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Preface

The program *Islam: Portability and Exportability* was the outcome of a collaborative effort between the Center for Near Eastern Studies (CNES) and the Center for European and Eurasian Studies (CEES) to combine an annual seminar with a public lecture series. The two centers’ initial objective was to explore some of the issues facing Muslim communities in Europe and North America and to examine the ways in which such issues contribute to the (re)construction of (new) diasporic Muslim identities. The title of the program was conceived in late 2003 by Leonard Binder, Professor of Political Science and then-director of CNES. The program was funded by the US Department of Education (USDOE) and supported by the UCLA International Institute and other research units and organizations in the UCLA system and the Southern California area.

In early 2004, I was asked to serve as visiting faculty for the seminar and as convener of the public lecture series. The seminar was designed to target students from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds, and was housed in the History Department during its first year (Spring 2004) and then in the Sociology Department (Spring 2005, 2006, and 2007). The aim of the concurrent public lecture series was to invite to UCLA senior and junior scholars with specializations in diverse fields to present their ongoing research projects or past/present findings.

Some of the predominant questions that arose during the planning and running of the program, as well as during subsequent reflection and reevaluation sessions, may be grouped into, but not restricted to, three broad categories. First, there was a felt need to pursue inquiries and areas of research with descriptive and comparative nature. Examples included the following questions. How do Middle Eastern and Muslim diasporic communities differ from each other and from other ethnoreligious diasporas? What are the historical foundations, communal infrastructures, and sociopolitical forces that have produced such differences/similarities? And, have these similarities and differences persisted, and in what ways, in the past three decades, especially since September 11, 2001?

The second type of inquiry was concerned with broader international developments and their impact on diasporic identities. For instance, will globalization (and Americanization) deliver a new form of Muslim identities and how are diasporic characteristics being
observed/determined? Will emerging phenomena like the new world order, road map(s), world police, global village, and sibling society facilitate new conceptions and manifestations for diasporic organizations and mobilization? Will harmony within diversity prevail as the dominant factor in the new era of multicultural citizenship?

The third category of inquiries dealt with future paradigms as the technological and post-Enlightenment age continues to unfold in the coming decades. For example, will religions, cultures, and ethnicities persist as core identitarian criteria despite the surfacing and/or strengthening of interfaith dialogues, intermixed marriages, multi-mixed heritage, and multi-hyphenated identities? Will satellite capabilities and cellular/digital/visual technologies help reinvent a real or hyperreal sense of the homeland? And will a hermeneutic of universal sameness in understanding religious and ethnic diversity (and conflicts) come within reach by the end of the twenty-first century?

Some of these questions have already been addressed by past participants in the series while others are being pursued for the forthcoming sessions. What follows in this publication are synopses of some of the presentations. They are regrouped thematically to facilitate greater ease of use by students, specialists, and other interested parties.

As a word of acknowledgment, I am very grateful to Leonard Binder, former director of CNES, and to Ivan Berend and Gail Kligman, former and present directors of CEES, respectively, as well as to Jonathan Friedlander, assistant director of CNES, for their support and enthusiastic insights that ensured the continued success of this program. Beyond the availability of institutional support as well as USDOE funding, the success of the program was also due to the superb professionalism and kindness of the faculty and staff of the International Institute, CNES, CEES, and the departments of History and Sociology, including Lydia Bomberg, Erika Chau, Diane James, Mary Jo Johnson, David Lopez, Amanda Mountain, Mona Ramezani, Jim Robbins, Peter Szanton, and Roger Waldinger. Special recognition is due to Vera Wheeler (former CEES office manager) for her excellent and resourceful skills until she retired in 2006. I am also very grateful to the former and current chairs of my own Religious Studies Department at San Diego State University, Linda Holler and Rebecca Moore, as well as to office manager Margie Hoagland, for their characteristically kind cooperation in granting me a teaching schedule that enabled me to be at UCLA on Mondays. Finally, I am most grateful to the guest speakers for their outstanding attentiveness to the requests and inquiries of UCLA faculty,
students, and other program attendees. I remain, however, responsible for the shortcomings of this program and publication.

Samy Shavit Swayd
Islam emerged in early seventh-century Arabia in the city of Mecca, and then, in 622 CE, Muhammad and his several dozen followers were forced to migrate and settle in the city of Yathrib (later renamed Medina), marking the first year of the Islamic calendar and, with the establishment of the Medinan constitution/charter, the first Islamic state. Within a century of religious conversion and political expansion, some Muslims emigrated from the Arabian Peninsula to surrounding regions and slowly adopted, or became more intimately acquainted with, some of the traits and characteristics of the host lands, peoples, and languages. Some of the early Muslim migratory movements were rooted in the need or the aspiration for better living conditions and greater economic opportunities, while others were due to familial, tribal, political, ethnic, or sectarian conflicts.

The settlement of Muslims in Spain in the first decades of the eighth century is perhaps one of the early prominent and lasting (until 1492) immigrant Muslim communities. With this Arab/Muslim diffusion, there were also “migrating” arts, literatures, and scientific and literary manuscripts from the Arabian and Levantine lands to the Iberian Peninsula and other parts of the European continent. Thus, Arab/Muslim influences on the host literary genres and vice versa were inevitable.

But knowledge about these early waves of migration within and beyond what later came to be externally referred to as “the Middle East” remains in principle in the minds of, or in the libraries designed for, specialists and other interested well-read individuals. Differently stated, the average American or European person has continued to be unenlightened in regard to these histories and exchanges, and there has certainly been no need to be well-versed in such an often inaccessible body of knowledge. However, the state of affairs in the West (and the world)
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been strikingly and arguably different. While knowledge of the distant past may be rightly perceived as a “luxury item” that has utility only for the few, knowing the present must be considered a supreme necessity, especially because of unfathomable and tragic events such as those of 9/11 and 7/7. Moreover, the rising visibility of Muslims in the West and around the world is indeed unprecedented. It suffices to note that in the year 1900 Hinduism was the second largest religion in the world (after Christianity) and by 2000 Islam had become not only the second largest but also, as some observers claim, the fastest growing religion in the world. Thus, Americans and Europeans can no longer neglect such new developments and demographics. It also follows, with the advent of globalization, that the ideas of communal and national isolationism are something of the past and that micro-problems are rapidly affecting the entire globe, more and more directly than indirectly. Hence, what impacts one community is, or will rapidly be, shaping another.

Furthermore, and with a wider telescopic perspective, some of the primary characteristics of the past 30 years include the proliferation of diaspora communities around the world, the widening application of the problematic and authentically religious term “diaspora” from the Jewish setting to other contexts, and the subsequent emergence of the new field of Diaspora Studies. For the first time, Islamic and Middle Eastern religiocultural diasporas (such as Armenians, Assyrians, Baha’is, Chaldeans, Copts, Druzes, Isma’ilis, Jews, Mandaeans, Sunnis, Yazidis, and Zoroastrians) and ethnonational diasporas (such as Afghans, Ethiopians, Iranians, Iraqis, Israelis, Kurds, Lebanese, Palestinians, Somalis, Sudanese, and Yemenis) have indubitably become ubiquitous. Nevertheless, most diasporas remain understudied; many of them persist in their invisibility to governmental branches and to large segments of the population, and often in their indivisibility or indistinguishability in the eyes of some specialists or almost all lay observers. But what does the term *diaspora* mean? What are its etymological roots? And could it be used in the Islamic context?

The term *diaspora* comes from the Greek *diaspeirein* meaning “dispersion,” “to disperse,” or “to scatter seeds,” and has historically become illustrious in reference to the early Israelites and later to the Jewish people as a whole. Therefore, it has almost always been capitalized and intended to refer to the Jewish Diaspora in the formative years including the period after the destruction of the First Temple (586 BCE) or in the modern era especially from the dispersion of Europe’s Sephardic (after the late fifteenth century) and Ashkenazic (after the mid-eighteenth century) communities. This modern Jewish Diaspora took place both in an age of progressive political, philosophical, and industrial enlightenment, and later, after the “dark” or “degenerate”
age of modernity surfaced, with the ascendance of the Nazi regime in the early 1930s and the subsequent cataclysmic realities of the Holocaust.

Because of these historical roots and references to “diaspora” as a Jewish phenomenon, some scholars have insisted that the term is not applicable with reference to other peoples; exceptions have of course been made in regard to the Black African diaspora. Moreover, the Hebrew language has expressively provided us with two terms: galut meaning forced exile, such as the Babylonian one alluded to above with the destruction of the First Temple, and tfutsot meaning global dispersion throughout the history of the Jewish people.

On the other hand, many writers in the past 30 years have begun to use the concept with regard to other ethnonational and religiocultural communities. But some scholars have specifically objected to its use with regard to Islam, since Muslim migrants do not come from a single geographic place and therefore, these experts preferred to use the term only in reference to some national Muslim diasporas such as the “Pakistani Muslim diaspora” and the “Egyptian Muslim diaspora.” Though this assertion may be acceptable on some levels, one can argue that if the term is applicable to a single national diasporic Muslim community it must follow that it should also be applicable to the sum of such communities, especially if they share a common history and politics (i.e., the same recent governing Islamic empire or colonial power). Secondly, almost all Muslims have a sense of “imagined” ummah (community) through the relation to a sacred place in their primary holy city of Mecca toward which they have the qibla (direction of prayer), let alone the pillar of hajj (pilgrimage) to that city once a year if one is able. Thirdly, the concept has already been used in the context of Islam so often and therefore for the purpose of convenience that it may be too late not to succumb to its proponents, considering that its opponents are very few. Nevertheless, as with all concepts, “diaspora” must be used with a sense of careful application and clear qualification at all times and with all communities.

With this in mind, scholars have developed diverse criteria for the meanings of the term and eventually contributed to the field of Diaspora Studies. Thus, without engaging the lengthy process in which the criteria for this strategic and increasingly ubiquitous concept were developed, as well as considering the argument above, let us recreate the central defining characteristics which prove useful for our broadly based objectives here. A diaspora is a group of people that 1) originates in one geographical location and/or looks toward a common sacred place, 2) disperses to two or more host lands, and 3) considers itself, and is considered by a
large number of scholars and other observers, as a distinctive diasporic community, society, or association.
Part I: From Identities to Diasporic Identities

2. The Grid Model: A New Typology of Diasporic Muslim Identities

Samy Shavit Swayd∗

Postmodern trajectories are in the process of (de)constructing new types of Muslim identities where the Islamic way of life is being either re-authenticated from above or de-authenticated from below. The forces from above include missionary activities inspired and/or funded by individuals and organizations in the homelands (e.g., Wahhabi advocates), revival activities initiated by Western-born Muslims in the host lands (e.g., Tariq Ramadan), and indigenous activities brought forth by Western converts to Islam (e.g., Yusuf Islam/Cat Stevens). Here Islam persists as the core ideology, identity manifests itself as a characteristic of Islam, and the present/future incorporates, or merges with, the past. The forces from below include the widespread spread of globalization, the resurfacing of interfaith dialogues, and the rising trend of avowing personal spirituality in contrast to institutional religiosity. Here identity takes central stage as the core ideology, Islam becomes a characteristic of identity, and the present/future is without the past, or with little of it. Uninformed non-Muslim spectators outside this discourse will often either promote or avoid one or both of these realities due to their own politics or preferences.

Whether re-authentication or de-authentication prevails as the dominant force in the coming decades or whether the two coexist as necessary competing forces, a new typology is urgently needed. Such typology must be unlike the ones based in 1) sectarian, cultural, national, or regional criteria; 2) “immigrants” and their offspring born in the host land, often referred to as the “second generation”; and 3) the descriptive but problematic distinction between immigrants as “Muslims in the West” and subsequent generations as “Western Muslims.” The latter is problematic because some immigrants may be more Western in their worldview than persons born in the West. All these categories have certainly been analytically progressive and sociopolitically informative and, therefore, the assertion here is not that of dismissal but rather

that of an attempt to develop a new typology that is intended to advance not only the study of Muslim diasporas in the West but also Diaspora Studies in general. Thus, what conceptual framework and theoretical model could be utilized to identify a variety of diasporic identity types and how could the relationships between such identities be illuminated?

But before launching on this typological model, a definitional statement of “identity” and “diasporic identity” may prove useful as a starting point. In regard to the study of identity, three relevant hermeneutics may suffice here. The first is that of Talcott Parsons who distinguishes between the individual who is said to identify with a “social role” and conform to the specific “role norms,” and the person who is said to identify with a “social group” and internalize the entire “role system” of the group.

The second perspective is that of Erik Erikson who transcends the Freudian notion of “identification” (e.g., with a family member) and instills the fountainhead for the study of “identity” (and “identity crisis”) more than some scholars are willing to admit. “Identification” for Erikson becomes the second of three steps, the first being “introjection” (“primitive incorporation of another’s image”) and the third being “identity formation” which is self-explanatory. More importantly, Erikson thinks of identity as consisting of 1) a conscious sense of individual uniqueness,” 2) an unconscious striving for a continuity of experience,” and 3) “a solidarity with a group’s ideals.”

The third hermeneutic of identity is that of Douglass Kellner who identifies “premodern,” “modern,” and “postmodern” identities, and argues that in the premodern era identity “was not an issue” since one was born into it and could do nothing but carry on the communal tradition as it was “given” rather than acquired. In the modern period, in contrast, identity is reconfigured as a result of the Age of Enlightenment and therefore it has often become “a central issue” despite the fact that the self was still connected to the home, the family, and the surrounding culture. (Indeed, it goes without saying that most modern sociologists believe that identity has its basis in society and that the home and school provide for the construction of a dominant “core identity,” which remains permanent.) Kellner’s “postmodern identity” is “more an issue” than it was in the modern period and is still of course unfolding.

These three selected models for the concept of “identity” could certainly facilitate several precepts for the “diasporic identity” of Muslims. First, Muslim identity in the West is predominantly the product of late modernity and therefore it is not only “an issue,” to borrow
Kellner’s characterization of identity, but rather undoubtedly a complex one, especially due to the diversity of ideological, sociocultural, ethnonational, and political trends. Second, by the same token, to apply the Eriksonian perspective, in this age in general, and more so in the West in particular, the individual becomes “conscious of its uniqueness” more than ever before. Third, with Parsons’ insight, the individual becomes today (more than 50 years after Parsons’ writing) an active participant and to a great extent a particularistic selector of roles rather than a blind follower who is often subservient to tradition.

With these remarks in mind and for our present purposes, diasporic identity may be described therefore as a three-dimensional function of personal, and/or homeland, and/or host-land characteristics. It is the product of a process of internalizing and/or externalizing the homeland and/or host land, leading to a sense of the self as an agent for itself, and/or for the homeland, and/or for the host land. Moreover, it is visually and theoretically advantageous to utilize the Venn diagram and introduce four primary types of diasporic identities (and three secondary ones) forming the grid model as delineated very briefly here.

The first type in this grid model is Gestaltian Diasporic Identities (GDIs). GDIs embody a sense of wholeness and a total balance of the three components of diasporic identity: personality, homeland, and host land. Thus, a GDI-type of person is defined as one who is able to internalize all three components in a coherent, harmonious fusion. In other words, they are intermixed, inseparable, and indecomposable rather than simply the sum of all three. Erikson’s conscious and unconscious elements, introduced above and applied here to diasporic experiences, are indeed intertwined.

The second type is Reflectional Diasporic Identities (RDIs). An RDI person is one who reflects on host-land experiences and at the same time on the homeland memories or traditions with the self-identity being unconsciously lost or dislodged, or consciously manipulated. The person is a dedicated follower who is unwilling or unable to perceive a possibility of being the agent for the self, because the self is already stripped of its selfhood by means of external indoctrination or internal transformation. The person has long experienced the demise or suppression of personal identity, either permanently or at least for an unspecified phase of his/her life. In the Eriksonian sense, some of the RDI persons have stopped at introjection (“primitive[ly]”) with a non-Eriksonian–identity type of identity.
The third category is Inflectional Diasporic Identities (IDIs). This type is characterized, or modified, by inflection: the person is deeply affected and reshaped by the host-land traits and way of life. Though in mathematics the "inflection point" (or "flex point") is the point at the middle of an arc, here IDI begins at or around that point; in other words, the person is in the area on the right side of the middle of the arc. One may reiterate the obvious and restate that social phenomena are not defined quantitatively but qualitatively and some take a lengthy period of time. A person with an IDI is one who lives more or less in the host-land ways but is not completely assimilated.

The fourth type is Deflectional Diasporic Identities (DDIs) and is the opposite of the previous one. Here, the person turns aside or away from any potential inflection by the host-land ways. A person who remains with such an identity is one who has deflected any host-land characteristics and is wholeheartedly fixated on the homeland; he or she avoids or rather preempts engagement with things of the host land and constantly embodies and defends the homeland mindset. He or she has neither totally rejected the host land nor lived completely in the homeland ways.

These four types are of course not fixed or static but are often dynamically moving on the surface and, based on individual orientation or circumstances, may relocate as often as their internal and external stimuli dictate. Moreover, they do not represent all possible types, and the Venn diagram presents us with others located at the surrounding boundaries of these four types. Though these alternate types are less frequent, they are probable and could be observable if one looked harder behind the scenes in any diasporic community. The first example could be the person who is totally assimilated in the ways of the host land and has unconsciously forgotten, or consciously erased, all attachments to the homeland; they neither imagine their (parents’) original homeland nor wish to think of it; for them, any argument for homeland identity is nonsensical. The second example is the person who is consistently and completely at the homeland. They are unaffected by the host land and they differ from the DDIs in that they neither interact with the host land nor are they even aware of its existence. Thus such persons are in isolation by their own choosing or due to their medical/mental condition; unlike the DDIs, they do not struggle to deflect it; in their case, the deflection has already occurred. They have been transfixied and due to whatever limitations they have been veiled. The third example reflects persons who are unimpacted by home- or host-land characteristics as they live in a psychological state of self-centeredness; that is, their awareness of any external stimuli, homeland or host-land, is nonexistent; they were born and remain that way.
Finally, the application of the Venn diagram provides us with a sharper typology and forces us to transcendent existing categories. It reinforces diversity in identity types and reiterates the dynamic nature of identity as it moves on the grid. The purpose and usefulness of the grid model may be briefly described as threefold. First, the model could serve to facilitate self-knowledge for individuals as they aim for better and more meaningful and productive encounters in their own daily life in the diaspora. By knowing one’s place on the grid one can develop working strategies for self-improvement and a rational base for selection. Second, the model could be used in the context of governmental screening of individuals perceived as threatening or having suspicious behaviors; the location of the person on the grid may define the level of threat and then facilitate the applicable and/or desirable course of action in order to reduce such threat and/or transform the individual. Third, the model could also be utilized in business and employment practices to recruit the most promising candidates and then design the appropriate training workshops.
Any approach to Islam’s relation to modernity requires an analysis of modernity itself. What I want to argue is that the current dilemmas faced in the Islamic world are the result not of some “clash of civilizations” or some “Arab exceptionalism,” but are rather due to an uneven process of incorporating different strands of modernity. In short, I think that the collapse of the modernization programs during the postwar era in the Middle East, coupled with the resistance of certain political traditions (specifically those tied to the Enlightenment), has led to a crisis in the Islamic world and has given rise to anti-modern Islamic ideologies.

Central to this argument is that modernity needs to be conceived in two different ways. Modernity can no longer be interpreted as a monolithic process, for good or for ill. Rather, we need to distinguish between content and form, or between two forms of modernization: the first I will call “degenerate modernity” and the other “enlightened modernity.” The first term refers to the insistence on institutional forms of modernity which emphasize centralization of power, modern economic processes, the exploration of technology and the modern sciences, and a move toward global economic interdependence. The second term is not mutually exclusive with the first, but emphasizes a moral-evaluative perspective which places emphasis on the notions of social justice, democratic culture, the questioning and critiquing of tradition and custom, and the move toward constraining the arbitrary exercise of social power and also the cultivation of individual autonomy which was the centerpiece of Western modernity itself. The extent to which the first kind of modernity is privileged at the expense of the latter, I call “uneven modernization”; and this can lead to complex problems politically, culturally and economically.

But how does this apply to Islam and its relation to modernity? In my reading, Islamic history for the past two centuries tells a story of a relatively one-sided incorporation of modernity, a classic case of uneven modernization. As a result, it has given rise to social fragmentation and to the

rise of Islamic ideologies as a result of the collapse of this one-sided modernization process. Islam’s relation to modernity begins in the late eighteenth century. Since Islamic society was largely structured around strong central authority—such as the Ottoman Caliphate—the way that modernity was appropriated and interpreted was for the increase of centralized power, the use of science as a means to exploit natural resources, and to develop military strength.

Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who was an Ottoman diplomat in Paris in the 1830s, put forth ideas that were to direct the policies of the empire for the next half-century. Among these, Reşid Pasha saw that

the empire must become a modern centralized state, and this involved several conditions: first, the creation of a modern army and an educated corps of officers; the use of this army to establish and tighten control of the central government over the semi-autonomous and virtually independent provinces. This would be done to lessen revolt and foreign interference. Last there was the concern for the equality of all citizens in the empire (Hourani 1962, 44).

This was not limited to the Ottomans themselves. Earlier than Reşid Pasha, Muhammad Ali came to power in Egypt as the French were leaving the country in 1805. He saw modern Europe as “a dynamic society rationally exploiting its resources and administering its affairs with national strength as the criterion of law and policy” (Hourani 1962, 52–3). Ali saw that the basis of the strength of modern Europe was in its scientific organization of production, and he also saw that the essence of modernity was an enhancement of centralized political control, the expansion and advancement of economic activity and industry, and the development of the military for means of control and defense. His indifference to Western political ideas was the result of this one-sided view of Europe and modernity.

The recent rise in anti-Western and, as a consequence, anti-liberal and anti-enlightenment modernity in the Islamic world is not, I would argue, a result of the internal cultural dynamics of Islamic societies themselves—i.e., a “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. What I think can most usefully explain the contemporary dilemma of Islamic societies is the collapse of this one-sided modernization process which created room for movements with Islamic ideologies to enter into the public scene. These groups were able to identify for many aspects of the public the source of injustice in the modernizing state—think of Egypt and Iran in this regard in the 1970s—and were able to use this to create a critical discourse about the conditions in which they found themselves.
Economic and social fragmentation between different segments of society (specifically in Egypt and Iran, but this is applicable to other Islamic countries in the Middle East as well) began to occur in the late 1960s and increased in intensity during the early 1970s, and as a result the ideological drive behind the development policies began to fall apart and so did the vision of a national culture (again, this is particularly in Egypt). As these two sectors drifted apart, the societal, political, and ideological cohesion sought by modernizers began to break down. Uneven modernization was accompanied, in this case, by uneven development and both were responsible for giving new life to the Islamic discourse—one that had been suppressed for a good part of the 1950s and 1960s.

As this situation grew worse, the real goal of the nationalist modernizers became harder to achieve: namely the integration of the entire populace into a national culture. Instead, the fragmentation of society—not simply in terms of class, but also in terms of social practices, education, values, etc.—became increasingly exclusionary with oppressive consequences. With the material foundations for a more even form of modernization lacking, the disenfranchised became increasingly susceptible to Islamist language and ideas. And this language and ideas—as is quite obvious from any casual analysis of their ideological tenets—are both thoroughly anti-modernist in outlook and in terms of their political and cultural projects as well.

References

4. Islam and Modernity in Turkey

Brian Silverstein

Turkey is not a post-colony, and the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Republican Turkey today may be considered an extended and ongoing experiment in the chain of events entailed by the engagement of a sovereign Muslim polity located on the near margin of the heartland of industrial capitalism with the characteristically modern forms of power and selfhood. The key context of this engagement was the Balkans, the region of the Empire on the front line of the assault by polities that were already in the process of incorporating modern techniques of governmentality (Imperial Russia and Austro-Hungary). Various Balkan nationalisms beginning in the nineteenth century have carefully orchestrated the “alien-ness” of Muslims in the region, as part of attempts to construct both homogeneous national states and to write histories of the allegedly natural relationship of these nation-states to Western Europe. Yet the Balkan environment of the Empire is crucial to an appreciation of the political culture of the late Empire and especially the Republican elites.

In the Ottoman and Turkish case the structure of the positions from which problems were identified and analyzed and measures proposed—in short, the relations of power and force, and conditions for strategic calculation and agency—indicates a sovereign polity attempting to incorporate modern forms of power, as a result of reasoned debate on terms internal to Islamic traditions, in order to prevent its own domination by nonbelievers, as would eventually be the case of so much of the Muslim world. This entailed the production and application of new kinds of knowledge (e.g., military engineering and medicine, sanitation and hygiene, etc.) which existing institutions were not producing, but which had to be gleaned from outside the Muslim world. However, over the course of the nineteenth century an increasing amount of authority and prestige was accorded to these bodies of knowledge, the proliferation of which was considered to enable Muslims to defend themselves. We should not understand this process as constituting simply “Westernization,” for this term elides the fragmented and provincial character

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of many regions that would eventually refer to themselves as the “West.” The Ottomans, not unlike Spain, Sweden, and Russia, were sending officers and administrators to such centers as Paris, London, and Berlin to observe and acquire those emerging techniques constitutive of the distinctively modern forms of power. The Ottomans were simply one of these sovereign polities seeking more efficient ways to maximize resources and prosecute more efficient warfare.

This is the origin of the arrangements that in Turkey later came to be called secularism, which in the Turkish context refers in principle to the separation of something called religion from something called public life, but refers in practice primarily to institutional issues of how much power is to be accorded to those whose authority derives from their knowledge of Islamic traditions. The questions Ottomans and early Republican generations asked themselves regarding this process were not philosophical ones, nor was the issue one of identity initially (the reformers were confident in their Muslim credentials). In important Muslim centers like the Balkans and the Caucasus, it had become clear by the late nineteenth century that there would simply be no more Muslims there if they failed to reorganize the regime of power and knowledge. Similar processes have taken place in other parts of the Muslim world, including the Middle East, but perhaps not so dramatically.

Most of the countries considered to unproblematically constitute a part of the present cultural and political geography of “Europe” were actively engaged in a similar process of incorporating (from “outside”) as much of these modern techniques as possible, by sending military and administrative commissions to Paris, London, and Berlin as observers. These processes have been retrospectively normalized, aided by nationalist historiographies of those aspiring to European status, as developments “within” a homogeneous Europe; in the case of the transfer of these techniques to Ottoman lands, it somehow becomes a matter of “civilizations.” Yet there is nothing “unnatural” about Ottoman appropriations of modern disciplinary technologies of power, any more than there is anything “natural” about Vienna, Rome, or St. Petersburg doing the same. The Ottoman and Turkish case is a particularly potent one for the project of provincializing Europe, for we cannot analytically assume an entity with a coherent, homogeneous “Western” or “European” essence, stretching from Spain to Russia, from the Balkans to Ireland, that simultaneously produced and experienced modernity as natural, authentic, and indigenous, and then exported it to “foreign” (“non-Western”) climes.

The differentiation in the late Ottoman Empire of specifically Islamic regimes of knowledge and power from other kinds of knowledge was the onset of a process, solidified in the Republic after
1923, whereby Islam came to be increasingly “privatized,” increasingly defined as having to do with private belief, personal choice, and domestic affairs. This process was not consciously initiated as such, but rather was a result of shifts in prestige and resource allocations associated with the creation of new institutions and types of knowledge that would allow one to maintain one’s sovereignty; the process was already underway well before it started to be theorized, and most certainly well before the establishment of the Republic in 1923. This process of Islam becoming a “religion” roughly in the liberal-secular mould that emerged from the history of power struggles between the Church, princes, and an emergent bourgeoisie in Western Europe is continuing to unfold in Turkey and to be debated, often implicitly, in many parts of the Muslim world. The Republican state made a conscious project of this privatization, which is the core issue around which the “modality” of Turkish modernity has been elaborated. For such a project, the institutionalization of a private/public distinction, and the locating of Islam as a matter of personal, private choice, is taken to be an index of the presence of political modernity in Turkey.
The “Coca-Cola-ization” of the planet is the most palpable facet of globalization. Another facet—one that receives less media attention but which is just as prevalent—is cultural heterogenization, a phenomenon that becomes apparent not only in cultural crossbreeding, but also by the fact that different groups (communities, nations) continue to survive and recreate themselves against the cultural imperialism of the West. The excessive homogenization of lifestyles can indeed be viewed as a danger and lead in turn to all kinds of self-preservation and self-reconstruction, sometimes in the more excessive incarnations such as “fundamentalism.” Planet “Coca Cola,” built around cultural products that have been standardized by the entertainment industries (music, television, cinema), and around communications industries, is a place where the search for true authenticity becomes difficult. “Authenticity,” this new buzzword on the international stage, refers to any movement that expresses within the political arena a need for specificity, whether in the form of Eastern nationalism, provincialism of Western democracies, or religions.

The above ideas lead us directly to the following dilemma: is it impossible, as Samuel Huntington claims, to disassociate the quest for authenticity from all the varied forms of fundamentalism, as well as from the notion of the clash of civilizations? Or, on the other hand, does this quest allow for the concept of individuality to be redefined (Lee 1997, 3)? Certain people are inclined to favor the clash of civilizations hypothesis. According to this theory, Islam clearly becomes, in the period following the end of the Cold War, the enemy of the West. Islam can only be considered a major cause of conflicts because of the supposed incompatibility between the Islamic value system and that of the West. Other thinkers, such as Bryan Turner, prefer a postmodernist interpretation according to which the Islamic quest for authenticity confirms the defeat of the Enlightenment. According to this approach, it is understood that anti-consumerist ethics (based on traditional Islamic doctrine) (Turner 1994, 92) are a response to

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the West’s cultural domination; and it is posited that Muslims seek security (regarding their identity and authority) in a literal interpretation of the Islamic tradition, applicable to all areas of life.

My approach is not based on either of these interpretations. Neither religion in general nor Islam in particular will be considered merely as a cause of international conflict, nor as a reaction against modernity (Halliday 1994). I opt rather for a sociological investigation of Islamic religious identities and practices using analytic tools that have been applied to other religious groups in order to dissolve the artificial opposition between East and West (the “Orient” and the “Occident”) within which the analysis of Muslim populations is still all too often enclosed and which leads to Islam being considered as a “special case exception.” This sociology of religious practices is based on the hypothesis that religions have the ability to accelerate the process of globalization by promoting the move from community ties to association-based ties. In other words, in the response to globalization, religions do not merely strengthen pre-existing identities (based on gender, family, or geography), but also offer resources for constructing new forms of individualization and globalization. The ideoscapes described by Arjun Appadurai (1990) are not exclusively tied to those promotions of Western culture such as Coca-Cola or McWorld. Religious and cultural facts that spread the ideas of justice, morality, dignity, and authenticity also play a crucial role in the shaping of ideoscapes in the same way as the Declaration of Human Rights, democracy, etc. In this respect, Muslim minorities within Western democracies come to be a very appropriate example of the complex relationships between modernity and globalization.

Western Muslims are faced with a radically new situation: the integration of the Islamic tradition at the heart of secularized democracies. Throughout this process, the compatibility of Islam with the notion of Western citizenship, the adaptation of tradition within a situation of pluralism, the transmission of and education in Islam within a minority situation, are topics which necessarily become of key importance. These questions are not only raised within the context of each national area, but echo and respond across national boundaries, an effect of cultural globalization. European Islam is connected with the stakes and political and cultural difficulties of the Muslim world, as demonstrated by the September 11 attacks. However, beyond sometimes radical networks of political activism, it is a whole collection of doxa, debates, controversies, and figures of authority that Western Muslims share with the ummah. At the same time, they are far from being merely an echo chamber for the political and cultural issues
that are taking place elsewhere, for they are, on the contrary, at the heart of religious and cultural innovations linked to their European context.

The condition of European and American Muslims brings to light the fact that the opposition between fundamentalism and universalism is insufficient in accounting for the complex relationship to religion that is generated by cultural globalization, a process that simultaneously promotes defensive reactions in the name of Islam, what Homi Bhabha calls forms of “contra-modernity.” It is thus not difficult to understand how and why Islam can be called upon as a resource for fighting against a West that has been essentialized as destructive and oppressive.

It is in such a context that the more conservative interpretations of the Islamic message (Wahhabism and fixed forms of Salafism) have so many followers in all parts of the Muslim world.

At the same time, cultural globalization accelerates the crossbreeding or hybridization of the Islamic message and the European or American cultural context by generating unprecedented reflection on the conditions necessary for tolerance and proper respect of the Other. Islamic thought, which has long been focused primarily on governing Islam, is thus currently taking on a new dimension that emphasizes the terms of coexistence between different religions at the heart of a shared national collectivity, and between religions and nonbelievers at the center of a shared tradition. One of the unexpected consequences of September 11 has been the way this trend has moved toward the heart of the Muslim world, bringing to light for the first time an opposition between the “local” and the “foreign” Muslim. To this opposition can be added a further one, between fundamentalists and radicals insofar as a return to the fundamental texts of Islam, i.e. fundamentalism, need not automatically be a synonym for religious extremism, i.e. the shutting off of one’s thoughts and the rejection en bloc of other belief systems. It is important, however, not to make the hasty deduction that the trend of universalism is restricted to the Western world alone. It is also present in many sectors of Muslim societies, even though the Western world functions as a kind of sounding board for ideas that are elsewhere silenced by authoritarian regimes.

As Humphrey has stated, “the Western frontiers actually represented an opening which might engender skepticism about the authority of tradition; the possibility of challenging the World through the engagement of traditions in new spaces constructed by relations outside their control” (1998, 18). It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the emblematic figures of modernism nowadays live in Europe and America, where they are reconciling Islam and the
West. Their presence alone constitutes a challenge to dominant historical narratives that continue to submit Muslims to the oppression of Western imperialism.

In addition, as interpretations of Islam become ever more numerous, debate intensifies over the use of Islamic symbols.

Increasingly, discussions in newspapers, on the Internet, on smuggled cassettes, and on television cross-cut and overlap, contributing to a common public space. New and accessible modes of communication have made these contests increasingly global, so that even local issues take on transnational dimensions. The combination of new media and new contributors to religious and political debates fosters an awareness on the part of all actors of the diverse ways in which Islam and Islamic values can be created. It feeds into new senses of a public space that is discursive, performative, and participative, and not confined to formal institutions recognized by state authorities (Eickelman 1999).

However appealing they may be, romanticized visions of transnational religious networks as a pre-condition for democratization must be resisted. Authoritarian regimes can take control of or manipulate transnational groups, as the secular leader Saddam Hussein did when he invoked Islam in his media broadcasts during the Gulf War.

In a challenge to pluralistic democracy, transnational Islam is also raising questions about religious freedom and tolerance, as well as limits to public expressions of faith. Pluralism in Western secularized society no longer refers to the integration of socially subordinated groups or the representation of social diversity, but rather to the balance between cultural diversity and cohesion within the national community (Cesari 2003). Democracies are thus forced to answer a number of questions regarding the possibility of reaching a collective agreement on cultural, political, and religious values (this dilemma is illustrated by the opposition between liberals and communitarians in the US), and the possibility of evolving beyond shallow civility to genuine acceptance of the Other.

In conclusion, it is useful to recapitulate that in the global era, Muslims in the West are currently formulating new debates on Islam, democracy, and modernization, and are involved in a process of translating Islam into more universalistic terms. Secularization is changing the meaning of Islamic observance and altering the relationship between the individual and religious tradition. Western Islamic communities have become participants within transnational networks
and Western Muslims have become legitimate members of the *ummah*. The ways Western Islam will challenge the Muslim world’s regimes remain to be seen.

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The notion of “critical Islam” refers to a particular orientation toward the production and status of religious knowledge. Unlike labels such as “liberal” or “progressive” Islam, critical Islam does not refer to any particular normative project. Rather, it speaks to a tendency toward greater sensitivity and reflexivity regarding the particular historical and political contexts in which claims to religious knowledge are formulated. With regard to individual thought and practice, it suggests a tendency toward greater objectification and externalization of religion—that is, to separate one’s Muslimness from claims to authoritative and “authentic” Islam and to examine the nature and status of those claims. For example, rather than blindly accepting the idea that the “Islamic” position on a given issue is a matter of settled received wisdom, critical Islam would ask questions about how such normative positions came to be accepted as convention or common sense. The work of the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi—such as her book *Women and Islam*, which interrogates the consolidation of Islamic tradition and practice around the role of women—is a good example of an early contribution to the evolving genre of critical Islam.

Diasporic contexts have played a particularly important role in the formation of critical Islam for a number of reasons. Muslim intellectuals working in these settings are often educated to the very highest levels, and have the capacity to deploy philosophical and social theoretical languages and concepts less familiar in the intellectual ecology of Muslim-majority countries. The diasporic experience is also one that—by necessity—leads Muslims to objectify their religion more so than if they were still living in countries in which Islam is simply part of the social fabric. In other words, to live as a religious minority is to be made much more aware of the distinctiveness of one’s religious identity and practice. Many of the key authors have been educated in and are

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professionally based in Western liberal contexts in which freedom of thought generally, and critical inquiry more specifically, are prevalent norms.

In the eyes of many young Muslims in the West today, the traditional scripturalism (or “village Islam”) of their parents holds little hope of providing resources for the issues and problems they face in their day-to-day lives. What they seek, rather, is a renewal and reinterpretation of Islam—a reorientation toward religion—such that it speaks directly to the circumstances of being Muslim in twenty-first–century Europe or North America. It is in the cosmopolitan, transnational spaces of cities such as London and Los Angeles that this kind of exchange is taking place. The range of myriad cultures, ideas, and people that flow through these spaces produce rich sites of hybridized intellectual activity. The syncretisms and interminglings that inhabit these cities also constitute the cutting edge of critical Islam. It is also an environment in which such conversations can be openly expressed, assessed, and reformulated. In this sense, Western transnational space stands in stark contrast to the situation in many Muslim-majority states where the capacity to stray publicly from officially prescribed doctrine is heavily circumscribed. Western settings, on the other hand, offer the aspiring Muslim intellectual the opportunity both to express and to encounter alternative readings of Islam.

An important trend in this regard is to be found in the work of the Swiss-Egyptian philosopher Tariq Ramadan. Called at times a “Muslim Martin Luther,” Ramadan is simultaneously steeped in the intellectual tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood—and, in that sense, certainly does not adhere to standard “progressive-liberal” viewpoints when it comes to social issues. He has, however, been at the forefront in recent years of an emerging, deeply hybridized idiom of European Islam. Ramadan’s project, elaborated primarily in two books, To Be a European Muslim (1999) and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (2004), calls for a new pragmatism in Muslim thought and jurisprudence, particularly among Muslims living as minorities in the West.

Yet Ramadan’s emphasis on the European Muslim is not an invocation to insularity and “ghettoization.” Rather he suggests that as a minority community, Muslims possess a set of responsibilities and duties as regards their relations with non-Muslim others. Through what amounts to a radical reinterpretation of the traditional Islamic dichotomous cosmology that divides the world into dar al-Islam (lands where Muslim rulers and shari’a law are in place) and dar al-harb (those lands in which Muslims struggle to achieve the former), Ramadan reffigures the political and ethical geography of minority Islam. If Islam in Europe is seen instead, he would
argue, as an example of *dar al-da’wa* (the abode of the call)—or, better yet, as *dar al-shahada* (the space of testimony)—then we have a situation in which Muslims are required to interact responsibly and equitably with non-Muslims. Withdrawal and introspection are not options; rather, civic participation, coexistence, and outreach all become imperative. As Ramadan writes:

> Muslims will henceforth have to ask questions, not alone, not *against* the whole society, but now *with* their fellow citizens through a sincere and genuine shared preoccupation.... The Muslims’ religion commands them to strive for more justice, but this certainly does not mean that they should be concerned only with themselves and not collaborate with all those who try to reform society for the better, in the name of human dignity and respect (1999, 230–2).

This trend in Ramadan’s work represents what I have defined above as “critical Islam,” again a dual connotation that suggests a need for historicism with regard to Islamic tradition but which also presents the possibility of regarding Islam as a form of critique (vis à vis, for example, Western neoliberalism). Ramadan’s idiom of Islam, I think, helps us to transcend the impasse between critique and solidarity, where the former is figured as a threat to the latter. Rather, he demonstrates that a new hermeneutics of the other in Islam—necessarily, at times, entailing critique—can actually produce a variant of solidarity premised upon coexistence and testimony to core ethical values. Ramadan has been a controversial figure in a number of Western countries, and often finds himself accused of engaging in a “double discourse”—that is, having one set of views that he presents to Muslim audiences, and quite a different one that he provides to the Western media. Perhaps the main point, however, is that many who use his ideas do not necessarily agree with his politics or his views on social issues. Rather, many of Ramadan’s diasporic admirers—aspiring practitioners of critical Islam in their own right—derive from his thinking a new confidence to interpret Islam for themselves and to resist the inertia of religious dogmatism.

References


Part III: Islam, Participation, and Education

7. Symbolic Politics and the Europeanization of Islam: The Role of Muslim Interest Groups in the European Union

Melissa Anne Parker*

Depending on the source, there are currently 12–15 million Muslims living in the member states of the European Union (EU), and this total is expected to climb to 23 million by the year 2015. These statistics reflect the significant number of Muslims arriving as refugees and asylum seekers, but also the growing proportion of the population that has been born in Europe. For this reason, it has been suggested that the Muslim community in Western Europe is now increasingly a “European community,” transnational in nature and joined by a common religion termed “Euro-Islam” by scholars and policy makers alike.

The concept of Euro-Islam describes a liberal variety of Islam that is acceptable both to Muslim migrants and to European societies; it is the same religion of Islam, but culturally adjusted to encompass European ideas of secularity and individual citizenship along the lines of modern secular democracy. Bassam Tibi has highlighted the features of Euro-Islam as “laïcité, cultural modernity, and an understanding of tolerance that goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamic believers (ahl al-kitab)” (2002, 37–8). He further asserts that, “thus defined, Euro-Islam… could enable the adoption of forms of civil society leading to an enlightened, open-minded Islamic identity compatible with European civic culture” (38).

Looking at Muslim communities in Western Europe, one can see certain aspects of civil society emerging, particularly the formation of interest groups. These groups are formed intent on providing representation for the minority Muslims with their European state governments. Furthermore, some of these state-level interest groups have chosen to cooperate transnationally at the EU level of government in order to bypass their unresponsive state governments and utilize EU institutions to place additional pressure on their state governments. While their effectiveness, relationship with the government, and implication for policy outcome vary among issues and among states, another important question emerges that has been

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neglected in the scholarship. What role do these Muslim interest groups play in the creation and/or perpetuation of a Euro-Islamic identity among Muslim elites? How important is the EU as an ally and venue for Muslim interest groups in the fostering of this identity?

Working Hypothesis

I argue that one of the causal factors in the emergence of a Euro-Islamic identity among Muslim elites is the constant and consistent interaction they have with EU governmental institutions and officials while working transnationally in interest groups. This interaction allows socialization, or Europeanization, to occur in which Muslim elites are indoctrinated into the European political culture as they lobby for Muslim representation within European society. This Europeanization informs the identity already cultivated by the Muslims living within Europe, providing another set of ideas, “European” ideas, with which to shape their identity. The outcome is the aforementioned Euro-Islamic identity. I will briefly outline the particulars of the argument below.

Synopsis of the Argument

In many European states, a sizeable population of Muslim minorities has found it necessary to engage the government on issues that are important to their communities. These issues range from discrimination and unemployment in the European cities in which they live to foreign policy toward the countries from which they, at one time, emigrated. In order to interact with the state and gain access to policy makers, Muslim elites founded interest groups through which they lobby state governments for recognition and have their voices heard on certain issues.

However, being minorities in a democratic state, these groups face certain challenges that block their success. First, Muslims face intense socioeconomic and religious marginalization within Europe. Much of the European Muslim population finds itself living in poverty, and since September 11, a new form of “Islamophobia” has spread across Europe, forcing public opinion against Muslims. This combination of low socioeconomic standing and hostile public opinion marginalizes Muslims in the eyes of politicians. Second, the parameters within which interest groups engage the state are defined by the state. This poses a major problem for ethnic minority groups, like the Muslims, who find that they are not recognized as legitimate interest groups in some states and thus have no standing with the state government.

Facing these challenges at the state level, and recognizing the increased interdependence within the multilevel structure of the EU, where every demand at the state level implies a
simultaneous pressure at the European level, and a similar situation in which every claim at the European level affects the decisions of each member state, Muslim interest groups have become Brussels-bound.

With its multilevel structure that includes the supranational level made up of the common EU institutions, the national level which includes the member state governments, and the subnational level which is made up of local units, the EU provides a two-fold advantage to interest groups in need of an audience for their grievances. First, Wayne Sandholtz points to the way EU institutions can affect political behavior and outcomes by creating options for domestic actors by giving them their choice of allies (1998). In this way, the supranational institutions can become potential coalition partners with domestic societal groups against their nonresponsive local or national governments. Second, the creation of the supranational level made possible the emergence of multiple political arenas, a “Brussels complex” that organizes ongoing, open-ended negotiation around a large number of common issues (Stone Sweet et al. 2001, 1). Thus, with the creation of the supranational level, Muslim interest groups have both a new ally and a new arena in which to agitate for a successful resolution of their grievances. No longer must they rely solely on their uninterested and nonresponsive state governments in order to gain a satisfactory response to their issues.

It is not only the Muslim groups who gain from their work with the supranational-level institutions and officials, as the European Union also benefits in certain ways. Two goals of the EU are to combat the alleged “democratic deficit” and to gain greater competence in areas of policymaking over which the member states still have control. In assisting the minority Muslim interest groups, the EU sees itself as addressing both issues. For example, since 1986, the European Parliament has made funds available to so-called immigrant associations to assist their efforts in developing interest groups, political strategies, and mobilization beyond the member states in transnationally coordinated “umbrella organizations” that represent all of the affiliated state-level interest groups. By funding and encouraging these transnational groups of minorities and giving them representation at the European level of government, EU officials see themselves as contributing to the democratic culture of Europe. Furthermore, they believe that with greater involvement in the area of migrant and minority rights, they will gain a greater foothold on policy making in this issue area.

As such, it is not difficult to understand the beneficial relationship between Muslim interest groups and the institutions of the EU. It appears that both stand to gain from working together;
the Muslim groups gain greater pressure on their state governments and the EU gains greater policy competence and combats the democratic deficit. However, these benefits are not the greatest success that emerges from the relationship between the EU and the transnationally cooperating Muslim interest groups. It is the emergence of an acute Euro-Islamic identity among the Muslim leaders working together with the EU officials that is the most interesting and important implication.

Case Studies and Preliminary Findings

In order to test my hypothesis, I focus on three state-level Muslim organizations: the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF), and the Association of German Muslims, along with the cooperative umbrella organization that works at the European Union, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE). My preliminary findings, based on the scholarly literature, organizational documents, official EU documents and reports, and interviews I have conducted with Muslim leaders, provide evidence that confirms my working hypothesis. I will briefly discuss three of these related findings below.

First, and alluded to in my earlier argument, Muslim interest groups have shown a shift in strategy, taking their issues to the EU, rather than lobbying only unresponsive state and local government. What is an apparent act of strategic politics, whereby organizations broaden and enlarge their issues by lobbying at a larger venue of government, in actuality also produces an identity shift. In order to lobby the EU institutions effectively, European Muslims from many European states work together in the FIOE. In this way, the Muslim leadership not only internalizes the socialization, or Europeanization, that affects officials working in the EU (Byers 2005), but they also face the reality that European Muslims are part of the greater European community that shares in the burden of alleviating societal pressures.

Second, and related, there has been a shift in the issues that are advanced by the Muslim organizations. Early in their history, these groups were solely concerned with "homeland issues," devoting most of their time and money to lobbying for an improvement in the policies of their European host state toward the state from which they emigrated. Today, these organizations are driven by the issues that affect European Muslims within their European states: education, discrimination, and unemployment, to name a few. This shift in issues reflects the fact that European Muslims no longer view the homeland as their primary focus of
allegiance; they are now Europeans and must work to improve the conditions in the cities in which they live.

Finally, there has been a *shift in the rhetoric* that is used by the Muslim organizations. Speeches and publications no longer assert the importance of working toward solving the Muslim community’s problems in spite of the European majority; instead, they assert the importance of working with fellow Europeans to solve common societal problems. Again, this shift shows how the Muslim leadership no longer views the Muslim community as disengaged from Europe, but as part of the larger European community.

Implications and Conclusions

By focusing solely on the policy output of European institutions, many scholars claim that Muslim interest groups that lobby the European Union are engaged in “symbolic politics.” While this appears to be true from that vantage point, there is much more happening between the European institutions and the Muslim leadership that is missed in such a superficial examination, namely the Europeanization of Islam.

I argue that one of the causal factors in the emergence of a Euro-Islamic identity among Muslim elites is the constant and consistent interaction that they have with EU governmental institutions and officials while working transnationally in interest groups. By working together to lobby the EU in a supranational-level umbrella organization, the FIOE, the leaders of state-level Muslim interest groups are becoming socialized, or Europeanized, and recognizing that they are part of a larger community of Europeans working toward similar societal goals. As the Muslim leadership internalizes this reality, and as it begins to shape aspects of their identity, one can see how this change manifests itself through the workings of the interest groups under their leadership. No longer are these groups working solely toward homeland issues and defining the European Muslim community’s challenges as distinct from those of the majority European society. Today’s Muslim interest groups are concerned with working toward common solutions to common European societal problems.

These shifts in the Muslim interest groups’ strategy, issues, and rhetoric distinctly parallel the shifts in identity occurring in their leaders. And while this is a research project in its infancy and much more work remains to be done, I am convinced that further study will uncover even more causal links between Muslim leaders working with European governmental institutions and the emergence of a Euro-Islamic identity.
References


Although much of the popular and academic discussion of the “Muslims in Europe” is carried out with close reference to issues of diversity, many of these accounts still disregard or downplay the wide range in the experiences and self-identifications of individuals who are nominally included in the category. Not only are there significant differences in the way Islam is interpreted and practiced by migrants in Europe from different national origins, but there is also great variability in the way individuals self-associate with the labels that popular discourses in the European host countries use to categorize them. Perhaps the most frequently overlooked dimension of such variability is that of the social-class backgrounds of transplants to Europe from predominantly Muslim countries. The case of high-skilled professionals from Turkey who live and work in corporate jobs in Sweden and Finland offers a glimpse of how these middle-class actors relate to the categorical markers of “Muslim” and “Turkish.”

In this paper I draw upon empirical material collected intermittently over two years in Sweden and Finland. During this time I had the opportunity, both within the confines of the actual study and outside of it, to hear about the experiences of a number of Turks living and working there. The original study investigated the organization and experience of high-skilled work inside multinational corporations, in the specific context of two of the world’s leading corporations in the mobile telecommunications sector based in Sweden and Finland. Since one of the major research themes was the forms of geographical mobility made possible through high-skilled employment in multinationals, foreign-born employees of the firms were of particular interest. Eleven of these professionals were Turks, some of whom had first moved to Sweden and Finland for higher education and others directly through their employment with the multinationals. I encountered them, in other words, not during the search for the “Turkish” experience in these country locations, but for the “high-skilled work” experience in the two

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corporations. The two were, expectedly, closely intertwined in the interviewees’ accounts, as well as in the accounts of their spouses and colleagues, also typically highly educated middle-class professionals whom I met through the research participants.

Although definitional and empirical complications make it impossible to cite precise figures, multiple estimates put the Muslim population in Europe at over 10 million, and the number of Turkish migrants at 3–3.5 million. Most of the Turkish migration to Europe, including that to Germany where over 2 million Turks now reside, took place in the 1960s and 1970s through guest worker programs and Western European economies’ demand for labor; the numbers dwindled in subsequent decades, with flows mainly driven by family reunification. The Swedish experience with Turkish migration follows this chronological pattern, but also includes the reception of asylum seekers from Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. Reflecting the general European experience with Turkish migrants, the Turkish communities in Sweden are largely composed of low-skilled labor migrants and their families. Finland’s experience with migration is altogether far more limited than that of Sweden: Finland having been a sending rather than a receiving country of migrants until as recently as the 1990s, migrants of all backgrounds, and certainly Turks, are currently a novelty there (Forsander 2002). It is not surprising that in these two countries that boast two of the best educated workforces in the world, precious few of the foreign-born residents, especially Turks, are high-skilled professionals. The Finnish and Swedish multinational corporations therefore play a vanguard role in bringing this new kind of foreign worker, and this new kind of new Turk, to their home countries.

The literature on immigration tends to treat migrants in a dichotomy of the “ethnic” versus the “elite,” the latter characterized as having been liberated from “national” lifestyles, values, and constraints (Favell 2003, 402) through their economic power and unproblematic access to privileged forms of mobility (Castells 1996; Bauman 1998; Sassen 2000; Sklair 2001). As Favell also argues, the dichotomy is far from vindicated by real-life experiences of the purportedly “elite” migrants such as the corporate employees included in my study. Their accounts far from support the arguments about the full and straightforward post-nationalization of life, and the abandonment of “ethnic,” in this case Turkish and Muslim, identities. True, a distinction and distancing from the “typical Turk in Europe” does constitute a central theme in their self-narratives. However, this “typical Turk” is far more often a reference to the representational construction that interviewees perceived to be held by host societies about Muslims in general and Turks in particular. Accordingly, popular media representations and public debates about Turkish migrants in Sweden widely and exclusively revolve around “problems” of integration,
lack of educational attainment, high levels of unemployment, stifled women’s rights, and a cultural dissonance with the larger Swedish society, often attributed to “cultural differences” where Islam plays a significant role. In Finland, interviewees felt that the images were more stereotypical still, having been imported from a highly clichéd, generic repertoire of European images of the “Turk,” often interchangeable with the “Muslim.”

While the interviewees found such representations overly generalized, at the same time they nevertheless perceived themselves as different from the immigrant Turkish communities in their cities of residence. Such distinction was so fundamental in some accounts, in fact, that a number of interviewees did not see themselves as “immigrants,” despite having become considerably permanent transplants, because of the term’s very association with said communities. Rather than disown Turkish and Muslim identities, however, they questioned the prevailing assumptions about the boundaries of their meaning. They promoted an expansion of these categories in two ways. On the one hand, the urban-secular tradition of Turkey provided a way of claiming a Muslim identity in the private sphere without it being a fundamental marker of group belonging, although the group also included those who did not profess any faith at all. Secondly, the interviewees largely thought that their status as high-skilled workers in transnational workplaces did not repudiate their nationality but, rather, underscored the diversity among workers of the same status.

References


9. Defining Islamic Education in Diaspora: The Case of Britain

Peter Mandaville*

The question of Islamic education within Muslim immigrant and diaspora communities has emerged in recent years as an important space of contestation about the meaning and nature of religious pedagogy, and has also served as a site around which debates about citizenship, identity, and loyalty continue to play out. Where Islamic education in Muslim majority societies tends to be associated with traditional institutions and methods such as the madrasa, the particular challenges and demands associated with living as a religious minority in diaspora has meant considerably more variegation in terms of the routes by which Islamic education is pursued. Examined briefly below are a range of practices and institutions associated with Islamic education in Britain. As will be shown, these sometimes very different idioms of Islamic learning represent discrepant visions of what it means to be a Muslim in diaspora. Hence we come to see how the seemingly narrow issue of Islamic education is actually part and parcel of a wider set of issues relating to the politics of cultural and political integration.

A rough typology of the sorts of Islamic educational institutions currently to be found in the UK looks as follows. First and most numerous (just over 100 schools in 2005) are the primary and secondary Muslim “faith schools.” The methods and subjects of instruction at these schools conform almost exclusively to the British national curriculum—that is, the standard lessons and forms of pedagogy prescribed for British state schools. Teachers and students are almost exclusively Muslim, however, and the institutions see themselves as trying primarily to offer a learning environment imbued with an “Islamic ethos” rather than direct instruction in religion itself. Best compared to the long tradition of Church of England and Jewish faith schools, some of these Muslim primary institutions have recently begun to receive direct financial support from the British state.

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Second, we can point to a number of higher education facilities that approach Islamic studies from within the liberal traditions of the Western academy, or through a hybrid curriculum combining elements of the former with the classical Islamic sciences. Again, students and faculty would tend to be exclusively Muslim. The credentials and qualifications available include standard post-baccalaureate certificates (often certified by mainstream British universities) and/or certification as an `alim (religious scholar) plus some measure of imam training in the form of skills relating to religious pastoral care.

Finally, one can also find in the UK a dozen or so madrasas—commonly called Dar ul-Ulooms (a colloquial transliteration of dar al-`ulum, “house of learning”)—which provide traditional courses of study in Islamic sciences that permit certification as a religious scholar (`alim). In these schools, pedagogy and intellectual traditions closely follow the model of (and in some cases are actual extensions of) seminaries in other Muslim countries. The madrasas in the UK tend to be rather insular in nature, and not heavily connected to or influenced by mainstream British educational methods or curricula. Indeed, it is the apparent “ghettoization” of the madrasas that has prompted much of the recent concern about Islamic education as a force militating against the social integration of British Muslims.

Before moving on to provide a brief analytical overview of how two of these different sorts of institutions map onto various strategies and approaches for dealing with wider challenges of belonging and integration, it is important to make very clear that the vast majority of British Muslim parents do not send their children to Muslim schools. Indeed, the best estimates available suggest that, at most, only 3 percent of school-age Muslim children in the UK receive their education primarily through Islamic educational facilities. Many parents regard the Islamic schools as a dead-end in terms of their children’s social mobility and access to employment.

The primary and secondary faith schools—perhaps best exemplified by the three institutions associated with Yusuf Islam’s (formerly the singer Cat Stevens) Islamia Schools Trust—should be understood as an approach to Islamic education that seeks to provide modern curricula and pedagogy (and hence later access to universities and job markets) within an Islamic social environment. Parents who decide to go this route may choose it for a variety of reasons. Sometimes it has to do with concern that attending British state schools will cause their children to lose their Muslim identity. Others, particularly the more conservative, are drawn to the idea of a space in which Islamic social mores provide the underlying normative foundation. Others still cite concerns about the safety of their children, seeing the Muslim faith schools as generally
more secure. The key point—particularly, as we will see, in contrast to the madrasas—is that most parents who choose this option understand themselves to be laying a path for their children’s future that involves a strong element of participation in mainstream society.

The traditional madrasas, which were actually the first institutions of Islamic learning to be established in the UK, represent a rather different approach to the social implications of Islamic education. Coordinated via the Dar ul-Uloom school in Bury, northern England, the educational model here reflects its founding during the earliest and most intense period of Muslim segregation from mainstream society. Very few modern, “secular” subjects are on offer and one gets very little impression that an attempt is being made to prepare students for participation (either in labor markets or as citizens) in wider Britain. In the case of these institutions, it is fair to say that “Muslim” and “British” are generally not understood as covalent signifiers of identity. Islam—or one’s Muslimness—is best compartmentalized as a separate (presumably primary) and perhaps even incommensurable value system and space of social affiliation.

The full reality of British Islamic education, of course, escapes the simple dichotomy of the distinction drawn above. In recent years, for example, there have been signs that some of the madrasas have been reaching out to the mainstream. We have also seen the appearance on the scene of a number of innovative institutions in the higher education sector, such as the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE), associated with the Islamic Foundation in Leicester—an institution that quite avowedly pursues a transformational curriculum focusing on difficult issues such as women and Islam, civic participation, and the importance of developing a distinctive “European Islam.” Through developments like this, which contrast so strongly with older models, it becomes clear that Islamic education will continue to reflect wider challenges faced by Britain’s Muslim community in the years to come.
Is there such a thing as Muslim American literature (MAL)? I argue that there is: It begins with the Muslims of the Black Arts Movement (1965–75). *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* is one of its iconic texts; it includes American Sufi writing, secular ethnic novels, writing by immigrant and second-generation Muslims, and religious American Muslim literature. Many of the works I would put into this category can and do also get read in other categories, such as African American, Arab American, and South Asian literature, “Third World” women’s writing, diasporic Muslim literature in English, and so forth. While the place of these works in other categories cannot be denied, something is gained in reading them together as part of an American Muslim cultural landscape. Like Jewish American literature by the 1930s, Muslim American literature is in a formative stage. It will be interesting to see how it develops (and who will be its Philip Roth!)

I suggest the following typology of MAL only as a foothold, a means of bringing a tentative order to the many texts, one that should be challenged, and maybe ultimately dropped altogether. My first grouping, the “Prophets of Dissent,” suggests that Muslim works in the Black Arts Movement (BAM) are the first set of writings in American literature to voice a cultural position identifiable as Muslim. Contemporary Muslim writing that takes the achievements of the BAM as an important literary influence also belongs here, and is characterized similarly by its “outsider” status, moral critique of mainstream American values, and often prophetic, visionary tone. In contrast, the writers of what I call “the Multi-Ethnic Multitudes” tend to enjoy “insider” status in American letters, often entering through MFA programs and the literary establishment, getting published through trade and university book industries, garnering reviews in the mainstream press. They do not share an overall aesthetic but are individual writers of various ethnicities and a wide range of secularisms and spiritualities, and indeed I question my placing them all in one group, and do so temporarily only for the sake of convenience.

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On the other hand, my third group, the “New American Transcendentalists,” appears to cohere, in aesthetic terms, as writers who share a broad Sufi cultural foundation undergirding their literary work. Their writings often show familiarity with the Sufi poets of several classical Muslim literatures (e.g., in Turkish, Farsi, Arabic, Urdu), as well as with American Transcendentalists of the nineteenth century, and that which tends toward the spiritual and the ecstatic in modern American poetry. Finally, the “New Pilgrims” is my term for a loose grouping of writers for whom Islam is not merely a mode of dissent, cultural background, or spiritual foundation for their writing, but its aim and explicit topic. Of the four groups, the New Pilgrims are the ones who write in an overtly religious mode and motivation, like Ann Bradstreet, Cotton Mather, and the Puritans of early American history. This does not prevent them from being capable of producing great literature, any more than it prevented the great Puritan writers.

Here is an example of just a few writers in each category, by no means a comprehensive list:

Prophets of Dissent

From the Black Arts Movement:

• Marvin X, whose *Fly to Allah* (1969) is possibly the first book of poems published in English by a Muslim American author.

• Sonia Sanchez, whose *A Blues Book for Blue Black Magical Women* (1974) is the work of her Muslim period.

• Amiri Baraka, whose *A Black Mass* (2002) renders the Nation of Islam's Yacoub genesis theology into drama. As with Sanchez, the author was Muslim only briefly but the influence of the Islamic period stretches over a significant part of his overall production.

Later Prophets of Dissent include:

• Calligraphy of Thought, the Bay area poetry venue for young “Generation M” Muslim American spoken word artists who today continue in the visionary and dissenting mode of the BAM.

• Suheir Hammad, Palestinian New Yorker, diva of *Def Poetry Jam* (on Broadway and HBO), whose tribute to June Jordan in her first book of poetry, *Born Palestinian, Born Black*
(1996), establishes her line of descent from the BAM, at least as one (major) influence on her work.

• El Hajj Malik El Shabazz (Malcolm X) is an iconic figure for this mode of Muslim American writing and, indeed, for many writers in all four categories.

Multi-Ethnic Multitudes

• Kashmiri American poet Agha Shahid Ali, an influential figure in the mainstream American poetry scene, with a literary prize named after him at the University of Utah, brought the ghazal into fashion in English so that it is now taught among other forms in MFA programs.

• Naomi Shihab Nye, Palestinian American, likewise a “crossover” poet whose work enjoys prominence in American letters, takes on Muslim content in a significant amount of her work.

• Sam Hamod, an Arab midwesterner who was publishing poetry in journals at the same time as Marvin X.

• Nahid Rachlin’s fiction has been published since well before the recent wave of literature by others who, like her, are Iranian immigrants.

• Mustafa Mutabaruka, an African American Muslim, debut novel Seed (2002).

• Samina Ali, midwesterner of Indian parentage, debut novel Madras on Rainy Days (2004), was featured on the June 2004 cover of Poets & Writers.

• Khaled Hosseini, debut novel The Kite Runner (2003).

• Michael Muhammad Knight, a Muslim of New York Irish Catholic background, whose punk rock novel The Taqwacores (2004) delves deeply into Muslim identity issues.

• There are a number of journals where Muslim American literature of various ethnicities can be found today, among them Chowrangi, a Pakistani American magazine out of New Jersey, and Mizna, an Arab American poetry magazine out of Minneapolis.

New American Transcendentalists
• Daniel (Abd al-Hayy) Moore is an excellent example of this mode of Muslim American writing. California-born, he published as a Beat poet in the early sixties, became a Sufi Muslim, renounced poetry for a decade, then renounced his renouncement and began publishing again, prolifically and with a rare talent. His *Ramadan Sonnets* (City Lights, 1986) is a marriage of content and form that exemplifies the “Muslim/American” simultaneity of Muslim American art.

• The Rumi phenomenon: apparently the most read poet in America is a Muslim. He merits mention for that, although technically I am not including literature in translation. Then again, why not? As with so many other of my limits, this is arbitrary and only awaits someone to make a case against it.

• Journals publishing poetry in this mode include *The American Muslim*, *Sufi*, *Qalbi*, and others.

**New American Pilgrims**

• Pamela Taylor writes Muslim American science fiction. Iman Yusuf writes “Islamic romance.” This group of writers is not limited to genre writers, however. Dasham Brookins writes and performs poetry and maintains a website, MuslimPoet.com, where poets such as Samantha Sanchez post. Umm Zakiyya (pseud.) has written a novel, *If I Should Speak* (2001), about a young Muslim American and her roommates in college. Writers in this group also come from many ethnicities but, unlike those in my second category, come together around a more or less coherent, more or less conservative Muslim identity. Websites tend to ban erotica and blasphemy, for example. The Islamic Writers Alliance, a group formed by Muslim American women, has just put out its first anthology. Major published authors have yet to emerge in this grouping, but there is no reason to think they will not eventually do so.

My criteria for Muslim American literature are a flexible combination of three factors:

Muslim authorship. Including this factor, however vague or tenuous, prevents widening the scope to the point of meaninglessness, rather than simply including any work about Muslims by an author with no biographical connection to the slightest sliver of Muslim identity (such as Robert Ferrigno with his recent dystopian novel about a fanatical Muslim takeover of America). It is a cultural, not religious, notion of Muslim that is relevant. A “lapsed Muslim” author, as one
poet on my roster called himself, is still a Muslim author for my purposes. I am not interested in levels of commitment or practice, but in literary Muslimness.

Language and aesthetic of the writing. In a few cases, there is a deliberate espousal of an aesthetic that has Islamic roots, such as the Afrocentric Islamic aesthetic of the Muslim authors in the Black Arts Movement.

Relevance of themes or content. If the Muslim identity of the author is vague or not explicitly professed, which is often the case with authors in the "Multi-Ethnic Multitudes," but the content itself is relevant to Muslim American experience, I take that as a signal that the text is choosing to enter the conversation of Muslim American literature and ought to be included.

In defining boundaries for research that could become impossibly diffuse, I choose to look mainly at fiction and poetry, with autobiography and memoir writings selectively included. I have not included writings in languages other than English, although there are Muslims in America who write in Arabic, Urdu, and other languages. I have looked at the twentieth century onward, and there is archival digging to be done in earlier periods: the Spanish colonial era may yield Muslim writing, and we already know that some enslaved Muslims in the nineteenth century have left narratives. More research is needed. If one expands the field from "literature" to "Muslim American culture," one can also include Motown, rap, and hip-hop lyrics by Muslim artists, screenplays such as the Muslim American classic The Message by the late Syrian American producer Mustapha Aqqad, books written for children, sermons, essays, and other genres.

There are pleasures and patterns that emerge from reading this profusion of disparate texts under the rubric of Muslim American cultural narrative. It is time! I hope, as this field emerges, that others will do work in areas I have left aside in this brief initial exploration.
Part IV: Islam, Assimilation, and Integration

11. Comparing Muslims in France and the US
   Laurence Michalak*

Muslims populations are growing in both the US and France and have become controversial in both countries. The Muslim populations are diverse and changing in both France and the US, and a comparison of the two settings shows an instructive pattern of similarities and differences.

Looking first at the US setting, Muslims sharply increased in numbers in the late twentieth century. In 1968, Muslims were only 4 percent of all immigrants, but by 1986 this figure had risen to 10.5 percent. The American Muslim population rose not only through immigration but also through conversion, as African Americans (and some non-African-Americans) converted to Islam in increasing numbers. African Americans now make up between one-third and one-half of all American Muslims, followed by Muslims of Arab and Indo-Pakistani origin, the other two large groups. Estimates of the Muslim population in the US vary from two to ten million, or between less than 1 percent and more than 3 percent of the population. Much depends on how one defines “Muslim”—as a practicing Muslim who attends a mosque or merely a person of Muslim origin or with a Muslim name.

Muslims in America have passed through a series of historical phases. From about 1935 to 1965, African Americans were the most visible Muslims. As many as 20 percent of the African slaves brought to the US were Muslim, so African American Muslims speak of “reconverting” rather than converting to Islam. After the assassination of Malcolm X and the death of Elijah Muhammad, the founder of the Nation of Islam, African American Muslims moved toward mainstream Islam. A multiethnic leadership began to arise in American Islam, with the emergence of Arab American and later Indo-Pakistani leadership. In the United States, the Muslim presence went relatively unnoticed until 9/11, but the terrorist attack by Al-Qaeda in the

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name of Islam has been followed by increasing surveillance of Muslims and sometimes the abuse of their civil rights.

In France, Muslims are more recent arrivals and are relatively more numerous. There were few Muslims in France before World War II, but there was a large influx of Muslims in the 1950s and 1960s, because of economic prosperity and European reconstruction. The French viewed these Muslims as temporary workers, but when the European economy turned down in the 1970s and Muslim immigrants did not go home, despite economic incentives to do so, the French began to realize that Muslims would be a permanent presence. Most Muslim migrants to France were Arabs who had come from Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, the latter country having gained its independence in a violent war against France. Muslims came to be viewed by some French as a threat, but a threat that is more demographic and cultural than political.

If we compare Muslims in France and in the US, there are some immediate differences. First of all, Muslims make up a larger percentage of the French population—about 3 million (depending on how we count them) out of 60 million, or about 5 percent. Also, the French tend to foreground the religious identity of immigrants, lumping together diverse North African, West African, and Turkish immigrants as “Muslims.” In the US, on the other hand, the discourse on immigration is much different; rather than religion, the debate turns more on issues of economic benefits and liabilities. One reason for this is probably that most immigrants in France are in fact Muslim, while immigrants to the US are more religiously diverse.

In both countries there are debates about the assimilability of Muslims. Those who perceive an Islamic “threat” often cite Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis. Others, such as Daniel Pipes and Steve Emerson, call attention to Muslims in America as potential enemies in our midst. American defenders of Islam—such as John Esposito and Yvonne Haddad—take a more ecumenical approach, stressing the similarities among Islam, Christianity, and Judaism and emphasizing the predominantly pietistic nature of Islamic revitalization.

The French also have a diversity of approaches to Islam, but they tend to agree on an assimilationist model, rejecting American multiculturalism. Relative to the US, France has a longer and more sophisticated tradition of study of Islam, including such scholars as Bruno Etienne, Gilles Kepel and Rémy Leveau, plus scholars who are themselves Muslim, such as Mohammed Arkoun and Hichem Djait. At the virulent end of the spectrum is Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the National Front, who begins political rallies with prayers to Joan of Arc and
advocates the expulsion of Muslims from France. The French view the French language as the core of national identity. Unlike Americans, the French have no bilingual education or multilingual ballots. In the US, in contrast, the “English Only” movement is marginal.

In France there seems to be greater recognition that Islam is becoming or has become an indigenous religion, while in the US Islam is still viewed by many as foreign. In both the US and France there is growing political activism on the part of Muslims, partly to defend themselves against attacks by political authorities and stereotyping in the media. The US has the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim Council, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, and the Muslim Public Affairs Council. France has groups such as SOS Racisme and France Plus. In both the US and France, Muslims are participating more in the political process and presenting Muslim candidates for political office.

In both the US and France, the ways in which Muslims see themselves and are seen by others have been evolving, and fit into larger contexts of national identity and ideologies of migration and citizenship. In both countries, Muslims are increasingly willing to stand up to defend their religious identities. In transplanting Islam to non-Muslim settings, Muslims are also reformulating Islam, discovering in the process that things they had thought were immutable parts of their religion are in fact cultural elements that should be open to reformulation. Thus, Muslims in the US and France are inventing new forms of Islam, while mainstream Americans and French are, albeit sometimes reluctantly, coming to see their countries as more diverse.
First consideration was given to the old context and the old configurations, where Hyderabadi Muslims were part of the former princely state of Hyderabad. Most of the ruling elite of the Nizam’s state was indeed Muslim, but the Mughlai court culture continued from earlier centuries prevailed until 1948, when independent India incorporated Hyderabad in the Indian Union. Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, and Anglo-Indians shared to some extent in the Persian- and Urdu-speaking ruling class, and the most important distinction in the state was that between mulkis (countrymen) and non-mulkis (outsiders, foreigners). Religion was a private matter and played little role in the public culture of the state.

In the new contexts in the West, here the UK, Canada, and the United States, Hyderabadi immigrants found new ways of configuring their identities. Sometimes language was important, not only Urdu but the vernaculars spoken by the peasants under the Nizam’s rule, Telugu, Kannada, and Marathi, and immigrants formed linguistic associations based on all four languages that crosscut religion. Sometimes national origin was important: those Hyderabadi Muslims who had gone to Pakistan in 1947 or 1948 had cut themselves off from those Muslims who stayed in India but found themselves migrating to the West and re-encountering relatives and others they had left behind in India but who were also migrating to the West. Indian or Pakistani associations of various sorts kept these people apart, by and large.

Sometimes religion became more important than it had been in either Hyderabad state or Pakistan (it was taken for granted in the latter), and Hyderabadi Muslims of both Indian and Pakistani origins assumed roles as leaders or followers in the regional and national organizations being developed in the Western countries. This happened more in Canada and

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the United States, as in the UK the immigrant population was more working-class and Punjabi-or Kashmiri-speaking. In Canada, other Muslims were predominantly South Asian, whereas in the United States Muslim politics was complicated by the large groups of indigenous African American Muslims and Arab immigrants.

Perhaps least often, Hyderabadi origin spurred the formation of Hyderabad associations, and these tended to be dominated by Hyderabadi Muslims but ones who celebrated the old cultural synthesis, that secular court culture of the ruling class.

In conclusion, this movement of Muslims out of Hyderabad was not really a Muslim diaspora (save for the early movement in the late 1940s to Pakistan), but part of a wider movement out of India or Pakistan to Western countries. Once settled abroad, depending upon the configurations of other immigrants and coreligionists, Hyderabadi Muslims sometimes chose to emphasize their religion and organize with other Muslims. Possibly the second-generation youth are choosing to emphasize Islam and build coalitions across lines of ethnicity and national origin, again not fitting a Hyderabadi Muslim diaspora model but forming new patterns of affiliation and organization in the new countries.
German challenges to the ability of the Muslim schoolgirl to wear a headscarf in a consistent manner have been more indirect than the French ban on the headscarf and reveal distinctively German cultural preoccupations. Exploring moments when the prescriptions of Islam confront the organization of the German gym class points us to aspects of Germanness that I suggest are confounded with the “democratic values” articulated in the German constitution but have quite different roots. Several lawsuits have been filed by Muslim girls for exemption from the requirement that they participate in gym, since it is impossible to maintain proper modesty in gender-mixed classes, where many of the required activities preclude the wearing of the headscarf, and gym clothes typically expose the legs and arms. Concern with the gym class can be seen in one of the questions on the “Muslim Test,” the popular label for a controversial set of guidelines to be used in questioning applicants for German citizenship that was implemented in early 2006 in one of the German states.

In response to a complaint first brought by the father of a twelve-year-old Muslim girl in 1989, the Federal Administrative Court ruled in 1993 that schools are obligated to make all reasonable efforts to offer gender-segregated gym classes for girls (A2.6 C 8.91, 25.08.1993). But public commentary continues around this issue. As these law suits are usually presented in the press as one of the signs that Turks are refusing to integrate, the issue of gym class has touched a nerve in the public imagination.

The specific articulations of German concerns suggest that gym class is felt to be an important part of a child’s enculturation and that by requesting exemption from gym, Muslim girls can never become fully German. The gym class is intended to educate and discipline the body. It is considered so important to the shaping of the young German that it is mandated by law. And it is precisely over the disciplining of not only the female body but also the male body that German and Muslim educational principles diverge sharply.

German preoccupation with physical fitness has a politically charged history. The significance of gym classes can be traced to the body culture (Korperkultur) movement that originated in the nineteenth century, when the first gymnastics club was established. The body culture movement was associated with counterculture, vegetarianism, and nudism, part of a romantic “back to nature” reaction to the demands of industrialization. During the Weimar Republic in the interwar period, body culture and “life reform” (Lebensreform) became movements to restore the body to natural health in the wake of the devastation of World War I. But it also spawned youth organizations such as the Wandervogel movement, “a mixed gender youth group that would be subsumed in 1933 by the Hitler youth” (Gordon 2002). The idea of a natural yet disciplined and hygienic body thus appealed to a wide spectrum of political movements ranging from anarchists to German nationalists (Mosse 1975).

During the Nazi era, there was a hypertrophied emphasis on disciplining and perfecting the Aryan male body, but women were also subject to physical discipline, with the idea of containing their dangerous sexuality and channeling it into service to the nation.

Similarly, the discipline of gymnastics and other physical training were important for instilling the physical and moral hygiene that would enable the German woman to raise a healthy family and contribute to the maintenance of social order. In contrast to the strong association in Islam between modesty and social order—which makes nakedness a great source of shame for both sexes—the German body culture movement linked nakedness with purity and simplicity, even in the restrictive Nazi era. Though the ideology of Nazism has been firmly repudiated in German public discourse since the end of World War II, there are significant continuities in certain aspects of the cultural logic that were so exaggerated in that era. Exposure of the human body and even full nudity continue to be associated with openness, purity, and a healthy sexuality.

The bifurcation of gender roles in German ideology during the extreme nationalism of the Nazi era is actually rather close to the Islamic vision of the ideal organization of gender roles and the family articulated by founders of the modern Islamist movement. These Islamist reformers saw the family as the foundation of social order, identified women as the mainstay of this order, and emphasized the education of women as essential to the proper socialization of children. Despite this parallel, Muslim strategies for maintaining the purity of women are radically different from the German association of purity with exposure of the body to public gaze.
Within the context of the modern gym class, children may actively be required by law to be fully nude before others, at least in schools where showers are required and no individual shower stalls are provided. Though the showers are single-sex, even this practice violates the prohibition against nudity, even in single-sex settings, for both males and females in the Qur’an. These arguments about the arrangement of locker rooms affect Muslim boys as well as girls and do not focus on the issue of gender segregation (since most locker rooms are gender segregated); these arguments are also not foregrounded in the media.

Physical privacy has a very different significance within German and Muslim discourses and is linked to an array of different bodily practices. Germans and Muslims have a very different sense of what is pure, clean, and healthy. Both Germans and Muslims use analogous evocations of disgust to mark otherness. In contrast, for Germans, the trope of the Muslim woman who is “hidden” behind the headscarf and modest clothing and refuses to participate in the hygienic discipline of the gym class can be readily deployed to evoke feelings of horror and disgust that are associated with hidden, uncontrolled, and polluting sexuality. The hidden women of today are also imagined as a festering secret, subject to arbitrary murder by their male family members. The girl “hidden” under a headscarf, her body a secret to the public gaze, evokes imagery reflecting this horror.

In specific national cultures—the French way of doing sex, the German requirement that the child stand nude before others in the locker room, or the Dutch enactment of the tolerant covert gaze—specific cultural practices are entangled and confounded with abstract, universalized “democratic values.” The consequence is that the defense of these democratic values becomes, ironically, a demand for sameness. When the Muslim is positioned as a threat to these values, then cultural and religious practices that are simply different ways of organizing gender or managing the body are interpreted as a violation of democratic values. The gym class is an arena in which the German state regulates the disciplining and exposure of the citizen’s body in a way that the child is not free to resist. The Muslim body—either male or female—challenges and exposes this particular contradiction. Public rhetoric obscures the contradiction by foregrounding the oppression of the Muslim girl whose parents do not permit her to expose her body. But the emotional charge of this public rhetoric—what to the rest of the world may appear to be a tempest in a teapot—points to the deeper challenge for German public culture. In all of this, the Muslim man is demonized, and the plight of the Muslim boy, who is also forced to violate the teachings of the Qur’an and expose himself in order to satisfy German notions of national hygiene, is ignored.
The political culture of respect is critical to facilitating the successful integration of diasporic groups into the wider society, wherever that is, and to the redefinition of Islam in ways that feel comfortable for Western liberal democracies. Canada—for reasons that it did not intend and that therefore make it fragile and misunderstood—has stumbled into creating a space that does a relatively good job of integrating its immigrants and minorities.

Integration, importantly, is not assimilation. Assimilation implies the adoption of an alternate identity, almost the jettisoning of one identity in favor of another. But people do not cast off their old skins and don new ones. They do not arrive someplace from elsewhere and stop being who they were. Slowly, painstakingly, they weave elements of a new perspective into the one they came with. This weaving takes time and it involves complex negotiations and redefinitions of the way one does things and the rationale one has and how one gives one’s life meaning in the new place instead of how one invested it with meaning in the old. This weaving takes place against a backdrop of the new place. It is not, in itself, a neutral process.

What is important is that the people they become are not the same people they would have been had they stayed at home, wherever home was. And also, of course, the place they have come to is changed, over time, because they have come to be a part of it. If one imagines the receiving place as a tapestry, and its immigrants as threads, the individual threads, woven into the larger tapestry, are bound to change as they are absorbed into this new context, but so is the larger tapestry as the threads are woven into it. This last bit is critical: it is where all the fear lies in societies that find themselves afraid of change.

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Integration, as a way of understanding immigrant incorporation, makes room for that process of weaving identities and worldviews and perspectives. Integration, as opposed to assimilation, does a better job of explaining that the ability of immigrants to become fully functional members of an adoptive society is actually separate from the process of identity renegotiation, which is taking place at the same time.

Canada has had a long history of dealing very badly with diversity and a very short history of dealing with it relatively well. We know that there are massive problems, from institutional racism to wasted human capital and unrecognized foreign credentials. Yet at the same time, there is a documented perception among educated observers and, more importantly, among immigrants and minorities themselves, that integration works relatively well in Canada.

What observers mean is that integration is relatively smooth. What immigrant Canadians are referring to is the Canadian embrace of diversity: the understanding that diversity does not hurt, that diversity actually strengthens the country, that in a borderless, globalized world, diversity gives Canada a competitive advantage, so that diversity is something Canadians boast about. This understanding gives immigrant Canadians and minority Canadians the right to say that Canada is theirs and that Canada reflects them and that they reflect Canada.

It is an understanding that developed for two reasons. The first is how multiculturalism is used and understood in Canada—which is different from how it is used and understood in the US or Europe. Multiculturalism was originally adopted in Canada in 1971 as a formula and a bargain intended to ensure white ethnic support for the project of accommodating Québec within Canada. Later, in the late 1970s and 1980s, when immigration expanded in greater numbers to include non-white immigrant groups, multiculturalism was already an accepted, successful part of Canadian society and element of Canadian public policy.

But the never-ending quest for Canadian self-definition is an important part of this story as well. I would argue that it reached an interesting moment during the free trade debate at the end of the 1980s, something that barely registered on the radar screens of most Americans but that was all-encompassing in Canada for a couple of years. That debate was never about trade, but it was about whether the Free Trade Agreement would result in Canada’s cultural absorption by the United States. In our attempt to define who we were—as opposed to who we were not—we fixed on this business of respecting diversity.
There was a recognition at that point that Canadian political culture understands the integration of immigrants and minorities differently from American political culture. Canadians tended to speak of creating a “mosaic” rather than a “melting pot.” Due to the consciousness of the French/English biculturality, there developed an uneasiness around the idea of trying to pour all newcomers into a mould so that they come out the same. Rather, the idea developed that Canada’s political culture prefers to allow immigrants to express themselves, to respect that expression, and—most importantly—to trust that they will return the respect.

Canadians began to put a lot of importance in what they perceived to be a pivotal difference between themselves and Americans in this regard, to see Canada as a place that lets you be who you are and that trusts that at the end of the day the respect that makes it possible becomes the single most important link between Canadians. It becomes, in fact, the definitional link. Implicitly, this means that we accept that Canada will be changed into the bargain. The mechanism of respect understands that everything is negotiated: identity; who is a Canadian; what being Canadian looks, sounds, and feels like at any particular moment.

To use Benedict Anderson’s much-quoted term, the “imagined community” that is Canada has declared that it is not afraid to reimagine itself and to allow all Canadians—no matter where they come from or how long they have been Canadians—to be a part of that reimagining.

My research in the Somali community and with other Muslims demonstrates that in order for identities to evolve and for immigrants and minorities to feel a strong connection to Canada or wherever their adoptive home may be, it is critical that they feel respected in their explorations and renegotiations of identity. Sometimes—often, even—those explorations will include religion. Sometimes religion is just the most obvious launching point for explorations or negotiations that are as much or more about race or gender.

The political culture that Canadians created is one that gives a mythic emphasis to a newfound pride in making place for diversity, in respecting diversity, and in following through on that respect. I do not use the word “mythic” carelessly. I mean mythic in the sense that Canadians have collectively invested in the significance of self-definition.

This became even more important after September 11, 2001. Gilles Kepel and other scholars have documented the Islamist organizations that are engaged in what he calls a “battle for Muslim minds.” In his telling, Europe is the battlefield, and among the organizations that vie with
each other are those that are pietistic—pleading for those islands of Islam—and those that are jihadist. In these last are the pathways to violence and to terror.

They prey upon the weak, the disenfranchised, the existentially disinherited, the disconnected, the hopeless, the rejected. It is not poverty alone that makes people vulnerable to the appeal of such groups—which often operate in a cultish manner—but a sense of a lack of options.

As one young observant Muslim man told me recently, “they try to get hold of you when you feel that there isn’t anywhere else for you to go.” But in an environment of fundamental respect, they have very little traction. In the words of this same young man, “what they have to say isn’t very interesting when there are so many other options.” He also said, “when I walk out of the Reviving the Islamic Spirit conference, I feel a real high about Muslim connectedness for about a day, and then it goes away.”

Canada’s Muslim population is relatively smaller than Europe’s, and, importantly, Canada’s immigration intake is so diverse that Muslims do not dominate the immigration discourse in the way that they do in Europe. Our proximity to Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia, as well as our desirability for African immigrants mean that we have a much more global mix of immigrants—all of whom affect the environment into which they arrive and the Canadian conversation about immigration and its effects.

Canada offers Muslims and other immigrants to renegotiate their identity—and to play out the internal conversations within these different communities that invariably arise—without forcing an us vs. them mentality or an alienation from the wider community.

The redefinition of Islam, as identity is renegotiated, happens in a way that is more accommodating of Western liberal democratic ideals in places that are open, flexible, and respectful. And this recognition is so much more critical in the wake of 9/11, in the face of the existence of pietistic and jihadist groups with global Internet reach, and of the June 2006 arrests of the 17 amateurish plotters in southern Ontario. One of the boldest strands of Canada’s identity lies precisely in its ability not to force a definition on its immigrants, to allow itself to be a place of “becoming.” This is a vision that has not been sufficiently articulated, but it is, nonetheless, radical, transformative, and hugely powerful.
September 11, 2001 has come to mark the day, in the consciousness of most Americans, when they realized that the security of their country could no longer be taken for granted. For Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans, 9/11 is remembered as the dawn of an era of “double” insecurity; one that they share with all Americans, another as victims of backlash. Backlash is defined here as a combination of stereotypes, hate crimes, and government initiatives. One of the surprises of the post–9/11 backlash was the mobilization of Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans. The leaders of community-based organizations spearheaded the call for civic and political integration into American society.

Hate crimes and bias incidents perpetrated by fellow Americans were front-page news immediately after the attacks. These included murder, arson, violent assaults, and defamation. The FBI reported that anti-Islamic hate crimes increased 1,600 percent between 2000 and 2001 (from 28 to 481 cases). Though the spike subsided in the following year, rates have remained higher than pre–9/11 levels. The US Department of Justice Civil Rights Division has been prosecuting cases of hate crimes and has won convictions for most of the heinous acts. There was also an increase in employment discrimination, especially against Muslims observing their faith at work—praying, breaking the fast during Ramadan or, for women, wearing the hijab. The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has been handling their increasing complaints.

From the perspective of Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans, however, the government dragnet was more devastating than the actions of the hate-mongers. A series of initiatives by the US government, including the USA Patriot Act, detentions, deportations, the absconder initiative, special registration, and the National Security Entry Exit Registration System, targeted

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predominantly noncitizen Arab and Muslim men. Many of these men had overstayed their tourist visas. As household heads, their families, including their US-born children, suffered material deprivation and potential separation due to their deportation. The state appeared to have contradictory objectives vis-à-vis Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans. On the one hand, President Bush and other officials declared Islam a religion of peace and condemned vigilante actions and hate crimes. On the other hand, the administration’s actions spoke louder than official proclamations, singling out Arabs and Muslims.

The cumulative effect of the backlash was widespread fear, anxiety, and a growing mistrust of the government. The Middle Eastern and Muslim American organizations and their constituents followed an evolutionary process in their reactions to the 9/11 backlash. Initially, there was a period of retrenchment and lying low, but this phase did not last very long. The organizational leaders mobilized their communities to stand up and claim their rightful place in America. The first step was to distance themselves from the terrorists. There were condemnations through the media and public forums. Soon thereafter, the organizations realized that they had to engage in a dual educational campaign. On the one hand, they had to mobilize the immigrants to integrate more actively into their adopted country, and to encourage all community members to engage more consciously in the political process. On the other hand, they had to launch a public relations campaign against the virulent stereotypes of Arabs and Islamophobia, both of which soared after 9/11. Middle Eastern and Muslim community leaders felt an obligation to educate the American public about the Middle East and Islam. This task, however, was made easier because many Americans were eager to learn more about Middle Easterners and Islam. This opportunity was widely recognized as the silver lining of the tragedy.

Many in the second generation (US-born to immigrant parents and born abroad but immigrated to the US at a very young age) initiated projects that embraced their American as well as their Middle Eastern or Muslim identities. Actors, comics, visual artists, poets, playwrights, and other talented individuals, especially women, found creative venues to express their advocacy. A few attracted the attention of major newspapers and other mainstream media.

Examining American history allows us to understand the similarities and differences between the 9/11 backlash and its antecedents. During World War I, Germans were closely supervised and forced to assimilate. The “Bolshevik Menace” which sparked the Palmer Raids or Red Scare between 1919 and 1920 led to raids, arrests, and deportation of some prominent leaders. During the height of the Cold War, McCarthyism penalized former Communist Party members...
and sympathizers. During the Hostage Crisis (1978–79), Iranian students faced mandatory registration and potential deportation. Undoubtedly, the internment of 120,000 Japanese, including the US-born, in detention camps during World War II was the most deplorable case. Contrary to the opinion of military strategists at the time, racist elites on the West Coast pressured the government to retaliate after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Government excesses during these episodes caused significant economic and social losses and psychological trauma to large numbers of innocent people, but yielded few culprits.

Historical comparisons point to the risks of state overreaction and repression. With the exception of the Iran hostage crisis, when the targeted minorities were foreign nationals, all historical cases involved both immigrants (aliens) and naturalized citizens. In the 9/11 case, only noncitizens were detained, deported, and subjected to special interviews and registrations.

The post–9/11 government reaction seems tame in comparison to the unjust, and now publicly regretted, treatment of Japanese Americans suspected of being America’s enemies during World War II. Also, unlike their precedents, the response of Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans to the 9/11 backlash was very quick and extensive. In contrast, it took Japanese Americans several decades after their internment to mobilize and eventually claim redress. These differences in ethnic/religious mobilization can be attributed to the codification and institutionalization of civil rights laws since the 1960s. The Bush administration itself was careful not to break any clear-cut laws. It aimed its initiatives at noncitizens—a more imprecise category in the US Constitution. There are some possible explanations for the relatively mild reaction of the Bush administration vis-à-vis Arabs and Muslims.

First and foremost, the civil rights laws have been a major deterrent to potential government repression. Second, civil rights and civil liberties organizations have been vocal watchdogs monitoring the government’s actions and holding it accountable. Third, since the 1960s, which also coincided with the massive influx of new immigrants, Americans have become accustomed to a more pluralist, multiethnic, multireligious society. Other explanations include the global communication network which has made the actions of the United States more transparent to the rest of the world, and potentially shameful to its image as the leading advocate of democracy in the Middle East and the Muslim world. The major lesson here is that hard-won civil rights require vigilance and buttressing, not dismantling.
The Middle Eastern and Muslim experience can tell us much about the challenges of inclusion and exclusion and about the ability of the United States to remain a country that welcomes immigrants. As Arab and Muslim immigrants have faced discrimination and hate crimes, and even later-generation descendants have been profiled by the expanding state security apparatus, their example reminds us that America’s hard-won ideals of equality and equity will be at risk if there is an erosion and abuse of civil rights.
Xenophobia continues to be a significant problem in Europe, and the millions of Muslims living there are often its targets. This paper contends that the fear and anxiety Europeans exhibit toward Muslims stem ultimately from fear and anxiety regarding themselves and their beliefs. In dealing with Islamist Muslims in particular, the doctrine of liberalism has failed to make good on the self-verifying promise generated by its core assumptions as they have been handed down historically: namely, that all persons properly exposed to liberalism will in due time embrace it. Put differently, liberalism is supposed to deal with its opponents through conversion. But as large segments of Muslims residing in Europe refuse to convert, Europeans lose confidence in the universality and superiority of their cherished liberal values and turn to other, illiberal ideas. Ironically, it is liberalism itself that through its failure helps to give rise to the illiberal attitudes exhibited in increased xenophobia.

Intolerant Liberalism

Liberalism has an intolerant underside despite its formal advocacy of tolerance. The original exponents of liberty and equality for all found it politically necessary to depict themselves as enlightened and their formidable opponents in the ancien régime and established church as benighted. The “epistemological manicheanism” (Spragens 1981) of the Enlightenment divided the world into two realms: the kingdom of coercion, superstition, ignorance, self-enslavement—in a word, darkness—and the kingdom of truth, reason, progress, self-mastery—in a word, light. On this view opponents of liberalism inhabited the former, proponents the latter. Thus critics were defined away as irrational and unfree. Moreover, their freedom and rationality could only be won through conversion to liberalism. Furthermore, liberal universalism—also propagated in contradistinction to theological catholicity—asserted the timeless, transcendental superiority of the principles of freedom and equality and taught, accordingly, that all persons properly exposed

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to these values would voluntarily assent to them (Solomon calls this view the “transcendental pretense,” 1979, xii). Put differently, liberalism generated an epistemological need for converts in order to legitimate itself.

Muslim Resistance

Muslim immigrants represent a particularly irksome problem in part because so many refuse to adopt liberalism, even after generations of residing in supposedly liberal Europe. Islamists underscore the shortcomings of liberalism and implore their followers to resist the temptation and pressure to conform to its norms and values. Such critics contend, for example, that the free market has not liberated human beings; it has rather enslaved them to the machine, consumerism, and raw materialism. Liberal ethics have hardly produced societies characterized by perpetual peace. To the contrary, modern European civilization has been one of unprecedented violence, aggression, and exploitation. Liberalism’s secularism has left Western man spiritually empty and alone (Siddiqui 2002).

Liberalizing Muslims

Europeans—steeped in liberal Manichaeism—tend to dismiss Islamist criticism as a product of ignorance and fear rather than reason and choice. Because the founding logic of liberalism teaches that free and rational thinking perforce culminates in the acceptance, not rejection, of liberalism, it does not prepare its adherents to recognize clear-thinking opponents. This epistemologically (as opposed to racially or nationally) justified distinction dictates that Europeans first enlighten Muslim newcomers (socialize them to liberal values) and only later politically empower them. In the meantime, the “protoliberals” remain second-class citizens whose true interests are articulated by others (O’Brien 1996).

Illiberal Recourses

It is precisely this process of socialization and ensuing incorporation—termed “integration” in most European lands—that appears to have failed after more than 30 years of implementation, at least with a sizable and perhaps growing number of Muslim immigrants who persist in defending their particular norms and values. Liberal universalism in effect failed to make good on the promise to its adherents (lodged in the logic of liberalism) that Muslims would in due time assimilate to European ways. In the philosophical vacuum left in the wake of this failure, European publics are left with no good liberal reasons to explain the persisting differences.
Anxiety mounts that liberalism does not represent the proper solution to cultural diversity as was once presumed. Illiberal explanations and proposals founded on the presumption of immutable differences between native Europeans and Muslim newcomers, once dismissed as imprudent and unethical, come to be reconsidered and newly validated. Once marginalized xenophobic parties and personalities insert themselves into the very mainstream of European politics, often using Muslims as their scapegoats (Zemni and Parker 2002, 235).

Liberal Options

Is Europe fated to jettison its lofty liberal heritage? No. Europeans have at least two liberal alternatives. Pure liberalism would forego technocratic assimilation and extend immediately to Muslims full rights of liberal citizenship despite the awareness that such rights would likely be used initially by some Muslims (as they are by xenophobic Europeans) to promote illiberal ends. This approach gambles on liberalism’s contagiousness. Muslims who directly experience (as opposed to being taught) liberal values would become infected with the freedom they permit and in the end cherish liberalism above any particular ideology. They might remain Islamists, for instance, but countenance only an Islam that expands rather than restricts personal freedom. Needless to say, liberals would have to overcome considerable fretting while waiting to see if the contagion communicates.

Postmodern liberalism would presume insurmountable diversity and antagonism. It would accept a postmodern Europe in which no single metaphysical worldview, including liberalism, predominates. Postmodern liberals would live side by side with opponents without converting or containing them while at the same time not worrying about the failure to do either. This strategy gambles that in postmodernity society needs no dominant set of principles to thrive. It gambles, in short, that a rudderless Europe will not necessarily be a worse Europe.

References


Immigrant Groups in the Netherlands

Though there was considerable immigration to the Netherlands in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was nearly none in the twentieth century until the late 1960s (Lucassen and Penninx 1997). The influx of immigrants between 1960 and 2006 consisted mainly of four groups: the first ones to arrive were former colonial citizens from Indonesia (393,175) and Surinam (331,953) (figures from the Netherlands’ Central Bureau for Statistics per January 1, 2006). Secondly, guest workers were invited and brought to the Netherlands to do low-skilled jobs in factories: first from Greece, Spain, and Yugoslavia, and later in larger numbers from Turkey (364,608) and Morocco (323,272). Thirdly, there is a considerable group of Western immigrants (383,921 Germans). And finally, in the last 15 years the number of refugees has been growing (Iraq: 43,778; Iran: 28,781; Afghanistan: 37,307; Somalia: 19,875).

In a total population of about 16 million, the number of immigrants including the second generation is now slightly more than 3 million (18 percent), of which 1.7 million are of non-Western origin (10 percent). In particular in the poor neighborhoods of Dutch cities, changes due to this influx are noticeable. The autochthonous Dutch feel threatened, particularly by the increasing number of Muslims, though the actual number is only 7 percent of the population.

Policies and Attitudes in the Netherlands

In the eighteenth century, the Netherlanders were famous for their advanced level of tolerance (Lucassen and Penninx 1997). Huguenots, religious and political refugees fleeing from France, and Jews from Spain and Portugal were received without hesitation. Incorporation into Dutch society seemed to take place without a lot of problems. For ages the image of the Netherlands as a tolerant and open society has survived, even though the actual attitudes of both citizens

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and government did not remain as positive as sometimes presented. Though this development did not start in a single day, the changes have been dramatic in the last five years. Both the policies of the Dutch government and the attitudes of ordinary Dutch people are changing rapidly. Bader (2005, 9) correctly remarks that the Dutch government—while in the 1970s and 1980s one of the forerunners on multiculturalism—now has one of the most restrictive immigration and integration policies in the Western world. These restrictions encompass areas such as asylum, family reunification (a higher age requirement for spouses: 21), required income guarantees for visitors, and expelling “white illegals.” Integration policies have also become more strict. The pressure on immigrants to adjust and assimilate to Dutch culture and speak the Dutch language has increased. The penalty for not getting through the new citizenship exam can reach as high as €12,000.

Actually these changes in policy slowly evolved over a decade. Starting with the negative tone of conservative politicians around 1990, a sharp increase in anti-immigrant feelings was stimulated by the populist politician Pim Fortuyn, who was murdered in 2002. Against the background of an increasingly negative climate toward Muslims worldwide during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, incidents like the 9/11 attack, bombings in London and Madrid, and the murder of Theo van Gogh stimulated negative feelings toward Muslims in particular. As a consequence of the increasingly negative image presented in the media and the increasing numbers of immigrants in big cities, people’s attitudes toward immigrants, but especially Muslims, changed too.

Frustrations of Moroccan Youngsters

Moroccan immigrants somehow ended up as the focus of negative attention. Moroccans who arrived as guest workers, usually from traditional countryside areas with very little education, are currently over 50 years old and unemployed. Their children, who grew up and went to school in the Netherlands, had no easy access to Dutch society. Only a limited number managed to attain a middle or higher education and get a better job. A high percentage received vocational training or dropped out of school, and difficulties on the labor market led to frustrations among many of them and to street criminality among some. The generational divide with their parents is huge, but young Moroccans also feel left out by the Dutch.

Some of the issues that trouble Moroccans in relation to the Dutch are: a) their religion is considered backward and their ideology even dangerous; b) they are supposed to be unwilling
to integrate into Dutch society; c) youngsters are viewed as possible criminals; and d) since 9/11 they are even viewed as possible terrorists. The enormous prejudice is difficult to cope with. Another problem of young Moroccans is the limited availability of teachers of regular Islam. That is why a section of Moroccan youngsters searches on the Internet and becomes receptive to Islamic radicalism.

Reactions of Moroccan Associations

As has been shown in several publications, associations have an important role in representing the interests of specific communities. What cannot be achieved by a single person becomes a powerful message when stated by an association (Fennema and Tillie 2001; van Heelsum 2004a and 2004b). The 720 Moroccan associations were nearly forced to react to (or against) their increased stigmatization in their Dutch surroundings. From our 80 interviews in the last four years with representatives of Moroccan associations (van Heelsum 2001; Kraal and van Heelsum 2002), we can distinguish three main reactions:

a) Associations of the first generation proceeded with their own religious and cultural goals and targets, though sometimes more actively informing community members about “real Islam.”

b) An increasing number of associations organized meetings with Dutch and Moroccans, and started providing information and holding discussions with local government and people in urban neighborhoods.

c) A third and smaller number of associations has decided to fight back: some in a positive sense by showing the good aspects of Moroccan culture and some in a negative sense by attacking Western social and cultural values.

Conclusions

Anti-immigrant sentiments are a phenomenon that is not only visible in the Netherlands but also in the US and several other European countries, such as Denmark, Austria, and Germany. In the US, Mexicans are targeted, but in the Netherlands, anti-immigrant sentiments particularly target Muslims. Compared to their parents, second-generation youngsters feel more frustrated about this. And finally, migrant associations could take an important position in coping with these feelings and defending the interests of immigrants.
References


“It is not inhuman to hate something that is not human.”

Quote from pamphlet distributed widely before the World Cup Qualifying match in Athens between the Greek national team and Albania. March 29, 2005

The question of hating the ontological other certainly extends beyond the pathologies of Islamophobia infecting Europe and North America today. The manifestation of this Islamophobia is pervasive in Europe since the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. From offensive cartoons to rising neo-fascist political parties, hating the Muslim other transcends political and economic domains to infest even sports and culture.

European xenophobia surfaces in the form of Dutch and Danish politicians who are joining hands with cultural icons such as Oriana Fallaci and Salman Rushdie to create a cultural, economic, and political front against a perceived Muslim outsider. The most direct and largely ignored manifestations of the ubiquitous racisms in Europe take place around seemingly immune arenas such as the football pitch in cosmopolitan cities such as Tel Aviv and Athens, where in 2005 Muslim players were vilified, threatened, and spat upon. Emblematic of the tenor of life today was the reaction to the Albanian national squad’s defeat of Greece, the European champions. The result inspired responses of outrage in Greece and euphoria among Greece’s three to four hundred thousand Albanian Muslim migrant laborers. In these reactions we found no more direct manifestation of how Muslims are universally criminalized by the European media, popular culture, and political leaders because of their faith. For self-identifying Greeks, there were individual pressures of a constituency that led many to feel slighted by a subordinated, inferior neighbor (the Albanian) who dared to challenge, even for a night, a presumed hierarchy in southeastern Europe. The contrasting reactions of Albanians and Greeks to the outcome of a football match, however, speak of division in Europe that meets at an often

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ignored apex of perceptions of power, rights, and a sense of place that go beyond regional national rivalries. That apex derives from collective perceptions that are utterly counter-intuitive to the unaccustomed observer willing to assume innocence behind football violence. The issue is not a clash of competing xenophobes, a kind of clashing nationalism, but an acknowledged hierarchy in which the Greeks are “better” and the Albanians are “lowly.” What determines this stature has changed since 9/11.

After more than 20 years of firmly being part of a European project that catapulted Greece out of the Balkans and back into Western civilization, Greeks have been able to lord over their impoverished (and “Muslim”) northern neighbors. Greeks’ otherwise modest role in the rest of the world is supplemented by their persistent use of the affiliation with the European Union and of Christianity to project hegemony over the lowly Albanian Muslim.

Interestingly, as much as the Greek is comfortable being directly associated with Europe, the Albanian national team’s victory over Greece was also read as a victory over all of Europe. This dual function of Greece as extension of the European continent and an immediate archenemy helps us to explore a life of subordination, persecution, and fear among European Muslims, terminally linked to ethnonational categories like the Albanian, the Turk, or the Bosnian and more generic criminalized pathologies. Interesting in all of this is the precarious existence of the Balkan Muslim in a relationship extended not only to Greece but to an entire European continent that has only been intensified after 9/11.

Some of the problems that lie behind the individual and the communities out of which they come are the direct associations people have with a faith which is by no means a monolith and is impossible to summarize as it is practiced in the Balkans. Unfortunately, the most accessible resources out of which European leaders derive their capacity to characterize and administer their respective Muslim populations abuse an ignorance of the Islams (in the plural) so prevalent in practice in Europe. That process of erasing the individual traumas of life as a Muslim Albanian/Turk/Algerian/Berber/Kurd and economic subordinate only heightens the importance of football matches and in large part explains the collective reaction of Muslims of all kinds to the now infamous Danish cartoons.

Tragically, all Muslims, even those migrating from elsewhere, are vulnerable to these pathologies of suspicion, arrogance, and ultimately, impunity. In the Balkans, the Kosovar Albanians’ struggle against Serb hegemony over the twentieth century, often framed in religious
terms by outside observers, has taken on new meaning since 9/11. Any direct confrontation involving a Muslim (Albanian or otherwise) becomes in the Serbian or Macedonian press tantamount to a confrontation between “terrorists” and “the Christian world.” The strategic manipulation of xenophobic associations has had deadly consequences not only for Albanians and Bosnians, but for Pakistanis, Kurds, and Arabs.

In 2002, seven migrant Pakistani workers on their way to find construction work in Greece, which was then preparing for the Olympics, were gunned down by Macedonian police. In an effort to cover up what was probably a robbery, the bullet-ridden bodies were theatrically laid out with Kalashnikovs and fresh uniforms of the Kosovo Liberation Army (an insurgency that had just recently been brought to the negotiation table), and with Qur’ans translated into Albanian, a language the seven men were clearly not able to read. This transparent incident belies something deeper and more horrifying for Balkan Muslims who have endured state persecution for decades. The impunity with which past regimes operated in this region, generally deemed war zones, gains greater legitimacy in the eyes of the outside world now spoon-fed rhetoric akin to Muslims being a collective threat to the native Christian and Jewish population.

In the face of such direct collectivization, the way the Muslim from the Balkans has navigated the world after September 2001 is enlightening and shockingly similar. While Daniel Pipes has suggested creating internment camps for US-based Muslims, à la those for Japanese during World War II, now millions of Muslims, many of whom are desperately trying to assimilate while negotiating poverty, racism, and marginalization, often face a double-edged sword of outbreaks of collective rage, as in the suburbs of Paris in 2006, and increasingly heavy-handed police tactics. In the end, for Europe and North America to reconcile with the fact that Islam and its followers are permanent, legal, and integral fixtures in their societies, “home-grown” manifestations of fear, intimidation, and humiliation are likely in the very forms of violence that most in the West agree are counterproductive and dangerous to their long-term stability.
In traditional and (to a great degree) modern societies, most people have lived and worked in close proximity to their families and, therefore, upheld the prescribed communal, cultural, and ethnoreligious identities. But in the past several decades and especially since September 11, 2001, postmodern phenomena and sociopolitical developments have on the one hand helped construct new types of identities, while on the other they idealize (and idolize) traditional identities. At the same time, some homelands have been undergoing substantial changes while their coreligionists or coethnics in the diaspora have remained stagnant in their perception of the homelands and in the process have either been refueling old images and vivid memories or reconstructing additional new self-definitions. Even though the construction of new identities, or the idealization of old ones, has persisted on some level among certain groups/individuals, diverse transformations are rapidly taking place in almost every aspect of life and in almost all diaspora communities. These realities are perhaps even more prominent when it comes to Muslims in the West.

The discourse that the program *Islam: Portability and Exportability* has generated points out, among other things, two types of distinctive trends that are in the making among Muslims in the West, trends that must be conceived as the two extremes of a continuum. While a strong emphasis on ethnicity and religiosity, as well as on social relations and group solidarity, still exists among the majority of Muslims in the West, some progressive Muslims are already (de)constructing their role in the diaspora by pondering the future more than the past, personal spirituality more than institutional religiosity, and coexistence more than conflict. These progressive Muslims to whom I refer here as the forces of disestablishment are trying to find their own unique place under the Western sun as “enlightened” and more “moderate” in the

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eyes of Western society. This does not mean that they are a well organized movement or a monolithic segment of the Muslim community.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, other Muslims are reinforcing a different type of teaching represented in ideological separatism and at times fanatical and even violent confrontation with the non-Muslim other as well as with the progressive Muslims. This second trend may similarly be referred to as the *forces of disenchantment* or as *digressive* Muslims. They are “digressive” because they *digress* from the accepted or expected norms of civic discourse; in their view, dialogue is futile and has been long lost. Of course, the concepts *progressive* and *digressive* are relatively problematic, but for the sake of analysis they may prove descriptively useful. Though one or the other of these two trends is often dismissed as minoritarian by many scholars and other observers, one needs to remember that major socioreligious movements often begin as a tiny band of agitators. The majority of Muslims on the continuum between the two extremes are seen by the two trends as potential joiners if not already ripe candidates.

Although many Muslims on the continuum may feel a profound affinity with their culture, religion, or heritage, others seem to be unable to fathom their forefathers’ or coreligionists’ collective memory, and unwilling to disengage from the age of mass culture and digital technology. Therefore, they consciously or unconsciously resist disentangling themselves from the deep penetration of the host country’s way of life. The outcome mirrors questions about authenticity, continuity, and (co)existence. Thus, central Islamic principles in regard to God, the self, and the other are being reasserted or rewritten at all points on the continuum and this will likely persist and continue to evolve in the coming decades.

Moreover, the notion that has often been referred to as “countries within countries” or “cultures within cultures” in large metropolitan areas in Europe and North America is already as a result of these two trends being either reinforced or transformed. If this continues to be the case, the meaning and purpose of life may soon be derived from additional sources besides ethnonational and religiocultural affiliations. More radically, if ethnicity and religion prove indeed to be transforming, downplayed, or deemphasized, it may follow that ethnic and religious conflicts will be substantially reduced if not overturned. Thus, ethnoreligious authenticity may become in some circles, if it remains traceable at all, unimportant for descendants of families who are themselves a mixture of two or more ethnicities or have simply originated in vanishing identities of transformed homelands that have been or are being ruined by tribal or political conflicts. The future intermixing of individuals from these circles will eventually become more and more visible.
among Muslims in Western society. Therefore, mapping the path in the twenty-first century must take into consideration hybridization or “the culture of intermixture” as well as its role in, and impact on, the rest of society. If the culture of intermixture turns out to be influential in the eyes of Muslims and/in the West, we may be moving toward a future, perhaps by the last decades of the twenty-first century, that is distinctively different from what we have witnessed in the past few decades.

While cultures and ethnicities began to intermix among some early immigrants almost a century ago, religious traditions may appear as more unbending and in-admixable. It is true that there are still Sunnis in Europe and North America who vehemently resist burying Shi`is in their cemeteries and Sunnis who refuse to attend salat (worship services) in Shi`i mosques. On the other hand, it is also true that for the first time Muslim women have surfaced in leading roles and one may therefore expect their numbers to increase despite resistance from the forces of disenchantment and their sympathizers. For example, the idea of a female prayer leader (imam) was unthinkable twenty years ago and is still abominable in many circles, even in the West.

Moreover, the seeds of the Interfaith Movement and interreligious and intrareligious dialogues that were planted by the participants in the 1893 Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago were indeed harvested during, and in some places a decade before, the second gathering of the Parliament in 1993. Furthermore, while cases of interreligious marriages, where spouses maintain their previous religious traditions and try not to influence the decisions of their children, are still very few among Muslims, one can be certain that they will be more visible in a few decades. Even though in most homelands such practices face an incontestable prohibition and grave penalties, diasporic identities have a unique built-in feature to mitigate the prohibited, survive the consequences, and reinvent the desirable. Stated differently, new waves of transported Islam will transform Islamic identities in the West into a chosen rather than a given, despite the ideologies of the homelands. This may of course vary from one diaspora, place, and time to another. Furthermore, since the 1980s, the decrease in ethnic and religious participation among the youth in some diasporas, on one hand, and on the other, the emergence of diasporic literary genres that represent common themes rather than ethnoreligious ones, may suffice here as examples of the (urgent) need for (re-)mapping the path in the twenty-first century. The program Islam: Portability and Exportability continues to contribute to the cornerstone of the necessary discourse that will eventually lead to a better understanding of Muslims in Europe and North America.
20. Selected Bibliography


