass murderer
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and that when Truman dropped the atomic
bomb he was a mass murderer and so there
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is a tradition of saying you know Truman
is a villain because of this but it's
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also worth remembering that at that time
we didn't know much about atomic bombs
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we didn't know they're full of facts
they were very new and Truman came into
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this game kind of late all the major
decisions have been made by not only
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Franklin Roosevelt who kept who didn't
inform Truman on much of anything as
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vice president but also buying this vast
machinery of the Manhattan Project which
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was secret properly and making a set of
decisions that led to the preparation of
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the atomic weapon and it was a war in
which there'd been a breach of the
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traditional views that you didn't bomb
cities and kill civilians morality he
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had deteriorated badly in World War two
and so Truman gets into office and the
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question put to him is will we go ahead
with this and his answer is yes and he
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says in his memoirs I didn't lose much
sleep over it you know I think of the
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number of American lives that would be
lost if I didn't go ahead with these
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bombs he said no I you know this this
was not a hard decision and Truman it
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was described by general groves who was
the head of the Atomic Energy Commission
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or discern sorry yet that before the
atomic entry head of the Manhattan
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Project which later evolved and the
Truman who was described by groves as
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being like a boy who was put on the back
of a toboggan which is already heading
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downhill in principle he could have
fallen off or he could have stopped he
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could have tried to stop it legally he
had the authority to stop it but you
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know in reality there wasn't very much
that he could do and this is why he said
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he didn't lose any sleep over it but
let's take the story a few steps further
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the United States had three bombs and a
third bomb had been forward base to
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Tinian to be dropped a week later after
Nagasaki and Truman said no you may not
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drop a third bomb and he said I'm not
going to kill any more women and
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children which is a very interesting
quick moral response to what we learned
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about the evidence of atomic weapons on
civilians in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and
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even more important is to fast forward
five years to 1950 when the Americans
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were losing the Korean War China had
crossed the Yalu River was pushing
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American forces down to the tail or
bottom of the peninsula and it looked
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very much as though we were going to
lose Truman was advised that if we lost
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or stalemated the war it would destroy
his presidency his chances of running
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for election again re-election in 1952
would be destroyed and Truman said no
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I'm not going to do it General MacArthur
came to him who was then the commander
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the Far Eastern theater MacArthur said
if you allow me to drop 25 to 40 atomic
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bombs on Chinese cities Oh
win this war for you and Truman again
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said no I'm not gonna kill that many
women and children that was quite an
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extraordinary moral decision notice
something which Thomas Schelling the
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Nobel laureate who in his Nobel laureate
lecture said the nuclear taboo was one
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of the most important decisions that was
taken in the last 75 years and if Truman
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had decided that differently if he had
treated nuclear weapons as normal war
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fighting weapons as opposed to weapons
which were used for deterrence only the
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world that we live in today would look
very very different and in that sense if
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you treat morality justice icing
sprinkled on the cake you got history
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wrong
Truman's moral views that he was not
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going to save his political skin or
interpret the American national interest
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as involving this destruction of women
and children that was a profound
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importance in terms of the way history
evolved it wasn't just icing it won as
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the was one of the key ingredients in
the cake and I think it's appropriate to
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recall that in a Bernhard Brody lecture
because this was what Brody wrestled
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with so I would submit that in the title
of my book do morals matter with a
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question mark perhaps it's not
surprising that I conclude the answer is
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yes morals do matter but the more
important question is okay the matter
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how you think about them and as you try
to deal with this you realize that very
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often we talk in about moral issues in
foreign policy but we do in a very
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shallow way for example there is the
tradition of American accept
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we Americans think ourselves as a moral
people therefore we do it it's good well
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you know that's quite a non sequitur or
we'll say if it turned out all right
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it's good that's also a non sequitur or
people will say if our intentions are
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good then it's good which is also a non
sequitur let me give you a concrete
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example of that and the invasion of Iraq
in 2003 if you look at George W Bush
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Bush 43 as he sometimes called people
ask you know where his intentions good
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some people doubt it they say Bush lied
and boys died I don't that's true the
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general consensus in intelligence
communities not just in the US but
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around the world was that Saddam Hussein
had weapons of mass destruction
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I think Bush believed that and I also
believe that if you could convert Iraq
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into a democracy you could maybe get at
the roots of terrorism so in that sense
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some of his defenders have said he was
moral innovating Iraq ari fleischer his
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press secretary said you have to admire
Bush's moral clarity he had a freedom
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agenda and whether it worked or not
doesn't matter
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he had this freedom agenda and it
therefore he was moral and what he did
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I find that extraordinarily shallow
moral thinking to just judge by
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attentions and I've argued that you
really need to think in three dimensions
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to have good moral appraisal or moral
reasoning you have to think of
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intentions and motives you have to think
of the beans and you have to think of
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the consequences so I call that 3d
and something like Fleischer's Comet
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that it was good intentions is just not
that's one third of the 3d if you want
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it's not adequate moral reasoning I
sometimes use is homely example which is
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in the book which is imagine that your
child is out at a high school dance but
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she has SATs tomorrow morning and
Frances I'll bring her home but get her
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home early
don't worry and picks her up the dance
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doesn't notice that it's rain the road
is slick and wet drives 80 miles an hour
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skids off the road hits a tree and your
child is killed would you say oh that's
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okay you had good intentions of course
not you would have said inappropriate
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means and failure to think through
unintended consequences which could be
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highly immoral and that I think is
pretty much what happened in Iraq even
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if you grant Bush the benefit of the
doubt on his intentions in terms of the
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means he did not have the means to
accomplish them there were many studies
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done in the State Department and in the
intelligence agencies that showed that
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you couldn't really we didn't have the
means to reconstruct Iraq properly we
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couldn't bring democracy to Iraq and
what Bush and the White House did was
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shut that all aside it didn't pay any
attention to it it went ahead anyway and
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then if you ask about the consequences
the consequences of Bush's actions were
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that you stimulated a civil war between
Sunni and Shia in Iraq and you laid the
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basis for a strengthening of al Qaeda in
Iraq which later became Isis the Islamic
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state was who had horrible Khan
sequences so you could argue that
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there's quite similarity between my
little road accident and this complex
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international relations but in analyzing
each of them we want to think in three
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dimensions we one don't want to settle
just for good intentions therefore
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that's a moral act so I think the the
key in terms of thinking about morality
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and foreign policy is to make sure that
we don't take the easy way out we don't
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do just one dimension but think of all
three and I'm not the first to think
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about this this actually has a long
tradition which goes back to just war
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theory remember st. Augustine in the
fourth century it was wrestling with the
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dilemma that as the Roman Empire decayed
and there was increasing disorder and
250
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increasing violence what should he do
about thou shalt not kill and his
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dilemma was if the good didn't kill in
self-defense then evil would prevail and
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the good would vanish from the earth so
he developed the view that killing in
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self-defense was morally acceptable but
if the self-defense wasn't there then
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there was no justification so that if
somebody was about to attack you you
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could use your force to kill them but if
they drop their sword or their gun or
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whatever and stop threatening your life
and put their hands up
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you no longer could kill them there was
no longer imminent self-defense and that
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developed over the centuries to be a
doctrine which is enshrined in
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international humanitarian law the
Geneva Conventions and in the US Code
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Uniform Code of Military Justice
so it's been secularized and adopted and
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in the basic premises of Just War theory
you have you have to have all three
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dimensions as I mentioned you have to
have just cause you have to have means
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which make distinctions between
combatants and non-combatants you have
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to have proportionality in the means you
can't just kill wanton way for it self
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defense and you also in terms of
consequences you have to have a
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reasonable prospect of success those
three dimensions which really come down
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to us over the centuries are pretty good
initial framework for how we should be
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thinking about morality in international
politics now life is always more complex
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than in any formula but I would argue
that it's a good framework to start with
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now it becomes more complex for example
when we talk about good intentions you
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have to realize that the stated
intention is that most political leaders
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are going to tell you are going to be
good that's how they get elected they're
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not going to say I'm about to go and do
evil the interesting question is do they
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have the emotional stability emotional
IQ to prevent their emotional needs from
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distorting their attentions so that
their motives are in line with the
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00:28:09,780 --> 00:28:18,540
intent stated intentions an example of
this would be in Vietnam both Jack
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00:28:18,540 --> 00:28:24,900
Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson their stated
intention was to save South Vietnamese
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from totalitarian communism imposed by
the north but their motives turned out
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to be slightly different because of
their different emotional needs McGeorge
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00:28:36,810 --> 00:28:42,530
Bundy who was a hawk on Vietnam and who
advised both
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00:28:42,530 --> 00:28:51,120
Kennedy and Johnson said later in life
after he'd retired he's asked what would
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Kennedy have done if he had not been
assassinated Bundy said Kennedy probably
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00:28:56,640 --> 00:29:02,790
would have been reelected and would have
got out and he said the reason is that
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Kennedy wanted to be seen as smart
Johnson of course did something very
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00:29:09,360 --> 00:29:13,230
different
he sent five hundred sixty-five thousand
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American combat troops into Vietnam
which ultimately led to 58,000 American
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deaths even though he knew that the war
was not going well and as he put it it
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00:29:27,360 --> 00:29:32,390
was interfering with what he really
loved which was the Great Society and
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00:29:32,390 --> 00:29:37,770
his one point he says that bitch of a
war is interfering with the woman I
290
00:29:37,770 --> 00:29:44,250
loved the Great Society and yet he went
ahead anyway and the reason according to
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00:29:44,250 --> 00:29:50,730
Bundy in tarns and others who study this
is Johnson emotionally having grown up
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00:29:50,730 --> 00:29:56,220
in Texas and being worried about being
seen as botch oh and his father's image
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00:29:56,220 --> 00:30:02,010
Johnson was most afraid of being seen as
a coward and he felt that if he was the
294
00:30:02,010 --> 00:30:08,250
man who lost Vietnam he would be seen as
a coward so even though the stated
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00:30:08,250 --> 00:30:13,680
intentions of Kennedy and Johnson were
the same they're different emotional
296
00:30:13,680 --> 00:30:19,440
needs twisted their motives into
something which was quite different in
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00:30:19,440 --> 00:30:25,290
terms of its consequences so we have a
we have to realize that there are many
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nuances as we think about votives means
and consequences on consequences there's
299
00:30:31,380 --> 00:30:41,420
also some very important differences
which you get into in terms of the the
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00:30:41,420 --> 00:30:50,520
context of the decision and how much you
can know with any complex social
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00:30:50,520 --> 00:30:56,930
phenomena and particularly foreign
policy which deals with the events
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00:30:56,930 --> 00:31:03,300
international nature there are many all
sorts of unintended consequences and so
303
00:31:03,300 --> 00:31:08,220
how should we judge somebody if there
are unintended consequences should we
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00:31:08,220 --> 00:31:14,040
say well nice try but you didn't get it
but that's okay you get a bye on this
305
00:31:14,040 --> 00:31:18,720
round
probably not I think what we would say
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00:31:18,720 --> 00:31:27,510
is how good was your contextual IQ how
good was your ability to think through
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00:31:27,510 --> 00:31:34,410
and make major efforts to assess on
possibility of unintended consequences
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00:31:34,410 --> 00:31:43,470
to assess risk so and that is where the
hardest kinds of calls are made for
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00:31:43,470 --> 00:31:52,350
example if you look at unintended
consequences I and go back to my example
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00:31:52,350 --> 00:32:01,550
of Bush 43 in Iraq the fault I think for
Bush was he didn't understand much about
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00:32:01,550 --> 00:32:07,490
International Affairs unlike his father
who I great very highly in my book
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00:32:07,490 --> 00:32:11,490
because he had extraordinary knowledge
of internationally or as the younger
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Bush didn't understand a lot about
international affairs and he didn't make
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00:32:16,860 --> 00:32:22,200
the effort that he needed to learn well
or see he didn't you should not have
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00:32:22,200 --> 00:32:27,420
discarded all those State Department
studies which was done partly out of
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00:32:27,420 --> 00:32:35,040
bureaucratic politics his intentions
let's assume they were moral the moral
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00:32:35,040 --> 00:32:41,340
intentions led him to inappropriate
means and a failure to think carefully
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00:32:41,340 --> 00:32:46,440
and clearly about the prospect of
unintended consequences which could be
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00:32:46,440 --> 00:32:54,030
highly immoral and when we look at that
we can say yes everybody is likely to
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00:32:54,030 --> 00:32:59,400
suffer unintended consequences at some
point but did they make a major good
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00:32:59,400 --> 00:33:06,600
faith effort to anticipate that and to
assess the risks of it and in law we
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00:33:06,600 --> 00:33:11,139
call that due diligence
others if you have done due diligence
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00:33:11,139 --> 00:33:17,409
you get a bye for having at least made
that every day and if you haven't done
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00:33:17,409 --> 00:33:24,549
due diligence then we call that in law
culpable negligence and I think the same
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00:33:24,549 --> 00:33:31,119
goes for the issues of moral judgments
about consequences which is did the
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00:33:31,119 --> 00:33:40,149
decision-maker do due diligence and if
not was it culpable negligence now there
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00:33:40,149 --> 00:33:46,090
are some cases that always turn out more
difficult than that Henry Kissinger once
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00:33:46,090 --> 00:33:53,039
said that the interesting thing is that
most issues of international morality
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00:33:53,039 --> 00:33:59,830
wind up in the sort of the range between
51 and 49 percent when you balance and
330
00:33:59,830 --> 00:34:05,350
wait the motives means and consequences
you have to make adjustments and you
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00:34:05,350 --> 00:34:11,319
often get a lot of things that come out
to narrow margins but at least if you
332
00:34:11,319 --> 00:34:17,349
have a framework you're not going to
have the sort of cheap and easy cop-out
333
00:34:17,349 --> 00:34:22,780
because we did it it's good or because
it turned out right it's okay or because
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00:34:22,780 --> 00:34:28,179
we had good stated intentions everything
is moral and what I've tried to do in
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00:34:28,179 --> 00:34:33,220
the book is demonstrate not only that
morals matter and if you deny that
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00:34:33,220 --> 00:34:38,740
you're gonna get history wrong but if
they matter we've got to do a better job
337
00:34:38,740 --> 00:34:44,889
of thinking of them in all three
dimensions and realizing that these easy
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00:34:44,889 --> 00:34:53,049
cop-outs are not sufficient one final
word I'll say before ending and having
339
00:34:53,049 --> 00:35:01,480
our conversation cow is when you assess
consequences you don't just take the
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00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:05,680
consequences of the particular action
you have to think of the consequences
341
00:35:05,680 --> 00:35:11,859
for the system as a whole and future
actions philosophers sometimes call is
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00:35:11,859 --> 00:35:18,460
the difference between act utilitarian
and rule utilitarian if I'm an act
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00:35:18,460 --> 00:35:22,670
utilitarian I look at
particular action and I say was this the
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00:35:22,670 --> 00:35:29,690
greatest good for the greatest number in
this act and you know that's one way to
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00:35:29,690 --> 00:35:37,070
do it but suppose if I do a decision
this way in this particular act I break
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00:35:37,070 --> 00:35:43,220
a set of rules or institutions that will
affect all future actions don't I have
347
00:35:43,220 --> 00:35:49,960
to calculate the consequences of that as
I make my decision that's a rule
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00:35:49,960 --> 00:35:54,830
utilitarian as opposed to an act
utilitarian a lot of what we're seeing
349
00:35:54,830 --> 00:36:00,530
today is to discount the effect of
breaking rules and destroying
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00:36:00,530 --> 00:36:06,520
institutions a lot of what we're seeing
is essentially very short run Act
351
00:36:06,520 --> 00:36:14,030
utilitarian transactional approaches and
I think that's a mistake I think there
352
00:36:14,030 --> 00:36:18,590
is a conventional wisdom that
international politics because there's
353
00:36:18,590 --> 00:36:25,370
no higher law or higher government to
enforce the law is like the game of
354
00:36:25,370 --> 00:36:29,600
prisoner's dilemma which there's a great
incentive for prisoners who are caught
355
00:36:29,600 --> 00:36:34,220
by the police to squeal on each other
essentially to cheat on each other to
356
00:36:34,220 --> 00:36:40,700
defect and that's often the model is in
Chapter one of the textbooks but there's
357
00:36:40,700 --> 00:36:47,530
a political scientist at University of
Michigan Robert Axelrod who did a
358
00:36:47,530 --> 00:36:53,450
computer tournament and he said to a
group all right we're gonna play this
359
00:36:53,450 --> 00:37:01,010
game not once but many many times
together and whereas if you play this
360
00:37:01,010 --> 00:37:06,590
game once there's a strong incentive to
cheat but if you play it again and again
361
00:37:06,590 --> 00:37:13,880
and again you find that the optimal
strategy is to have reciprocity what he
362
00:37:13,880 --> 00:37:19,640
called tit-for-tat you cheat on round
one I'll cheat on you round two you can
363
00:37:19,640 --> 00:37:26,590
cooperate I'll cooperate and so forth
and what Axelrod found was that this
364
00:37:26,590 --> 00:37:33,170
expectation that the game was going to
go on created what he called a long
365
00:37:33,170 --> 00:37:38,510
shadow
of the future and institutions and rules
366
00:37:38,510 --> 00:37:46,520
and norms create a long shadow of the
future and that's what bothers me about
367
00:37:46,520 --> 00:37:51,109
some of the ways in which we're
approaching foreign policy today we're
368
00:37:51,109 --> 00:37:57,050
discounting institutions and discounting
that long shadow of the future and the
369
00:37:57,050 --> 00:38:03,950
net result of that is I think we're
selling our own future short the I think
370
00:38:03,950 --> 00:38:09,020
the better better for for how to think
about morality and foreign policy is
371
00:38:09,020 --> 00:38:13,430
that used by George Shultz who was
Reagan's Secretary of State
372
00:38:13,430 --> 00:38:19,700
we should had better to think of foreign
policy is like gardening you cultivate
373
00:38:19,700 --> 00:38:27,170
you trim you we you you proceed but
you're playing this for a long range and
374
00:38:27,170 --> 00:38:31,160
that's very different from a
transactional approach which says each
375
00:38:31,160 --> 00:38:38,089
of these operations like a real estate
deal I win you lose this zero-sum and
376
00:38:38,089 --> 00:38:43,390
then we go on to the next deal in the
next deal the next deal I think that
377
00:38:43,390 --> 00:38:50,020
this whole question of thinking of
morals has to think not just of act
378
00:38:50,020 --> 00:38:57,829
utilitarian each transaction but a rule
utilitarian which includes the long
379
00:38:57,829 --> 00:39:04,430
shadow of future and these international
institutions do create that long shadow
380
00:39:04,430 --> 00:39:10,339
of the future and that essentially
allows for greater range for morality in
381
00:39:10,339 --> 00:39:16,670
foreign policy so I would submit that
yes morals matter in foreign policy if
382
00:39:16,670 --> 00:39:20,930
you don't believe that you're going to
get history wrong and that if you accept
383
00:39:20,930 --> 00:39:26,599
it you have to accept it in terms of
thinking of all three dimensions of
384
00:39:26,599 --> 00:39:33,730
morality motives means and consequences
and include in the consequences
385
00:39:33,730 --> 00:39:41,089
institutions and oral frameworks as well
as the particular actions so let me end
386
00:39:41,089 --> 00:39:44,810
there and turn to our conversation all
right well thank you so much for for
387
00:39:44,810 --> 00:39:50,000
coming out and for that lecture
so I thought what we could start with a
388
00:39:50,000 --> 00:39:54,530
couple of questions were based on your
your book and your your remarks tonight
389
00:39:54,530 --> 00:39:59,360
and then maybe open it up a little bit
MMN to the audience so so maybe first
390
00:39:59,360 --> 00:40:05,480
thing on the case for morals mattering I
had understood Morgenthau and others as
391
00:40:05,480 --> 00:40:10,040
making a normative critique that
Americans traditionally focused too much
392
00:40:10,040 --> 00:40:15,890
on morals or at least at that time did
in our foreign policy and that that led
393
00:40:15,890 --> 00:40:20,810
to mistakes and I think you made a
pretty convincing case that it also
394
00:40:20,810 --> 00:40:24,080
leads to a miss read of history but it
doesn't necessarily answer the question
395
00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:27,320
of whether we ought to be focusing on
morals so can you speak to that a little
396
00:40:27,320 --> 00:40:33,830
bit is that something that we should be
doing why I think the the conventional
397
00:40:33,830 --> 00:40:41,870
wisdom in the period after World War two
that Morgenthau ave georgetown and made
398
00:40:41,870 --> 00:40:46,430
the same points was that we had gone
through a very moralistic period under
399
00:40:46,430 --> 00:40:51,230
Woodrow Wilson Wilson wanted to create a
League of Nations didn't have the
400
00:40:51,230 --> 00:40:55,940
capacity or the means to do it
and in the process of trying had
401
00:40:55,940 --> 00:41:01,490
terrible consequences because it failed
and they led to an isolationist reaction
402
00:41:01,490 --> 00:41:04,130
against it
so I think with what Morgenthau and
403
00:41:04,130 --> 00:41:10,820
Kenan and their generation of post-war
intellectuals were trying to do was
404
00:41:10,820 --> 00:41:16,250
protect us against the mistakes of World
War one and it's aftermath and
405
00:41:16,250 --> 00:41:20,960
particularly the isolationism of the 30s
and I think I grew that I think they're
406
00:41:20,960 --> 00:41:26,210
right I mean they if you are too
moralistic and don't have the means to
407
00:41:26,210 --> 00:41:30,650
carry it out you can have terrible
consequences which is my little example
408
00:41:30,650 --> 00:41:38,930
the road accidental Iraq but it is
interesting to me that and essentially
409
00:41:38,930 --> 00:41:46,190
they overdid it George Kennan who wrote
a classic work called American diplomacy
410
00:41:46,190 --> 00:41:53,450
in 1950 which was highly critical
Woodrow Wilson by the late 1980s Kenan
411
00:41:53,450 --> 00:42:00,710
said you know I've revised my opinion of
Wilson maybe he wasn't quite so bad
412
00:42:00,710 --> 00:42:08,630
for all so I I think I agree with their
premise but I think they overdid it so
413
00:42:08,630 --> 00:42:11,510
let me ask you about those specifics of
the president so you talk about 14
414
00:42:11,510 --> 00:42:17,119
presidents in the book maybe give us a
sense of one or two surprises that you
415
00:42:17,119 --> 00:42:23,599
found things you didn't expect you sort
of alluded to one which is the Bush 41
416
00:42:23,599 --> 00:42:27,080
that you've you've evaluate him quite
highly in the book and you didn't
417
00:42:27,080 --> 00:42:31,070
necessarily expect that but are there
others that you want to point out well
418
00:42:31,070 --> 00:42:39,050
it's interesting that Bush 41 I had
spent a good part of 1988 trying to
419
00:42:39,050 --> 00:42:45,710
prevent it being president obviously not
very effectively and I had to in as a
420
00:42:45,710 --> 00:42:55,359
story in there analysts say you know I
was wrong and so I think Bush 41 was
421
00:42:55,359 --> 00:43:01,550
extraordinary in the sense that he had a
great emotional intelligence remember
422
00:43:01,550 --> 00:43:06,980
when people said to him celebrate these
fall of the wall he said I'm not going
423
00:43:06,980 --> 00:43:12,380
to dance on the wall I've got to deal
with Gorbachev so he resisted the the
424
00:43:12,380 --> 00:43:19,400
braggadocio temptation and he also had
great contextual intelligence the
425
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:25,640
questions of how do you end a cold war
with Germany inside NATO and not a shot
426
00:43:25,640 --> 00:43:32,720
being far fired required extraordinary
understanding of the nuances of
427
00:43:32,720 --> 00:43:38,690
international politics so that's that's
why I revised my opinion on but there
428
00:43:38,690 --> 00:43:45,440
there are others that I also revised my
opinion on I was much more critical
429
00:43:45,440 --> 00:43:51,520
Truman frankly before I started doing
the more detailed research on his
430
00:43:51,520 --> 00:43:58,490
positions on nuclear weapons and the
more I read more I uncovered the more I
431
00:43:58,490 --> 00:44:03,980
said gee this guy it was a lot better I
used to think that Hiroshima Nagasaki
432
00:44:03,980 --> 00:44:11,660
was a tough call on utilitarian grounds
and you know that was it it was actually
433
00:44:11,660 --> 00:44:15,450
a much more
interesting and nuanced evolution that
434
00:44:15,450 --> 00:44:20,619
Truman had and it's also interesting
there it the role of emotional
435
00:44:20,619 --> 00:44:25,299
intelligence Harry Truman never went to
university he was a very simple man who
436
00:44:25,299 --> 00:44:33,069
spent a lot of his life as a farmer
before World War one and I but he knew
437
00:44:33,069 --> 00:44:39,099
who he was he had he had emotional
intelligence he wasn't going to be you
438
00:44:39,099 --> 00:44:48,099
know stampeded and in that sense
Truman turned out to be another who rose
439
00:44:48,099 --> 00:44:54,549
up even higher in my estimation than
they expected a third would be Jimmy
440
00:44:54,549 --> 00:45:01,569
Carter I had worked for Jimmy Carter I'm
high then criticized and still
441
00:45:01,569 --> 00:45:08,529
criticized his tendency to get absorbed
in details as people said you know they
442
00:45:08,529 --> 00:45:13,059
said Jimmy Carter couldn't tell the
forest from the trees but some people
443
00:45:13,059 --> 00:45:19,119
said no he couldn't tell the trees from
the leaves but but I think that kind of
444
00:45:19,119 --> 00:45:23,319
character of Carter turns out to be
wrong he took some really tough
445
00:45:23,319 --> 00:45:29,440
principled decisions which were costly
to him politically but because he had a
446
00:45:29,440 --> 00:45:35,680
larger vision that one was decision to
give back the Panama Canal right away
447
00:45:35,680 --> 00:45:40,720
when his staff told him there's no waste
a lot of political Apple don't do it if
448
00:45:40,720 --> 00:45:45,160
he hadn't you could have imagined
guerrilla movements in many Latin
449
00:45:45,160 --> 00:45:54,700
American countries which would have been
you know a nasty legacy or a nasty
450
00:45:54,700 --> 00:46:00,750
spread if you want and also his general
raising of the profile of human rights
451
00:46:00,750 --> 00:46:06,779
in American foreign policy I think
deserves more credit I think the time
452
00:46:06,779 --> 00:46:12,040
Carter is going to look better than we
assessed in
453
00:46:12,040 --> 00:46:17,770
at the time so yeah but this is always
true with history anytime you look at
454
00:46:17,770 --> 00:46:22,900
something and you you you look at in
history you have new information and new
455
00:46:22,900 --> 00:46:28,720
perspectives from the from the current
time and that leads you or it should
456
00:46:28,720 --> 00:46:34,590
lead you to make some reassures so those
are all examples of upgrade upgrade
457
00:46:34,590 --> 00:46:43,300
downgrades well downgrades are I mean
that's less yeah exciting i well richard
458
00:46:43,300 --> 00:46:50,290
nixon is generally celebrated as a on
foreign policy only now I'm not talking
459
00:46:50,290 --> 00:46:53,830
about Watergate and so forth who
generally celebrated as a foreign policy
460
00:46:53,830 --> 00:47:00,100
genius and that you know he his opening
to China was great it redeemed all his
461
00:47:00,100 --> 00:47:07,120
other problems when you look more
carefully at Nixon's foreign policy he
462
00:47:07,120 --> 00:47:14,920
did a lousy job on foreign economic
policy he basically didn't care about it
463
00:47:14,920 --> 00:47:24,120
and what it led to was an unleashing of
a rampant inflation which led to major
464
00:47:24,120 --> 00:47:29,980
problems in the international system as
well as the American economy in addition
465
00:47:29,980 --> 00:47:38,440
to that there's a whole question of how
he left Vietnam in when Nixon came into
466
00:47:38,440 --> 00:47:47,560
office in 69 he and Kissinger did an
assessment of what were the prospects
467
00:47:47,560 --> 00:47:54,640
for winning the Vietnam War and decided
it was unwinnable and the question is
468
00:47:54,640 --> 00:47:59,470
what do you do there were people like
Senator Aiken of Vermont who were saying
469
00:47:59,470 --> 00:48:06,630
declare victory and get out and centered
Russell of Georgia that a similar view
470
00:48:06,630 --> 00:48:12,970
Nixon and Kissinger said no we have to
have a decent interval between when we
471
00:48:12,970 --> 00:48:22,060
leave and when the North takes over and
that term decent interval led us to
472
00:48:22,060 --> 00:48:29,410
continue fighting and it cost twenty two
thousand American lives and in the end
473
00:48:29,410 --> 00:48:36,640
the time between when we signed a peace
accord with the North Vietnamese and
474
00:48:36,640 --> 00:48:43,060
when the north of these took over Saigon
turned out to be two two years and that
475
00:48:43,060 --> 00:48:50,110
is about 10,000 American lives a year is
that the right trade-off I mean he did
476
00:48:50,110 --> 00:48:55,660
it for credibility in our overall
foreign policy it's not clear that that
477
00:48:55,660 --> 00:49:01,720
was necessary I mean there may have been
alternatives so I the idea that Nixon
478
00:49:01,720 --> 00:49:07,060
was a foreign policy genius I give him
full credit for the opening to China but
479
00:49:07,060 --> 00:49:11,890
as the more I looked at this a more I
said that the foreign economic policy
480
00:49:11,890 --> 00:49:21,130
was a mess and that the policy on
Vietnam was marginal the framework that
481
00:49:21,130 --> 00:49:25,540
you laid out in your remarks would you
apply that generally to questions of
482
00:49:25,540 --> 00:49:28,510
morality I guess another way to put the
question is what's distinctive about
483
00:49:28,510 --> 00:49:32,470
foreign policy when we're thinking in
Walter well I think you can I mean this
484
00:49:32,470 --> 00:49:37,870
is why I use this simplistic example of
the road accident you you can apply to
485
00:49:37,870 --> 00:49:42,880
anything and morality I think what's
different in foreign policy is the
486
00:49:42,880 --> 00:49:50,110
complexity of the situation if you if
you think about foreign policy the it
487
00:49:50,110 --> 00:49:53,410
with so many different countries
different cultures different power
488
00:49:53,410 --> 00:49:59,590
structures changing context the prospect
of unintended consequences going to be
489
00:49:59,590 --> 00:50:07,360
much higher and it's harder than to
think through the risks so the due
490
00:50:07,360 --> 00:50:16,650
diligence is a tougher job and I think
in that sense a foreign policy is the
491
00:50:16,650 --> 00:50:20,830
framework can be applied to anything but
I think it's tougher in foreign policy
492
00:50:20,830 --> 00:50:26,410
because of the difficulty of doing the
due diligence about unintended
493
00:50:26,410 --> 00:50:31,600
consequences does that suggest greater
caution because we have adversaries in
494
00:50:31,600 --> 00:50:35,670
the foreign policy and texts and those
adversaries are going to react maybe
495
00:50:35,670 --> 00:50:40,680
well it does
does suggest that caution and prudence
496
00:50:40,680 --> 00:50:47,670
are more than instrumental virtue in
foreign policy it means that the
497
00:50:47,670 --> 00:50:53,550
prudence is you know it's there's
something like a Hippocratic oath and
498
00:50:53,550 --> 00:51:00,060
foreign policy first do no harm
doesn't mean do nothing but it does mean
499
00:51:00,060 --> 00:51:09,540
that err on the side of being awfully
cautious you know be careful before you
500
00:51:09,540 --> 00:51:16,980
unleash the dogs of war and so it does
lead to a greater emphasis on prudence
501
00:51:16,980 --> 00:51:22,080
and now you could argue that our time
when prudence is inappropriate
502
00:51:22,080 --> 00:51:31,140
you know Chamberlain and after Munich
should vote her not as prudent so if
503
00:51:31,140 --> 00:51:35,430
you're faced with a Hitler and you know
it's a Hitler and you can you can
504
00:51:35,430 --> 00:51:39,720
understand some of the likely
consequences of not standing up to
505
00:51:39,720 --> 00:51:44,730
Hitler then prudence is not a virtue but
on the other hand if you're dealing with
506
00:51:44,730 --> 00:51:53,640
a very complex situation such as Libya
in 2011 maybe you ought to be more
507
00:51:53,640 --> 00:51:58,770
prudent than we were I mean what we did
was use military force to prevent
508
00:51:58,770 --> 00:52:05,970
Qadhafi from destroying or killing
civilians in Benghazi but we hadn't
509
00:52:05,970 --> 00:52:09,660
thought through the fact whether the
Europeans were up to their part of it
510
00:52:09,660 --> 00:52:16,890
what did you do if after you've
protected the civilians in Benghazi what
511
00:52:16,890 --> 00:52:22,980
did you do about Qaddafi and if you
allow the mission to morph into regime
512
00:52:22,980 --> 00:52:29,910
change and you left chaos did you have a
plan for let's say a massive UN
513
00:52:29,910 --> 00:52:34,230
peacekeeping operation or something to
stabilize situation none of that
514
00:52:34,230 --> 00:52:41,040
occurred and the net effect of that was
in an unintended consequences was that
515
00:52:41,040 --> 00:52:47,040
when we tried to do something about
Syria the Russians and the Chinese would
516
00:52:47,040 --> 00:52:52,190
veto every UN resolution we
tried to pass to get some action on
517
00:52:52,190 --> 00:52:59,150
Syria and they said it's because look at
what you the mess you made in Libya so
518
00:52:59,150 --> 00:53:08,750
in addition to the mess that's in Libya
today there's the contribution to the
519
00:53:08,750 --> 00:53:17,990
mess in in Syria so I think in that
sense you know the prudence it's hard I
520
00:53:17,990 --> 00:53:27,470
mean Obama in in his various interviews
and retrospective has said that said I
521
00:53:27,470 --> 00:53:31,280
intervened in Libya
I didn't intervene in Syria and I'm
522
00:53:31,280 --> 00:53:36,410
criticized for both but there may be
more of a connection between the two it
523
00:53:36,410 --> 00:53:41,300
does seem like the the last 20 years
it's hard to assess the mood of a nation
524
00:53:41,300 --> 00:53:47,150
like ours but the last 20 years have led
to a time in which is increasing concern
525
00:53:47,150 --> 00:53:50,780
about the day after problem and a lot of
questioning of things that I think were
526
00:53:50,780 --> 00:53:57,530
viewed as at the time maybe reasonable
choices now seem imprudent because we
527
00:53:57,530 --> 00:54:03,620
couldn't deal with the aftermath of
racism but well it's a good example this
528
00:54:03,620 --> 00:54:13,580
is the current situation in Afghanistan
after the Taliban hosted al Qaeda and al
529
00:54:13,580 --> 00:54:21,730
Qaeda then planned and bounded attacks
on us from their bases in Afghanistan
530
00:54:22,030 --> 00:54:33,310
the question of should we have gone in
as we did had defeated al Qaeda and
531
00:54:33,310 --> 00:54:38,750
basically driven them out of or some
people would say not driven out loud
532
00:54:38,750 --> 00:54:46,070
that escape from Afghanistan but
essentially in early 2002
533
00:54:46,070 --> 00:54:51,500
should we have said you've done what you
needed to do is a basic minimum now
534
00:54:51,500 --> 00:54:58,160
withdraw or should we have stayed and
tried to construct an effective Afghan
535
00:54:58,160 --> 00:55:06,630
state and we have not done that
effectively and it's lasted there what
536
00:55:06,630 --> 00:55:10,620
is the saying that there young men
fighting in Afghanistan today who
537
00:55:10,620 --> 00:55:15,630
weren't even born when we started this
and there's an interesting article in
538
00:55:15,630 --> 00:55:20,940
the LA Times day by Andy bass of itch
saying that this was not a success so
539
00:55:20,940 --> 00:55:27,390
the question is are there some
situations in which you know you're
540
00:55:27,390 --> 00:55:34,470
better off making a statement going in
and getting out than trying to cure the
541
00:55:34,470 --> 00:55:39,080
whole situation because you're not
capable of hearing the whole situation
542
00:55:39,080 --> 00:55:44,850
it's ok let's pivot to a couple of
broader bright issues as al said you've
543
00:55:44,850 --> 00:55:48,030
covered so many different things and so
I just want to ask you a few I guess a
544
00:55:48,030 --> 00:55:52,770
few questions about fly-fishing so I
didn't notice your tie how's that that's
545
00:55:52,770 --> 00:55:59,310
right I wore that for Al so maybe we
could start with coronavirus so you've
546
00:55:59,310 --> 00:56:02,640
thought about the effect of
globalization and transnational
547
00:56:02,640 --> 00:56:08,460
relations for decades and now we're
facing potentially a major pandemic it's
548
00:56:08,460 --> 00:56:12,270
hard to say at this point but it's
expanding still what do you see is the
549
00:56:12,270 --> 00:56:16,260
kind of geopolitical implications of
that what is that well it's interesting
550
00:56:16,260 --> 00:56:20,870
because if you look at our national
security strategy which was issued in
551
00:56:20,870 --> 00:56:30,660
December of 2017 it said we were
reorienting our budgets in our strategy
552
00:56:30,660 --> 00:56:40,320
toward great power competition China and
Russia and some of that's okay but it
553
00:56:40,320 --> 00:56:48,210
doesn't deal with coronavirus doesn't
deal with climate change so we're we're
554
00:56:48,210 --> 00:56:53,510
spending what seven hundred billion
dollars plus on the defense budget and
555
00:56:53,510 --> 00:56:59,420
yet we're facing a threat today which is
not addressed by any of that seminar
556
00:56:59,420 --> 00:57:04,860
virtually any of that seven or $50 would
mean you'd wanted to be unlike what the
557
00:57:04,860 --> 00:57:12,510
administration did which was to cut
resources for the CDC and to abolish the
558
00:57:12,510 --> 00:57:16,380
part of the National Security Council
which which was
559
00:57:16,380 --> 00:57:22,140
oriented toward dealing with pandemics
you would say no we're you know we're
560
00:57:22,140 --> 00:57:27,779
looking at the wrong things we have to
deal with other dimensions as well so it
561
00:57:27,779 --> 00:57:32,880
doesn't mean you say I'm not gonna worry
about Chinese encroachments in the South
562
00:57:32,880 --> 00:57:37,079
China Sea but it means you don't spend
all your time and attention on that
563
00:57:37,079 --> 00:57:44,309
there are other things to think about as
well so I think the covin 19 may prove
564
00:57:44,309 --> 00:57:49,019
something of a wake up call on this you
would have thought the way it got called
565
00:57:49,019 --> 00:57:54,150
already occurred with Ebola
remember Obama's first reaction of Ebola
566
00:57:54,150 --> 00:57:59,479
is what's the last thing I want to get
involved in this is this is a no-win for
567
00:57:59,479 --> 00:58:04,739
me back here in the US and then he cited
you know I'm not going to be able to
568
00:58:04,739 --> 00:58:09,839
isolate us from this I'm not being able
to keep away from this and it's also a
569
00:58:09,839 --> 00:58:17,640
humanitarian issue and so we used our
the American military to build emergency
570
00:58:17,640 --> 00:58:24,329
hospitals in Liberia and other places
and we were able to stamp out a major
571
00:58:24,329 --> 00:58:33,660
part of that virus before it became a
pandemic and then in this administration
572
00:58:33,660 --> 00:58:40,819
we've cut back on that that to me is
there's a lesson there do you think if
573
00:58:40,819 --> 00:58:45,869
we'll hope this doesn't happen but if it
became something worse something that
574
00:58:45,869 --> 00:58:50,969
really was truly global would there be
implications for for example the
575
00:58:50,969 --> 00:58:53,219
importance of you mentioned
international institutions in your
576
00:58:53,219 --> 00:58:57,779
discussion so that we would look more
towards the World Health Organization
577
00:58:57,779 --> 00:59:01,890
other organs that would it strengthen
multilateralism because we would see the
578
00:59:01,890 --> 00:59:05,069
need or would it in fact have the
opposite effect where countries would
579
00:59:05,069 --> 00:59:09,420
want a wall themselves off more and in
fact disengage politically and
580
00:59:09,420 --> 00:59:15,660
economically well the initial reactions
that we've seen have been stop
581
00:59:15,660 --> 00:59:20,910
international travel no travel from
certain countries so forth that may be a
582
00:59:20,910 --> 00:59:27,810
temporary measure of that is useful it
doesn't deal with the basic problem
583
00:59:27,810 --> 00:59:36,120
and for example the virus apparently was
more widespread and realized earlier and
584
00:59:36,120 --> 00:59:43,050
many people had already traveled from
China or elsewhere well before we closed
585
00:59:43,050 --> 00:59:51,150
the border so you know closing the
border is not the sufficient answer if
586
00:59:51,150 --> 00:59:56,700
on the other hand we had strengthened
the World Health Organization and more
587
00:59:56,700 --> 01:00:03,660
cooperation with China on pandemics and
had a better early warning system of
588
01:00:03,660 --> 01:00:08,970
what was going on we might have had a
better capacity to limit it so I think
589
01:00:08,970 --> 01:00:18,990
the the dangers we think that that were
safe behind borders unfortunately we're
590
01:00:18,990 --> 01:00:24,570
not and if you go from Co food to
climate change of the idea that you're
591
01:00:24,570 --> 01:00:33,420
safe beyond borders is nonsense we in
China 40% of the the greenhouse gases
592
01:00:33,420 --> 01:00:40,710
that are produced in the world the idea
that we can solve this without China is
593
01:00:40,710 --> 01:00:46,320
a mistake the idea that China can solve
it without us mistake and these are
594
01:00:46,320 --> 01:00:51,290
challenges which don't respect borders
the only way you can deal with them is
595
01:00:51,290 --> 01:00:57,990
essentially by working with others so
what I argue in the last chapter of the
596
01:00:57,990 --> 01:01:01,950
book where I try to look ahead of what
are the moral challenges for the future
597
01:01:01,950 --> 01:01:08,010
is we've got to get away from focusing
just on power over others we've got to
598
01:01:08,010 --> 01:01:13,470
think also of power with others certain
things you can do with power over others
599
01:01:13,470 --> 01:01:17,730
there are other things and climate
changes is a good example you can only
600
01:01:17,730 --> 01:01:23,040
do with power with others final question
then we'll open it up so this is the
601
01:01:23,040 --> 01:01:28,950
lecture on the conditions of peace what
do you see as the primary threat today
602
01:01:28,950 --> 01:01:33,130
to peace the leading threat it's most
urgent threat
603
01:01:33,130 --> 01:01:43,480
well the short-run media threats are in
my mind of miscalculation which would
604
01:01:43,480 --> 01:01:49,720
destabilize the nuclear deterrent
relationship I don't think there's a
605
01:01:49,720 --> 01:01:58,060
high probability of that but that would
be a truly catastrophic event it's worth
606
01:01:58,060 --> 01:02:06,670
remembering that in 1914 August 1914
nobody expected World War 1 they
607
01:02:06,670 --> 01:02:12,910
expected the third Balkan war in which
Serbia would be taught a lesson and the
608
01:02:12,910 --> 01:02:18,070
troops would be home by Christmas what
they wound up with was four years of
609
01:02:18,070 --> 01:02:26,470
horror which Europe tour itself apart
he destroyed three empires and Europe
610
01:02:26,470 --> 01:02:33,820
ceased to be centered the world in terms
of the global palace of power so today
611
01:02:33,820 --> 01:02:38,950
when we look at the rivalry with China
for example many people say this is the
612
01:02:38,950 --> 01:02:48,250
greatest threat an even greater threat
is not to underestimate China its
613
01:02:48,250 --> 01:02:54,610
overestimate China but it's getting the
right balance to realize that if we
614
01:02:54,610 --> 01:02:58,480
played chicken with China and somebody
miscalculates
615
01:02:58,480 --> 01:03:05,350
and it does escalate that could be truly
catastrophic so if you say what is my
616
01:03:05,350 --> 01:03:12,300
what worries me most it's Americans
working himself up into a fervor of
617
01:03:12,300 --> 01:03:19,930
anti-chinese sentiment so that we create
the fear that can be devastating one of
618
01:03:19,930 --> 01:03:26,580
my colleagues at Harvard talks about a
Thucydides trap and with China in which
619
01:03:26,580 --> 01:03:32,170
through cities famously attributed the
Peloponnesian War to the rise of the
620
01:03:32,170 --> 01:03:37,270
power of Athens that fear created in
Sparta and everybody focuses on the
621
01:03:37,270 --> 01:03:41,500
first half of that equation the rise of
the power of China they don't pay enough
622
01:03:41,500 --> 01:03:44,770
attention to the fear it creates in
Washington
623
01:03:44,770 --> 01:03:49,780
and to overstimulate that fear is a
great danger this doesn't mean we
624
01:03:49,780 --> 01:03:53,350
shouldn't stand up to China I'm all in
favor of freedom of navigation
625
01:03:53,350 --> 01:04:00,340
operations in the South China Sea and so
forth but to overstimulate fear and to
626
01:04:00,340 --> 01:04:05,560
create a climate in which there's a
miscalculation I think is something that
627
01:04:05,560 --> 01:04:11,920
worries me that's my that's my short-run
fee with fear of the threat to peace my
628
01:04:11,920 --> 01:04:21,010
long-run fear is failure to master new
technologies and their application
629
01:04:21,010 --> 01:04:25,540
particularly cyber and artificial
intelligence and what that means for the
630
01:04:25,540 --> 01:04:32,890
ability to continue to maintain control
not over not only over nuclear systems
631
01:04:32,890 --> 01:04:42,300
that Bernhard Brody was so prescient
about but over many more systems and
632
01:04:42,300 --> 01:04:48,310
that is not is imminent but it's
something that we should be worrying
633
01:04:48,310 --> 01:04:51,870
very much about the longer term