0:04
Alright, good afternoon everyone. Can everyone hear us? Okay, great. So welcome. So this is a somewhat impromptu panel that we threw together with the supported in this area and center, which we greatly appreciate to give us a chance to talk about what's happening with the US and Iran. What's happened what, what may happen in the future, give some context and some some color and texture to it. I'm really glad to have both my longtime friend Rand, Middle East Center Director, am I getting that right, your exact title chief Dalia Dasa K, and then double x men who's just come to UCLA just in the last few weeks to become a new inaugural. We're not in our world to begin his term as director of the Zerrin center and also Gilbert chair in Israel study. So it's great to welcome Doug so what we're going to do is not really given a presentation I'm Tara cell, I run the Burkle Center and teacher in the law school. I'm just going to sort of moderate, we're going to have a conversation, we're gonna open it up to all of you. And we'll run for about about an hour. So, you know, I thought maybe we could start Dolly, if you want to just kind of kick us off with maybe giving us some context about us Iran relations, where they stood before the sum of money strategy. And just kind of generally what is that has been obviously lots of tension for many, many years. So you can choose how far back you want to go. But just give us a little sense of where things stood prior to the strike. And then we can pivot to what is the significance of that strike?
1:41
That's a good Yeah, that sounds great. Thank you for having me. Thank you, UCLA and during center Institute and Burkle Center. Well, I am not going to go back to 1979, which is really where the major friction between the US and Iran starts. I'm just going to go back a few years because I think
1:58
53
2:00
No, definitely not there. But we can have that discussion and q&a or I'll be better with my, my colleague here. But I think it's important to start, really, and it's a good question because the context matters. We really saw the ratcheting up of the UFC wrong tensions that predated this almani strike. I would say most significantly, with the US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement. That was in 2018, although even before that, the President made it very clear that he was not a fan of disagreement, and that he wanted to get rid of it and scrap it. So we were in a place where even though there was international agreement that Iran at that time had been complying with the agreement, the United States made the decision to unilaterally withdraw. The rest of the remaining parties of the agreement of the JCP did stay in Russia, China and the European powers, but the United States law and what happened there is that that there was a period for about a year or Iran was kind of kept culated figuring let's see if your warnings can save the deal. Because if people remember, the deal was ultimately about we give Iran sanctions relief if they if they contain their nuclear program. And there are a lot more details. We don't want to I don't think we want to relitigate the number on nuclear deal. I did plenty of talks here now that time, and I didn't want to go through that. Again, we are where we are. But the context is important in that it gives you a sense of when this escalation started. So after about a year, when Iran it was clear, the Iranians were not getting the sanctions relief. The United States also was ratcheting up and very effective maximum what they call the maximum pressure campaign, which has zero tolerance for Iranian export of oil. And so the United States not just stopped its own trade with Iran, but basically said we're going to punish anyone else who trades with Iran. It was a very effective, I think a lot of people are surprised at how good the US Treasury is very good at its job. It completed nearly completely put a halt to Iraq. moil exports. And that's when things got basic starting last summer, especially in May, the Iranians strategic patients were out. And they started lashing out. And on my assessment, I think, you know, we'll never know exactly the calculations in Tehran, but basically they started hitting oil targets in the Gulf Oil facilities, even a strike on a US drone unmanned at the time, but essentially signaling, if we're not going to be able to export oil, no one else should. And there's a cost. There's a cost to this confrontational maximum pressure approach. And we're going to make you pay a price. And we're going to we're going to kind of show we have some shifts to play to. So that's where things really got heated. She went a summer of escalation. And it got to the point where the most brazen Iranian attack was on Saudi Aramco Aramco, and there was not a US response. This is a you know, a facility. That is the most important oil facility globally and certainly in Saudi For the global oil supply level don't release oil supply. So when there was no response, there was a lot of question about what was gonna happen. So that's pretty
5:10
sure there have been a response.
5:11
You know, I think arguably, you know, it depends what you think us interest are, you know, in 1991, the United States went to war to dislodge Saddam Hussein from its invasion of Kuwait because we were worried about oil supplies, right, in those days. And we got an international coalition together. So one could argue you could have had a US response where we tried to rally international coalition at that time, and said, You know what, yeah, maybe oil is less important United States, we have to give, you know, we are not as dependent as we used to be, as our president likes to remind us often, but our partners are and it's important global stability. I'm not sure exactly what that response would have been if it was military probably would have ratcheted up things as well. But we are where we are there was not a response. So then we had continue rocket attacks. against the ronnie a rocky basis of house American forces. And the President's red line was, he may not respond if the Saudis get attack. But if an American, if there's an American loss of life, the United States is going to respond. And what happened is and the American military contractor was killed. The United States did respond with attacks on Iraqi militia forces with any rock. And then you have the embassy issue where the Iranian militia and others were really agreed that the United States was attacking, violating a rocky surface sovereignty, and you had an assault on the US Embassy. Thankfully, that ended with no loss of life. But then there was this decision, very murky decision, I don't think we'll know unless historians in the future will know exactly the decision making process but a decision by the President and his advisors to launch this attack, General soleimani, probably arguably the second most important person in Iraq. And I think what's important about this recent escalation on And there is what was until that point a proxy conflict involving forces that the United States are supporting the Iranians were supporting what moved as a proxy conflict became even though it was on a rocky territory. The sulemani killing really brought us to a new level, because now we are in a direct confrontation between the United States and Iran. He is was a I don't think anybody was was shutting too many tears about his loss. He was a pretty bad guy. But he was a high level Iranian official. This wasn't just a militia for supported by the Iranian. He was an Iranian official killed on a rocky soil, but an Iranian official. So this puts us into a new, I think, a new level of confrontation with I think, lots of unpredictability, so I'll just leave it there.
7:50
It was fear Ronnie's will say check out Papa do something about
7:55
it. Yeah, probably more comfortable would be the head. Let's say Mr. CENTCOM or central at our military forces stationed in the region. But yes, a very high level official National Security Adviser Secretary of State is of that magnitude. So yeah, so things have gotten extremely heated. And we can continue, you know, to talk about the consequences. But I hope that gives a sense of the context that got us to where we are
8:21
perfect, perfect start. So I'm going to make and go further back in time in terms of the context, Donald gave an excellent summary of the chronology of this current crisis. But I think the roots of this crisis extend further back not not just to 1953 or 79, but specifically to 2003 2003. Of course, the when the United States invaded Iraq, and among other consequences, all the US invasion of Iraq was a essentially the end of a strategy that the United States previously been pursuing, which was called dual containment, essentially a strategy that sort of contained by Iran and Iraq, and in particular to do so by playing off the two separate the two rivals against each other. And, of course, although I have very, very loudly consequences, the Iraqis and the rankings, that's essentially what the United States didn't do that throughout the 1980s, during the iran iraq war, and through the 1990s, as well, by placing sanctions on both countries, the invasion of Iraq, Iraq, took out a law as a counter to prevailing in power, and in particular, is the counter to alongs westward expansion. It was ambition to extend its power towards shores of the Mediterranean. And so I really think going from that point on, even though this this consequence was not foreseen at the time, I think by the Bush administration, although many warned that this was a potential dangerous invading Iraq. Essentially, what's happened since then is that not only has iraq now become the battleground for competition for regional influence between Iran and Iraq, but also Iran's Power BI has increased ever since the war in Iraq. Poverty as the United States has been weakened in the region. But also because now Iran, Iran has been able to establish Shia dominated government in Iraq, with Eunice allied as well as increased its support for arranging proxy forces in Iraq, and more recently in Syria and of course in Lebanon. So, in many ways, the the this latest crisis is really a product of I think, the US is America's difficulty in coming to terms with this expansion of Iranian power. The field This is provoked Iran region labor, in particular the Saudis and the Israelis. And that fear is acting partly why the Trump administration's failure to respond to Iranian actions over the summer and the boom, which really unnerved the Saudis and the Israelis in particular who why we that basically, the United States is on its way out of the region. And without the United States there, in Iraq, in Syria and in the region more broadly, essentially, Iran is going to be free to establish will try to establish its hegemony in the region. And I think it's in response to those beers from regional allies. And it seemed to sponsor this long. Why they have Iranian influence across the region that this crisis has taken place. This is the confrontation In other words, that is been brewing for a very long time. It's been great and I'm really want prevented it from spilling over into war has been, I think, the pragmatic and cautious decision making of previous administrations as well as to some extent, pragmatic decision making in Taiwan, which may sound unusual, but both sides are generally being pretty cautious. And one of the things that's changed is being disarmed predictability in Washington, and therefore the Iranians not knowing what they can get away with basically, because nobody knows any longer that you have united states is likely to respond. And this fear, as I said, among other countries in the region that the United States is on its way out. And that's emboldening alone. And it's also leading the Israelis and the Saudis and others to take their own actions, which is also added to this crisis. So in many ways, the remarkable thing about this kind of crisis is that it didn't happen sooner.
12:56
Let me just your point about passion. It's important to note that both President Bush and President and Obama had considered strikes on sermonic. In the past, he had been identified, he had been able to be targeted. In both cases they chose not to. Mostly, again, this is just recorded because of the fear of blowback.
13:14
Can I just add that I think it's a great point. And I think 2003 was a pivotal year. Obviously, when you remove the Sunni dominated Iraq and turn it into a she had dominated and there were the fears, and I think that was King Abdullah Jordan coin, the share Crescent and silver. I would just caveat that with a little bit by saying, you know, these fears of Iranian dominance and hundred many, you know, I think they've been overplayed before, so we'll money and they'll be overplayed after because the truth of the matter is, there is a lot of pushback on Iran from the region itself. And in some ways, the US interventions complicate that pushback. And so I think it's important to be nuanced a little bit about that because you see it even in Iraq. Which is really a wrong fact backyard and probably the highest priority in terms of the Iranian strategy of cultivating these non state actors to projected influence. And even there, there's a very strong sense of nationalism. And not all Shia parties are like there's a lot of beggars among the Shia parties in Iraq, and they're straddling Iraq is probably bearing the highest cost of of this episode and what preceded it. Because there's traveling between Iran, their neighbor, you know, maybe the US are going to leave but Iran is there and all the neighbors know that they have to live with an Iranian neighbor. They don't know what future us presence in the region's going to be. That said, We're not leaving anytime soon. Look at the course numbers were there. But but but there's that perception. At the same time, they need the United States. We haven't talked about the Islamic State, but they more happy seeing an existential threat from the Islamic State coming into Iraq, threatening Kurdistan threatening Baghdad, and they need the United States to be trading their forces. And in that respect the US and the Iranians were actually on the same side fighting ISIS. So just to complicate things even more, there's not just kind of a straight line trajectory of Iranian influence inevitably leading to this backlash. It's also I think, important to recognize how US policy is formulated matters. There's not just this inevitable historical trajectory that was going to lead us there. We had a nuclear deal, not perfect, but it was containing the problem. We were not having US forces targeted in we were during the Iraq war, and sulemani. Kill many, unfortunately. But in recent years, they were not targeted until this happened because Iran is playing a very calculated game. So I think that's just rude or something. But just
15:47
I actually agree that in many ways the uranium threat has been exaggerated and the Iranian influence across the region. I mean, whether it was in Yemen where we see that they exaggeration of relating and influencing the Hootie rebels has had disastrous consequences. But I also think, you know, more precisely looking from from in, in Lebanon with Hezbollah, it's very tempting to simply depict every sheer group in the region as a proxy of Iran and simply acting at the behest of the wrong but I think actually does obscure the reality that in many ways, these all these actors have their own interests, their own agendas and their own domestic politics to navigate. So I don't want to suggest that a law is actually the kind of has these hegemonic ambitions that that in many ways actually think you're on. Because this was the the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown itself to be reasonably cautious and conservative, more so than its critics, at least depicted to be but the fear whether the fear is well founded, I think is that and the fear is not necessarily one held by those most knowledgeable the administration. establishment in the way as well, for elsewhere, military intelligence establishment in Israel, for example, tend to take a somewhat more sanguine view over regards to bond than the political excellent. They did not believe that the Iran nuclear deal friend Scott, for example, should be Scott. And even before the deal was signed, they didn't necessarily subscribe to listen to his view that it was it was a nuclear program was an existential threat. But we have leaders in the region Prime Minister Netanyahu for one but we say Mohammed bin Salman, in Saudi Arabia, he was described, Iran is the new Hitler. For mainly in particular, we have leaders who, whether it be for their own purposes or not, can speculate about their own internal motives. But these are leaders who have painted Iran as enemy number one, you have argued that he's bent on regional domination and have sought to use the United States and draw the United States in really for their own regional banks have power contest. I actually don't think this ultimately serves us interest. I think fun underlying a lot of the tension that has happened over recent years between the US and the Saudis in the US and the Israelis with regard to struction Toriel on is the fact that the US thousands of miles away, right, the one does not have the ability to target the United States directly. The United States is increasing the energy independence as well. So from the US point of view, a confrontation with Iran, let alone a war with 1007 interesting is really not necessary. The Saudis and the Israelis and others, on the other hand, who are stuck in that neighborhood have a different threat perception, and I think, a lower threshold for this, in that regard. And this is one of the reasons why there's been this kind of constant. Underlying It's not often always voiced in public tension and concern even under the Trump administration, where the Saudis and the Israelis Initially when I got we got Trump and no more of the appeasement, what he saw is the bomb as a piece of policies. What was that? Let's put that aside. But even with President Trump in office, there's been, as I said, it continued concern, not only his voice publicly, but really the President Trump's policy, if you can describe it as such to where the Middle East is actually more likely to Obama's than one might lead. And essentially, it's a policy of trying to gradually draw down US forces in the region and gradually move a pivot away from the Middle East, and pivot toward Asia Pacific, which is really where America strategic interest most likely that if the United States is slowly on its way out of the Middle East. What we're beginning to see then is this renewed competition for power between the potential leads Petra mons, Israel, the Saudis and the Iranians. And I think unfortunately, as that happens, we're going to see more of these kinds of questions. And that's why the region today is such a tinderbox.
20:12
Let's go. That's very helpful. Let's drill down on the American interest for a moment with both of you. So what is our actual interest in this issue? So whether it's with Iran or regional stability writ large, right now, we're an interesting political moment. A lot of people both right and left, seem to want to see us out. On the other hand, we have a long tradition of Stanyon Saudis, a great example. What is our interest in Saudi Arabia? I've heard people many of us have heard people from the US government and others try to articulate that over the years, never convincing them. Why do we actually care or should have troops there on a major level? Iraq, again, very contested war with very uncertain results afterwards. So what is our interest in Iran right now?
20:54
Well, I mean, more broadly, the United States is historically pursued.
21:00
33 interests, which were one to protect the supply of oil at reasonable price, to to ensure
21:08
its value pointed out, that's increasingly less important
21:10
and less important to the United States of the global economy, and therefore it is economy as well. So the idea that the United States can afford to it is not
21:17
the 1980s. And this
21:18
is not an isolated setting, but the energy market is still global. And so that, you know, it's somewhat of an illusion, I think that the states can maintain complete independence from Middle East and oil. But that prevert preserving Israel's existence and security, and historically preventing the Soviets or external force from from gaining dominance in the region. Those those are the kind of articles of faith which have underpinned us strategy over Republican and Democratic administrations since the end of World War Two. And one of the things is that there really hasn't been a reassessment even after the Soviet Union discipline. And the political will appear there hasn't been a fundamental reassessment of what are America's core strategic interest in the region, and therefore the best way to advance those interests? I mean, we've seen and we see the consequences in this today where there's four tactics and no strategy. Right? There really is not a clear strategy. nobody really understands it, what the what the strategy is, I think maybe the Obama administration did have a strategy but didn't really do a good job of articulating that strategy. Or maybe they didn't want to articulate it because they didn't want to upset regional allies. But that, but that's one of the problems the United States for better for stuck in the Middle East, and increasingly, without any clear rationale, and it's part of that and that has given rise to this demand, which is understandable domestically, for just bringing the troops back home, get out of the region, right. Why are we that these endless wars and I understand that people just you know, This has been the US streets happiness massage laboratory. I happen to think the Mideast remains strategically important to the US. But I do think it's important for domestic political purposes, and also foreign policy purposes to be able to articulate a clear strategy and clear interests. And until that's done, this is just kind of be this incoherent some confusion within the United States as to why the us is that among America's allies and adversaries.
23:29
And yeah, well, I more or less agree and I think we also have to distinguish between rhetoric and what reality is. I think you're right there's exhaustion from the Middle East and we see this at our organization there's lots of funding for training Russia and very little interest in the Middle East despite the crisis we see Yeah, yeah, it's it's definitely there. So and, and and we saw it in US national strategy, where there's an interest in looking at GOP you know, big powers are backed geopolitical rivalries, bad You know, we're done with counterterrorism counterinsurgency, we're exhausted from the endless war that comes to be the mantra now, and that is bipartisan. I mean, that is that that's continued from the administration into the Trump administration. But then you have kind of that, that framing, and then you have the reality of what do we actually still have in mind? And what's interesting is now, especially with this ratcheting up attention, is that the wrong President Trump keeps talking about withdrawing troops, but we've been sending more troops, more troops to the region. We have more forces on the ground since this escalation started. And we haven't removed the ones we had before. He talked about removing the troops from Syria, we only have 2000. We still have 1000. There. I mean, it's marginal tinkering. We still have over 60,000 troops in this region. So the question I think, though, we should get away from this all in or all out. And these very, I think, endless debates that get us nowhere and it's still very important politically and we need to have this discussion then. What getting to your question? What are they there for? What is our strategy? And again and again, I completely agree, we constantly are up. We're always against things in the middle. So against Iran, we're against Islamic terrorism, okay, all good things to be against, you know, you don't want extremists. You don't want Americans killed you want, you know, you want our friends protected. But what are we for? And this is where I differ a little bit from, you know, not from you. But in terms of really us strategy in the region. And this is across administration's and I do think to be honest, there has been a big shift with Trump from Obama, this law that nothing's changed, the locks changed. I don't think we should underestimate what a disruptive period we are in, we're in an incredibly disruptive period doesn't mean it was good before. But we're really in disruptive period. But my feeling is, and it's not my
25:48
feeling is going to a couple of examples
25:50
while withdrawing from the Iran deal, because nuclear proliferation just to add to the list of for us interest, global interest. I'm not in the camp. I know in few of you students who are here, if you're taking our classes, the big debate, are nuclear weapons, good or bad? I'm in the camp. They're not good. So, yeah, so we don't want them. So I would say that's very disruptive. Because today we are facing in Iran that is much closer. And let's not get alarmist about it. They do not have a nuclear bomb. nuclear enrichment capabilities do not mean they have a nuclear bomb, you need a month to get to the position to be able to weaponize, I'm not going to get too technical here. And you should do nonproliferation. But you need months to get there. They're not there yet. But they're a lot closer today. They found back because of this ratcheting up of tensions that I started with. They are much closer today than they were in 2015. And this is very uncomfortable for us interest and for interest of every all of our friends in the region. So that's number one. I think that's that's hugely disruptive. And this increasing of artifacts, and this gets me to my second point about what's really different. Okay, yeah, the US is always been here for critical about human rights. Let's face it right? When have we ever walk the walk talk that we never we never match that. But never have we seen a US president, this openly embracing repressive, brutal dictators in this region. An American citizen just died, a tragic death in any gyptian prison. And we have not one statement from the State Department. This is unprecedented, unprecedented. This is a big change. So I'm not about Yeah, I mean, you can criticize what Obama did, you can like what Trump said, let's recognize their changes, this is different. And getting to what our interest and where I think all administrations have failed. And you see this coming out of the region itself. The people in the region, these mass protest movements we're seeing are not going to end. It didn't. We saw emerge in 2011. Of course, the Arab Spring is you know, we know what such a sprain it's led to a lot of horrific physical death and civil work. But the yearning of people in this region to have governance that serves people, the end of repression, the end of corruption, the end of inequity, people in the region want to just as much as people united states, they have not been served well by their leaders. And the US has propped up these leaders year after year, and this is Democrats, and this is Republicans. This is not a so this is my own assessment. But I think more and more people, that doesn't mean I have a silver bullet solution. But I think if we want from a strategic interest perspective, we need to start thinking about people. We need to start thinking about people and leads in this region. And we need to be more long term and our strategies together won't happen overnight, but we need to be thinking about that. So I would not add that into the mix.
28:48
Just to I just thought I would say in the interest of the underlying interest of the United States is stability in the region and to prevent extremism and extremist movements in the exploitation of extremist violence, then the ultimate interest is in order to create is to help sustain creating sustained, flourishing, prosperous societies in which people's human rights are recognized and respected. And sadly, United States his track record is as Dahlia suggested, is getting very poor in that regard. So by, you know, supporting more authority, including the current one in Egypt, which is even what more authoritarian than Mubarak's regime was by supporting these regimes. Ultimately, it as it's been pointed out by many analysts and observers over time, it actually feeds instability in the region, it feeds the these extremist groups and of course, toppling the regime in the case of the advantage of Euro and pulling out of the Iran nuclear all of these actually can destabilize the region. So this is your if I want it that while proclaiming to seek stability in the Genetic and pursue actions to in order to maintain stability. In fact, US actions, not irregular actions have also been destabilizing to be sure your actions have actually created more instability in the region, more or less for regional partners. I can ultimately by figuring out a way whereby Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel can have a modus vivendi happy figure out some kind of rapprochement between them not, not by not not fueling the regional arms between them, which is what essentially the United States ourselves have been doing is more important. So So I think the US does have an interest stability to an end to prevent the exploitation of extremism and the rise of extremism. But in fact, its actions have been very counterproductive to me the underlying objective fantastic. So
30:57
let's circle back to the specifics of A strike in the aftermath. And what happens next? So Iran replied, in essence with some strikes, if its own statements from Iran suggested that was the end. But it's of course not clear. Other statements suggested it wasn't the end. What do you see happening either of you in the Next, let's say, two months, 12 months? What do you predict? I realized that that that's a difficult a dicey thing. But do you think that we are going to see a period of calm do you think was the escalation?
31:30
If so, what might it look like? So I don't think this crisis is over. I think right now, there's a there's a number of things to watch for. And I think it's I think it's unlikely that Iran will directly carry out another direct strike. I mean, now it's going to happen tomorrow. What's important is, this is the risk of making predictions about lives. But I think it was what was unusual about one's retaliation was It was direct. And and and the literature it was more likely as a continuation of what the Lord has been doing. She's using these militia groups proxy groups to act against us interested in that's very likely.
32:14
But there's there's that so we are
32:16
unnecessarily escalation. So it's
32:18
not I think they were on for the time being I think they want it doesn't have an interest in escalation. No actually does be allowed to stay. So I don't see this kind of loose. I don't see any intentional war from occurring. But of course, there's a real risk of miscalculation. Couple of things to watch for, first of all next month is the parliamentary elections in Iran. So the Iranians are incredibly focused on on that. And obviously now there's the resumption of street protests inside Iran. So I don't think the Iranians have an interest in in in more instability right now. And of course, there's the American elections the next year in other words, this year some extent may be waiting, see, wait and see what's going to happen in after the federal elections and so on. And whether that might I doubt it will lead to any sort of changes in their arms regional behavior, but but we'll we'll see. But more importantly, the the crucial one will be the the election here because I think the Iranian approach since iraq since the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement, I think it was a mistake to have done that. But the Iranian approach seems to be in a kind of waiting game. You know, let's get the Europeans to try to soften the economic sanctions and the economic pain that alone is under. And in the meantime, let's hope for a Democrat in the White House who will not pursue this maximum pressure campaign. If Trump is reelected, then things things will change because then aliens will I don't think he wants economy, for one thing can endure four more years of the Is this level of sanctions, and if multinational UN sanctions coming in, which is not a possibility, but is what the Europeans just did this week, and in triggering this dispute mechanism, then I think the rains will be even more desperate for to do something and so they might strike out or are less likely, they may capitulate and agree to renew, renegotiate a deal, a deal, which will be to maybe more to the Trump administration's liking. I don't think that's going to happen. And so I think, in fact, if the Iranians fail, that they're going to be facing these crippling economic sanctions, which are a real, real threat to the this regime, the survival of this regime, ultimately, they will do something and then that something is likely to be destabilizing.
34:54
What about and I want to answer this as well. What about the possibility of we just saw today? I think NAFTA is Over, and now we have a new NAFTA called something else. There's a style to the Trump administration are doing that we're going to get rid of this thing that we hate it and we're going to introduce something that's almost identical boring called something else. It's going to be new and it's mine. Exactly. And so my we see that here no longer JCP away, but something very similar to it.
35:21
Well, I've heard that a lot. I think a lot of your hands think that or maybe it's a kind of an ego thing, just put a name on it and have you know, maybe it's such an unpredictable moment. Um, I don't think that's likely I had the from the Iranian perspective. They're facing what they view as existential threat right now, not just because of the punishing sanctions, but this hit on sulemani was a direct attack on the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic. So I agree, I don't think it's over. In fact, the Middle East, it's hard to predict, and I think not exactly and predictable, but it's often safer to predict things can get worse. When you think it's bad. They can actually be worse. I don't mean to be a downer about it, but I think they make it worse. And I don't see capitulation. And I see a lot of people there was a brutal eight year war between Iran and Iraq. This is not a country and these leaders Unless, you know, unless something happens. So that's the big one for right. I think you have. So that's on the running side. You also have folks in the US administration, that might be what President Trump is thinking. things on the ground pick a dynamic of their own, by accident and other us is to eat even if the Iranians are so far calculated. Let's face it, they launched it over a dozen missiles into from Iraq from Iranian territory, directly targeting us basis. Yeah, they weren't given morning time. They bunker down, you know, that save lives, a lot of things can go wrong. There are a lot there. A lot of militia forces in Iraq. They really want to kill Americans. And we got a lot of vulnerable guys on the ground and they're not that far. A lot of things can go wrong. So yeah, they may not want more, but things can escalate. And I don't think, you know, if a long time until the election, a lot of things can go wrong. So our lecture, so I, a lot of things can go wrong. And you have some factions within the US administration. That really, I think, and the signaling is mixed. And that's the problem. And those of you starting to turn to know how difficult it is to determine atmosphere, if there's not clear we have the capability, that's for sure. But we don't have clarity. And we don't necessarily have credibility, because what are we going to do? And so I think that there's a lot of wealth hurts and so I'm not, you know, I'm not confident that olfaction administration, they may be looking at Iran right now, and saying, you know, kind of look like this Iranian regime is on the ropes. There are people are so upset at this horrible government they were protesting before this happened. Now they accidentally shot down this airliner with this horrific tragic effect of hundreds of over 170. You think right Oh, civilians killed. Enormous outpouring of emotion. So their faction administration, I think, who would like to see this, this change? And so they call it regime collapse, but whatever you're going to call it latest thing I saw as regime disruption. There's all kinds of euphemisms for. So I'm not sure that is the strategy. And that's part of the problem. We don't know what the endgame is, where is this going to end? So maybe that's a good case scenario, if I'd be perfectly fine with that, if it was called the Trump deal, and it was everything that we got Medusa, bro and even more wonderful. The other factor we need to take into consideration is our partners in the region. The Israelis in particular, they ended up being okay, not not an M cell for district 30 establishment. You know, they didn't love it, but once it was there, they preferred it than the alternatives. If there's just a deal that has his name on it, that doesn't look much different than the end of the day in Israel, the rest of the neighborhood. Yeah, they worry about the nuclear, but the Saudis and the others They're much more concerned about Ron's tentacles with these non state actors throughout the region in Lebanon and Syria and Iraq and Yemen than they are with the nuclear. And if there's not a deal that really stops that, and just you know, I'd love to believe that I want to pony into universal but heal these things. So unless all those things happen, I don't think we're just going to it's not going after something even after that's a much simpler either trade is really hard as burger thing, but this is not simple. And and the Iranian nuclear program will be at Advanced point. So I don't mean to be so pessimistic, but
39:34
I am. So I'm going to just even a more pessimistic and I, either, I think we have to be careful about historical analogies. I think it is, you know, you might think of like July 1914, right, whereby you have a shifting balance of power. dominant powers can be losing its power rising, rising powers and listener. system of alliances where a miscalculation when nobody wants war. Clearly, any of the players in this major players want an accomplished it doesn't serve anybody the interest. But we've seen from historical cases world war one being the most famous example how miscalculations and then Alliance commitments and fear about credibility and maintaining credibility can actually set off a chain reaction that can lead to cataclysmic conflict. And I am so I think we really, I think the danger would be complacency in this situation. I'm thinking because you have not seen despite all of the belligerent rhetoric between the US and Iran, and between Israel and Iran, because that hasn't erupted into war. Thus far. That won't happen. Effectively, Israel, the United States hasn't been at war with Israel is effectively at war with Iran. Israel has basically been fighting a shadow war. You No undeclared war with Iran for a number of years now. And in since 2012, Israel has been carrying on mega airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets Iranian backed militias. It's it's been an engaging a long war of attrition, essentially with Hezbollah. So that's been going on the United States has been fighting this has been engaging with credit card, your will on almost going back to 1979. That is a real risk that especially with impulsive decision makers, think of like Kaiser Wilhelm or German impulsive decision makers who who don't want to look weak, who are sometimes dragged by the arrows because there are certain areas, the mountains, that that mean, I think, at the very least, we should really take this very seriously. And then it needs to be there needs to be a serious discussion with how to de escalate this. And Angela, Adam and I walk in the United States due to Give Avon opportunities to, you know, expect some kind of all in college because I agree with Dahlia capitulation is not on the card it is not going to sign what it sees as a surrender agreement with which in other words in the revised two point O Trump nuclear being which would involve not merely what, how it is what that would like permanent apartment and of its nuclear program, but also a succession of its missile building program and its regionals. I can't see Iran agreeing to that under any circumstances. So there has to be something they can't just be maximum pressure maximalist goals. If that's if that's the approach, then I think conflict is really there's a real high risk of conflict. So we have to figure out some ways to,
42:54
you know, to make concessions on both sides to offer compromises. I think that's possible. And I think there are cooler heads in all these places, in Taiwan, in Jerusalem, in Washington, there are also others who want conflict. But I think it's possible to find ways to avoid this. I mean, I've used the example of Israel and Iran so far despite Israel's repeated attack strikes against Iranian militias, and Iranian facilities in Syria and also in Iraq. There hasn't been this hasn't erupted into a total war into war between Israel. One of the reasons why is that the Israelis, unlike the Trump administration is going immediately about what they've done. They don't make a big point of it. They do it. They don't admit to doing it. Everybody knows they've done it. And that's it. And that God will save space. It allows the Syrian regime to save face it allows the Iranians to not have to feel domestic Italia. One of the things going back to the ceremony assassination. Without was probably aside from the legality and assassinating for an official drop about all the utility of such an assassination. Whether or not it was justified whether or not it was a good idea, the way the way it was done afterwards, the kind of bond box and the fact that the company, I think, actually undermined the one rationale, which I think was that which was a deterrence one. If you want to do that you've got to not then force them in your adversity into a position where they feel that if they don't respond, they're going to be kind of humiliated. You and the Trump administration didn't do that. And that's the risk. That's why I think there's a danger because it's not just carrying out his actions. It's doing so in a way almost designed to humiliate. And whereas these rain is at least, that I've taken very forceful actions to prevent these threats. northern border, they have done so in a way that has actually avoided all that escalation and toward so I think in that respect, at least, the Trump administration has something to learn.
45:12
Interesting. Okay, before we go to questions, any last comments, things we didn't cover? Anything else you want to add?
45:17
Well, I just I agree with everything you said, I think is terrific. The only habit I would say on the on the Israeli craft, and it's very, I think, a good one to watch. I think actually, the regional reaction is very interesting, because there's a lot of diversity here now, even though the Arab Gulf States and Israel very aligned in terms of their counter Iran focus. You are seeing some reports of this campaign what Israelis call the campaign between the wars is persistent attack on Iranian backed forces, and mostly in Syria, although starting last summer expanding to Lebanon and Iraq, and they're getting more vocal about it. You're seeing now reports in Israel suggesting postal the money strike, maybe Now this might be an opportunity to do something more serious. Hezbollah haven't had it grabbed Israeli has the law complex since 2006. And for long time evidently standards, they're watching the missile capability closely and the ability of Hezbollah to develop precision guided missiles that can be very, very deadly for from the Israeli perspective, the Israeli homeland. So there is this kind of talk now and you're saying in some Israeli Defense circles and in the press, even, that the IDF military intelligence is looking at the possibility of ratcheting it up with Hezbollah, they have an enabling environment. This is not an illustration of Washington that's likely to hold them back. So that's another potential Flashpoint if the Israelis go after they kind of move away from her husband and very strategically sensible, quiet, you know, kind of let's keep contain the Iranians and this way to a much more frontal attack and has Bulaga leads to a war and all these predictable consequences that Especially with relationship between the US and Israel, the US more committed to maybe more than we had bargained for. So that's a thought when I would look for. And but in contrast, you're seeing a really interesting interest in de escalation by the Saudis and the Gulf Arabs who are so out there, you know, with all kinds of very alarmist rhetoric about Iran and in practice doing a lot of learning, and then Yemen and the whole escalation there. And all of a sudden after Aramco and the non response by the US or anyone else, for that matter. They kind of said, you know, we may be alone here. And, you know, to be honest, what if the Iranians attack Aramco again or another facility and the goal are we going to do what we just did? Take a civil monument? I don't think the Saudis are confident about so you see a lot of back channels now between the Saudis and the Gulf Arabs, because they don't like Iran, but they know they're gonna have to live with them. And yeah, if the Islamic Republic or false great if the Trump gamble, you know, that Work, there's a new deal or veteran wrong or you know, Nuki, five, but if it doesn't, we may need to kind of come up with our own plan B. So you're starting, I think, and it's very early. And it's something we just have to watch a lot of this, we're going to have to see play out, I think in the months and even years ahead, but you're starting to see an interesting difference in the kind of react potential difference between the Gulf air side and the Israeli side, which I think is interesting.
48:24
Great. Thank you. Okay, so we're gonna open it up. It's usually our tradition to start with some student questions. So yes, go ahead.
48:34
Can you touch on this? I wanted to kind of open up the Pandora's
48:37
box.
48:38
legality of the show wasn't the money. I think there
48:41
have been reports that there was an intent for him to attack his forces
48:46
and it would have been illegal strike. But everything that I've read says that that's kind of like a
48:50
fabrication hasn't been verified.
48:53
So with that in mind, was the strike illegal and if it wasn't, are there any sort of like international chances The framework of international law that allows us to kind of like, come back to that.
49:07
So Canada is really the experts on this planet, you
49:15
just might might be. I would my senses. Well, obviously we don't know where we don't have access to the classified intelligence. So it knows it may be that there was indeed, an imminent threat, which would justify this kind of legally was will preemptive self defense, which wouldn't be justifiable, which wouldn't be legal under international. That doesn't seem, however, from the public reporting of this, that that was the reason that the administration keeps on getting bigger than the administration keep on changing their story and their explanation, which raises questions as to whether there really was a clear image, but obviously, we can't do that without access to classified intelligence. So from a international point of view, it's not a self defense for preemptive self defense. It's illegal. According to international law, it's also worth noting, so those are illegal and domestic American law because there's such thing as a War Powers Act. And so Strictly speaking, the Iran the president doesn't have the legal authority without congressional authorization to do this. So from a legal point of view, I know that law as we foresee, unfortunately, in our hearing, and also, it's been that much of a guide to either international behavior or the US foreign policy behavior, but from a legal point of view now, I think it's on let me say very shaky legal that is a border question of whether it's still justified or legitimate morning. Again, I think it's very, very problematic to for a country to engage in targeted assassinations of foreign officials. One point about Israel's experience so even targeted assassinations of terrorist leaders and let's not forget from the US point of view, for the money it was lead or the designated terrorist order. ization to be here the GC and in republican God's word designate which was itself a escalator instead. But the I think the Israeli experience demonstrates that our best targeted assassinations only temporarily disrupt the activities of these groups of terrorists which let alone state actors and do not really deter them from that bad behavior. So in that respect, I think not only is it problematic or a worrying precedent and illegal but also ultimately I don't think it will serve the tactical objective of really effective uranium behavior. But if it was example, just going to capitate leaders of organizations be their terrorist groups or law, new leaders emerge. In this case maybe he was exceptionally skilled or had the knowledge and the contacts. So you may be that the disruption operational to option to answer actions will be longer than it is in some other cases where they can easily replace that person. It might be that it could be a more severe blow. But that doesn't mean that nevertheless, Iran is too sophisticated. Its military intelligence operatives, not ultimately to be able to continue to do the activities is enduring. So I don't see this assassination, even from a map from a strategic or tactical point of view, as effective, let alone sunset, undermine the basically completely disregarding international law. But that's another piece with the administration's policies in other respects with all sorts of national level.
52:40
I would only add to it that does exactly right, that we don't really know because the administration has not given a clear articulation. So it's conceivable that it could be legal. So you would either have to have an imminent attack, we have responded to under the UN Charter states are allowed to act in self defense however, they're having To be the terms of the charter and actual armed attack, that's usually understood to include eminence as a matter of customary international law. And in turn, you have to then report that to the Security Council on it. We haven't done that, as as Iran in terms of so we have taken steps that are consistent with some kind of legal defense, we've not yet seen that defense. The only other thing I would add about US law, US law that when a president can use force is not very clear. So under the Constitution, Congress is supposed to declare a war, that's only happened five times in American history. Congress generally does not do that, instead, when Congress usually does is either authorized force as we did after 911. And as we did in the run up to the Iraq War, or the president is understood to have the power to repel sudden attacks of sometime again, in a kind of eminent sense. So generally, presidents have taken a very expansive view of that. And unfortunately, Congress's regardless of who's controlling Congress is happy to give them that power. So yes, there's more power Act, it may this may rise to the level of hostilities, which is the term that's used in that or may not. It's hard to say. But the courts are not going to get involved. It's a political decision. It's a political decision. The courts never want to be involved in this sort of happy to let Congress fight it out. And Congress generally does not want to take any kind of responsibility. So to answer the last part of your question, no, it's unlikely that any real response, you could imagine some kind of international level. Before the International Court of Justice, some kind of I can't imagine exactly what the claim would be something like that. Maybe highly unlikely. Other questions, other students?
54:41
Okay, let's go over here.
54:44
Also, from the legal point of view, I haven't had a chance to do any more than just paragraphs
54:54
after
54:55
Iran admitted to shooting down the plane, do any other do expect that there will be a trial of people involved or that they might
55:11
take care of the
55:14
trial. You will see lawsuits take place in the countries of the victims, which could have the Iranian government as the defendant. Whether that actually results in a judgment that's meaningful, in terms of saving money going back to their families, is very unlikely. But that certainly could be pursued. You might see something else occur at the international level. It's really within Iran. I'll defer these two on that, I would guess no, but yeah, I
55:46
think I mean, there. It is unprecedented that they have actually publicly acknowledged that they are responsible. We have so that suddenly, they really did. I mean, there was well that they've been phased out. But I think we live in a new world as well. I mean, they've covered up things in the past, but you know, with the kind of technology we have, and also because of the domestic unrest they were facing, I think that if they calculated it would have been more of a restaurant too. So, so that was a big step. But to move a step further to actually a legal process that would have real accountability. I think the the chances of that are pretty minimal.
56:22
But just to circle back to your point about unpredictability in conflict, that's a great example, there was not an intended act, and nonetheless, it took down a jetliner. Yeah, that kind of thing can very easily occur. Yeah.
56:33
Right. And let's also remember, you know, in terms of how one events can trigger massive repercussions, I mean, he's sucking the elation of a vegetable vendor in Tunisia. Right, stop the Arab Spring. I mean, one of the things that as a Middle East analysts you you're repeatedly coming together is the inability to predict precisely because these single events think which nobody can expect more. You know, when they're going to happen, can have unleashed massive consequences across the region. And we see this time and time again. And so yeah, I can, you know, with it's very likely that something of this sort will occur, but we can't really know when and and we can say that the regional conditions mean that when this this trigger event, whatever it may be takes place, then there's a real the underlying conditions are such that there's a real danger for for major conflict.
57:32
Other questions
57:34
here? Yes.
57:37
Someone I think was Professor Waxman said something about the radians hoping for it. I'd like to hear more. And in as much as you live in an environment where you're not shy about intervening seven really true and what impact might that have
58:04
Um, I didn't see. I mean, I think he was gonna kind of follow bashes, you know, I mean, they may wish to play some apps and facebook, facebook to allow this thing. Right. But I don't see like these the ratings are going to be trying to, you know, influence the outcome of the election. But I do think certainly not just Iran. I mean, many countries in the region are going to be looking at the next year, because that's going to what happens in this election is going to have huge consequences for the region. As as Gary mentioned, the the change from Obama to Trump had massive consequences for the region and well beyond. So I think the uncertainty that this election introduces is it adds to the dilemma by way of searching the barber and again means that it's very This is why Things also, you know, we keep on repeating the point the carriers right now, precisely because if, if a Democrat in the White House then at least climate listeners know who may not be prime minister by that, but will think we need to act now, before democrat concentra while we have President Trump in office and said, we see that, for example, talk about annexation of parts of the Western Israel, they want it they're going to do it. This is the best time with President Trump and all these other countries are making similar calculation. Is this the time time now because they see a friend anyone has? Or is this the time to hold back and wait until the death friend in the White House? Either way, I think American domestic politics is one of the factors now that really is influencing the region and the behavior of states in the region and beyond.
1:00:00
pastors
1:00:03
Daya focused on the possibility of escalation toward Alma. I'm wondering what the likelihood is in your view that Israel would sort of further that escalation to attack Iranian centrifuges, a nuclear facilities.
1:00:22
Question, Dan.
1:00:24
You mean a kinetic attack? Not a cyber attack on
1:00:27
Iranian territory itself? visible? Yeah. I I don't think, you know, I will defer to who is heading the Israel programming everything Israel. I don't want to ask the question. myself, but I would say if they were going to take this escalates, that already would be an escalatory path right to take him but I think that might be unnatural right now. I think that would be Israel's main concern would be degrading. That's Israel's primary interest of grading has the last capabilities and they would take the opportunity for that. It would depend though, of course, on their intelligence assessment of how far along the Iranians are. Now we know the whole run up to the nuclear deal to begin with was all hinges on the debate of will Israel attack can be, you know, who can be by enough time, a big part of the negotiations were about we need to keep Iran a year away from being able to weaponize this program, because that was kind of the run behind for this race. I mean, it's really want to know in Richmond, but that was understood to be a red line for the Israelis. So if the Israelis feel that certain red lines are being crossed on the nuclear threshold, are they get intelligence adjusting? Actually, the centrifuge development and uranium enrichment levels are just too threatening and they could be months away from weaponizing? They may want to take that opportunity to especially if they think there's a window. Now I think it's highly unlikely I think the more likely scenario and even that is uncertain. They're going to go after Hezbollah because that's the more immediate threat.
1:01:58
So yeah, degree I think, first of all in Israel were two strikes, which I think is unlikely. Currently, the estimate is two years. This is what the latest military intelligence to one to two years Iran is away from me decides to and the Israeli military intelligence that publicly that Iran has yet made a decision to raise for the MA word to raise for Yvonne, it would take maybe one to two years before they have a nuclear weapon. So they're not had them for the Israelis right out and not in the pilot. They feel they must, even when they weren't really weighing in, there was a really big debate and division within the Israeli defense establishment. One of the things that today which be a precondition, this is why I agree with talking about there is a risk of the confrontation between Iran and Hezbollah is that in order for Israel to kill they have the ability to strike Iran's nuclear facilities if it were to make that decision. They have to prevent Hezbollah from having the ability to learn missiles, precision guided missiles down On Israeli cities, so a precondition if you like, for action against Iran reaction against Iran's nuclear program will be first of all, to address this growing crystal armor soft on Israel's northern border. I don't think these ways will do that. Let's not forget, Israel doesn't have a government right now. But Mississauga is the interim Prime Minister. And He therefore doesn't even have the authority and it can't launch. And he said, I don't think he has the authority or for that matter, the temperament he's actually kind of risk averse when it comes to military actions. If if the gods were to come in, they may that was certainly the view as as Daniel mentioned, that maybe a moral principle was inevitable. So if it's going to happen sooner or later, better, that should happen sooner as a kind of preventive war before Hezbollah retains missile capabilities, but in terms of striking against That was really missing Yahoo's believe. And but I think if he leaves office if he ever leaves office will say that I don't I don't have a predictable that yeah he makes I don't see dance or doing being willing because the Israeli defense establishment was a lot more divided in fact they were the ones with the gentleman who basically blocked Netanyahu from carrying out a military attack against Iran facilities when these rays really didn't think that one was close to capacity. I don't even think the rings would go that far because I personally haven't got into this, that they're actually there module is North Korea. Their motto is to use the threat of nuclear ization to extract whatever benefits and ultimately a kind of defense style. Well, I hope your
1:04:58
model is not worth Caribbean This
1:05:03
is kind of what's going on. I'm so unfortunately North Korea and Trump's approach to North Korea only further convinces the Iranians that actually yeah, hey, what's the point of having an agreement, because you're the US, the US may break it. But what you should do is, is basically push gun pros use use threats, and eventually traffic will sit down with you. So I can actually, you know, to me an example is the one that the Ravens are more likely to follow. And I think the Israeli is very worried about that, but I can't see a direct strike and also now the hoping that, you know, by carrying out other kinds of shadowy ways of disrupting the rounds and you know, cyber attacks or assassinating Iranian scientists and such, but they can at least delay that one year. A breakout period.
1:06:01
Will we see more of that like a Stuxnet type.
1:06:05
That's the it's actually wrong to say that the US didn't retaliate against the Saudi get to the tacking on the Saudi oil facilities. They did retaliate. There was a cyber, apparently a cyber attack. So we there's a lot we don't know. I mean, as I said, essentially, we're focusing on this overcompensation escape in place. But there's really been for some time now, a shadow war in the shadows, much like the Cold War, of assassination cyber attacks that's been happening for some time and only occasionally doesn't reach the level of escalation that we we actually do about it.
1:06:43
Yeah, and I would say yesterday, I think that is exactly because it's such a it's such a more effective way to delay a program, because a military strike, and that was the whole debate about the merits of a military strike, even if there was a decision to make law, whether that was an effective way to actually stop it if they're over. So We saw this debate in 1981 when it's really struck the rocky nuclear facility and we and so forth and it's easier to reconstitute a program and you have the technical know how, right if you can't bomb you don't know where all the facilities are. Iran is a very big place. Lots of them lots of capabilities could be hidden but it's also the technical know how that they have. So unless you kill every potential nuclear scientist, it's gonna be very hard for them not to reconstitute it. So but it is a delaying tactic. So I think we the chat, so called shadow war type of activities are very much a possibility.
1:07:35
Okay, so we have actually gone over our allocated plan to our but it was such a good discussion, I felt that was worth it. So please join me in thanking
Transcribed by https://otter.ai